Dagestan : is Ethnicity A Political Resource ?

Abstract: Successively, this essay will try to explore two points. First, I am going to argue that the role of ethnicity in Dagestan’s Politics is singular in the region but limited due to the informal political resources. Then, after acknowledging some determining features, the study will focus on the functioning of politics in Dagestan to a […]

Abstract: Successively, this essay will try to explore two points. First, I am going to argue that the role of ethnicity in Dagestan’s Politics is singular in the region but limited due to the informal political resources. Then, after acknowledging some determining features, the study will focus on the functioning of politics in Dagestan to a larger extent. To provide an overview on the topic, I have been helped in my research by an expert, a Dagestani student in last year of BA in Governmental and Local Administration at the Russian Public Administration Academy, who gave me field information about the subject. For the sake of this paper and to ensure anonymity, he is going to be furtherly called “Shamil”. His contribution is not taken as granted but in a qualitative approach, it offers valuable and direct-source complementary information to compare with existing literature on the topic – which is academically widely understudied with this approach.


Dagestan is by far the most complex of the federal subjects of Northern Caucasus. Located at the eastern part of the Caucasus range, Dagestan is bordered by Georgia and Azerbaijan on the south; the Republic of Chechenia, on the east; the region of Stavropol and Kamulkya on the north; and the Caspian Sea on the east. It is large as the Netherlands and populated with more than 3 million inhabitants – like actual states such as Armenia or Mongolia. Its specificities rely on the extremely heterogeneous population compared with other autonomous republics of Northern Caucasus, as more than 40 different ethnicities, including 14 natives, are registered. Despite this phenomenon, Dagestan has been prevented from inter-ethnic conflict since the dissolution of the USSR, which is almost unique among the Northern Caucasus republics, whose names became known abroad while wars were going on: the Ossetian-Ingush conflict (1992), the Russian-Chechen wars (1994-1996; 1999-2009), kidnapping of Mountain Jews of Kabardino-Balkaria (1998).

Unlike the others federated republics of Russia, Dagestan is not the land of a “titular nation”, like Chechnya for Chechens or Tatarstan for Tatars: indeed, thirteen languages are labeled official languages, including Russian and other minorities’ languages. More specifically, 35 different ethnolinguistic groups live in Dagestan, ranging in population from 1000 to more than 500.000 people. According to Eaton, “the largest ethnic groups represented are, in descending order, Avars (27.9%), Dargins (16%), Kumyks (12.5%), Lezgins (12.5%), Russians (7%), Laks (5%), Tabasarans (4.5%), Azeris (4.2%), Chechens (4.5%), Nogais (1.6%), Tats (or Mountain Jews; 8%), Rutals (8%), Aguls (7.5%), and Tsakhurs (3%)[1]”. As the larger ethnic group represents less than 30% of the population, an original political system has been implemented since 1994 with the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of Dagestan, which gives to the national minorities an active political role in the People’s Assembly of Dagestan. This Assembly holds the legislative power and shall appoint the Head of the Republic, holding the executive power and the main political competencies[2].


Dagestan politics is characterized by the importance of local governance ever since modern states have been developing in the region. After the Arabs invasions of the 8th century, the territory of modern-day Dagestan has been for long under the Persian influence with a degree of incorporation into the Persian empire often shifted, in relation with the state capturing capacities of both Persia and the local elites, which kept a direct control in the political management of the territory. Eventually, the local traditions got legalized in the 16th and 17th century, so the little mountainous communities, the “djamaats”, received large autonomy. The “djamaats” continue to play today an important role in the social organization[3]: the relation between decision-making process and social consensus used to be made up within this structure, which was also involved in the management of the local religious community. In the meanwhile, Russia and Persia were for long in competition for the control over the territory, and after numerous wars and loss of control over Dagestan, Russia finally ended up governing the territory with the 1828 Treaty of Turkmenchay.

