After nearly a decade under conservative rule, Canada is now poised to move back toward the political center. On Oct. 19, Justin Trudeau’s Liberal Party won the country’s parliamentary elections, positioning the 43-year-old leader to succeed Stephen Harper as Canada’s next prime minister. Trudeau will likely adopt a more centrist style of governance than Harper, prompting a review and refocus of Canada’s national security and foreign policy priorities. Meanwhile, on the domestic front, the new administration will maintain support for energy initiatives that promote the diversification of the country’s hydrocarbons exports.

Analysis

Trudeau, the son of former Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, emerged from the Oct. 19 elections with a solid majority in Parliament. With just shy of 40 percent of the vote, his Liberal Party won 184 seats, while the Conservative Party came in second with 99 seats and the leftist New Democratic Party trailed with only 44. Because of the Liberal Party’s sweeping victory, Canada will avoid the political turmoil that accompanies coalition building by minority parties — a situation that often creates room for votes of no confidence, uncertain policymaking and premature elections.

Once he is sworn into office, Trudeau’s first order of business will be to select his Cabinet. He will likely choose lawmakers with a range of experience levels, drawing from a pool of parliamentary members who served in previous Liberal Party governments. The new prime minister will also follow the Canadian protocol of picking Cabinet ministers and deputies who are representative of each of the country’s 10 provinces and three territories.

After he has formed his Cabinet, Trudeau will turn his attention to Canada’s international engagements. Under Harper’s Conservative Party administration, Canada conducted military interventions and operations in a number of the world’s conflict zones, including Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq, Ukraine and the Baltics. The Canadian government also took a strong stance against Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and against China on a variety of issues, including human rights. Trudeau will likely pull back somewhat, in terms of both rhetoric and troop commitments, from becoming involved in military operations that have a limited coalition mandate. But Canada will not disengage from the international community; on the contrary, under Trudeau’s rule, Canadian soft power and humanitarian interests will play a stronger role in Ottawa’s foreign policy. As a result, Canada will support multilateral initiatives in which there is a place for its influence.

At home, the incoming Liberal Party government will likely pick up where its predecessor left off in the realm of energy. Harper’s administration prioritized the development and diversification of export routes for Canada’s oil and natural gas resources. Trudeau will continue to pursue this goal, lending support for the construction of east-west pipelines and the controversial Keystone XL project. However, he will also push for greater oversight over new energy infrastructure projects to ensure that the pipelines address the concerns of environmental groups and the First Nations aboriginal peoples. Trudeau will work with provincial governments, particularly in Alberta and British Columbia, to achieve these goals and to win support for his Liberal Party in Canada’s Conservative hub.

As the new prime minister works to introduce a new style of governance in Canada — one that is dynamic, inclusive and less militarily active — he will encounter significant challenges on several other policy fronts. Canada’s recession continues to drag on, and the country remains constrained by its economic interdependency with the United States. Canada must also cope with high natural resource costs while its industrial and manufacturing base continues to search for growing markets for its outputs. With his campaign now over, Trudeau will have to shift his focus toward these issues if he hopes to turn Canada’s economy around.

Nigeria’s President Muhammadu Buhari has finally selected all 36 members of his Cabinet, and not a moment too soon. While the Nigerian Senate still needs to approve his nominees so they can be sworn into office, Buhari has already taken his time in appointing his Cabinet almost five months after being sworn in as president. Patience has worn thin in corners of Nigeria as the new president’s opponents — and even some of his supporters — have waited to see what his policy priorities are and how they will be implemented. Despite the country’s need for cautious leadership and fair distribution of power to promote national stability, it is clear that various interests in Nigeria will move to protect, or in some cases win, their influence. And it will be the president who manages the country’s priorities and responses to them.

Analysis

At this point, Buhari has clearly prioritized the counterinsurgency campaign against the Islamist militant group Wilayat al Sudan al Gharbi, more commonly known as Boko Haram. Former Chief of the Army Staff Gen. Abdulrahman Bello Dambazau’s appointment to the Cabinet, possibly as defense minister, attests to this. But continued suicide bombings in Nigeria’s North-East region raise tension and social displacements in the area. For example, suicide bombers struck the town of Maiduguri for the second day in a row on Oct. 16. And though the Nigerian military’s successful campaigns against Boko Haram forces have retaken population centers from the group, forcing it to shift away from conventional tactics and toward terrorism, continued advances will require further financial and political support.

However, Nigerians concerned with an effective response to Boko Haram are not only expecting a military offensive against the insurgents but also want a broader socio-economic plan to improve the impoverished region, mainly because its large pool of unemployed youth easily falls prey to militant groups. Social spending to improve economic standards would go a long way in reducing if not denying jihadists new recruits. However, diverting spending to the poorest region of the country is not an easy political sell for Buhari. The military needs funds to fight Boko Haram. Moreover, other regions want to support their economic bases and will pressure the president for the same finite resources.

