A healthy obsession with education, an ambitious energy plan, a respectable GDP, a big territory rich in natural resources and a huge hope for progress, have all positioned India in the analysts’ favorite prediction to be a world potency since more than two decades ago; but religious and cultural traditionalism are cutting off the incredible potential of the nation.

Low oil prices and a weak global economy have thrown a wrench in many countries’ plans to develop and exploit their untouched energy resources. But for Mozambique, those plans may be back on the table.

On March 1, an energy consortium signed a cooperation agreement to construct a pipeline that will stretch from Mozambique’s massive offshore natural gas fields to northern South Africa. Though the deal is just an early step toward the pipeline’s actual completion, it could be a sign of progress to come for both countries’ energy sectors.

The consortium responsible for building the pipeline comprises Mozambique’s Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos (ENH), South Africa’s SacOil, the Netherlands’ Profin and the China Petroleum Pipeline Bureau. In their agreement, which builds on an initial deal struck in December 2014, the four companies committed to the funding needed to complete the project’s pre-investment and engineering studies, as well as the pipeline’s construction and operation. According to project estimates, the 2,600-kilometer (1,600-mile) pipeline will cost approximately $6 billion.

The China Petroleum Pipeline Bureau will shoulder 70 percent of that total cost by securing funds from Chinese financial institutions. For the state-owned China National Petroleum Corp., of which the China Petroleum Pipeline Bureau is a subsidiary, the pipeline is an opportunity for the company to increase its profits from its energy assets in Mozambique. The company currently holds a 10 percent stake in one of Mozambique’s potentially lucrative offshore natural gas blocks. However, as is true of the rest of Mozambique’s offshore reserves, obstacles have prevented the block from being fully developed.

Constrained by Economic Realities

This speaks to a broader problem for Mozambique: The country has considerable natural gas reserves, but it cannot tap into them on its own. Instead, it must rely on Anadarko Petroleum Corp. and Eni, the biggest foreign energy companies operating within its borders. Together, the two hold adjacent blocks in Mozambique’s enormous deep-water Rovuma Basin that are estimated to contain at least 4.5 trillion cubic meters of recoverable natural gas reserves.

Anadarko and Eni are seeking ways to develop these resources, but their efforts are being complicated by expectations of a boom in U.S. and Australian natural gas exports. Mozambique’s energy reserves are located relatively far from the country’s existing infrastructure, and its energy sector has few capabilities of its own. Consequently, the companies’ attempts to build the infrastructure needed to produce and transport Mozambique’s offshore natural gas have been massive undertakings. Such projects may have made sense when liquefied natural gas (LNG) prices were higher, but with prices now close to $7 per million British thermal units, they will be much more difficult to complete.

Instead, Anadarko and Eni have turned to parsing their projects into phases, rather than tackling them in one fell swoop. To that end, the two companies have agreed to develop 24 trillion cubic meters of natural gas that lie along the shared border of their adjacent blocks. Once those reserves have been produced, they will enter into a joint venture to develop the rest of their blocks’ remaining resources. As part of this plan, Eni is exploring the option of constructing a floating LNG export facility that would be relatively cheap and manageable in size. The Mozambican government approved the project in February.

However, the companies’ strategy to develop Mozambique’s offshore resources hinges on their ability to secure buyers for their natural gas. BP has agreed to buy all of the LNG that would come from Eni’s floating export facility, and Anadarko has managed to sign agreements covering some 90 percent of its initial output. But none of these deals are binding, meaning neither company has eliminated the risks they are incurring by pursuing the projects.

This is where the pipeline deal may make a difference in Anadarko and Eni’s calculations. If finished, it would connect Mozambique to the only natural gas market in southern Africa that has the potential to grow in the coming years. (South Africa is the most industrialized country in the region, but its industries have not made much use of natural gas because they lack a reliable supply.) It would also provide a less challenging way to transport natural gas to consumers than shipping it in the form of LNG.

The pipeline may be the solution to some of Pretoria’s problems as well. South Africa’s energy sector relies on coal and is plagued by intermittent blackouts. Natural gas may offer a more stable source of energy for the country’s new coal-fired power plants, particularly as South Africa shifts away from coal to address some of its persistent environmental concerns. Though the country boasts its own shale resources, they have proved difficult and costly to develop.