By the edge of the Revolution of 1917, the Dagestani peoples got united with the Northern Caucasus peoples within the Union of the Allied Mountaineers and, by taking advantage from the ongoing uprising in Petrograd, declared the independence of the Mountain Republic from the Russian Empire. The experience of independent statehood by the North Caucasian peoples lasted from 1918 to 1921, until when the Bolsheviks took back the region. As Robert B. Ware explains, it was a turning point in the formation of modern-day Dagestan: “In January 1921, following the Bolshevik conquest of the region, it was established as the Autonomous Soviet Mountain Republic, including Chechen, Ingush, Osset, Kabard, Balkar, and Karachai districts. At the same time, the peoples of Dagestan were combined into the separate Dagestan Autonomous Republic. But whereas Dagestan endured as an aggregation of ethnic groups, the Mountain Republic was quickly dissolved into separate national units[4].” Indeed, as Dagestan was composed with more ethnicities, it was not possible for the Soviet administration to label one ethnic group as “titular nation”; instead, the Bolsheviks started ruling the region using military strengthen, as under the Tsar’s rule, so the population got disappointed. A massive uprising in 1921 led by Imam Gozinskii demanded another way of managing the territory, so the Bolsheviks imagined a system combining both the Soviet and local traditional structures.

To stop the insurrectional situation, it has been established a system in line with people’s aspirations and the communist way of governing. The Bolsheviks created “village councils”, which corresponded to the theoretical territorial management framework of communism, as well as the traditional structures of Dagestan’s people. Ware states that “indeed, the Bolshevik slogan of “Power to the Soviets,” in its initial presentation during the revolution and civil war, corresponded to the goals of the Dagestani highlanders, since it came close to approximating their traditional djamaat-based organization of political life”. The identity of inhabitants was characterized by localized clan and village consciousness, so it matches quite well with the newly set up political organization. The traditional influence of the Islamic law, the sharia, has been included in this system; and even Stalin stated in 1920 his support to the development of the practices: “The Soviet government recognizes sharia as a legitimate, customary law, practiced among other nations of Russia. If the Dagestani peoples wish to preserve their law and tradition, then they should be sustained [5]”. This system has been effective until 1927, when the Central Committee decreed the abolition of this system and the alignment of Dagestan’s politics with the standards of the other autonomous republics within the USSR.

In 1936, the new Constitution granted Dagestan with the status of an autonomous republic, along with Checheno-Ingushetia, Abkhasia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and North Ossetia. In the meanwhile, it institutionalized the management of the different ethnicities, allowing them cultural development and language promotion programmes. For Zaslavzky, it was mainly about developing “techniques to prevent the organization of alliances between neighboring ethnic groups, to undermine the capacity of any existing ethnic group to act as a unified entity, and to co-opt the crucial sectors within each ethnic population into the Soviet regime [6]”. Until the end of the Soviet Union, if the autonomous republic were the frame of the regional political organizations, the management of the ethnic groups by promoting their national identity arguably enabled the central power to shape singular ethnic identities in the North Caucasus which coped with the supranational and universal Soviet identity. It provided political stability by applying the Latin motto “divide et impera” (divide and rule) which weakened the common Caucasus identity which started to develop with the Mountain Republic. The ethnic conscious consequently started developing.

This political compromise starts crumbling along with the whole structure of the Soviet Union. Indeed, the economic stagnation and modernity which characterized late-USSR were harming the decade long status quo in North Caucasus. It has been especially exacerbated by the open conflict between Yeltsin and Gorbachev in 1991 which corresponds to the conflict between the federal center and the republics within the Parliament. Eventually, with the fall of the Societ Union, Moscow had huge issues with its territorial integrity, as Ware explains: “Russia was confronted by some of the same centrifugal forces that had fragmented the Soviet Union as some republics clamored for greater independence while others sank into border disputes that threatened their disintegration. At the same time, broad coalitions in the Urals, the Far East, the Western borders, and the Caucasus began to challenge Moscow’s authority[7]”. Secessionist movement raised in the North Caucasus, but Dagestan maintained relative stability compared with neighboring republics and especially since the development of ethnic conflicts and the breaking out of independence war in Chechenia in 1994. Despite an important Islamic threat in Dagestan, which must be analyzed in the larger frame of the jihadist rise in North Caucasus, the political stability remained in Dagestan due to the political system established with the 1994 Constitution which grated an ethnic political turnover fostering national harmony within the North Caucasus’ largest republic.