In the country’s South-South, or Niger Delta, region, activists are awaiting clarity on Buhari’s intention to continue an amnesty program that provides material support to former militants belonging to groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta. Buhari has worked with several Niger Delta leaders, including Cabinet nominee and former Rivers state Gov. Rotimi Amaechi, to facilitate continued stability in the oil-producing region. Some militant leaders such as Government Tompolo, who enjoyed patronage under former President Goodluck Jonathan, are continuing to see their private regional security operations contracts honored. Still, a long-term understanding between Abuja and the region’s political and militant elite has yet to be arranged. But again, like with the North-East region, it is politically difficult for Buhari to focus on this region and neglect others, especially since the Niger Delta enjoyed its turn commanding considerable influence under Jonathan, who hailed from the region’s Bayelsa state.

Buhari’s anti-corruption campaign, which started when he became president, has seen some high-profile developments as well. The president, seeking to fulfill his electoral pledge and make governance more transparent, has detained a few former high-level officials on corruption allegations and dismissed potentially poor-performing appointments made by the previous administration. Most recently, former Petroleum Minister Diezani Alison-Madueke, who served under Jonathan, was arrested on corruption allegations in the United Kingdom on Oct. 2. So far, Buhari has managed to drive his anti-corruption crackdown with the force of his personality alone. However, to sustain it, Buhari will need to institutionalize the campaign, ensuring that there are empowered government agencies to independently investigate, prosecute and convict on corruption charges without requiring Buhari’s close attention.

Talk of creating a special anti-corruption tribunal has emerged, but the president has yet to actually convict former government officials. Moreover, even prosecuting and convicting officials through domestic courts in a relatively timely manner will be a test of Buhari’s ability to follow through on his campaign promises on this popular issue. And while the Nigerian public wants the government to rein in corruption, there will be political costs to doing so, such as alienating other powerful political leaders who do not want to be investigated. Buhari, as with the other national issues, will need to be both careful and successful, before using that success to deflect the enemies he will undoubtedly make.

Similarly, the Nigerian president is also attempting to inject transparency into government accounts and finances. Buhari implemented a treasury single account on Aug. 9 to capture revenues from all government agencies and ministries at the Central Bank of Nigeria, reducing the risk that cash held by these departments could be misallocated if not outright stolen. Previously, government officials and the civil service practices enjoyed vast autonomy, having little to no financial oversight under Jonathan. Reintroducing such accountability measures, especially on political leaders who have grown accustomed to privilege, will be a burden for Buhari, who is already trying to substantially reform the regions and the country as a whole.

But Buhari has demonstrated that he is a cautious but forthright leader. He challenged powerful factions within his own All Progressives Congress that wanted him to follow his predecessors’ footsteps by taking advantage of his position to promote his support base’s narrow interests while shutting out his opponents. In doing so, he showed his ability to lead and cemented his administration’s control, enough to begin the process of reforming Nigeria. But asserting policy priorities will be a long-term effort given the country’s multiple political, economic and security challenges, as well as historical practices that undermine attempts to solve those problems. Some regions and political leaders will work to protect the influence they have won from previous administrations. Others will equally strive to win patronage for the first time after suffering neglect in the past. Buhari’s difficulties are only beginning, and so far he has only nominated a Cabinet.

In Colombia, a Peace Deal May Not Improve Security

Summary

On Nov. 8, Myanmar will hold its first nationwide general election since the country began transitioning from military to quasi-civilian rule in 2011. The scale of the vote is vast, with 91 parties competing for 498 parliamentary seats representing constituencies throughout the fractured, largely rural country, in addition to state-level positions. The new parliament will choose the next president in early 2016. International attention has focused primarily on the contest between the establishment Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), founded by the former military junta, and the National League for Democracy (NLD), led by democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi.

The military has used the USDP to continue its dominance over the government since 2011. President Thein Sein, himself a former general, has overseen the opening of the country to a flood of foreign investment and has shepherded negotiations that culminated in a landmark cease-fire with eight major ethnic militant groups. The military-led move away from international isolation has been deliberately slow — a strategy rooted in concern that liberalization could unleash destabilizing forces that military rule had long helped contain. And the military elite has carefully managed the transition to democracy to ensure that their influence and interests would survive the whims of democracy.

Nonetheless, anecdotal evidence suggests that the National League for Democracy may be poised to carve into the military’s control over the government. The NLD could capitalize on frustration with the incremental pace of reform, the uneven distribution of the country’s nascent economic boom and lingering distrust of the military. These factors, along with the proliferation of ethnic minority parties and grassroots political forces, herald an increasingly incoherent political environment in Myanmar that will challenge even the military’s best-laid plans.

