Young Diplomats

A leading British member of the Islamic State, known as Jihadi John, and three other foreign militants have been killed in U.S.-led airstrikes in Raqqa, Reuters reported Nov. 13, citing the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.

The Briton was featured in Islamic State videos showing the killing of American and British hostages. An unnamed U.S. official could not officially confirm the reports but said that the strikes had probably killed the man. The use of media as a tool of terror has become more common, but while criminals and terrorists can use technology to record and publicize their attacks, investigators can use the same tools to help prevent them

Forecast

• German conservatives’ criticism of what they perceive as Berlin’s soft approach to EU issues will not abate and will affect Germany’s foreign and domestic policies in 2016 and particularly after elections in 2017.
• Within two years, conservative and mildly Euroskeptic governments are likely to rule in Germany and France — the main economic and political players in Europe.
• Berlin and Paris will continue to have different ideas regarding the future of the European Union, but rather than debating on how to deepen continental integration, they will discuss how to reverse some aspects of integration to preserve the bloc.

Analysis

German Chancellor Angela Merkel is struggling to preserve the cohesion of the German government. The leaders of the three parties in power — Merkel’s conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU); its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU); and the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD) — met Oct. 31 but failed to reach consensus on measures to cope with the immigration crisis. However, after the meeting officially ended, Merkel and Bavarian President Horst Seehofer released a joint position paper calling for the creation of transit zones for migrants at the Germany-Austria border and the suspension of family reunification for certain groups of migrants. During a Nov. 5 meeting, the three parties replaced the idea of transit zones with a proposal to build new reception centers for immigrants and plans to make deportations faster.

These actions confirm that pressure from the Bavarian party is shaping Merkel’s reaction to the refugee crisis. They also show that Merkel thinks she can convince the SPD, which is against the creation of transit zones, to adopt a tougher stance on immigration. Neither the SPD nor the CSU is ready for early elections, so the continuity of the government is not in danger at this point. But the events of 2015 have shown the limitations of a grand coalition government in times of crisis and will push Germany’s main political forces to redefine their ideological positions before the general elections of 2017.

Two Crises in One Year

Berlin spent the first half of 2015 focusing on Greece, which got dangerously close to leaving the eurozone. During the second half of the year, Berlin had to deal with the immigration crisis as hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers moved across Europe trying to reach the wealthy economies in the north. These crises sparked revolts among conservative factions in the German government and created confusion among progressive factions.

When it comes to the European Union, Germany needs to keep the continental bloc alive, especially for its relationship with France. It also needs to protect its national wealth and prevent the European Union from becoming a transfer union in which wealthy economies in the north subsidize those in the south. Though most German politicians are interested in protecting both imperatives, the largest parties have different views of what is the best balance between the two.

In general, the CDU and the CSU tend to prioritize the protection of Germany’s national wealth and think that Berlin and its neighbors should focus on the establishment of strong rules to govern an increasingly complex European Union. The SPD agrees with this view, but it tends to be more willing to make concessions to other countries, especially those in the south, to ensure the European Union’s political viability. Finding the right balance becomes particularly hard when Germany is ruled by a grand coalition that includes the three parties.

In the early months of her third term, Merkel implemented many measures from the progressives’ agenda, including passing a minimum wage and lowering the age of retirement. The measures disoriented both camps. The progressives accused Merkel of using their agenda to boost her popularity. The conservatives warned she was moving too close to the center. During the Greek crisis, Merkel’s efforts to extract concessions from Greece without expelling it from the eurozone infuriated many conservative lawmakers. SPD members were also unable to choose between their natural tendency to accommodate a fellow center-left party (Greece’s Syriza) and most German voters’ desire to be tough on Athens.

The refugee crisis is creating similar problems. The CSU and several members of the CDU demand a tougher stance on asylum seekers, which explains Merkel’s recent policy shift. The SPD is trapped between its ideology, which tends to be sympathetic with asylum seekers, and the growing fear among voters that the German state is spending too many resources to deal with a migrant influx of a size that is still impossible to determine. In the meantime, Merkel’s image as an efficient problem solver has been damaged, maybe permanently.

Avoiding the ‘Die Linke’ Trap

As the next general elections approach, Germany’s main parties will try to more clearly define their positions after four years in a grand coalition. The conservatives’ main concern will be preventing the emergence of new electoral parties on the right. Other conservative parties have rarely competed with the CDU and the CSU. The closest these parties saw to competition was the Free Democratic Party, a small centrist party that formed government alliances with both the CDU and the SPD.

For the SPD, however, the situation is more complex, as disenchanted SPD voters express their anger at the party by turning to the left-wing Die Linke (The Left) or to the environmentalist party The Greens. Disenchanted CDU and CSU voters have little to choose from — or at least they did until the Euroskeptic Alternative for Germany emerged in 2013. The party, which was born as a sophisticated club of university professors campaigning against Germany’s membership in the eurozone, soon evolved into an anti-immigration party with a more traditional right-wing agenda. Alternative for Germany’s rebranding coincided with the anti-Islam Pegida group’s rise in popularity.