Dagestan seems to be an interesting case for peace-makers, constitutional lawmakers and scholars specialized in political transition issues. Indeed, even by regional standards, Dagestan is the poorest region, with the highest rate of crime and terrorism. It managed however to sustain a political model comparable to some extent with Switzerland or Lebanon, in which the rotation of the political elites at the representative level is ensured by the constitutional provisions. The traditional role of djamaats in the social structure furthers the autonomy of clans which evolves in kinship and property-based system, close to the endogamous model of the family structure proposed by Emmanuel Todd[8]. To that extent, effective political representation in Dagestan includes this aspect in its functioning. The State Council is the Parliament of this Republic, an as the prerogative to appoint the Head of Dagestan, which holds the executive power.

There cannot be more than one representative of each of fourteen major ethnic groups on the Republic’s chief executive body (the State Council); and a representative of the same ethnic group cannot be elected chairman of the State Council for two consecutive terms [9]”. These are the terms of the articles 89 and 93 of the Constitution of Dagestan, which gave the republic its collegial nature. The effectiveness and equality provided by this disposition are enforced with the 72nd article, which states that the “representation of all peoples of Dagestan shall be guaranteed”. This constitutional precept implies a dynamic definition, which leads to the creation of national electoral districts, in which only member of a given nationality can run for office. There are 66 such districts, out of 121, mainly in the mainly monoethnic region of the republic. It gives the representation of the peoples and is deeply rooted in the political tradition of the region, as it is inspired by the djamaat-system. “2 are Avar districts, 12 Kumyk, 10 Russian, seven Dargin, five Tabasaran, five Azeri, four Lezgin, four Chechen, three Lak, two Tat, one Nogai and one Tsakhur[10]”, states Eaton. Notably, it gives an over-representation of the Tats (the Mountains Jews) which argues towards the peacefulness of the Dagestan society regarding the ethnic issues. In 2000, the Constitution has been amended so it guarantees even the smaller groups a representation at the Council[11]. However, this system may be criticized regarding democratic standards. Indeed, such constituencies can be considered as gerrymandered, which means designed for electoral purposes. Some consider it as “a violation of civic equality and the individual’s right to stand for election in a district of choice”. On one hand, this system lack of democratic representation if we consider the western-like model of liberal democracy. Indeed, it promotes the traditional relations over the equality of citizens to vote for whoever they want and to be themselves candidates. It would be ethnocentric to stop to this level of analysis, as arguably the democracy is a system in which people feel represented, so as this system appears to work, that means it is effective for this society. Comparative Politics as a field of research is also about studying how a political system is an institutional translation of the organization the society. Nonetheless, it supports communities over the formation of a citizen identity, which is hard to develop in an authoritarian context.