The latest pipeline deal is not yet finalized, and several financial roadblocks still lie in its path. But if the project is completed, it could open up many new opportunities for the Mozambican and South African energy sectors, fueling their economies in the years to come.

This morning, many of the world’s elite suffered a rude awakening. The Panama Papers, the product of a year’s work by an international network of reporters, had been made publicly available. The information dump, the largest of its kind, reveals the private financial dealings of hundreds of wealthy individuals, with records dating back 40 years in some cases. The development hit the superrich in particular, which partly explains the sensitive nature of the report: Its anonymous source was a leak from within a large law firm in Panama — a notable haven for offshore wealth — and its contents reveal the details of offshore companies and holdings. These details are normally hidden from public view and often for good cause, whether to mask tax avoidance or something darker. The average citizen usually lacks the motive and the resources to make use of such facilities.

As it stands, the scandal looks as though it will have a long life. The information so far released feels like only the tip of the iceberg, yet already important figures have been implicated. A trail appears to connect Russian President Vladimir Putin to a string of secret holdings, including a $2 billion offshore account. He is not alone. Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko has substantial wealth in the British Virgin Islands. Iceland’s prime minister, Sigmundur David Gunnlaugsson, already faces stiff pressure to resign after struggling to explain his holdings in a shady company at the time of Iceland’s economic collapse. Various senior figures in the Middle East and Africa are on the list, as are members of China’s Politburo. So, too, is Argentina’s president, Mauricio Macri.

But not all of these revelations will have a lasting effect. Ownership of offshore accounts is not illegal in itself. Offshore bank accounts traditionally provide a venue for dubious dealings, but they also offer low-tax environments where the superrich may keep their wealth away from prying eyes. Of course, international leaders are embarrassed that the world knows just how much untaxed money they have squirreled away, and where. But that may be the extent of their suffering. For example, Macri’s wealth was never a secret. After all, he was once the president of the Argentine football club, Boca Juniors. Perhaps he could also be forgiven for keeping his money outside the country, considering the restrictive administration that preceded his accession to the presidency in November. If having wealth offshore turns out to be the scope of Macri’s financial activities, he might escape the scandal relatively unscathed.

In other cases, notably those involving former Soviet, African and Middle Eastern leaders, the public might just shrug their shoulders. For one thing, some of these leaders have a tight grip on power, limiting the civil institutions that could conspire to topple them for any crimes they might commit. Furthermore, with a long history of leaders lining their pockets, the populace in those countries may be more surprised to find a ruler did not have an offshore account somewhere. So far, the reaction in the West, where such dealings are considered beyond the pale, has been muted — except in Iceland. Then again, Iceland is hardly a player of global influence.

But there will be repercussions, that much seems sure. In countries where citizens suspected that elites were embezzling money but could not prove as much, evidence will now be available. In China, a corruption probe, aimed in part at rooting out party members with large sums stashed abroad, was already underway. Any new information produced in the Panama Papers may actually do President Xi Jinping a favor by exposing undesirables. At the same time, the leaks could implicate party members or others whose identities he would rather conceal. For instance, Xi’s brother-in-law is among those mentioned in the report. In short, senior figures may lose their jobs, and indeed their freedom, over these revelations. There are also potential political ramifications.

In Russia, Putin’s spokesman has claimed that the leaks are a calculated exercise in realpolitik, an attempt by the West to muddy the waters after Russia showed good faith by withdrawing troops from Syria. In the Netherlands, a referendum will be held on Wednesday over whether to ratify a European trade agreement with Ukraine. Already, the deal’s opponents have seized on Poroshenko’s inclusion in the Panama Papers as evidence of Ukrainian disrepute.

Perhaps the broadest implications will come from the light these revelations shed upon the banking and financial system itself. It is not a secret that vast riches are stored in offshore havens — Gabriel Zucman’s 2015 book The Hidden Wealth of Nations calculated the total sum of hidden assets at 8 percent of global financial wealth — but never before have we had access to the details. And the phenomenon of offshore wealth is a symptom of a more malignant condition. The disparity between rich and poor has been growing for decades, and these giant offshore sums are likely a reflection of that trend.