Germany’s history and political culture will prevent Alternative for Germany from entering a coalition government any time soon. However, the party will influence the country’s political debate far beyond what its current popularity (around 8 percent) suggests. As the Greek crisis — and especially the immigration crisis — shows, a combination of ideology and fear of losing votes to Alternative for Germany is pushing CDU and CSU politicians to adopt more nationalist and mildly Euroskeptic positions. Meanwhile, the SPD will have to decide between turning to the left and building a clearer identity, and jumping on the Euroskeptic bandwagon.

Repercussions for the European Union

In the coming years, Germany’s view of the European Union will probably resemble that of German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaueble, who sees it as a continental bloc that moves at multiple speeds, in which not every country is meant to reach the same level of political and financial integration and problematic members can be expelled. This view would keep several Central and Eastern European nations from entering the eurozone. Countries such as Poland and Hungary would probably agree with this approach; Warsaw and Budapest are not particularly enthusiastic about joining the common currency. Moreover, because crises in the eurozone periphery are far from over, the possibility of Greece and others leaving the euro cannot be ruled out.

Germany’s coming approach to Europe will probably also include small doses of the CSU’s view of a European Union where foundational principles such as the free movement of people could be suspended or reversed to protect national and regional interests. Germany’s new view could also have some elements of the SPD’s foreign policy agenda, which is based on cordial but distant ties with the United States and fluid energy and trade ties with Russia.

The transition will be slow and will not be fully felt until after elections in 2017. However, 2016 will offer some early signals of the change. To begin with, Germany will probably be more receptive to the United Kingdom’s request to protect the interests of non-eurozone countries, keep the EU budget under control and curtail immigrants’ access to welfare benefits. A full revision of the EU treaties is unlikely, but Berlin and London will work on ways to accommodate some of the United Kingdom’s requests. At the same time, Germany will resist France’s push for deeper financial integration, especially if it means creating separate budgets for the eurozone or a mechanism for fiscal transfers from northern Europe to the south.

In the short run, this will create friction between Berlin and Paris. However, it could be short-lived, because France will probably become more Euroskeptic after it holds its own general elections in 2017. The ruling Socialist party will struggle to make it to the second round of France’s presidential elections, which will probably end up pitting a moderately Euroskeptic center-right (especially if former President Nicolas Sarkozy defeats Alain Juppe to become the conservative candidate) against a ferociously anti-EU right (the National Front).

The next administration in Paris is likely to make two policy decisions that Berlin will support: defending tougher policies on immigrants and preventing new countries from joining the European Union and the eurozone. But a more nationalist government in France could also request the introduction of temporary exceptions in the free movement of goods in Europe to protect some sectors such as agriculture. This would be the ultimate red line for Germany, a nation that depends on exports to keep unemployment at tolerable levels.

Disagreements between France and Germany will not end with the elections in 2017, but the nature of the debate will change. Since the beginning of the economic crisis, the discussions between Paris and Berlin focused on how to deepen European integration to prevent new crises. This was controversial enough, because Berlin and Paris have different views on what the future integration should look like. However, starting in late 2017, the debate will begin focusing on how to reverse some aspects of continental integration to try to save the European Union.

Summary

Ukraine is likely to undergo a significant political shake-up after the ruling coalition’s main parties performed poorly in recent local elections. This overhaul likely will include a Cabinet reshuffle, the replacement of several key ministers, and a public campaign to crack down on corruption and, more specifically, on powerful oligarchs. The Western-oriented government led by Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko and Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk will probably remain intact in the near term, but increasing pressures and growing political instability in Kiev will have important implications domestically and for Ukraine’s relationships with Russia and the West.

Analysis

Mayoral and city council seats were contested throughout most of Ukraine in elections on Oct. 25. Although official results will not be available until after Nov. 15, when some cities and regions hold runoff elections, the initial vote made it clear that Ukraine is still deeply a divided country. Regions in western and central Ukraine favor pro-Western parties, while eastern and southern regions show more support for the pro-Russian Opposition Bloc party. Notably, the major parties in Ukraine’s ruling coalition did not perform particularly well. The Poroshenko Bloc lost ground to other Western-oriented parties such as Samopomych, and the People’s Front party founded by Yatsenyuk in 2014 fared so badly in polls before the vote that it refrained from even participating in elections.

Poroshenko’s and Yatsenyuk’s parties dominated the most recent parliamentary elections, which were held in October 2014. But since then, Yatsenyuk’s popularity has eroded; recent polls show he has less than 5 percent of his own party’s support. He lost much of his base when he championed painful austerity measures to get financing from Western Institutions and prop up the ailing economy amid the conflict in Ukraine. Moreover, much of the population sees high-level corruption as pervasive and views the government as ineffective in areas such as judicial and legal reform. And as Yatsenyuk’s popularity has fallen, so has support for Poroshenko’s party. Today Poroshenko’s and Yatsenyuk’s parties collectively hold only 225 seats in the 450-seat parliament.