Analysis

In many ways, Myanmar’s military establishment has been preparing for this election for more than a quarter century. The National League for Democracy emerged as a unified and potent political force in 1988 amid a nationwide wave of anti-government protests. The military junta called elections two years later. Under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of Myanmar’s revolutionary hero and founding father, the NLD shocked the junta by winning nearly 80 percent of the seats, compelling the ruling generals to annul the results and establish a new military government.

For much of the next two decades, the NLD was banned and hundreds of its members imprisoned, while Suu Kyi’s international stature grew from house arrest. The NLD boycotted the 2010 elections, which signaled the formal start of the generals’ transition. But the party fielded candidates in 2012 by-elections, giving the military’s liberalization drive much-needed legitimacy in the West and leading to a gradual easing of sanctions. The NLD won 43 of the 44 seats it contested in the upper and lower houses, including one by Suu Kyi, while the USDP lost ground. Perhaps because of this result, the government canceled a second set of by-elections planned for 2014.

The military’s historical pattern of retrenchment following opposition electoral successes naturally raises questions about what would happen if the NLD triumphed again. But from the military’s point of view, the slow transition to a participatory system, as laid out in the 2003 “Roadmap to Discipline-Flourishing Democracy,” has unfolded largely as planned.

The Military’s Worldview

The roadmap set in motion a gradual shift that would help to maintain a high degree of military influence in the new political order, allowing broader public engagement without undermining, in the military’s view, the foundations of the country’s stability and power. In this, Myanmar has mirroredIndonesia’s 1998 transition from over 30 years of New Order rule.

The military’s cautious embrace of democracy is, in part, a response to the inherent geopolitical challenge of governing Myanmar, a country whose fractious geography and pockets of resource-rich territory have continually nurtured powerful ethnic militant groups. The key divide is between the lowland valleys of the Irrawaddy River dominated by the majority ethnic Bamar and the highland areas home to numerous ethnic minority groups. Indeed, since taking power in 1962, the military has felt it imperative to push ethnic armed groups out of the core and into the resource-rich border areas and to hinder political forces that may weaken its ability to do so.

But the military’s heavy-handed pacification strategies alienated it from the international community. And continued isolation left it poor, weak and heavily — over time, almost-exclusively — reliant on Chinese investment to fuel even its relatively anemic economic growth through the 1990s and 2000s. For Myanmar, this was geopolitically untenable, particularly as China emerged from its own spell of isolation to an era of breakneck growth and newfound ability to project power across its borders. Thus, the military establishment increasingly recognized the benefits of an opening to the West that would usher in investment and give the country strategic balance.

Still, the military could not ignore the potential for disorder and fragmentation that might flow from liberalization. So today, in practice, the roadmap means constitutional guarantees to give the elite a degree of buffer from the political forces that they see as a threat to an orderly transition shepherded by the military.

Discipline-Flourishing Democracy in a Divided State

The NLD is widely tipped to win a substantial number of seats, though there are no polls with which to evaluate this claim. The bar for USDP, however, is relatively low. The military — and the establishment — already has substantial protection and extensive powers under the constitution. Amendment would require a vote of more than 75 percent of the legislature, followed by a nationwide referendum. Because the constitution reserves 25 percent of seats in both the upper and the lower houses of parliament for military officers directly appointed by the armed services, any change would require broad military support. The military has also stuffed the bureaucratic ranks with its retirees. Meanwhile, military figures seized control of an array of lucrative enterprises privatized during the opening.

As a result, the Myanmar military, its retirees in parliament and the bureaucracy, and its business allies control many of the country’s levers of power and remain far and away the most coherent force in the country — however popular the NLD may prove to be. Whatever its success at the polls, the NLD will still have to bargain for clout — even if it overcomes the military’s constitutional advantages and wins enough seats to control the speakerships and, possibly, appoint the next president in early 2016 — and the military establishment will still be able to largely set the pace of reform.

The NLD’s ability to push forward even run-of-the-mill legislation will likely be complicated. Although Aung San Suu Kyi has been acclaimed as a democracy icon internationally, in many parts of Myanmar she is still seen as a representative of the interests of her majority Burman ethnic group. This is important. The Nov. 8 election will have two essentially separate theaters: the core areas and the ethnic periphery.

The southern-central Burman-dominated part of the country will fill 291 seats (41 percent of parliament), while the ethnic areas will fill 207 seats (31 percent). The USDP and the NLD are among the few parties running nationwide, but nearly two-thirds of registered parties are ethnically based — up from 40 percent in 2010. Many of the ethnic regions are split among numerous parties representing the overlapping constituencies. Minority voters will be choosing between parties led by their ethnic brethren; the NLD, which represents a vote against the oft-despised military but is not as uniformly popular among minorities as mainstream narratives suggest; and the USDP, which has channeled development funds and infrastructure to these areas and whose support from Buddhist nationalists extends beyond the Burman core. The ethnic parties thus have a strong chance of gaining a sizable number of seats and greatly complicating the picture in parliament, which for the past three years has been divided essentially between the NLD and USDP.