Offshore funds are a problem for governments. Economies around the world have been flagging, saddled with high debt and lacking obvious ways to overcome their stagnation. While the debt limits spending, raising taxes would surely further stifle economic growth. Meanwhile, central banks, which have been carrying the burden for the past eight years, now appear to be reaching the ends of their effectiveness. To these governments, the 8 percent of global wealth that may currently reside in untaxable offshore havens presents an opportunity. Wealth that should be taxed, whose tax revenue could bolster government coffers, ready to be spent on infrastructure projects that might stimulate the next round of sustainable growth, is instead sitting idle in the Cayman Islands.

That, then, may be the true legacy of the Panama Papers: that they will draw the eyes of the world to the darkest corners of the financial system, and the resulting public outrage will empower governments to shut down these havens that have long sheltered the rich from taxation. In recent years, the world’s leaders have been discussing ways to defeat tax evasion. Thanks to the efforts of investigative journalists, they may have now have the means to do so.

On April 3, the Panama Papers hit media outlets around the world, and the fallout was swift. A prime minister lost his job, and other global leaders are under mounting pressure to account for their actions. But the effects of the leaks are not evenly spread; the documents contained far more information about the offshore activities of individuals in the developing world than in the developed world. Whatever the reasons for the imbalance, it will likely limit the papers’ impact. In the developing world, long histories of corruption have dulled the public’s sensitivity to scandal, and repressive governments leave little room for popular backlash.

So although less information was released on Western leaders, it is already doing more damage. Iceland’s leader has left his post, and relatively minor revelations have had a disporportionately large impact in the United Kingdom and France. Meanwhile, in the developing world, the Panama Papers’ effects have been most strongly felt in the former Soviet Union, a region in which political tensions were already high. The leaks’ results have been more mixed in China, where they have provided new targets for the anti-corruption drive already underway but have also implicated figures close to the administration’s upper ranks.

This is only the beginning. The Panama Papers are the largest information dump of their kind, and the information that has been released so far appears to be just the tip of the iceberg. They are also the latest in a string of public leaks that seem to be happening more and more frequently. As revelations continue to surface, calls for greater global transparency will only get louder.

The publication of the Panama Papers has drawn leaders and elites from five former Soviet states into corruption scandals. In Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan, Georgia and Azerbaijan, politicians — or their family members or friends — have been accused of having ties to offshore accounts or corruption. This will be worse news for some leaders than for others.

Azerbaijan

As in Russia and Kazakhstan, corruption charges are a perennial feature of Azerbaijani politics. President Ilham Aliyev, the son of Azerbaijan’s third president, and his wife, Mehriban, both come from influential families with extensive business connections at home and abroad. Several members of the president’s family, including his wife, children and sister, have now been linked to secret offshore companies.

Nonetheless, little will come off the reports in Azerbaijan. The political opposition is too weak to challenge the Aliyevs, and the media have already begun to spin the accusations as Western propaganda. Given the country’s poor economic conditions, the scandal could spark protests, which Baku can quickly quell.

Georgia

Former Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili’s foreign business dealings are also included in the Panama Papers. Allegations of corruption have plagued Ivanishvili ever since he threw his hat into the political arena in 2011. But until now, the accusations had centered on his activities in Russia.

Ivanishvili’s power in Georgia has been steady for the past four years. In Tbilisi, he remains a kingmaker, planting his followers in all the country’s top positions. His Georgian Dream coalition is fracturing, however, holding only a slight majority in the legislature. With parliamentary elections set for this fall, accusations are already flying between Georgia’s various political parties. Although most of the country’s population has ignored the news so far, the Panama Papers will fuel the opposition’s politicking. Moreover, if it gains more traction among the people, the scandal could erode Ivanishvili’s influence at a time when his ruling coalition is already falling apart.

Kazakhstan

Allegations of corruption, particularly concerning President Nursultan Nazarbayev and his family and friends, are constant and widespread in Kazakhstan. But because the country is on the verge of both economic recession and a succession of power, the fresh accusations could have greater impact than usual.

Nazarbayev’s grandson Nurali Aliyev is accused of ties to offshore accounts. Just two weeks ago, Aliyev stepped down as deputy mayor of Astana to return to business, inviting speculation within the Kazakh media over his motives. Aliyev has long been considered a possible eventual successor to the presidency, although he is still too young to take a top government position.