Recognizing that public support for the Ukrainian government is declining, Yatsenyuk pledged to enact a major political overhaul, including a reshuffling of the Cabinet, after the elections. The prime minister said he may replace ministers in such areas as energy, health care and education in as little as two weeks. At the same time, Poroshenko has launched a public anti-corruption campaign that included the arrest of Gennady Korban, an influential businessman linked to Ukrainian oligarch Igor Kolomoiski, on bribery charges. According to Poroshenko, the arrest was just the beginning of a broader crackdown on corruption. The president has promised a renewed emphasis on tackling graft in the country.

Although these measures are meant to revitalize support for the government, they put the ruling coalition at some risk. Oligarchs remains extremely influential in Ukrainian politics. Figures like Kolomoiski not only hold major stakes in the country’s banking and energy sector but also wield influence through volunteer battalions operating in eastern Ukraine. Pushing too hard against the oligarchs comes at a price; oligarchs Dmitri Firtash and Rinat Akhmetov withdrew their support from former President Viktor Yanukovich before his ouster in 2014. Poroshenko, himself one of Ukraine’s richest men, will have to proceed cautiously in targeting the more powerful oligarchs as part of his anti-corruption campaign.

Yatsenyuk’s position as prime minister is likely safe for now. Poroshenko has no other party he can work with to maintain a majority in parliament, and Yatsenyuk, as the force behind financial reform in Ukraine, has substantial support from the West. Yatsenyuk also plays a key role in Ukraine’s negotiations with the International Monetary Fund to receive the next tranche of its bailout before the end of the year. However, next year could prove more problematic for the prime minister. Members of his party may take the opportunity to join other Western-oriented parties — something that could lead to early elections or usher in a new prime minister in 2016.

The growing precariousness of the ruling coalition’s position is also likely to have important consequences for Ukraine’s relationship with Russia. The conflict in eastern Ukraine has calmed significantly since temporary cease-fire was established at the beginning of September, and both Ukrainian and separatist forces have begun withdrawing heavy weaponry from the line of contact in accordance with the Minsk agreement. However, following an uptick in fighting in recent days, Ukraine’s Security Council secretary has said that the country will suspend the armament withdrawal if the Russian-backed rebels continue their provocations and use of heavier weapons such as mortars.

Meanwhile, the government is considering delaying controversial constitutional reforms that would grant greater autonomy to the Donbas regions — a key demand by Russia and the separatists. If Kiev does delay the reforms until after the end of the year as it struggles to implement its domestic agenda, tensions with the separatists and Moscow may escalate.

The main theme for Europe in the fourth quarter will be a recurring one: fragmentation. Indeed, the next three months will bring political and even territorial fragmentation to the Continent. The European Union will be dealing with three main issues, the migration crisis and political developments in Spain and Greece.

Germany will be increasingly hemmed in by domestic factors. Pressure from conservative forces within her government will force Chancellor Angela Merkel to continually seek accommodation. This will be the case, for example, with the migration crisis. On the one hand, Germany will introduce reforms to make it easier for refugees to join the workforce. On the other hand, it will toughen its asylum policies to slow the flow of refugees to Germany

Conservative pressure will also be felt in Merkel’s handling of the Greek bailout. Berlin will give Greece’s new administration enough time to come up with a governing plan. However, Berlin will also push Athens to honor its bailout commitments and will be willing to delay the disbursement of money in the likely case the reforms calendar is not respected. Merkel’s position as chancellor is not under threat, but dissidents within her party will remain very vocal, forcing Merkel to seek the middle ground.

The Immigration Crisis

The arrival of asylum seekers will remain problematic for Europe during the quarter, but measures by EU members to enhance land and maritime controls and colder weather will temporarily reduce the influx of migrants into the Continent. During the quarter, Europe will focus its efforts on measures designed to prevent people from entering the Continent, especially by seeking to cooperate with countries in the Middle East and Africa.

However, European efforts to prevent migrants from reaching EU territory will have modest success. The European Union will provide more funds for countries in the Middle East and North Africa. This will only be modestly effective: In countries such as Libya, there is not a central government to negotiate with. The European Union’s naval operation in the Mediterranean Sea will start boarding, searching and seizing vessels in international waters. This will increase the chances of violent clashes between EU forces and human traffickers. In addition, money will not be enough to keep migrants in countries like Turkey or Lebanon, where asylum seekers find legal barriers to work.

Under pressure from conservative forces at home, Germany will toughen its position on asylum, trying to become less attractive for asylum seekers. Access to asylum benefits will be made harder while repatriations will be made easier for certain groups (especially migrants from the Western Balkans). Sporadic border controls will remain in place across the Continent aimed at disrupting migration routes.

The Greek Crisis

During the fourth quarter, the Greek government will introduce just enough measures to receive funds from its bailout program, but the entire schedule of reforms and disbursement of money will be delayed. Because of the general elections that were held in September, Athens postponed the approval of many of the reforms included in its bailout package. As a result, the creditors will probably delay their assessment of the bailout and the disbursements of money (both were originally scheduled for mid-October).

