The Arab spring that spread throughout the last years in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria didn’t seem to effectively reach the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. In fact, the Palestinian territories remained shielded for the most part from the Arab Revolutions.

The Arab spring that spread throughout the last years in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria didn’t seem to effectively reach the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. In fact, the Palestinian territories remained shielded for the most part from the Arab Revolutions.

The Arab Spring model didn’t permit Palestinians to overcome their political divisions between the two corrupt leaderships – Fatah and Hamas. The divisions between the two main Palestinian movement started 8 years ago in June 2007, when Hamas won the elections and took control of the Gaza Strip by arms force. Since then Palestinians Territories are divided into two territorial entities ,one controlled by Hamas and funded by Qatar, the other one controlled by Fatah and funded by the European Union and US. An Arab Spring in Palestine could have helped to bring down the existing regime and with it the high degree of corruption.

Indeed, despite the changing political landscapes in the Arab World and the subsequent Revolution in neighboring countries such as Egypt, the Palestinians stayed mostly out of this popular movement. The small outburst of popular protests that broke out in subsequent years such as the April 29 protest in 2015, have been futile a well. These outbursts are happening once again today in Palestinian Territories , but this time, instead of being directed toward Fatah or Hamas , they are directed directly toward Israeli Troops, occupying the West Bank.

These clashed have been conveyed mostly by social media sites. Facebook, for instance has been at the heart of these clashes, permitting the Palestinian people to express their anger and despair. Social media has served as a platform for the young citizens to criticize and express their discontent toward the major parties that are Fatah and Hamas, which are no longer sacred in the eyes of the 1990s generation, considered the main force behind the recent uprising. Today ,this new generation is rising against the Israeli forces on its own, without orders from any political party or any leader. This new age revolution by which political leaders are not the main drivers of protest are very much akin to the Arab Spring revolutions of Tunisia and Egypt. However it would be wrong to say that the current uprising is being led through social media.

Social networking sites such as Facebook or Twitter are actually the main means of mobilizing and inspiring action amongst the youth , as most events are prepared and called upon through social media outlets on the internet rather than through traditional political parties. The absence of any leadership in charge, whether it is on the field or through social media clearly shows that the political parties don’t have any actual control on the new events and clearly don’t have any ability to stimulate them. There are, in fact, clear similarities between the Palestinian uprisings and the Arab Spring in terms of utilizing social media to collect support, and the absence of a leader.

However there is a major difference that needs to be pointed out. The Arab Spring Revolutions were against the different Arab regimes and their internal despotic structures , while the Palestinian uprising is against an occupation force. The fact that the Palestinians are rebelling against a well-structured foreign military force, makes the task more difficult , because the soldiers composing the Israeli Army , unlike the Egyptian or Tunisian Army, have no connection whatsoever to the Palestinian population and cannot be influenced as the Egyptian soldiers were.

This makes it more difficult for the Palestinians, especially given the harsh punishment measures set by the Israel forces such as preventive arrests, or house demolition. Social media and free communication on the internet at large has raised a new sense of awareness among young people, pushing them to adopt a new rhetoric of patriotism , not connected to any faction or partisan affiliations. In an Oct. 19 post on his now-deleted Facebook account, Ahmed al-Herbawi, 19, who died on the eastern border of the Gaza Strip after taking a bullet in the chest, wrote, “I do not stand with the Ramallah authority, nor with Hamas, the party of hypocrisy, injustice and lies.” The fact that no Palestinian Political Parties have officially claimed the leadership of the current uprising is a clear proof that young Palestinians are its lifeblood. This young generation is actually generating quietly but surely a local Arab Spring , making it work in Palestine , whether in the field or online. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly strongly condemned the social networks such as Facebook , for instigating and igniting escalation in Jerusalem and the West Bank.

He even declared recently in one of his speeches “ The main battle should be focused against the instigating social media networks”. The success of this silent revolution might reside in the ambiguous aspect and the secret identity of the people behind it,which makes it very popular among the young Palestinians , and causes much worry for the Palestinian Authority Security Services that seems to have no control on the situation. Young Palestinians are the clear leaders of this spontaneous outburst of protests, and are for the first time in Palestinian history, working under the banner of one national flag rather than the banner of one party. 

Young Palestinians have gone beyond the different factions ,acting on their own without any directives , as the Palestinian factions have proved in the past years unable to bring any positive changes for the population. Bahaa Alian, 22, who died attacking Israelis on a Jerusalem bus on Oct. 13, was a living example of the will of the young people to distance themselves from the banners of the political parties. “I ask the different factions not to embrace and adopt my martyrdom, as I died for the sake of my homeland, not yours,” he said 10 months before he carried out his attack. A statistical study published Nov. 9 by the Jerusalem Center for Israeli and Palestinian Affairs Studies showed that among the overall attacks carried out by Palestinians since the beginning of October, lone operations amount to 60%, 22% had organizational connections and 18% were affiliated with groups — which does not mean that the organizations or groups claimed the attacks, clarified the study. A Jerusalem teenager declared to a local Newspaper that “despair is the main thing pushing young Palestinians to rise up.

“We are the generation of disappointments and losses. We have lived through the recent wars, blockade, infighting, the failed Palestinian reconciliation and peace process, and the false promises to open crossings and improve the situation,” The tensions in the West Bank and Jerusalem are reaching a peak , but Palestinians seem reluctant to call this Revolution the “Palestinian Arab Spring” because the Arab Spring revolutions brought nothing but disasters to the Arab World (Libya and Syria are now in the midst of a Civil War , while Tunisia and Egypt are now struggling with Salafis/Jihadi groups). That is one of the reasons most of the young Palestinians prefer to give it another name , a more positive name.

Summary

Crimea is in the midst of an energy crisis after electricity links from mainland Ukraine to the peninsula were cut over the weekend of Nov. 20-22. It is unclear who attacked the electricity service, although it appears that Ukrainian security forces would not have prevented Crimean Tatar activists who had been protesting (and continue to protest) near the transmission towers from sabotaging the infrastructure. The crisis could be a message from Ukraine that it has leverage against Russia, though sending a message this way risks escalation.