On the other hand, his mother, Dariga, is a viable successor and already one of the most powerful figures in Kazakh politics. Following the March 20 parliamentary elections, she unexpectedly did not take a position in the legislature. This has led to speculation that she is jockeying for a more influential position before the formal succession commences. As the power struggle in Kazakhstan begins in earnest, rival political elites could use corruption charges provided by the Panama Papers against Aliyev or his mother.

Russia

In Russia, the loudest corruption allegations concern President Vladimir Putin. Although the president’s name does not appear in any of the 11.5 million documents published, those of three of his closest friends — Sergei Roldugin, Arkady Rotenberg and Boris Rotenberg — do.

Longtime intermediaries for Putin’s business, the Rotenberg brothers are unsurprising inclusions in the Panama Papers. Among Russia’s elite, the brothers are not decision-makers. Nonetheless, they are considered to be some of the country’s highest-ranked loyalists, trusted to handle Putin’s furtive financial and business affairs. Roldugin, a cellist, is also outside of Russian politics. But he, too, is a loyalist and one of Putin’s trusted associates; in fact, he is godfather to Putin’s eldest daughter. Following the Panama Papers leaks, Roldugin stands accused of moving more than $2 billion for the president.

The Kremlin’s reaction to the Panama Papers actually anticipated their release. Nearly two weeks ago, presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov warned journalists that a Western “information attack” on Putin was forthcoming but that it would not be factually accurate. On April 5, two days after the release, Peskov went a step further, denouncing the Panama Papers as a demonstration of “Putinphobia” and claiming that the journalists’ allegations were nothing new. Indeed, corruption charges against Putin and his close friends predate the president’s rise to power. By now, they have been assimilated into the Russian people’s mindset.

Peskov also called the papers an attempt to undermine Russia before its elections in September. In this, too, there is a hint of truth. Putin’s administration has been concerned about the possibility of protests after the elections, on a scale comparable to — or perhaps worse than — the mass demonstrations that followed the 2011 parliamentary elections. In the 2011 protests, corruption in the Kremlin was a central theme. Renewed corruption accusations could compound public resentment over the weak economy in Russia, fueling larger protests.

To reduce the risk of protest, the Kremlin is trying to turn the Panama Papers into a rallying point. Russian media and the government continually highlight this as another attack on the country and its president. After the West imposed sanctions on Russia, similar rhetoric was used successfully, reviving nationalism across the country.

Ukraine

Of all the former Soviet states, Ukraine will likely see the greatest fallout from the Panama Papers, which allege that President Petro Poroshenko holds accounts offshore. In response to the revelations, Ukrainian politicians are already calling for an investigation into Poroshenko’s hidden funds. The head of the Radical Party has even pushed for the president’s impeachment. But Ukraine’s Office of the Prosecutor General said the papers contain no evidence that Poroshenko committed any crimes. For his part, Poroshenko has gone on the defensive. In a string of tweets, the president called himself the first of Ukraine’s leaders to take corruption seriously. At the same time, he has skirted the issue of his culpability, claiming that he handed management of his assets over to a consulting firm upon taking office.

The papers’ publication came at an inconvenient time for Poroshenko. Over the past week, the president had been close to a deal on a parliamentary coalition between his party, Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk’s People’s Front and a group of independent lawmakers. In light of the scandal, Poroshenko’s faction now believes the deal may not come through after all. Poroshenko had been lobbying for the new government, a prerequisite for Ukraine to receive its next tranche of money from the International Monetary Fund and increased financial assistance from the United States. Poroshenko’s mention in the Panama Papers could not only further destabilize the fragile government, but it may also weaken the president’s rule.

Europe

France

In France, the fallout from the papers has landed mostly on the National Front, a right-wing party that has found some electoral success of late. They implicate former party adviser Frederic Chatillon, who was previously charged with electoral fraud related to the 2012 election. The National Front has already distanced itself from Chatillon. Evidence of offshore financing would be particularly detrimental if it was linked to party leaders, who have crafted an image of their party as honorable alternatives to their corrupt establishment counterparts.

Iceland

The Panama Papers have had the biggest impact in one of Europe’s smallest countries: Iceland. The papers revealed that Prime Minister Sigmundur David Gunnlaugsson made suspicious transactions of some bank shares before the global financial crisis of 2008. Icelanders took to the streets in protest, and the prime minister resigned. (He would later say he had merely “stepped aside for an unknown period.”) His coalition in parliament now appears insecure. A snap election could bring to power the Pirate Party, an anti-establishment party that currently leads in polls and advocates a system of direct democracy.