The creditors are likely to give Greek politicians some extra time to come up with a government program and a plan for reform. But several governments in Northern Europe, including Germany, the Netherlands and Finland, invested significant political capital in approving the Greek bailout and promised conservative lawmakers at home that they would keep constant pressure on Athens. This means that the lenders will have some patience with Greece, but pressure will return by the end of the year.

The delays in the reviews and disbursement of money will also delay the International Monetary Fund’s decision on whether to participate in the program. The Greek government will push for debt relief, but the creditors will not make any concrete moves. Talks on debt relief will start during the quarter but will probably not bear any fruit before the end of the year.

After making substantial debt payments to the European Central Bank in July and August, Greece faces a somewhat calmer calendar of debt maturities for the rest of the year. This means that Athens can probably survive a delay in the disbursement of bailout money. However, Greece is not out of the woods. The longer the implementation of the program is delayed, and the longer the disbursement of money is deferred, the greater the fear of a Grexit and the more political frictions within Germany are bound to escalate.

The Spanish Crisis

In Spain, the political effects of its economic crisis will be fully felt as secessionist sentiments continue to create problems between Madrid and Catalonia and as anti-establishment parties challenge the political establishment in the general elections.

In Catalonia, pro-independence forces will spend the first weeks of the quarter trying to form a government because the Together for Yes party, which won the election in September 27th , will need support from the small left-wing CUP party to appoint the next Catalan president.

Friction within the pro-independence parties will delay the secession process somewhat, and the next Catalan government will move cautiously: The Catalan parliament will probably approve a solemn declaration announcing the beginning of the independence process and will also announce plans to draft a constitution. However, political differences within the pro-independence camp will prevent Catalonia from making any drastic moves. The government in Madrid will turn to the Constitutional Court to block whatever measures it believes violate the Spanish Constitution.

At the national level, Spain will get ready for general elections on Dec. 20. After years of crisis, the two largest political parties (the People’s Party and the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party) are discredited and will probably not be strong enough to form a government alone. This will lead to a coalition government, potentially including newcomer parties such as Podemos and Ciudadanos. Considering that Spain has little experience with coalition governments, 2016 will be a year of political fragility, as the decision-making process will become considerably more complex.

Italy and France Dodge EU Sanctions 

The final quarter of the year will be eventful for Italy. Prime Minister Matteo Renzi will push ahead with his agenda of economic and institutional reform while trying to prevent a rebellion within his party and seeking to circumvent the EU Commission. Renzi will make progress in the process of constitutional reform because the Italian Senate will approve a plan to modify the composition and powers of the Senate with the goal of creating more stable governments.

The reform, however, will not be completed during the quarter; approval by the lower chamber and a popular referendum will only happen in 2016. The government in Rome will also introduce tax cuts for households when it presents its budget for 2016.

In France, the Socialist government will continue to make timid moves toward reform in the labor sector. Paris will enter negotiations with unions and businessmen to simplify labor regulations in early 2016. Like Rome, the government in Paris will also introduce tax cuts for households and seek to slow the pace of deficit reduction in its budget for next year. We expect the EU Commission to criticize Italy and France, but formal sanctions are unlikely — another illustration of Brussels’ increasingly politicized role in moderating the Continent’s economic affairs.

France will be particularly active in the Middle East as Paris continues its air campaign against the Islamic State in Syria. The Elysee is worried about being sidelined in negotiations over the future of Syria and will try to position itself alongside the United States as a counterbalance to Russia’s presence in the country. Paris will also seek to mediate the political stalemate between rival political factions in Lebanon when French President Francoise Hollande visits the country late in the quarter, though Paris lacks the weight to meaningfully influence Lebanese politics.

Political Change in the East and the North

The fourth quarter will be very important for the two largest countries in Central and Eastern Europe: Poland and Romania. Poland will hold general elections in October that could result in the defeat of its business-friendly government. Should the nationalist opposition take over, it will try to reverse some of the policies implemented by the previous administration. It could, for example, announce higher taxes for the banking sector and lower the retirement age. Domestic political changes will not, however, substantially modify Poland’s Foreign Policy, which will continue to be based on EU and NATO membership and a tough stance on Russia.

Romania will also face political turmoil during the quarter. Prime Minister Victor Ponta will be under pressure from the opposition to resign, and he will struggle to find support from his own party. But as with Poland, political frictions in Romania will not affect the country’s foreign policy priorities, which involve keeping close ties with the United States and NATO. While political developments may prevent Poland and Romania from making any substantial progress in their bilateral relationship, Warsaw and Bucharest will remain interested in developing closer bilateral ties.

The fourth quarter will also feature the growing debate in Sweden and Finland over the issue of NATO membership. The threat of Russian aggression has prompted leaders in both countries to consider joining the military alliance, with which they already have close ties. While public opinion in Sweden is slowly starting to favor NATO accession, Stockholm will not act without Helsinki on board. Considering that the Finnish government is currently focus on the on-going economic crisis.      Helsinki will be willing to discuss NATO membership but not to make any concrete moves during the quarter.