Analysis

Electrical power running from Ukraine’s Kherson region to Crimea initially was disrupted on Nov. 20, when two transmission towers were damaged and subsequently went out of service. In the early morning of Nov. 22, an explosion took the two remaining transmission towers offline, effectively cutting off all electricity supplies from Ukraine to Crimea. Afterward, authorities in Crimea imposed a state of emergency and turned to backup gas-powered generators to provide electricity temporarily to the peninsula’s major cities, such as Sevastopol, Simferopol and Yalta. However, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Kozak said Nov. 23 that at least 1.5 million Crimean residents were still without power and that the generators were able to fill only around 30 percent of electricity needs for those with access to them.

No one has officially claimed the attacks on the electricity lines, although the disruption coincided with a demonstration by Crimean Tatar activists and Ukrainian nationalists who blockaded the transmission towers in Kherson over the weekend. The demonstrators were protesting Russia’s treatment of Crimean Tatars on the peninsula and called for a blockade of all Ukrainian trade with Crimea until Moscow releases political prisoners and allows international organizations to monitor human rights on the peninsula. Ukrainian security forces initially had minor clashes with the activists following the first disruption, but this did not prevent the explosion that cut off electricity supplies altogether.

Russia has called for the immediate repair and restoration of electricity supplies to Crimea, which depends on Ukraine for 70 percent of its electricity supplies, but on Nov. 23 the Ukrainian authorities claimed that the situation was not stable enough to restore energy flows. Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak said Nov. 24 that Moscow would consider retaliation for the disruption in electricity supplies to Crimea, including halting natural gas and coal exports to Ukraine. Also on Nov. 24, Ukrainian energy company Ukrenergo started repairs on one of the four transmission lines. But the company said the line would not be fixed until Nov. 26 at the earliest and did not specify if or when work on the remaining cables would start. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian government temporarily banned the movement of cargo between Ukraine and Crimea, increasing economic pressure on the peninsula.

These developments come amid increasingly confrontational talks between Ukraine and Russia on bilateral trade. Moscow has threatened to restrict all Ukrainian agricultural exports to Russia on Jan. 1, when the implementation of a free trade agreement between Ukraine and the European Union comes into effect. The restrictions could cost Ukraine roughly $600 million, and the European Union has said it will not provide financial assistance to Kiev if it loses the Russian market. Moreover, the conflict in eastern Ukraine has grown more intense in recent weeks after two months of relative calm, possibly because of a breakdown in political negotiations between Kiev and the West on one side and Moscow and the separatists on the other.

Ukraine could thus be using the electricity cutoff to Crimea to send a message to Russia that Kiev will enact its own restrictions. Crimea’s dependence on Ukrainian electricity makes it particularly vulnerable. Russia has worked to expand energy and electricity links to Crimea, but it likely will take years for the peninsula to gain independence from Ukraine, although Novak has said plans to construct cables under the Kerch Straits into the peninsula would be fast-tracked. Kiev could also be interested in renegotiating the electricity supply contract with Crimea for a higher price and steeper transit fees and could be trying to gain as many financial concessions as it can while the peninsula remains without substantial alternatives to Ukrainian electricity.

At this point, it is difficult to tell where the standoff will go. There have been other temporary cutoffs of goods and electricity flows from Ukraine into Crimea since Russia annexed the peninsula last year, but not to the extent of a full electricity cutoff. Therefore, it will be important to see to what extent and how quickly Ukraine restores electricity supplies to Crimea. Ukraine’s actions will shape Russia’s reaction to the cutoff. It will also be important to watch the reaction from the West, which has so far remained quiet on the dispute, and from Turkey, which has cultural links to Crimean Tatars and whose ties with Russia could deteriorate following the shooting down of a Russian fighter jet near the Syrian border. Kiev and Moscow could reach an agreement in the next few days, but if Ukraine stalls in restoring electricity supplies, this could turn into a more serious standoff in which retaliation by Moscow or even a Russian intervention into the Kherson region cannot be ruled out.

By Philip Bobbitt

In June 2001, the Hart-Rudman Commission released its report on the U.S. National Security Strategy. It didn’t mention al Qaeda or global, networked terrorism. It didn’t note the threat of hybrid warfare in which insurgency, terrorism, covert operations and conventional conflict merge to paralyze the international institutions of the 20th-century nation-state. It didn’t mention the growing financial fragility of the global system of trade and finance. It didn’t anticipate the legal issues that would arise from targeted killing, the collection of metadata by intelligence agencies, or confusion over the appropriate war powers for the executive. But it did try to come up with a plan to maximize the United States’ influence and political suasion abroad.

Many people confuse a plan with a strategy. This is often reflected in the usual criticisms of any particular U.S. administration when events confound the plans it has inherited or promised on the campaign trail. It is true that the current administration’s plans for the Middle East are in some disarray; the president has forthrightly, and I think courageously and wisely, conceded this. But even if we were to devise an effective plan to deal simultaneously with growing Iranian power and a burgeoning threat from the Islamic State, this would not amount to a strategy.

That’s because a strategy is a dynamic, multiparty activity in which at least some of the participants are dedicated to disturbing the plans of the others. We defend our interests, but we can’t defend them everywhere. We plan against the likeliest threats, all of which were dutifully recorded by the Hart-Rudman Commission. So our adversaries attack where our defenses are weakest, and that is where an attack is least expected. Thus the nature of conflict, as Sir Michael Quinlan once observed, is surprise.

This strategy must have a clear answer for the questions: When are we at war? What is our war aim? What role do we wish for law — constitutional and international, humanitarian and human rights — to play? And what role do we wish for strategy itself in shaping our law, and being shaped by it?

It is no less astounding that, following the atrocities in Paris this week, French President Francois Hollande should discover the attacks to be “an act of war,” than it is that the French responded with a barrage of air attacks on the decimated city of Raqqa. But who can blame them? For more than 10 years they’ve been told that it was the Americans who made war through a simpleminded misunderstanding of terror. And the Americans themselves have been told that wars must have an end, and that our actions alone will dictate that timing. To slightly alter the famous French phrase, “C’est magnifique, mais ce n’est pas la strategie” — “It is magnificent, but it is not strategy.”