Though most ethnic groups are fragmented into a number of competing parties, one ethnicity has managed to unify its factions: the Rakhine. The Rakhine comprise 3.5 percent of Myanmar’s population but control a western state that fronts the Bay of Bengal. Rakhine state is also the origin point of an oil and natural gas pipeline to China and home to the lucrative Shwe natural gas fields, a key driver of GDP. The Rakhine parties have merged into the Arakan National Party, which has a strong chance of winning many of the 78 seats it is contesting. The party’s leadership has already said its ambition is to lead the state-level parliament and gain presidential appointment to the chief minister post, suggesting it would make a deal to do so.

The Rakhine are also notable because their state is the flashpoint of a nationwide movement toward Buddhist nationalism, which has manifested itself most concretely in communal violence against Muslim minority ethnic Rohingya. Unlike the small ethnic parties, this movement has the potential to transcend ethnic boundaries: Between 80 and 89 percent of the country practices Buddhism, including the majorities of the ethnic Burman, Shan, Rakhine, Mon and Karen. So far, the organization forwarding this movement has been the Race and Religion Protection Association, which is pro-Buddhist and anti-Muslim (and foreigner). A pro-Buddhist party also seen as aligned with the military, the National Development Party, was founded in July 2015 and is contesting a stunning 365 seats. The USDP has backed anti-Muslim bills in parliament as well. If the Arakan National Party, National Development Party and USDP can strike bargains over these issues, a Buddhist nationalist bloc has the chance of emerging in parliament, much like Sri Lanka. As a result of this rising sentiment, the NLD has found it difficult, for example, to defend the ethnic Rohingya and has been criticized when its leaders speak up.

New Democracy, New Uncertainties

As a result, Myanmar will emerge from the Nov. 8 polls with a more pluralistic, complex and racially charged political environment at a time when rapid growth and change heightens the stakes.

If the USDP does sufficiently well, it will certainly have to contend with a more robust NLD presence and the unpredictability of swing-voting ethnic parties. If the NLD sweeps the polls, to govern from a position of strength that does not threaten the military’s core interests beyond what it can tolerate, the party will still need to negotiate some sort of status quo with the ethnic parties and the USDP, not to mention the broader military establishment. A constitutional clause bars Suu Kyi from running for the presidency, but if an NLD win puts it in position to appoint the next president in January, there is an outside chance that it could expose unforeseen fractures in the military, further clouding the picture — particularly if it tries to peel off moderate military officers by appointing a former general like recently ousted USDP chief Shwe Mann.

Either party would face immediate and seemingly intractable problems, such as implementing the Nationwide Cease-fire Agreement and finding a way to pacify the powerful ethnic militias that have held out from negotiations. An unstable parliament that reflects a broader power struggle and changing of the guard would be less than conducive for addressing these and challenges to come. The military elite may have been planning for this election for 27 years, and in doing so their interests and perks of power have likely been largely secured. They can also look at neighbors such as Thailand to see how militaries can ease overt control but remain their country’s ultimate arbiters of power. But if the roadmap to democracy ends at elections, the next stretch is likely to be anything but orderly.

An increasingly complex political environment could present certain opportunities for countries such as China, which has held talks not only with USDP and NLD but also with the Arakan National Party. Beijing might manage to regain some of the influence it lost in the 2011 transition if it can play these parties off one another. The West, if Suu Kyi’s NLD is in power, will also find it easier to engage with Myanmar, perhaps increasing ties and investment.

A lack of coordination among Germany’s officials is chipping away at the popular perception of the Berlin government as a well-oiled machine. In the latest example of internal discord, a government spokesperson said Thursday that Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziere had decided to reintroduce EU regulations on asylum seekers without first informing the country’s chancellor or refugee coordinator. On the surface, this behavior might seem erratic or even indicate a competition for power among German ministries taking place beneath the surface, but in reality it hints at a much deeper problem — one that could seriously undermine Chancellor Angela Merkel’s government and have wide-ranging repercussions for the rest of Europe.

The ongoing refugee crisis has overwhelmed Merkel. The German chancellor is famous for her ability to sense the direction of public opinion and adjust her policies accordingly. This time, though, many think she may have miscalculated. When asylum seekers began arriving en masse to Germany early this summer, Merkel promised that her country would receive them with open arms — and open borders. And Germans initially supported her decision, which they saw as an opportunity to show solidarity to those in need.

But as the influx of people grew, many Germans started to worry that their government had failed to assess the true magnitude of the crisis. Suddenly, Merkel was no longer the infallible leader who could do no wrong but an impulsive head of government who had put her country in danger. Some began to see the chancellor’s famous statement about refugees — “we can manage” — as proof that Berlin had lost control of the immigration problem.