Climate Change Commitments 

During the fourth quarter, more than 190 countries will send delegates to Paris for the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference in hopes of signing a legally binding deal on environmental standards and emissions targets designed to combat the effects of climate change. Although this will likely be the biggest global climate change deal since the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, it will still remain weak on enforcement, and developing countries will try to make sure emissions targets do not hinder economic development.

The United States and especially the European Union have opted for more aggressive measures targeting climate change. The European Union has outlined a target to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 40 percent from 1990 levels by 2030. The United States has set out a target of 26 percent to 28 percent by 2030 from 2005 levels. Most developing countries have chosen to establish targets on emissions intensity — emissions levels per unit of GDP — instead of targeting overall emission levels. The 2015 Paris summit will lead to some sort of an agreement in December, but it is still an open question whether it will obtain enough votes, particularly from the United States and China, for ratification to be legally binding, as Paris and Brussels hope.

At this time last year, a string of leaderless resistance-style attacks by grassroots jihadists in the West was making people very nervous. And their concern was understandable: In late October 2014, the tempo of attacks by grassroots jihadists in the West reached its highest point in history. The spike in activity largely stemmed from a statement made by Islamic State spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani a month earlier, urging individuals in Western countries to:

“… single out the disbelieving American, Frenchman, or any of their allies. Smash his head with a rock, or slaughter him with a knife, or run him over with your car, or throw him down from a high place, or choke him, or poison him.”

The wave of violence continued through the end of 2014 and into 2015, as assailants struck Australia and France in December, followed closely by the Charlie Hebdo Attack in Paris in January and the Copenhagen attack in February. But since that time, it has become clear that the momentum of the attacks has slowed, and that grassroots jihadists have not been able to keep up a consistent tempo of striking multiple times each month. In other words, the violence taking place in October last year was an anomaly, not the start of an emerging trend. The question is: Why didn’t the movement gain more traction?

The Limited Appeal of Jihadism

At least some of the reduction in violence can be traced to stepped up law enforcement efforts to identify potential attackers and disrupt plots. But it is also becoming increasingly clear that, the Islamic State’s appeal has its limits, and after an initial spurt of dramatic growth, the group seems to have reached its pinnacle. Now, the market for its ideology has hit a point of saturation, and its recruiting attempts are becoming less and less successful.

This is not to say that the jihadist ideology, or even the Islamic State’s version of it, will disappear anytime soon. Jihadist insurgencies and terrorist attacks will persist for the foreseeable future, albeit at a slower tempo. However, the factors that led to the Islamic State’s stunning rise in popularity last year — the group’s territorial gains, its successes against authorities, and its propaganda — are starting to wear out. Much of the group’s appeal lay in its portrayal of itself as an agent of apocalyptic Islamic prophecy. The Islamic State wasn’t just talking about the end of times; it was actively working to make it happen.

There are other ways the group’s diminishing appeal is making itself known. In addition to the slowing tempo of grassroots attacks, many reports have surfaced in recent months of the Islamic State arresting and executing its fighters as traitors when they try to leave the group’s territory and return home. The days of the “five-star jihad” that promised lavish lifestyles to new recruits are clearly over, and many of the foreign fighters who traveled to Syria and Iraq have become disenchanted with the Islamic State — especially because many of the people they are fighting and killing are other Muslims.

A recent remark by FBI Director James Comey highlighted this trend when he said that fewer Americans are attempting to travel abroad to join the Islamic State. Of course, some of the decline could be explained by officials’ efforts to make travel more difficult, but the key thing to note is Comey’s phrasing: He said fewer people are attempting to travel to join the group, not that fewer people have successfully traveled there. There also has not been a corresponding spike in attacks by Islamic State supporters who may have been prevented from traveling, or a spike in arrests of people trying to travel to Islamic State-held territory. Clearly, the group’s appeal has waned among American Muslims since last year, and many of its remaining supporters appear to be losing their zeal to be arrested or killed during an attack in the West.

Exposing the Islamic State’s Vulnerability

Prior to the U.S.-led coalition’s bombing operations over the past year, the Islamic State seemed to be invincible as it gobbled up large portions of Iraq and Syria. The media’s coverage of these conquests only added to the hype as it portrayed the group as far more powerful than it actually was. The Islamic State’s battlefield successes, coupled with the media limelight, played right into the group’s apocalyptic propaganda that the end of times was near, and that it would triumph and conquer the world. To Muslims seeking a transcendent cause, the Islamic State’s message held great appeal.