This is a time for us to return to the bedrock principles of American strategy. First and foremost is our cultivation of and reliance upon alliances. Occasionally irksome and often confused, our relations with our allies are our greatest international asset. To realize our relative strength, one need only ask: Who wishes to be an ally of Russia, China or Iran? Second is our skill at constitutional and technological innovation. The Islamic State is self-consciously creating a constitutional order for the 21st century: Like Iran, it is an insurgent market state that wishes to destroy the international order just as surely as Germany wished to destroy the international system in 1914 or Napoleon wished to destroy the international system in 1790. Neither of these 21st-century insurgent market states will be defeated by relying on the tactics and plans that have made the order of nation-states pre-eminent. This much should have been evident in Iraq. Third is our remarkable social cohesion despite our equally remarkable diversity. If it is true that tens of thousands of youth wish to join the Islamic State, there are millions who want to become a part of the parliamentary states of consent of which the United States is the steward. Pretending that we can force these tides, friendly or hostile, from our shores with declarations of uninterest is so unrealistic that it could only have been propounded by an academic movement calling itself Realism.

It is quite notable that the front-runner in the campaign for the American presidency is the only candidate in the debate for the Democratic nomination who forthrightly asserted that terror armed with weapons of mass destruction currently pose the greatest threat to the United States. We have been given visionary and decisive leadership in past crises. Perhaps we will be again.

Now don’t get me wrong. The Realists have a point: terrorism doesn’t pose the sort of broad-based threat to our interests that the competition with China, the alienation of Europe and the vulnerability of our critical infrastructure to cyber attacks do. It’s rather that the strategic solution to the wars on terror necessarily implicates law — either reforming and vindicating it or discrediting and delegitimating it — in a way that will make the more conventional threats either manageable or impossible. If we neglect to address the threat of terror successfully, because it seems so peripheral to the state system as we have known it in the 20th century, it will make the more familiar dimensions of strategy virtually intractable.

Summary

But still the English came to North America and still government and business leaders supported them. This was not without reason. In the 17th century, Europe was in upheaval and England’s place in it unsure. Moreover, England was going through a period of internal instability that would culminate in the unthinkable — civil war in 1642 and regicide in 1649. England’s colonies were born from this situation, and the colonies of Plymouth, Massachusetts Bay and the little-known colony of Providence Island in the Caribbean were part of a broader Puritan geopolitical strategy to solve England’s problems.

Analysis

Throughout the first half of the 17th century, England was wracked by internal divisions that would lead to civil war in 1642. Religion was a huge part of this. The dispute was over the direction of the Church of England. Some factions favored “high” church practices that involved elaborate ritual. The Puritans, by contrast, wanted to clear the national religion of what they considered Catholic traces. This religious crisis compounded a political crisis at the highest levels of government, pitting Parliament against the monarchy.

By the beginning of the 17th century, England had undergone centralizing reforms that gave the king and his Parliament unrestricted power to make laws. Balance was needed. The king had the power to call Parliament into session and dismiss it. Parliament had the power to grant him vital funds needed for war or to pay down debt. However, Parliament had powerful Puritan factions that sought not only to advance their sectarian cause but also to advance the power of Parliament beyond its constraints. Kings James I and his son Charles I, for their part, sought to gain an unrestrained hold on power that would enable them to make decisive strategic choices abroad. They relied, internally and externally, on Catholics, crypto-Catholics and high church advocates — exacerbating the displeasure of Parliament.

Both kings continually fought with Parliament over funding for the monarchy’s debt and for new ventures. Both dissolved Parliament several times; Charles ultimately did so for a full 11 years beginning in 1629.

Spain was England’s major strategic problem on the Continent. Protestant England saw itself as under constant threat from the Catholic powers in Europe. This led to problems when the people came to see their leaders, James I and his son Charles, as insufficiently hostile to Spain and insufficiently committed to the Protestant cause on the Continent. In order to stop mounting debt, shortly after taking power James made the unpopular move of ending a war with Spain that England had been waging alongside the Netherlands since 1585. In 1618, the Thirty Years’ War broke out in the German states — a war that, in part, pitted Protestants against Catholics and spread throughout Central Europe. James did not wish to become involved in the war. In 1620, the Catholic Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand II, a relative of Spain’s King Philip III, pushed Frederick V, the Protestant son-in-law of England’s King James, out of his lands in Bohemia, and Spain attacked Frederick in his other lands in the Rhineland. The English monarchy called for a defense of Frederick but was unwilling to commit to significant military action to aid him.

Puritan factions in Parliament, however, wanted England to strike at Spain directly by attacking Spanish shipments from the Americas, which could have paid for itself in captured goods. To make matters worse, from 1614 to 1623, James I pursued an unpopular plan to marry his son Charles to the Catholic daughter of Philip III of Spain — a plan called the “Spanish Match.” Instead, Charles I ended up marrying the Catholic daughter of the king of France in 1625. This contributed to the impression that James and Charles were too friendly with Spain and Catholicism, or even were secret Catholics. Many Puritans and other zealous promoters of the Protestant cause began to feel that they had to look outside of the English government to further their cause.

Amid this complex constellation of Continental powers and England’s own internal incoherence, a group of Puritan leaders in Parliament, who would later play a pivotal role in the English Civil War, focused on the geopolitical factors that were troubling England. Issues of finance and Spanish power were at the core. A group of them struck on the idea of establishing a set of Puritan colonial ventures in the Americas that would simultaneously serve to unseat Spain from her colonial empire and enrich England, tipping the geopolitical balance. In this they were continuing Elizabeth I’s strategy of 1585, when she started a privateer war in the Atlantic and Caribbean to capture Spanish treasure ships bound from the Americas. Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay were part of this early vision, but they were both far too remote to challenge the Spanish, and the group believed that the area’s climate precluded it from being a source of vast wealth from cash crops. New England, however, was safe from Spanish aggression and could serve as a suitable starting point for a colonial push into the heart of Spanish territory.

The Effects of Spanish Colonization

Spain’s 1492 voyage to the Americas and subsequent colonization had changed Europe indelibly by the 17th century. It had complicated each nation’s efforts to achieve a favorable balance of power. As the vanguard of settlement in the New World, Spain and Portugal were the clear winners. From their mines, especially the Spanish silver mine in Potosi, American precious metals began to flow into their government coffers in significant amounts beginning in 1520, with a major uptick after 1550. Traditionally a resource-poor and fragmented nation, Spain now had a reliable revenue source to pursue its global ambitions.