Doubt began to build among the German people, and cracks formed within the coalition government. The center-right pushed for a tougher stance on immigration, while the center-left found itself trapped between its ideological sympathy for asylum seekers and its need to respond to voters’ demands. Conservative lawmakers who were already upset by what they perceived to be a soft stance on Greece renewed their vocal criticism of Merkel. As a result, the German administration hardened its position on migration while chaos within the government reached new heights. Questions arose about whether Merkel would be able to complete her third term, which is set to end in late 2017.

At the moment, Merkel’s position is not under threat. Even if Germany’s conservatives decide to withdraw their support, the process required to replace a German chancellor is extremely cumbersome and requires lawmakers to show that they can appoint a new government to replace its fallen predecessor. But if the center-right chooses to stop backing Merkel, the center-left probably will not be far behind. At that point, early elections would be nearly impossible to avoid.

Nobody in Germany is ready for a new round of elections, at least not right now. The popularity of Merkel’s conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) has declined since the refugee crisis began, which has reduced the party’s appetite for an early vote. Meanwhile, Germany’s center-left is still trying to sort out its own contradicting imperatives and has no clear candidate to put forth for the chancellorship. And as the country’s major parties struggle in the polls, support for the anti-immigration Alternative for Germany party has reached a record high of about 10 percent, and attacks against immigrants are becoming more frequent. Altogether, the complexity of Germany’s current political situation means that the chances of new elections taking place in 2016 are slim.

Still, many things could happen in the coming months that would have long-term ramifications for the country and the Continent. Even if Merkel keeps her job, the ruling coalition could become increasingly ineffective, and infighting over her succession could undermine her leadership. Elections in several German regions in 2016 will test the popularity of the parties within Merkel’s coalition, and the outcome will affect their calculations about seeking early elections. Should the CDU perform poorly, party members will probably start planning for a future without Merkel.

The problem is, the CDU does not have many natural successor candidates to choose from. The only party figure who rivals Merkel is Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble, an experienced politician who lost his race to head the CDU to Merkel over a decade ago. The Greek crisis revealed a more virulent side of Schaeuble, who went so far as to suggest that Athens be expelled from the eurozone, but he has remained relatively quiet throughout the refugee crisis and has only sporadically criticized the government’s policy. With his image as the defender of Germany’s fiscal stability and economic interests, some think Schaeuble may be preparing to challenge Merkel for her post.

Regardless of who heads the government, though, the current situation in German politics is important for several reasons. First, a government too focused on dealing with internal disputes and preparing for new elections will be less effective in leading the European Union as it deals with a number of major issues, including heightened tensions with Russia and the migration of massive numbers of refugees. Second, the emergence of a political crisis as the already-existing migration crisis plays out could lead to a more inward-looking and Euroskeptic government. This year’s events have already debunked several myths about the European Union, from the irreversibility of the eurozone to the sanctity of open borders; if a new German government arises from the ashes of the immigration and Greek financial crises, its effects will be felt across the entire bloc.

The fighting in eastern Ukraine may be on the verge of getting worse, perhaps even moving beyond skirmishes to actual limited offensives. Over the past week, we have seen an uptick in fighting along the demarcation line in eastern Ukraine, as well as movements of equipment back to the front line by both sides.

At the same time, it is becoming clear that Ukraine will not be implementing legal changes as required by the Minsk agreement within the timeframe that was put forward, and deadlines will have to be extended for the accord to be implemented. And pushing back the Minsk agreement implementation timeline means European sanctions on Russia are unlikely to expire in January, diminishing the incentive the separatists and Moscow have to tamp down the fighting.

Analysis

The situation on the demarcation line had been relatively calm since Sept. 1, and cease-fire violations were becoming a rarity, but this has changed since the end of October. Independent reports of cease-fire violations in the Donestk sector have started to emerge more frequently, and although they were not initially mentioned in official accounts on the status of the cease-fire, the volume of infractions, which are now rather overt, has continued to increase.

Separatist forces and the Ukrainian army were scheduled to start removing lower-caliber mortars from the front line in the Donestk sector Nov. 6. But mortars are being used once again. Both sides have also started bringing equipment that had previously been withdrawn back to the front line. These movements do not necessarily mean either side is planning to ramp up military activities on the demarcation line — they are a logical consequence of the uptick in fighting — but they are still worrying. Each side will be forced to put into place contingencies to deal with an offensive from the other.

Withdrawals had been taking place on track with the timeline for the implementation of the Minsk agreement, and tanks, artillery pieces and heavy mortars had already been removed. Initially, cease-fire violations involved the use of small arms almost exclusively, including rifles, heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades. As the escalation continued, however, mortar fire began to be seen, and there were a few reports of the use of heavy artillery and tanks. One incident even mentioned the firing of a Grad rocket, which landed in the center of Donetsk. There is no evidence that the rocket was launched from Ukraine-controlled territory, but within the conflict the use of Grad rockets stands as a reminder of the most intense periods of fighting.