But since that time, the coalition’s bombing efforts have significantly degraded the Islamic State’s capabilities, even if they have not destroyed the group entirely. As a result, it has stymied the Islamic State’s spread, as has the human geography of the region, and the group has not seen much success beyond Sunni areas. In fact, in many areas, such as northern Syria, coalition air power has played a decisive role in helping forces such as the Kurds push the Islamic State back from key border crossings. While smuggling in and out of Islamic State territory still occurs, the volume of goods and people crossing the border is undoubtedly far less than it was when the Islamic State controlled strategic areas around it.

By halting the group’s advance and destroying its military units, the coalition has also helped curtail the Islamic State’s biggest supply of resources: the homes, farms, business, goods and people that do not belong to the group, as well as the taxes levied on conquered citizens. This type of logistical model is severely undermined once conquerors can no longer acquire more territory to rape and pillage to support the areas already under their control.

And make no mistake, controlling territory requires resources, especially in large cities the size of Mosul. The rulers of such cities must provide services, utilities, food, water and security for the population, all while guarding against any threats from locals who are unhappy with their rule. So while many have noted that the Islamic State is “the richest terrorist group in history,” they must also account for the vast economic drain that comes with holding and governing the amount of territory the Islamic State has, on top of the financial toll its war efforts are taking.

The Draw of Apocalyptic Ambitions

The Islamic State’s brutal rape and pillage strategy has not alienated all of its potential recruits. For many in the region controlled by the Islamic State, they have no other choice but to support the group or die, and often few other career opportunities exist. But beyond these captive supporters, there are still many who have volunteered to support the caliphate experiment because of its transcendent purpose and because the idea of approaching the final days is so powerful that it can override any qualms about how the end is to be achieved. If you are fulfilling an apocalyptic prophecy, does it really matter that you murdered, raped and robbed?

The Islamic State’s end goal is powerfully appealing to jihadists around the world, and even beyond to many non-jihadist Muslims. The opportunity to bring about an Islamic prophecy is exciting, and Islamic State leaders truely believe what they are preaching. The group’s barbaric actions prove that its leaders genuinely subscribe to their apocalyptic vision and do not care about possible repercussions. Their doctrine has an especially powerful pull among marginalized individuals who tend to flock to cults, gangs and radical groups, as we can see not only in the young fighters and brides traveling to Syria but also in the grassroots jihadists conducting leaderless resistance-style attacks in the West.

The powerful appeal of apocalypticism can influence people to do unthinkable things. In the past, we have seen followers of the apocalyptic cult Aum Shinrikyo try to kill millions of people with biological and chemical weapons. Members of the Branch Davidians gave their daughters to David Koresh as brides and fought to the death to keep him from being arrested. Followers of the Heaven’s Gate cult committed suicide in the hope of getting onboard the UFO hiding behind the Hale-Bopp Comet, and members of apocalyptic Christian cults have sold all their possessions in preparation for the foretold second coming of Jesus Christ that never came.

These historical examples point to the major limitation of groups that embrace apocalypticism: They lose their appeal when their predictions fail to materialize. When the second coming of Jesus did not take place in 1832, 1878, 1914 or 1975; when chemical attacks against the Tokyo subway system did not usher in the end of the world; and when David Koresh did not rise from the dead after three days, the organizations promoting such claims quickly became less attractive and began losing their ability to recruit new members.

This doesn’t mean that the Islamic State’s appeal will disappear overnight. But as the group’s offensive operations are thwarted, as its economic engine stalls, and as the events it waits for do not come to pass, people will become increasingly disenchanted with its ideology. There are still Aum Shinrikyo and Branch Davidian supporters in the world, just as some of those who are invested in the Islamic State’s ideology will continue to support the group until their final breaths. Once a person has sacrificed so much for a cause, it becomes hard to let it go. But as the clock continues to tick and the world continues to spin, time will ultimately undermine the apocalyptic ideology of the Islamic State.

This article was written by Scott Stewart.

Nigerian state is now the largest economy in Africa, and global multinationals are queuing up to tap into its potential. Yet there are still major hurdles for the country to overcome before it can properly silence its critics.

NIGERIA FACTS

The Federal Republic of Nigeria, located in Western Africa on the Gulf of Guinea, is the most populous country in Africa with a rich cultural heritage and diverse ethnic background. Half of its 170 million population is Muslim, while Christianity is practiced by 48%. A former British colony, Nigeria gained independence in 1960. After years of civil war and military rule, it has been on the path to democratization since 1999, with Goodluck Jonathan elected President in 2011. This year Nigeria overtook South Africa as the largest economy in Africa. While oil reserves still play a major role, Nigeria’s financial and telecommunications sectors are growing fast and it has a promising pipeline of infrastructure projects.

INVESTMENT FLOWS IN

At the epicentre of this 21st-century story of extremes of hope and doubt is teeming Lagos, a magnet for the optimistic poor. Every year about 600,000 locals join the city’s informal economy. The UN estimates that within a few years Lagos could edge out Karachi to become the world’s third-largest city, after Tokyo and Mumbai. It is for this reason that Nigeria’s economic future looks increasingly urban.