Beyond the State Council, this political ethnic-management system has been implemented at other levels. First, at the level of local governance, the electoral districts also ensure the proportional representation. In the villages or remote raions (subnational entity), the society is often monoethnic, so some seats are assigned especially for the “titular nationality”. In the case of mixed towns, the seats are assigned to the more numerous nationalities, according to Ware. Some minorities can feel injustice about this mechanism, but at least it prevents from an Avar/Dargin monopoly over the local politics. In the words of Shamil “Dagestan Politics have been dominated by Avars and Dargins for centuries. Now, governance is much-balanced thanks to this system.” This dynamism is also sizeable at the scale of the Duma constituencies. Indeed, in 2003, a new constituency has been created in the region of Derbent to give more representation of the Lezgin minority, which is the larger ethnic group in the southern part of Dagestan. This decision seems well-grounded as some valuable consequences in term of political and social stability are sizeable. First, according to Wave, “(a) while Lezgins hold few important posts, the most powerful offices in the Republic (the chair of the State Council and the mayor of Makhachkala) are currently held by Dargins; (b) many Lezgins are consequently alienated from the Republic’s leadership; (c) there are problems of criminality and extremism, and a potential for even greater problems, in Lezgin territories; (d) as late as 1996 the Lezgins had a noisy separatist movement, known as Sadval, which organized around issues that remain salient; and (e) Dagestani political culture traditionally avoids the gross under-representation of any ethnic group[12]. Moreover, because of this drawing, it gave the Buinaksy district a more homogenous nature which leads often to an inter-Avar competition, in which the ethnic feature is not the primary base of the election. In the district of Makhachkala, the ethnic factor is not predominant, as what is required is to get the benediction from the mayor, either Dargin or Avar since the fall of USSR. Nonetheless, financial powers are involved in the process; we will be coming back on this issue. So, does this model can participate in the de-ethnicization of politics at long-term in one of the most multicultural regions on Earth? It is unclear to make prospects about the political development of Dagestan, but as far as the economic deal which links Moscow and the regional elites is effective, ethnicity remains not such a big deal in Dagestan politics. Furthermore, as the ethnic groups are mixed, multicultural and present in the whole territory, there is no secessionist demands but arguably co-management of the Republic by the peoples.


As the tradition of multi-ethnic representation is deeply grounded in the political DNA of Dagestan, Shamil, who comes from the Lak minority, was a bit surprised by my questions focusing on the ethnic factor in Dagestan politics, as it is not the prism of analysis he adopts when dealing with Dagestan politics. Indeed, at the level of representation politics, this proto-consociational system provides if not the equality in the representation, at least the equity of the different people. However, in the practices, personal relations and kinship is a factor which seems more relevant in terms of political resources. “In Dagestan, it is nothing compared with the rest of Russia. If you have the relatives in charge, everything is possible for you if you want to work in a state administration. Even if you are a stupid person from a minority, if you know the good person, you can get the job”. Kinship in Dagestan is based on the clan system, comparable with the structure of djamaats. As the society is multicultural and widely mixed, ethnicity does not enter necessarily as a determinant resource, according to Shamil “if you want to get a position in the municipal or governmental administration, if the head is for example Avar, and there are two applicants, including one Avar, he might has more chances to get the job, but it is not even a fact”. Beyond the issue of minorities, this statement argues that there is a low level of animosity towards the supposed ethnic domination of both Avar and Dargin, as it is arguably rooted in the social contract of the region.

To explain the traditional structure of the division of power in Dagestan, one shall glance at the form of political Islam in the region. Indeed, most of the peoples are Sufi Muslims, which united around the religion instead of basic ethnic division which damages the Post-Soviet states. Indeed, at the governance level of the djamaats, the Iman is appointed by the Tariqa brotherhood, closely linked with the djamaats-based structure. It avoids the ethnic question as   even if the spiritual life is not manifestly at stake in Dagestan politics, that implies that  “Dagestan society  [can be analyzed] as a whole through the prism of interactions between tariqa brotherhood  […] Islamic politics in Dagestan largely reveal a typical picture of “the stability of instability”, which seems to be an optimal form of interethnic peace in the North Caucasus.[… ]Sufi brotherhoods are firmly integrated into the clientelist tradition of Dagestan society[13]”. The questions which raise to me are the following: are Sufi brotherhoods by their nature promoting clientelism in Dagestan politics, or do Brotherhood copes with the traditional social practices? I would rather argue in favor of the second assumption, as Islam is not the main variable in the clientelism, especially with the scope of the Post-Soviet society.