There are clear indications that Moscow is still in control of the situation in separatist-controlled areas. A high-level Russian official recently paid a visit to Donetsk, and Russian troops are still visibly present in the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk. It is notable, however, that the escalation over the past weeks has been concentrated only in the area north and west of the city of Donetsk. The Luhansk and Mariupol sectors have been less active. This suggests that Moscow or separatist leaders have not given a general order for separatist militias to engage Ukrainian forces all across the contact line. It could also simply mean preparations for an operation in the Donetsk area are still underway.

No major preparations are visible right now that would indicate offensive operations are looming, but the Donetsk sector is the gateway to towns such as Slovyansk and Kramatorsk — areas the separatists once held. As the prospect of Kiev immediately implementing the Minsk agreement fades — and with it any hope in Moscow for the imminent removal of sanctions — there are fewer reasons for the Ukrainian separatists in the east to clamp down on cease-fire violations. And as violations go up, so does the risk of a return to active offensives.

The concept of the failed state is meaningless. It was invented as a rationale to impose US interests on less powerful nations.

In the same week that the investigative reporter Jeremy Scahill spoke of the need for the US to “take a humility pill”, we’ve been subjected to precisely the opposite – yet another instalment of Foreign Policy magazine’s annual Failed States Index, complete with accompanying “postcards from hell” purporting to show what it’s like “living on the edge in the world’s worst places”.

Quibbling with the many bizarre claims of the index is tempting (Kenya is “less stable” than Syria, we learn), but in the end such gripes only give credibility to this tedious yearly exercise in faux-empirical cultural bigotry. For anyone interested in actually finding out about places such as Yemen or Uganda, the index is probably the last place you’d want to go. But what’s more interesting, and more helpful in understanding what the index really does, is to grasp that the very concept of the “failed state” comes with its own story.

The organisation that produces the index, the Fund for Peace, is the kind of outfit John le Carré thinks we should all be having nightmares about. Its director, JJ Messner (who puts together the list), is a former lobbyist for the private military industry. None of the raw data behind the index is made public. So why on earth would an organisation like this want to keep the idea of the failed state prominent in public discourse?

The main reason is that the concept of the failed state has never existed outside a programme for western intervention. It has always been a way of constructing a rationale for imposing US interests on less powerful nations.

Luckily, we can pinpoint exactly where it all began – right down to the words on the page. The failed state was invented in late 1992 by Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner, two US state department employees, in an article in – you guessed it – Foreign Policy, suggestively entitled Saving failed states. With the end of the cold war, they argued, “a disturbing new phenomenon is emerging: the failed nation state, utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community”. And with that, the beast was born.

What followed in the essay was a grumpy version of the history of the “third world” after 1945, in which Helman and Ratner lamented that the claims of “self-determination” made by colonised peoples had ever been established as a major principle for organising international affairs. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, Helman and Ratner argued, the time for fripperies such as state sovereignty for third world nations was over. What these failed states needed was the ever-benign “guardianship” of the western world. We westerners would keep hold of our sovereignty, of course; they would make do with something called “survivability” instead, and be grateful for it.

 Details are still emerging as to precisely who was responsible for the Nov. 13 Paris attacks. Sorting through the jumble of misinformation and disinformation will be challenging for French authorities, and for outside observers such as Stratfor.

While the Islamic State has claimed credit for the attack, it is still uncertain to what degree the Islamic State core organization was responsible for planning, funding or directing it. It is not clear whether the attackers were grassroots operatives encouraged by the organization like Paris Kosher Deli gunman Ahmed Coulibaly, if the operatives were professional terrorist cadres dispatched by the core group or if the attack was some combination of the two.

Analysis

French President Francois Hollande publicly placed responsibility for the Nov. 13 attack on the Islamic State, declaring it an act of war. This French response to the Paris attacks is markedly different from that of the Spanish Government following the March 2004 Madrid train bombings. Instead of pulling back from the global coalition working against jihadism, it appears that the French will renew and perhaps expand their efforts to pursue revenge for the most recent assault. The precise nature of this response will be determined by who is ultimately found to be the author of the Nov. 13 attack.

To date, there has been something akin to a division of labor in the anti-jihadist effort, with the French heavily focused on the Sahel region of Africa. The French have also supported coalition efforts in Iraq and Syria, stationing six Dassault Rafale jets in the United Arab Emirates and six Mirage jets in Jordan. On Nov. 4, Paris announced it was sending the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle to enhance ongoing airstrikes against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. To date, French aircraft have flown more than 1,285 missions against Islamic State targets in Iraq, and only two sorties in Syria.