United Kingdom

In the United Kingdom, Prime Minister David Cameron has borne the brunt of the anger over the papers. His father was listed among those who held offshore accounts, and Cameron has now had to admit to owning a tax-efficient product before his premiership began. The media have begun to question actions he took in 2013 that appeared to hinder the process of increasing the transparency of offshore havens. Cameron’s interference might have been in Britain’s interest, since the United Kingdom could be said to have benefited from the global tax avoidance industry. Regardless of Cameron’s intentions, the subject has added fire to an already heated atmosphere surrounding the Brexit referendum. Though the latest leaks are unlikely to unseat Cameron on their own, further revelations could, and any damage done to the British prime minister’s reputation will hurt his campaign to remain in the European Union as well.

Latin America

Argentina

In Argentina, the Panama Papers linked President Mauricio Macri to an offshore company, although he has since denied being a shareholder in the company. An Argentine prosecutor has already requested the opening of an investigation into Macri’s involvement with the company. The opposition Front for Victory, which has been dealing with internal divisions, is eager to keep the spotlight on the Macri offshore company scandal ahead of legislative elections in 2017, and the opposition would use the investigation against the Macri administration.

Brazil

Brazil has enough political turmoil going on already that revelations in the Panama Papers will probably have minimal effect. The leaks have linked lower house leader Eduardo Cunha to an offshore company, but Cunha and other Brazilian politicians are already tied up in the graft scandal at state-owned energy firm Petrobras. Ongoing criminal investigations against members of the ruling Workers’ Party, such as former President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, and the impeachment attempt against President Dilma Rousseff will probably have a more immediate political effect than the Panama Papers will.

Guatemala

In Guatemala, the release of information through the leaked documents will draw greater scrutiny from the government investigative commission known as the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG). The United Nations-sponsored body announced it would investigate the documents for evidence of wrongdoing. A CICIG investigation led to the indictment of former President Otto Perez Molina on corruption charges in 2015, and further evidence of Guatemalan officials’ corruption, if found, could kick off additional investigations by CICIG in the country.

Venezuela

The fallout from the Panama Papers leaks in Venezuela is likely to be minimal. None of the key individuals in the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela are named in the leaks. The ongoing political standoff between the government and opposition, growing divisions in the ruling party, and the country’s extreme inflation are all likely to more immediately influence the country’s political future than corruption allegations.

Asia-Pacific

China

Beijing imposed an almost total media blackout on the Panama Papers: The only state media coverage on the subject was a print edition of Global Times claiming that the Panama Papers were a way for the West to attack its enemies.

The papers uncovered at least eight cases of family members of current or serving Politburo members who have done business with Mossack Fonseca. These include President Xi Jinping’s brother-in-law (though his accounts have been inactive since before Xi took power), family members of current Politburo Standing Committee members Liu Yunshan and Zhang Gaoli, the daughter of former Premier Li Peng, a granddaughter of former Standing Committee member Jia Qinglin, and a business partner of purged Politburo member Bo Xilai.

The papers are unlikely to affect the Politburo, whose members are all from the ruling class and are aware that other members of the same class tend to be wealthy (with some possessing ill-gotten gains). Given the pervasive anti-corruption campaign and the intense political struggle as Xi Jinping ascended to the presidency, there was incentive for factions to dig up any dirt on each other long ago. As a result, much of the political effect of any of the revelations is likely already tapped out. The revelations might, however, spotlight some lower-level or midlevel officials who have not yet become targets of anti-corruption investigations.

Chinese law enforcement and anti-graft authorities have shown a fair amount of skill in tracking down illegal capital flows abroad as part of fugitive hunting campaigns such as Operation Fox Hunt and Operation Skynet, uprooting Chinese underground banks that handled upward of $100 billion in transactions from April to November last year. These were domestic operations; whether Chinese law enforcement is good at tracing shell companies in offshore accounts remains unclear. Presumably, though, investigators have encountered the problem while handling the assets of fugitives — generally Party members and their families who flee China, bringing with them large amounts of embezzled or otherwise illegal wealth.