Despite having no successful colonies until the beginning of the 17th century, England did see some major benefits from the discovery of the Americas. The addition of the Western Atlantic to Europe’s map and the influx of trade goods from that direction fundamentally altered trade routes in Europe, shifting them from their previous intense focus on the Baltic Sea and the Mediterranean to encompass an ocean on which England held a unique strategic position. The nearby Netherlands — recently free from Spain — enjoyed a similar position and, along with England, took a major new role in shipping. By the middle of the 17th century, the Dutch had a merchant fleet as large as all others combined in Europe and were competing for lands in the New World. Sweden, another major European naval power, also held a few possessions in North America and the Caribbean. (This led to curious events such as “New Sweden,” a colony located along the Delaware River, falling under Dutch control in the 1650s and becoming part of the “New Netherlands.”)

England’s Drive Into the New World

In spite of its gains in maritime commerce, England was still far behind Spain and Portugal in the Americas. The Iberian nations had established a strong hold on South America, Central America and the southern portions of North America, including the Caribbean. Much of North America, however, remained relatively untouched. It did not possess the proven mineral wealth of the south but it had a wealth of natural capital — fisheries, timber, furs and expanses of fertile soil.

However, much of the population of the Americas was in a band in central Mexico, meaning that the vast pools of labor available to the Spanish and Portuguese were not present elsewhere in North America. Instead, England and other colonial powers would need to bring their own labor. They were at a demographic advantage in this regard. Since the 16th century, the Continent’s population had exploded. The British Isles and Northwest Europe grew the most, with England expanding from 2.6 million in 1500 to around 5.6 million by 1650. By contrast, the eastern woodlands of North America in 1600 had around 200,000 inhabitants — the population of London. Recent catastrophic epidemics brought by seasonal European fishermen and traders further decimated the population, especially that of New England. The disaster directly benefited Plymouth, which was built on the site of the deserted town of Patuxet and used native cleared and cultivated land.

After its founding in 1620, Plymouth was alone in New England for a decade and struggled to become profitable. It was the first foothold, however, for a great Puritan push into the region. In time, this push would subsume the tiny separatist colony within the larger sphere of the Massachusetts Bay Colony. This new colony’s numbers were much higher: The first wave in 1630 brought 700 English settlers to Salem, and by 1640 there were 11,000 living in the region.

Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay were different from nearby Virginia. Virginia was initially solely a business venture, and its colonists provided the manpower. New England, by contrast, was a settler society of families from the start. Both Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay were started by English Puritans — Christian sectarians critical of the state-run Church of England. Plymouth’s settlers were Puritan separatists who wanted no connection to England. Massachusetts Bay’s colonists were non-separatist Puritans who believed in reforming the church. For both, creating polities in North America furthered their sectarian political goals. The pilgrims wanted to establish a separate godly society to escape persecution; the Puritans of Salem wanted to establish a beacon that would serve to change England by example. Less known, however, is that the financial backers of the New England colonies had a more ambitious goal of which New England was only the initial phase.

In this plan, Massachusetts was to provide profit to its investors, but it was also to serve as a way station from which they could then send settlers to a small colony they simultaneously founded on Providence Island off the Miskito Coast of modern Nicaragua. This island, now part of Colombia, was in the heart of the Spanish Caribbean and was meant to alter the geopolitics of Central America and bring it under English control. It was in this way that they hoped to solve England’s geostrategic problems on the Continent and advance their own political agenda.

Providence was an uninhabited island in an area where the Spanish had not established deep roots. The island was a natural fortress, with a coral reef that made approach difficult and high, craggy rocks that helped in defense. It also had sheltered harbors and pockets of fertile land that could be used for production of food and cash crops.

It would serve, in their mind, as the perfect first foothold for England in the lucrative tropical regions of the Americas, from which it could trade with nearby native polities. In the short run, Providence was a base of operations, but in the long run it was to be a launchpad for an ambitious project to unseat Spain in the Americas and take Central America for England. In keeping with Puritan ideals, Providence was to be the same sort of “godly” society as Massachusetts Bay and Plymouth, just a more profitable one. Providence Island would enable the English to harry Spanish ships, bring in profit to end disputes with the crown and bolster the Protestant position in the Thirty Years’ War.

But while Massachusetts Bay would succeed, Providence would fail utterly. Both Massachusetts Bay and Providence Island received their first shipment of Puritan settlers in 1630. Providence was expected to yield immense profits, while Massachusetts was expected to be a tougher venture. Both were difficult, but Providence’s constraints proved fatal. The island did not establish a cash crop economy and its attempts to trade with native groups on the mainland were not fruitful.

The island’s geopolitical position in Spanish military territory meant that it needed to obsessively focus on security. This proved its downfall. After numerous attacks and several successful raids on Spanish trade on the coast, the investors decided in 1641 to initiate plans to move colonists down from Massachusetts Bay to Providence. Spanish forces received intelligence of this plan and took the island with a massive force, ending England’s control.

Puritan Legacies

The 1641 invasion ended English settlement on the island, which subsequently became a Spanish military depot. The Puritans left little legacy there. New England, however, flourished. It became, in time, the nearest replica of English political life outside of the British Isles and a key regional component of the Thirteen Colonies and, later, the United States. It was the center of an agricultural order based on individual farmers and families and later of the United States’ early manufacturing power. England sorted out its internal turmoil not by altering its geopolitical position externally — a project that faced serious resource and geographical constraints — but through massive internal upheaval during the English Civil War.

The celebration of the fruits of the Plymouth Colony’s brutal first year is the byproduct of England’s struggle against Spain on the Continent and in the New World. Thus, the most celebrated meal in America comes with a side of geopolitics.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was in Brussels on Tuesday with an ambitious agenda: to promote the establishment of a “safe zone” in northern Syria. Erdogan can see that the Europeans have no good solutions to their immigration crisis other than to manipulate the route and flow of migrants. The latest idea gaining traction in a host of European capitals is to keep the hundreds of thousands of people trying to cross the Mediterranean off of Europe’s shores by bottling them up closer to home instead. Brussels would, of course, pay Ankara to take care of its problem by housing more refugees traveling overland. But Turkey, which already hosts more than 2.5 million Syrians and has spent $7.6 billion on the refugee crisis so far, isn’t buying into Europe’s offer. Erdogan wants more. Much more.