France has numerous options for retaliation at its disposal, but its response will be conditioned by who was ultimately responsible. If it is found that the Islamic State core group was indeed behind the Nov. 13 attack, France will likely ramp up its Syrian air operations. The skies over Syria, however, are already congested with coalition and Russian aircraft. With this in mind, the French may choose to retaliate by focusing instead on the Islamic State in Iraq, or perhaps even other Islamic State provinces in places such as Libya. Another option would be to increase French programs to train and support anti-Islamic State forces in Iraq and Syria, or even to conduct commando strikes against key leadership nodes. France also has the option of deploying an expeditionary force like it did in the Sahel, although that would probably require outside airlift capacity from NATO allies, especially the United States.

European Ramifications

The Paris attacks occurred during a Europe-wide political crisis over migrant flows from the Middle East, Asia and Africa. A Syrian passport was found near the body of one of the Paris attackers, prompting a Greek official to say Nov. 14 that the name on the document belonged to a person who passed though Greece in October. This news means that a number of politicians critical of the European Union’s response to the immigrant crisis will amplify their disapproval. In particular, advocates who want to end the Schengen agreement, which eliminated border controls in Europe, will use Paris to support their cause.

This has already begun. Poland became the first country to link the Paris attacks to the uptick in immigration. On Nov. 14, Polish Minister for European Affairs-designate Konrad Szymanski said the Paris attacks make impossible the implementation of an EU plan to distribute asylum seekers across the Continental bloc. As expected, France’s National Front party also demanded the end of the Schengen agreement. In a televised speech, party leader Marine Le Pen said France has to “recapture control of its borders.”

In Germany, Bavarian Prime Minister Horst Seehofer said the Paris attack demonstrates that border controls are more necessary than ever. Seehofer has been very critical of the German government’s handling of the refugee crisis, demanding permanent border controls as well as faster repatriation of asylum seekers. The Paris attack will likely strengthen his position and further weaken the government of Chancellor Angela Merkel, which was already facing internal dissent because of the migration crisis. In recent weeks Germany has seen an increase in anti-immigrant violence, including arson attacks against refugee shelters. The Nov. 13 attacks may encourage more extremist groups across Europe to attack asylum seekers.

The anti-Schengen camp will feel vindicated by a parallel event that took place in southern Germany last week, when a Montenegrin citizen was arrested while allegedly driving to Paris with several weapons. While German police have not established a direct connection between this incident and the Nov. 13 attacks, they have said that a link cannot be ruled out. The fact that this man was from Montenegro — a country in the Western Balkans — and made it to Germany in his car will strengthen the demands for stricter border controls along the so-called Balkan route of migration, which connects Greece to Northern Europe.

The Paris attacks will therefore improve the popularity of anti-immigration parties in many European countries, and continue to weaken popular support for the Schengen agreement. Several countries, including Germany, Sweden, Slovenia and Hungary had already re-established border controls because of the immigration crisis. Hungary and Slovenia have gone as far as building fences along their borders. After the Nov. 13 attacks, most EU governments will find it hard to justify a policy of open borders.

Until Nov. 13, the eight attackers responsible for the night of violence in Paris were just a handful of radical Islamists in a large universe of Islamist radicals in France. Many of these radicals are nonviolent, while a small segment of them are extremists who espouse violence to achieve their radical agenda — the type we refer to as jihadists.

Yet even among the jihadists who advocate violence, there are divisions. Some maintain that jihad should be waged only defensively in support of fellow Muslims being oppressed or attacked in places such as Syria. Another subset advocates for attacks in a Western country such as France. Even among the latter group, there are those whose threats are merely hot air and those who are actually willing to act. Even among those willing to attack there are actors who pose different degrees of threat.

For French authorities, sorting through the universe of potential attackers to identify those who pose the greatest risk is a daunting challenge — as it is for any other government. The process is like a shark attempting to select a few fish from among a vast shoal of baitfish swimming in unison. A shark has an incredible sensory array that is extremely effective at identifying prey to be devoured by its rows of formidable teeth. But the shoal provides security by making it next to impossible for the shark to identify the specific individual fish its needs to target.

This is exactly the situation in which the French authorities find themselves. They have incredible intelligence capabilities (sensors) and very capable police and military forces (teeth). Yet, those intelligence and enforcement resources are quite limited and can be overwhelmed by the sheer size of the shoal of potential jihadist attackers.

It requires an incredible amount of resources to maintain live telephone taps on one target, much less 24/7 physical surveillance. This means that security services very quickly reach their capacity. Thus, they need to use risk assessments to rank the potential threats and deploy their resources selectively against those threats deemed the most dangerous. This is especially true in a democratic country such at France, where there is rule of law and one cannot just conduct sweeps to arrest every known potential threat and then sort them out in prison. But frankly, as seen in even authoritarian countries, one simply cannot arrest (or kill) their way out of the problem and, often, draconian measures serve only to fuel anger and resentment, further aiding in radicalization.