If Lagos became independent tomorrow, its GDP would be similar in size to Angola. But such breakneck pace also brings with it a propensity for whiplash. The city is also one of the most congested urban sprawls on the planet, with a rudimentary mass transit system and chronic infrastructure problems.

Indeed, the city’s Governor, Babatunde Fashola, recently put the estimated amount required for infrastructure development in Lagos in the next 10 years at $50 billion. No wonder Lagos state has used a Public- Private Partnership (PPP) strategy to solve its vast infrastructure deficit. At the beginning of 2014, the Lagos State Government revealed that 83 roads had been completed in 2013 – as had Nigeria’s first cable-stayed bridge, the Lekki-Ikoyi Link Bridge (although this was publicly, not PPP, funded). The State Government also recently revealed how N160 billion ($981 million) it borrowed from the World Bank has been used to fund its Light Rail project.

Nigeria has also privatized the infrastructure and assets of Parastatal Power Holding Company of Nigeria, splitting the company up in regional distribution and placing the national power grid on a management contract. This is crucial to solve Nigeria’s notoriously erratic power supply. Although it will likely take years for the power supply to improve, it is hoped that private investors are placed to access the funding and technical expertise required to make it happen.

Oliver Facey, Vice President of Operations at DHL Express Sub–Saharan Africa, sees this infrastructure scale-up and improved regional trade, from both an SME and multinational perspective, as intertwined. “As multinationals turn to Africa, and as smaller African enterprises look to trade cross-border, regions like West Africa need increased capacity to cope with the rising demand for transportation of goods,” he says.

This demand for goods from a growing middle class is a turnaround because, to date, Nigeria’s economic growth has been a narrative shaped by oil and gas. Although energy resources only account for 14% of its GDP, they are still responsible for 75% of Nigeria’s federal revenue and 90% of exports. But the recent rewriting of Nigeria’s GDP took into account thirteen previously uncounted industries which included telecommunications, online sales, film production, and music, each offering promising signs for the future. In short, it’s increasingly all about “human energy”.

And international companies want to tap into that energy. General Electric recently became one of the global manufacturers to take advantage of this new narrative, with a $1 billion investment over five years in a service and manufacturing facility in Calabar, Cross River State. On a bigger scale, the $9 billion investment of Dangote Group in petroleum refining and petrochemical and fertilizer plant in the Olokola Free Trade Zone is set to transform the area. Nigeria is also making the great leap towards its own car industry. In the last few months Nissan began manufacturing family saloons and SUVs at an old Lagos Volkswagen assembly – foreign cars with a “Made in Nigeria” stamp.

Certainly, foreign investment is increasing. According to a June 2014 report from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Nigeria’s foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow stood at $5.6 billion in 2013. Yet a May 2014 report from Ernst and Young forecasts that FDI inflows to Nigeria will average about $23 billion annually over the next five years and create around 95,000 jobs.

PEOPLE POWER

The bottom line, digging beneath the statistics, is that there is a positive story here and all to play for. To be a dominant world economy, like China or America, two fundamental things are required: a large population and strong productivity. Nigeria is making bullish inroads into both. Simple demography is probably the most fundamental factor. At 180 million, the current population is the world’s seventh-highest. By 2050, this is projected to be 400 million, setting Nigeria on course to replace the United States as the world’s third most populous country.

This population windfall is part of a broader developing world trend whereby 1.2 billion mostly emerging-economy youth are forecast to move out of subsistence poverty by 2020. For this new generation of local consumers in Nigeria, household discretionary spending will exceed $5,000 for the first time. What this means in the present is Nigeria, as a burgeoning consumer market, is simply too large to ignore.

Analysis

Boko Haram, the Islamist militant group based in northeastern Nigeria, has aroused little attention in the West despite launching assaults on churches, police stations and government buildings that have killed an estimated 10,000 people since 2002. The group, however, has recently been in the news after it abducted more than 270 schoolgirls and publicly threatened to sell them into slavery. The political response since this story started making headlines the week of April 27 has been swift. The group’s latest acts have been condemned by both U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, and the United States promised military and intelligence aid to Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan on May 7.

YD has been chronicling Boko Haram and its changing tactics since 2009. Below are key YD analyses on the militant group.

The Rising Threat from Nigeria’s Boko Haram Militant Group

Nov. 10, 2011: Boko Haram, which means “Western education is sinful” in Hausa, was established in 2002 in Maiduguri, the capital of Nigeria’s Borno state. It has since spread to several other northern and central Nigerian states. Some in the country have referred to Boko Haram as the Nigerian Taliban in reference to the group’s call for Sharia throughout Nigeria. In June 2011, a spokesman claiming to represent Boko Haram amended this demand, instead calling for what the group defines as a stricter form of Sharia in the northern Nigerian states where Sharia already is the law.

U.S. Offers Counterinsurgency Training to Nigeria

June 6, 2012: The United States will likely begin training Nigerian military forces in counterinsurgency operations following discussions held in Washington on June 6. Nigeria is seen as a logical partner to receive U.S. military assistance as it struggles to contain Islamist terrorist group Boko Haram, and having soldiers in Nigeria will help U.S. intelligence monitor for increasing terrorist threats in West and North Africa.