Now that Turkey has Europe’s attention and Russia has blindsided the United States in Syria, Erdogan is attempting to use the chaotic climate to dust off his plans for a Syrian safe zone. The Turkish version of a safe zone entails reinforcing rebel forces that are friendly with Turkey to flush out the Islamic State from a zone measuring 80 kilometers (50 miles) by 40 kilometers in Syria’s northern Aleppo province. A no-fly zone, according to the Turkish proposal, would accompany the safe zone. Once the zone is declared safe and free of terrorist activity, refugee camps would be set up and Syrian migrants could live within their country’s borders again.

There is also a broader objective framing Turkey’s strategy. A divided Syria undoubtedly creates risk, but it also presents an opportunity for Turkey to expand its sphere of influence in the Levant. This is the main driver behind Turkey’s campaign to topple Syrian President Bashar al Assad’s government and replace it with a Sunni Islamist-led administration that takes its cues from Ankara. After all, someone would have to provide security to make the zone in northern Syria “safe”; Turkish forces and civilian personnel presumably would take the lead in reinforcing such a corridor, potentially placing Turkish boots back on Arab soil.

Meanwhile, there is a murkier motive to consider. Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party will enter the Nov. 2 elections with a low chance of winning enough votes to regain its majority in parliament. The likelihood of the elections resulting in another hung parliament, coupled with Erdogan’s reluctance to share power, raises the potential (albeit in an extreme scenario) for Turkey to use the premise of a military operation in Syria to stave off a third round of elections.

But Russia is botching Turkey’s plans. Russia, Turkey and NATO are still arguing over whether two alleged Russian violations of Turkish airspace near the Syrian border were intentional (as Turkey and NATO claim) or accidental (as Russia insists they were). Russian Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov said Tuesday that Russia was ready to form a working group and that it would be pleased to host Turkish Defense Ministry officials in Moscow to avoid further misunderstandings in Syria. Ankara has no choice but to interpret Russia’s actions as a signal that Moscow is willing to interfere in a Turkish-led safe zone if Ankara tries to push ahead with its plans.

Moscow’s strategy has already begun to bear fruit. The European officials who met with Erdogan in Brussels listened politely to his ideas for a safe zone and promised to discuss the idea further. But no European power wants to risk getting mixed up with a brazen Russia on the Syrian battlefield. The Europeans would rather bargain with Erdogan on issues such as visa liberalization for Turkish citizens and Turkey’s acceptance of more migrants on the Continent’s behalf instead.

The United States has kept Turkey’s safe zone plan at arm’s length for similar reasons. However, Russia’s military adventurism in Syria is accelerating U.S. plans for a rebel offensive that could still at least partially fit with Turkey’s interests.

In the coming months, the United States will be focused on the areas east and west of the Euphrates River. To the east, the United States will ramp up its support for Kurdish forces and their allies in preparation for a move toward Raqqa against the Islamic State. Greater U.S. support for Kurdish forces will not please Turkish leaders, but the United States’ simultaneous boost in aid for the rebels Turkey has been preparing to the west will. Here, the United States and Turkey will work together to try to carve out a border zone free of the Islamic State’s presence. The Americans are avoiding the label of a safe zone to keep the operation from conflating with Turkey’s more ambitious agenda. Nonetheless, the United States will be indirectly taking the first crucial steps toward Turkey’s ultimate goals for northern Syria.

Of course, Turkey will still have to contend with Russia. Moscow will do whatever it can to play off the fears of the NATO alliance. If a buffer zone were established in Syria and if Turkey, a NATO member, tried to protect the airspace over the zone, who would shoot down the Russian air force in the event that it crossed into the zone? In Brussels, Erdogan reiterated that “an attack on Turkey means an attack on NATO.” But if NATO proves too afraid of the consequences of responding to Russian interference, then NATO’s credibility will have been dealt a major blow. And that is exactly the outcome the Russians are hoping for.

Summary

France’s intervention in Mali, supported by other Western states and a large African force, is winding down. Most offensive operations have ended, and French forces have begun withdrawing. Now the achievements of the operation and the remaining challenges are becoming clear. Although the intervention has succeeded in denying jihadists territorial control over northern Mali, it could not contain such forces, which have dispersed throughout the Sahel region. While French operations degraded the militancy, the wider jihadist threat in the region persists due to the lack of capabilities and cooperation among the countries of the Sahel.

Analysis

France launched its military intervention in Mali on Jan. 11 in response to the actions of jihadist militants in the north of the country. In 2012, West African countries, along with France, Germany and the United States, had attempted to set up an African-led intervention with Western support after jihadist militants established a presence in northern Mali. The objective of the proposed mission, and subsequently of the French intervention, was to deny sanctuary in the country to the jihadists.

The French hoped to mitigate the threats emanating from a militant sanctuary that had been established when jihadists exploited an existing conflict between Tuareg factions and the Malian government in Bamako. The issue was not necessarily Mali’s territorial integrity, but rather regional stability and economic interests across the Sahel, including French oil and natural gas projects in southern Algeria and uranium mining in Niger.

Achievements of the Intervention

While the intervention in Mali could be seen as a success, the wider region remains unstable. The French campaign, known as Operation Serval, denied sanctuary to jihadist forces in northern Mali but it did not destroy the militant organizations. The operation’s inability to fully contain the jihadist elements within Mali allowed militants to disperse into several other countries across the region. Jihadists are still present and capable of operating throughout the Sahel, and they could be augmented by fighters fleeing Mali.

In Mali, French and allied forces have degraded jihadist forces so that they are no longer able to control territory in the country. French forces eliminated a threat against central and southern Mali, and the militants are no longer capable of conducting the conventional operations needed for territorial control in northern parts of the country. However, the remaining militants still can launch insurgency-style attacks.

Throughout the intervention, the French offensive operations went largely unanswered because of the firepower France was able to project and the huge imbalance resulting from the militants’ lack of military sophistication. The cost of the operation, which involved some 4,000 troops over three and a half months, reportedly reached 205 million euros ($264 million) by April 25 — a relatively high amount considering the French military’s budgetary constraints due to huge spending reductions across Europe and the expense of a long-term presence in Mali.