Because of this reality, some attackers will slip through the screen, no matter the proficiency of security services. Once they attack, they are immediately removed from the shoal of potential threats and are subjected to an incredible amount of scrutiny. Their electronics will be seized as evidence and searched, and their past travel, associations and communications will be reviewed under a microscope. Under this heavy scrutiny, investigators will undoubtedly find clear warnings and indicators that the attackers were up to no good before the attack. Indeed, we will undoubtedly that some, if not all the attackers had previously come to the attention of the authorities.

To use another analogy, prior to the attack, the authorities had a mountainous pile of puzzle pieces with no frame or reference picture — some of those pieces could have led them to these attackers had they been assembled. But sorting through a gigantic pile of pieces of data and putting those pieces together without a frame of reference is often very difficult. Following this attack, the French authorities now have both the frame and the reference picture, and as they examine individual pieces of information, they will be able to place them into context using the frame of reference and (in retrospect) discover smoking guns.

Many will criticize the French government for missing such obvious clues, but those who do have lost sight of the initial challenge of the shoal of suspects and the vast amounts of data associated with each individual fish. Hindsight can be far more acute than foresight.

What we know so far: The Islamic State has claimed responsibility for multiple attacks in Paris. 

—President Francois Hollande called the attacks an “act of war” and said France’s response would be “merciless.” He declared a nationwide state of emergency late Friday.
—Hollande said 127 people had died in multiple attacks. French officials said there were eight known attackers—seven of them suicide bombers who had blown themselves up. The eighth was shot dead by police.

—There were at least six attacks: the Bataclan concert hall; Stade de France (the national stadium), La Carillon bar in the 10th arrondissement, La Petit Cambodge in the 10th arrondissement, La Belle Equipe in the 11th arrondissement, and La Casa Nostra in the 11th arrondissement.

The Islamic State appears to be claiming responsibility for multiple attacks in Paris on Friday night that killed at least 127 people and wounded dozens of others.
Here’s part of the statement from the group, translation for which was provided by SITE, which tracks militant organizations:

The One World Trade Center spire is lit blue, white and red after New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo announced the lighting in honor of dozens killed in the Paris attacks Friday, Nov. 13, 2015, in New York. French officials say several dozen people have been killed in shootings and explosions at a theater, restaurant and elsewhere in Paris. (AP Photo/Kevin Hagen)

Let France and those who walk in its path know that they will remain on the top of the list of targets of the Islamic State, and that the smell of death will never leave their noses as long as they lead the convoy of the Crusader campaign, and dare to curse our Prophet, Allah’s peace and blessings be upon him, and are proud of fighting Islam in France and striking the Muslims in the land of the Caliphate with their planes, which did not help them at all in the streets of Paris and its rotten alleys. This attack is the first of the storm and a warning to those who wish to learn. 
Speaking on national television earlier Saturday, President Francois Hollande called Friday’s attacks an “an act of war … prepared and planned from the outside, with accomplices inside.”

He said France’s response will be “merciless against the terrorists.” Hollande declared three days of mourning for the victims, as France announced a series of security measure in the wake of the attacks, including the indefinite closing of the Eiffel Tower.

On Friday, as the attacks were unfolding and the scale of the carnage unclear, Hollande declared a nationwide state of emergency. The attacks are the worst violence on French soil since World War II, and the worst in Europe since 2004 when coordinated blasts on Madrid’s commuter train system killed 191 people. The attacks also came 10 months after two Islamist gunmen killed 11 people at the offices of the Paris-based Charlie Hebdo, the French satirical magazine. Several attacks around Paris that followed the Charlie Hebdo massacre killed an additional five people.
France was already on high alert following those attacks when the events of Friday night unfolded. There were attacks on two restaurants in the 10th arrondissement (at least 12 dead in gun attacks) and two on restaurants in the 11th arrondissement (at least 24 dead). The national stadium, where France was playing Germany in a soccer match, was also attacked (at least three attackers dead), as was the Bataclan concert venue, which was packed with fans of Eagles of Death Metal, a rock band from California (at least 80 dead).

A clip on Vine showed the moment of the attack during the soccer match.
According to L’Express, Hollande was in attendance, but was moved to safety.

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Neighboring countries, including Italy and Belgium, said they were increasing security following the attacks, condemnation of which was near-universal.
Speaking in Vienna, where he is attending a meeting on the Syrian civil war, John Kerry, the U.S. secretary of state, called the attacks “vile, horrendous, outrageous.” British Prime Minister David Cameron vowed to do “whatever we can to help” France. “We are crying with you,” German Chancellor Angela Merkel said. “Together with you, we will fight against those who have carried out such an unfathomable act against you.” On Friday night, even as the events were unfolding, President Obama called the situation “heartbreaking.”