Clientelism is Dagestan politics is not singular but has some specific features. Indeed, the frame of North Caucasus looks quite similar from a western point of view, involving tribes, villages, and kinship relations. However, what is singular is the collegiality of corrupted politics which results from the cultural and social background. Geographic considerations are also at stake to the extent that the local administrative division has been drawn to satisfy the traditional way of dealing with politics. This corruption-oriented multicultural system is constitutionally established and is part of the deal with the federal government. Indeed, the 1994 Constitution has been designed in line with Moscow’s view on its relationship with Dagestan, respecting the local habits to promote peace in the region and avoid the secessionist threat. In Chechnya, the Kadyrov clan has been set up in charge with Putin’s support after the 2nd Chechen war to provide long-term stability relying on the traditional domination of the Kadyrov clan and its possibilities to make alliances with other groups. In Tatarstan, the secessionist threat has been avoided by autonomous dispositions, as the article 4.2 of the Constitution illustrates: “In case of contradiction between a federal law and a normative legal act of the Republic of Tatarstan issued on subjects belonging to the jurisdiction of the Republic of Tatarstan, the normative legal act of the Republic of Tatarstan shall prevail”. The Russian federal government has been particularly pragmatic in the instauration of new relations with its constitutive republics – to avoid the disaster of Chechnya. The political history is not ignored by Moscow, which provides the republic with the required political tools to satisfy the local elites with being integrated in Russia. In the case of Dagestan, arguably, the inter-ethnic political contract is stable, as the poorest republic of Northern Caucasus received the highest level of federal grant to foster and sustain the economy. Even if Dagestan is under Russian perfusion, the local elites have been managing a way of coping with the traditions and economic needs of the peoples. On the other hand, the modernization of the society leads to a form of cosmopolitism, as lots of Dagestanis become urban citizens, in the multicultural cities of Derbent, Makhachkala or Moscow. “When walking in the center of Makhachkala, people do not think about the others about ethnic groups, it is like one nation. If you speak with a guy, know his name, you can understand by his accent or something where he is from and may be what is his ethnic group, but nobody pays attention to this. Everybody communicate in Russian”, told me Shamil, emphasizing that ethnicity is a minor factor in Dagestan everyday life. Politics is much more the reflection of the social organization of the society, than a co-ethnic management of the republic. During the 1990s, the notion of “ethnoparties”, meaning the coalition of political djamaat-based parties has been rising and some scholars[14] consider it was the way democratic Dagestan would develop in the context of the 1994 Constitution. Nonetheless, the political resources-capturing by the elites prevent such a consociational model to emerge durably.

However, the oligarchization of the political and economic elites is an established social fact which may harm the status-quo by increasing the inequalities between the peoples, as it could be perceived as an ethnic issue. “Avars and Dargins have been dominating politics and economics for years, but Lezgins also have good positions. It is more about connections and numeric superiority than an ethnic issue”, states Shamil when asked about the relations of political domination between the people. According to Ware and Kisriev, quoted by Ealton[15], 200 families constituted the elite in 1998, but only between 6 and 12 nowadays. Cronyism and corruption are the main concepts at stake. The election of the chairman of the State Council in 2002 consecrated Magomedov, a Dargin politician who has been overwhelmingly elected as he managed to gather around him the potential candidates by giving them lucrative positions. This trend is also illustrated by the Senator Suleiman Kerimov, a Lezgin from Derbent region, whose assets worth more than 7 Billion dollars. It could lead to ethnic frustration but as Kisriev states, the “long-term impact that elite concentration will have on Dagestani politics is difficult to assess[16]”. It is nonetheless widely known that Moscow pro-active role in this process is increasing, as the region is politically managed in coordination with the federal interests.