Roughly 91 million euros of the operation’s budget were allocated for transporting French forces and equipment. The airlift operations into Mali highlighted one of the shortcomings of the French military, which required support from several Western nations to move the necessary troops and equipment into staging areas in Mali. The United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates, Canada, Spain, Italy, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium all contributed military transport aircraft in support of the French mobilization. France also depended on the United States for aerial refueling during long-range French sorties departing from Chad, as well as intelligence gathering through U.S. drone coverage.

Operations inside Mali also were not the work of the French alone. France cooperated closely with African forces, the contingent of which eventually grew to 6,000 troops. Chadian forces played the most active role in the offensive phase of the intervention, especially in fighting in the Tigharghar Mountains. Chad has now initiated a progressive withdrawal from Mali, and only half of its contingent remains in the Kidal region, though the Chadian government has said it would redeploy its troops once the intervention becomes a U.N. operation involving 12,000 foreign troops on July 1. Meanwhile, forces from other African states are taking the leading role in Mali as French troops withdraw, and securing Mali’s population centers is becoming an African responsibility.

The Aftermath

Although France is wrapping up its most active operations in Mali, security threats remain in northern Mali and throughout the Sahel. Jihadist elements continue to stage attacks in Mali, and the dispersal of militants to other countries in the region has drawn attention to the cross-border jihadist threat, which will be more difficult to combat. Algeria, Tunisia and Libya have preexisting militant threats that could be augmented by fighters fleeing Mali. This problem will persist until all countries of the Sahel become capable of dealing with these security issues and begin concerted actions against the persistent jihadist threat, but internal constraints in these countries will limit regional collaboration.

Nevertheless, while militants have remained in northern Mali, the conditions under which the jihadists were able to gather such strength in northern Mali — the collapse of the Libyan regime and the resulting flow of weapons to several militant factions — are unlikely to be replicated anytime soon. Moreover, the permanent deployment of 1,000 French troops in Mali, along with a U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle base in Niger, will limit the threat posed to the north.

After the jihadist threat in northern Mali was reduced, reports emerged from across the Sahel region indicating that fleeing jihadists had not been contained within Mali. Tunisian security forces are combating militants, including elements that had been involved in fighting in Mali, and other jihadists previously active in Mali have announced the establishment of a new organization in Algeria. Reports of fighters coming from the ranks of Malian jihadists have also come from northern Nigeria, where Boko Haram is active, and from as far away as Chad and Sudan’s Darfur region. Perhaps the most worrisome presence of fleeing Malian militants from Mali is in Libya. It has been suggested that most of the jihadists that have left Mali have settled in southern Libya, a country already facing a struggle against militants and where a power vacuum could allow elements from Mali to reorganize, re-supply and plan new operations.

The risk in the greater Sahel region resulting from the French intervention is not limited to the dispersal of militants. French and other Western interests have been targeted several times since the beginning of Operation Serval. The continuation of such a threat will force France and other Western states to expend more resources to secure their assets and interests throughout the Sahel. The threat of attacks at home in France, whether by “lone wolf” terrorists or by established militant networks, has also increased. The presence of French citizens among the jihadists in northern Mali has added to France’s concerns about such attacks — fears that date back to the 1990s, when al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s predecessors conducted attacks in France.

In northern Mali, a lower level militant threat is unlikely to disappear soon. Bombing attacks targeting Malian and African forces have occurred throughout the area. The initial style of attacks that militants conducted after the intervention began — using gunmen in population centers such as Gao and Timbuktu to draw security forces into prolonged firefights — was successful, but it might have been too manpower-intensive to continue. The jihadists gradually changed their tactics to focus on bombings, but these have proved less successful.

African forces, which man the first line of checkpoints and defenses outside population centers, have been trained by French forces on procedures to deal with these threats and appear to have followed, so far, French instruction. The ability to mitigate the effects of bomb attacks through proper security checkpoints and search procedures, which have allowed few casualties and little material damage, could compel militants to modify their tactics — possibly using small arms attacks to draw in security forces before using suicide bombers, as militants in Afghanistan and Somalia have done. The limited damage caused by the bombings could also push jihadists to improve their bombmaking techniques.

The security threat from jihadist militancy in the wider Sahel region, which predates the French operations in Mali, will continue. These militants could be strengthened by jihadist elements leaving northern Mali under pressure of the French offensive, and they could seek to exploit the limits of security operations and regional cooperation as they plan further attacks. A repeat of the threat posed in northern Mali is highly unlikely, but power vacuums such as the one in southern Libya could lead to new concentrations of jihadist activity.

Spanish Elections are making their appearance in the near horizon. This year, the Spanish people might be faced to meaningful unexpected and never-seen-before outcomes. This year has given place to the rise of new players in the political game and to modern creative and alternative parties to the mostly traditional bi-party p  olitical scenario that characterized the Spanish government until present—the Popular Party (PP) and the Socialist Labor Party (PSOE).

We refer here to the two new popular parties who have recently made their ways towards a more significant presence in the Medias, a closer connection to the public, the issuing of new promising promises and a rise amongst the conservative parties in Spain, highlighted throughout the polls ahead of the mid-December elections.

These are the CIUDADANOS and the PODEMOS parties, two young ideologies lead by ambitious figures—Albert Rivera and Pablo Iglesias respectively—ready to come to the front and, if not becoming Spain’s leaders, at least catching a piece of the cake that is being raffled amongst the candidates of the new coalition government to be formed in December.

See Polls made by EL MUNDO journal – Elecciones Generales – Sondeos

What is it that has given the two the opportunity to stand out in the last year?

Being each party differently placed in the political spectrum, the one in the center-right and the second to the left, the most highlighted aspect to be noticed is the name given to these two parties. Indeed, as much as the traditional PP and PSOE possess titles that make reference to the society, these two new parties have rather chosen a more quotidian name to make such a reference, a title accessible to all’s understanding, a simple name that represents nothing but a new, fresh, popular character. The name CIUDADANOS means citizens, a common word that attracts everyone who holds a Spanish passport and feels a Spanish national. This gives a feeling of belonging, I am a citizen, and therefore I belong, or, Spain for the Spanish people. The name PODEMOS is more of a “yes, we can” kind of name, which appeals to the slogan of positivism within a lake of problems that Spain currently counters. Just as the American crisis required a motivating slogan in 2008, the European crisis does to. PODEMOS refers to entrepreneurship, initiatives, the saving light after the tunnel, an alternative, motivation, and many more positive adjectives that the Spanish public is so much in need of at the moment.