Is Boko Haram More Dangerous Than Ever?

Dec. 13, 2012:  While Boko Haram progressed rapidly in terms of operational ability in 2011, it is still struggling to conduct sustained operations outside its core geographic territory, and it has yet to successfully strike a hardened target. Even the August 2011 attack against the United Nations, while demonstrating some geographic reach and a focus on an international target, was directed against a relatively soft target instead of a harder target like a government ministry building or a foreign embassy. It is also notable that the group has not conducted an attack in Lagos, Nigeria’s most populous city, or in Niger, Chad or Cameroon, which are all closer to the Boko Haram home territories than Lagos.

Nigeria: Limitations on a Boko Haram Cease-Fire

July 11, 2013: Rather than being merely focused on spreading Islamist tenets, Boko Haram also serves as a political tool. Powerful Muslim politicians in Nigeria’s north use the group to pressure the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan in an effort to gain a larger share of the political patronage funded by Nigeria’s oil revenues. Southern politicians such as Jonathan use militant groups in the Niger Delta for the same purpose. At the very least, the 2015 presidential elections will provide significant motivation for the northeastern political elite to deploy its tool, just as Niger Delta militants such as Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo-Asari of the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force have threatened violence should Jonathan’s re-election bid be thwarted.

In Nigeria, an Attack Shows Boko Haram’s Current Capabilities

Dec. 3, 2013: An attack on a Nigerian air base shows that ongoing military operations in northeastern Nigeria have not prevented Boko Haram from mounting attacks in the urban centers of the northeast, despite government claims to the contrary. However, the attack — notable for both its size and target — does not necessarily note new capabilities or a departure from the previous pattern of attacks. Boko Haram continues to be primarily active in northeastern Nigeria and does not yet pose an existential threat to the Nigerian government itself.

Boko Haram Adjusts Its Methods

April 24, 2014: The April 14 car-bombing near the Nigerian capital of Abuja, for which Boko Haram claimed responsibility, marks the group’s renewed use of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices to carry out attacks. Boko Haram is modifying its strategy, employing guerrilla and terrorist tactics while abandoning its effort to control a small part of Borno state — a goal the group pursued during the first half of 2013. The most recent attack marks a return to the methods Boko Haram used in 2012, although the softer targets and lack of suicide bombers suggest a lower degree of sophistication. The group’s activity during the first quarter of this year also suggests a more limited geographic concentration to the three northeastern states of Nigeria: Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. However, occasional attacks in Kano state and the Middle Belt region remain likely.

Nov. 6

Syria

Rebels from the Free Syrian Army and from various Islamist groups recently defeated an offensive conducted by loyalist forces backed by Iran and Russia in Hama province. Rebels have since launched a counteroffensive, during which they seized important territory in the northern part of the province, including the town of Morek. In light of their losses, loyalists are now marshaling their forces in the city of Hama to repel further rebel advances.

The events in Hama province are revelatory, for they show the limits to Russian and Iranian support. Critical though that support may be, it is not robust enough to comprehensively turn the tide in the loyalists’ favor. Russia is mostly providing air support and materiel, but it is not providing what the regime needs most: dependable manpower. Iran has helped to establish the National Defense Forces as an auxiliary force and has dispatched several Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps units and third-country militia forces, but even these cannot replace the tens of thousands of troops the regime has already lost.

It is little surprise, then, that the success of the loyalists has been uneven at best. They have pushed rebels back in places in southern Aleppo province, but they have been less successful in pushing them back in the provinces of Latakia and Homs. Clearly, the swift victory pro-government forces had hoped would accompany increased foreign backing is not in the offing.

The rebels’ success in Hama will pressure Russia and Iran to commit even more forces to the conflict. Moscow and Tehran will probably give in to this pressure because even if outright victory is not possible, improving the lot of loyalist soldiers improves their bargaining positions if and when powers convene to negotiate a settlement. Indeed, Russia has already increased its presence in Syria from 2,000 personnel to 4,000. It has also established three forward operating bases beyond its airfield in Latakia, has sent additional surface-to-air missile systems, and has increasingly involved its own artillery units in support of the loyalists.

But therein lies the inherent danger of mission creep. Given how dim the prospects are for negotiating a settlement to the conflict, Russia and Iran could find themselves involved in a difficult war without a clear end in sight.

The limits of Foreign Military Support to the Assad Regime in Syria are clearly showing their limits in November 2015.

Jordan: Military Officer Kills Americans, South African At Training Center

A Jordanian military officer shot and killed two Americans and a South African before security forces shot and killed him at a police training center outside of Amman on Nov. 9, Jordan News Agency reported. According to a government spokesman, the officer also wounded two other Americans and four Jordanians in the attack at the Muaqar training facility, which was established by a 2004 U.S.-Jordanian agreement to train Iraqi police officers. Lone-wolf attacks such as this one are notoriously hard to thwart.