The federal government used to try to be discreet regarding its interferences in Dagestan Politics, not to awake long-lasting frustration from a part of the society. However, when invoking the fight against terrorism and corruption, Moscow’s longhand promotes legitimate interventions to influence politics in the region. In 2017, it promoted the nomination of Vladimir Vassiliev as the head of the Republic, appointed by the State Council and holding the executive powers. It can be analyzed as a turning point in Dagestan Politics, as he is the first ethnic Russian ever to hold this position – which was previously held either by an Avar, Dargin or more rarely by a Kumyk. This professional politician from the Moscow region arguably has been supported to secure the federal interests and prevent the empowerment of the political elites. Following this nomination, dozens of administrative civil servants have been fired, as well as the mayor of Makhachkala Musa Musayev, to fight against the corruption, according to official statements. According to the Caucasian Knot, Vassilev “reported that more than 200 officials in the republic had been brought to responsibility for violating anti-corruption laws[17]”. Charges were related to drug trafficking, corruption and taking of benefits from the “unregulated constructions in Makhachkala”. The later issue is at the center of the debates, as Shamil states: “you cannot even imagine, in Makhachkala, lots of speculation is done, constructions are everywhere, even on the beach, despite law regulation. The city is full of new building stinking corruption! There is even no road or basic facilities, just clientelism in the construction and sales!”. It appears that the coming back of Moscow in Dagestan’s affairs responded from a regulation demand from the peoples, even if there have no illusion about the role of Moscow in politics in general. Some experts consider that it is “an attempt, on an example of a particular region, to change the clan system existing in the republics of Northern Caucasus[18].”

This restructuration at the top-administrative level respected the constitutional provisions, as Vassiliev was introduced craftly to respect the law and the local elite interests. Even if it harmed the positions of some of the top Dagestan officials, others have been awarded due to their loyalty to Moscow. Nonetheless, the frequency of the meeting between Putin and Vassiliev, “can prove that the federal center has a serious concern over Dagestan[19]“, according to Akhmet Yarlykapov. Indeed, Moscow does not ignore that multiethnicity can lead to an explosive situation if the power is not secure. In Yugoslavia, the war broke up after years of cohabitation, when the strong central power of Tito collapsed. Frustrations, resentment, and privileges can be one of the reasons; and it is possible to consider that the Pax Russia established by Putin in Northern Caucasus, between Ingushetia and Ossetia for example, would crumble if a strong power appears to be missing. On the other hand, if the local elites consider that their interests are not protected anymore by the political status-quo, ethnicity could become a political resource exploited both by the local and central authorities. The balance between local clans, local elites, and federal influence seems to be delicate and evolves in relation to the social and economic contexts. The different factions must be satisfied with the situation to sustain. “Before Vassiliev took office, the ordinary people were really angry about the corruption in the elite system. Even if he has been appointed from Moscow, he did good things as he is firing mayors, officials, etc. Lots of people have been sued for the corruption which makes the society poorer” reports Shamil, arguing that a certain idea of the social justice was also promoted by Moscow, “as the whole system is based on the family connections, Moscow wants it to change”.


The political system established in Dagestan in 1994 gave to the ethnicities a unique place in its management, as the ethnic factor is important for the elections of the deputies of Dagestan State Council, to the State Duma and Senate of Russia. The representation is ensured by original constitutional provisions, which so far provided the Republic with peace and co-management of the political affairs. Nonetheless, one should not pay too much attention to this factor, as in the practice the traditional structures play a more important role. The local djamaats-based governance includes the ethnic resource, but cannot outline how the political system as a whole work. In fact, beyond ethnicity, the major political resource in Dagestan remains the family-based connections. The economic resource is also signification, especially when taking into consideration the role of corruption in the political system’ functioning. Being in a powerful clan, would it be tribe-based or economic-based, enable citizens running for office, taking it and ruling over a part of the administration. The local administration works closely with the business sphere thus it appears there is an interdependent blurred relation between them.

Moreover, local politics relies on the political and economic support of Moscow. Being part of the elite in a republic within the Russian Federation gives the local elites a relative autonomy, but as the nomination of Vassiliev shows, this autonomy is granted with respect to the extent Moscow considers its interests secure. The management of the region is a sensitive issue for Russia, which has economic, political, social and security concern towards Dagestan. For Moscow, it is a dangerous game as the political sphere must be secured, as well as the aspirations of the peoples to keep living peacefully in the region. Therefore, the multi-ethnic republic might face change if the balanced system changes and if the political resources available do not satisfy the people’ cohabitation. For now, there is a social consensus over the belonging in Russia; but the oligarchization and corruption, along with economic stagnation, can harm it. The secessionist threat is low as the different ethnic groups seem to benefit from this system and Russia provide the republic with the financial resources it requires. As it is common to see in Moscow or St. Petersburg Dagestani people whose coats are labeled with the inscription “Russia”, one can consider that the national pride can be united for decades dozens of peoples under the same flag. “We did not enter Russia voluntarily, but neither we would leave it voluntarily[20]”: thus spoke the Dagestani poet Razul Gamzatov about the complex relations his fellow Dagestani people paradoxically live and feel about the political situation, between autonomy, multiculturalism, and integration.