Although the name of a party might only seem like a title to give to it, something catchy and with a good sound, in fact it is rather the reflection of the party’s principles, bases, ideas, and is meant to give a hint on what is to be expected from its ideology. In these cases, the parties’ names indeed point to two ideologies which propose quite new and popular ideas, different from the old ones, the ones that have been around ever since the Spanish democracy came along in 1977. When a country finds itself drowned in a number of problems, and when the leading figures don’t seem to be able to avoid the boat from sinking, the people start showing an interest for new solutions to the same problems. These two parties have come along recently in light of the current political, economic and social situation in Spain. The political situations is reflected through the numerous cases of corruption emerging mostly at the provincial and municipal level, the economic refers to the obvious Euro crisis that has been going on for the past seven years and which has affected a high portion of the population, creating more than a 25% of unemployment, and the social aspect is connected to the previous one, which has brought about a significant rate of young people leaving the country seeking for jobs abroad, and therefore creating an important brain drain in the country. In a moment in which the Spanish people find themselves at a desperate moment, and see no positive results coming from the government’s repetitive promises, they claim the need to find solid alternatives. And for it, CIUDADANOS and PODEMOS have appeared with “saving solutions” and “promising results”. They have approached society and reached their hurt feelings to propose the most attractive measures to be taken at the political level. They have created a, maybe placebo, medicine to cure all the country’s problems. One might ask, how come they have such a simple spectrum of solutions, and how come they can promise to apply them, while the current government hasn’t been as smart to find these first? Probably the emotional part is the one that plays a central role amongst the Spanish people at the moment, to the point that it overshadows the logical thinking. These parties have ridiculed the traditional parties, presenting them as incapable of managing the situation, and as lacking control of the panorama.

This has given them the opportunity of offering an alternative to the existing ideologies and political parties. This is the fourth aspect that has allowed these parties to stand out in the political scenario of Spain. That is, CIUDADANOS and PODEMOS are putting out there a clear alternative, avoiding vague policies and expressing a solid base of principles. For example, adapting taxes to the citizen’s revenues which would alleviate the weight on the middle classes, the most affected one by the crisis, request for government workers to declare their assets and monthly payments with public money before, during and after they take their post in order to block the possibility of corruption, making government meetings open to the public in order to increase transparency, including a mailbox to receive anonymous denouncing of corruption cases, the banning of corrupted leaders in their party lists, stopping the government’s plans for privatization of the health system, in education promises on making kindergarten and text books for school free, promises on stopping evictions of debtors with ‘good faith’ with no alternative housing, establishment of a rescue plan to ensure the supply of water, electricity and gas for people in difficult economic situations.

Spain is seeing a repetition of history. Desperate periods have repeatedly requested desperate solutions; often when a country has seen itself in a long-time trouble it has always needed renovated ideas and fresh leading figures to take over the government. This has been the case of the raise of fascism in the aftermath of fist world war, Soviet Lenin after the Bolshevicks revolution, Nasser’s victory in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and later the different governments that derived from the Arab Spring, more recently, the rise of Syriza in Greece, amongst many more examples.

The analysis to be made for these elections should be that old traditional parties have a life-time experience in the political game, with the legal apparatus, and socio-economic constraints, as opposed to the newly created parties, while the young parties might be able to propose new creative ways of working around the country’s obstacles and challenges and might provide the people with new hopes. As of now CIUDADANOS and PODEMOS have gained ground, although they still remain less popular than the two traditional big parties PP and PSOE. This might only mean that new players will gain weight in a possible coalition.

Aidan Borkan is a young and promising political analyst. He is specialized in the changing political landscapes of the US and the Middle East. He is currently a student from a top American University. He is currently serving as a political Analyst for a prestigious American Candidate to The White House.

As the new presidential election cycle comes into spin, the same forces behind foreign policy agendas – the American elite – are revving their engines and preparing to spend enormous sums to bring their favorite candidates to power. A small country of 8.4 million, the State of Israel has emerged as a political asset among the central issues for candidates to address to swing donors and key voting blocs.

In the first Republican debate, Israel is second only to Iran in numbers for countries mentioned. That is no coincidence. The Democratic voter base is becoming alienated by an Israeli government led by a right-wing conservative coalition of hawkish ministers, with 47% describing the Jewish State as “Racist” and only 48% who believe Israel sincerely desires peace according to a poll by political consultant Frank Luntz.

These figures appear unnoticed by the Democratic mega-donors’ favorite, who has taken a hardline stance toward a commitment to the future and security of the state. In a personally addressed letter to Haim Saban, Hillary Clinton allayed her opposition to BDS initiatives and will play the ‘Israel’s security first’ card against a house that is deeply divided. 

There are two major Democratic candidates that have openly expressed their criticism of Israel’s policies – Martin O’Malley and Bernie Sanders – though their chances of electoral success depend on a grassroots level support, while Clinton courts billionaires to the likes of Haim Saban and George Soros. Senator Sander’s opposition to Israel’s reaction in Operation Protective Edge resonates with progressive voters and is directly in-line with his refusal to bow to the Billionaire class and its interests. As the divisions deepen between pro and anti-Israel constituencies, no candidate will make it to the White House before addressing how they will change the relationship with Jerusalem. Israel’s very image as America’s top ally in the region is suffering numerous blows, from the backlash of a failed attempt by of Prime Minister Netanyahu to sway elected officials against their president on the Iranian Nuclear Accord, and the brash and confrontational stance the leading coalition has taken against advancing the prospects for peace – namely the expansionof settlements at a time of dimming hope for renewed talks with a weakened Palestinian Authority. Dissent is growing, even within the Pro-Israel community.

Self-identified Jews and Zionists are expressing their discomfort with an administration that does not represent their values in major forums. The once solid base which held the US-Israel relationship as sacrosanct is beginning to fracture, as major donor-backed candidates tow the same line as decadesbefore and struggle with outreach to young and progressive voters. Republican candidates – with the sole exception of Rand Paul – are strengthening their hardline positions on Israel’s security in a shallow attempt to court Evangelist and conservative Jewish votes. Open sympathy towards the settlement movement and a break from traditional bipartisan opposition to a cause that is near universally seen as undemocratic, can be seen in the form of campaign stops in Shiloh by Mike Huckabee and the flow of US dollars through shadowy conservative organizations. The very idea of referring to the West Bank and Gaza as occupied territories, as did Chris Christie, has come under fire by Sheldon Adelson, whose view of a greater Israel which encompases all post-1967 geography without 4.4 million of its demography, will dictate the Republican stance.

The right-wing GOP has grown its influence in the major Israel lobby, AIPAC, and made inroads through the Orthodox-Jewish establishment, but further distanced itself from the majority of US Jewry and as the events of this summer prove – is incapable of driving a wedge between a solidly Democratic majority of Jewish voters. To the dismay of Adelson, the love of Israel as a Jewish and Democratic state is greater in America than is the desire for ethnic supremacy – one of the principals which the foundation of Israel was to fight against. The state will survive this election cycle, but the Netanyahu government ought to open its eyes towards the sway of the nation away from a traditional alliance, from the college campus and eventually to capitol hill.

Summary

China’s already formidable military may be about to get an overhaul. With Chinese President Xi Jinping reportedly set to unveil what the media is calling the most sweeping set of military reforms since the mid-1980s, one of the most powerful forces in the world may get a reshuffling that makes it more flexible and effective. The reforms will be officially announced in the wake of a Sept. 3 military parade to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. One potential plan leaked to the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post offers some insight into Beijing’s intentions. Though the final reforms will likely be more conservative, the leaked proposal suggests China is generally aiming to centralize command, increase cooperation between services and look beyond hard geographic boundaries. In the end, China may be successful at improving its military effectiveness, but its reforms will fall short of loosening the Communist Party’s tight grip over the country’s armed forces.

Analysis

According to the South China Morning Post, it was several “reform-minded officers” who leaked a version of the reform plan to the media. The leaked proposal includes large personnel cuts and several structural changes. First, the seven existing military regions would be consolidated into four, each of which would be open to command by officers from other services. A new national guard, responsible solely to the Central Military Commission, would replace the People’s Armed Police. And three of the People’s Liberation Army’s four general departments would merge into one — the General Staff Department. The Ministry of Defense, now a figurehead, would be empowered to conduct mobilization and recruitment activities.

The plan is probably one of the more radical options on the table, and Beijing is certainly weighing more conservative approaches. The high level of detail in the report, however, suggests that the leaked proposal survived to a late stage in the deliberation process, meaning parts of it may actually make it into the final plan — especially the long-discussed consolidation of military regions and the promotion of joint commands.

The leaked details of the reforms largely conform with those Stratfor outlined in January 2014, soon after plans were announced. At the time, China was making moves to cut its military regions down to five as well as open up positions of military leadership — previously an option for only ground force officers — to officers in the navy, air force and possibly even Second Artillery Corps. The change to a four-region structure likely came late in the discussion; as recently as April, a U.S. Department of Defense report to Congress on Chinese military and security developments still predicted five regions. But if Beijing has in fact pared it down to four, they will likely consist of a Northeast Command, charged with protecting Beijing and the border with Russia and Korea; a Southeast Command, responsible for operations in the Pacific and Indian oceans; a Northwestern Command to stabilize Xinjiang and protect Gansu and Qinghai; and a Southwestern Command to secure Sichuan and Tibet. Even with the slight change in details, Stratfor’s projections for the overall reform trends still hold: increasing centralization, increased cooperation between services and the erosion of hard geographic boundaries.

The People’s Liberation Army’s current operational structure is centered on land-based warfare to be conducted within the framework of seven military regions. This is an artifact of the military’s primary Cold War mission: to conduct a “people’s war” against an invader, most likely the Soviet Union, by mobilizing the entire population to draw enemy forces into the interior and wear them down. However, the times — and the strategic situation in East Asia — have changed a great deal. Beijing now needs to build capabilities that will allow it to carry out missions along the Chinese periphery in areas that include the East China Sea, South China Sea and Taiwan. This will mean moving beyond a model centered on ground forces. Missions in distant waters are also growing in importance. These could include counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, evacuations of Chinese citizens in the Middle East and Africa as well as joint air and naval exercises beyond the first island chain. The projected reforms would free the military from its territorial focus and help to integrate other branches of the services more closely.

China’s leaders have understood for decades that the existing military structure is inadequate to meet the nation’s changing needs. But Beijing is just now overcoming the structural constraints that have barred reform. These included limitations in terms of capability, such as poorly trained personnel, outdated equipment, and primitive command and control. More important, however, were the political obstacles: military corruption as well as powerful entrenched interests in both top brass and the retired officer pool. The Chinese government has worked for years to overcome these limitations, not only making broad investments in modern equipment and weaponry research and development but also raising education requirements for new recruits, trimming redundant personnel and stepping up joint as well as transregional exercises. Military exercises in particular have laid the groundwork for the smooth and frequent cooperation between branches of the military.

Of course, the upcoming reforms will almost certainly reduce high-level staff positions and eliminate some patronage networks, prompting opposition among government and military officials — and especially among the People’s Liberation Army ground forces. It was to overcome this resistance that President Xi Jinping in 2013 launched a far-reaching and ongoing military anticorruption probe, which has helped purge over 30 generals this year alone. It also brought down two retired vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission, Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, who had been the highest-ranking generals in the People’s Liberation Army under Hu Jintao. Yet in spite of progress, resistance will persist or even worsen as reforms continue. Surveillance over military officers and intense anticorruption investigations are likely to intensify, as are moves to bar retired officers from influencing policy, which is part of an overall trend in all parts of the Communist Party.

The Chinese military will certainly become more professional as a result of these reforms, but only in a very specific sense of the word. The People’s Liberation Army will develop the organization and skills necessary to prevail in modern warfare. This, however, will in no way loosen the Communist Party’s hold over China’s armed forces. The interests of the Party will continue to dominate the military. And though the leaked plan would elevate the role of the Ministry of Defense — a government and not a Party organ — Beijing will most likely opt to reject that and other elements that reduce the influence of the Communist Party. Indeed, Chinese state media have continued to caution against calls to nationalize or depoliticize the People’s Liberation Army. Wary that reforms empowering the military could also erode Party control, the Party will be quick to slow and even reverse reforms if the careful balance between Party control and military effectiveness tips too far away from the Party. Whatever impact the reforms may have on the military’s capabilities, the People’s Liberation Army will remain the Party’s gun.