[1] SACKMAN EATON Jana The Russian Federation Islamic Republic of Dagestan: Curricular Decentralization, Social Cohesion, and Stability, Peabody Journal of Education, Vol. 80, No. 1, Newly Emerging Global Issues (2005), p.55

[2] Constitution of Dagestan, 1994, available at https://www.prlib.ru/en/node/420926

[3] KISRIEV, WARE, Dagestan: Russian hegemony and Islamic resistance in the North Caucasus, Armonk New York, 2010, p.31

[4] KISRIEV, WARE, Dagestan: Russian hegemony and Islamic resistance in the North Caucasus, Armonk New York, 2010, p.24

[5] KISRIEV, WARE, Dagestan: Russian hegemony and Islamic resistance in the North Caucasus, Armonk New York, 2010, p.29

[6] KISRIEV, WARE, Dagestan: Russian hegemony and Islamic resistance in the North Caucasus, Armonk New York, 2010, p. 29

[7] KISRIEV, WARE, Dagestan: Russian hegemony and Islamic resistance in the North Caucasus, Armonk New York, 2010, p. 31

[8] TODD Emmanuel, L’Origine des systèmes familiaux : Tome 1 L’Eurasie, Gallimard, NRF Essais, 2011

[9] Constitution of Dagestan, 1994, available at https://www.prlib.ru/en/node/420926

[10] SACKMAN EATON Jana The Russian Federation Islamic Republic of Dagestan: Curricular Decentralization, Social Cohesion, and Stability, Peabody Journal of Education, Vol. 80, No. 1, Newly Emerging Global Issues (2005), p.55

[11] KISRIEV, WARE, Dagestan: Russian hegemony and Islamic resistance in the North Caucasus, Armonk New York, 2010, p. 35

[12] WARE Robert Bruce, Recent Russian Federal Elections in Dagestan: Implications for Proposed Electoral Reform, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 57, 2005, p. 584

[13] IBRAGIMOV Magomed-Rasul, Islamic Politics at the Sub-Regional Level in Dagestan: Tariqa Brotherhoods, Ethnicities, Localism and the Spiritual Board, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 57, 2005, p. 756

[14] KISRIEV, WARE, Dagestan: Russian hegemony and Islamic resistance in the North Caucasus, Armonk New York, 2010, p. 47

[15] SACKMAN EATON Jana The Russian Federation Islamic Republic of Dagestan: Curricular Decentralization, Social Cohesion, and Stability, Peabody Journal of Education, Vol. 80, No. 1, Newly Emerging Global Issues (2005), p.64

[16] SACKMAN EATON Jana The Russian Federation Islamic Republic of Dagestan: Curricular Decentralization, Social Cohesion, and Stability, Peabody Journal of Education, Vol. 80, No. 1, Newly Emerging Global Issues (2005), p.64

[17] TUAYEV Magomed, Political analysts intrigued by Vladimir Vasiliev’s frequent meetings with President Putin, Caucasian Knot, July 2018, available at https://www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/43810/

[18]  TUAYEV Magomed, Political analysts intrigued by Vladimir Vasiliev’s frequent meetings with President Putin, Caucasian Knot, July 2018, available at https://www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/43810/

[19] TUAYEV Magomed, Political analysts intrigued by Vladimir Vasiliev’s frequent meetings with President Putin, Caucasian Knot, July 2018, available at https://www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/43810/

[20] SINELCHTCHIKOVA Eketerina, « Peuples du Daghestan : lorsque diversité rime avec unité », RBTH, 2017, available in French at https://fr.rbth.com/lifestyle/79237-peuples-daghestan

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