Chinese intelligence and anti-graft services will sift through the documents to identify potential new targets. To the extent that the papers shed light on how Chinese citizens like to hide their wealth, they may be able to seal off further escape options for fugitives and their assets. More interesting is the question of how much the Chinese already knew but never shared, both in terms of dirt on perpetrators and in understanding their tactics.

Middle East and North Africa

In many countries in the Middle East and North Africa, corruption charges will not create much of a stir because of media restrictions and because it is widely known that wealth often primarily benefits the royal family or ruling elite. Given the lenient tax structures in those countries, the kinds of things described in the Panama Papers may not even be considered crimes. In countries such as Iraq, Jordan, Syria and Egypt, however, the charges against prominent former politicians will fuel distrust of the establishment.

Egypt

In Egypt, the papers indicate that Mossack Fonseca did not conduct due diligence in identifying and cutting ties with Alaa Mubarak, the son of deposed President Hosni Mubarak, quickly enough after the 2011 Egyptian revolution. (Alaa used the firm to hold cash in a British Virgin Islands firm.)

Gulf States

While Saudi King Salman and UAE President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed al-Nuhayyan were both implicated in Virgin Island shell companies, Gulf media coverage has focused on how the Panama Papers affect other places, such as Iran, and has not touched on domestic implications. It is unlikely that the revelations will instigate a serious challenge to the Saudi or UAE governments.

Iran

In Iran, the papers revealed that Mossack Fonseca conducted business for Iranian oil companies such as Petropars despite U.S. sanctions, a revelation more damning for Mossack Fonseca than for Iran.

Iraq

In Iraq, former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi’s name surfaced in the Panama Papers in connection to various London properties. Allawi was removed from office in August 2015 when Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi abolished the vice presidencies in a bid to stem protests. The leaks could undermine any attempt by Allawi to re-enter the government in the event that al-Abadi’s government collapsed. Iraq’s central government has already been overwhelmed by protests demanding a purge of corrupt officials, though recent reshufflings to install technocrats are more likely to deepen Iran’s influence in Baghdad than defuse anger at the government.

Israel, Palestinian Territories

In Israel, the papers implicated some major banks that have been linked to corruption before. Idan Ofer, the majority shareholder in Israel Corp., the largest private joint stock company on Tel Aviv’s stock exchange, was also named in the papers. Moreover, Tareq Abbas, the son of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, held shares worth nearly $1 million in a company associated with the Palestinian Authority.

Jordan

In Jordan, it was revealed that former Prime Minister and Defense Minister Ali Abu al-Ragheb became the director of an offshore British Virgin Islands firm before leaving office.

Syria

In Syria, Mossack Fonseca cut ties in 2011 with the Makhlouf brothers — cousins of President Bashar al Assad — after nearly 15 years of using offshore entities to invest in the brothers’ Syrian tech firms.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Though several prominent politicians of African countries or their close associates have been linked to the scandal, it will have little effect on the continent’s governments. The threshold of corruption in many places in Africa, whose history is littered with elites who engaged in egregious acts of self-enrichment, is higher than in other places in the world. More important, many of those mentioned in the leaks are either no longer in office or are related to former leaders. Moreover, some of the people named with links to current rulers likely used offshore companies with their governments’ blessing.

Angola

Angola Minister of Petroleum Jose Maria Botelho de Vasconcelos, a former president of the OPEC, held interest in an offshore company that was deactivated in 2009. The revelation may damage his career in the image-sensitive country. He likely had implicit or explicit sanction from the regime.

Republic of the Congo

The Republic of the Congo’s current minister of science research and former energy minister, Bruno Jean-Richard Itoua, requested that Mossack Fonseca create an offshore company in the British Virgin Islands. In a 2003 lawsuit, Itoua was accused of diverting oil revenues, but the case was dismissed. Itoua has close ties to President Denis Sassou-Nguesso, so any blowback on Itoua will likely be limited.

Rwanda

Gen. Emmanuel Ndahiro, Rwanda’s former head of intelligence, is listed as the director of an offshore company owned by a former military colleague. Ndahiro is a close confidant of President Paul Kagame.

South Africa

Clive Khulubuse Zuma, the nephew of President Jacob Zuma, was linked to a company involved in acquisitions of oil fields in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. He has a reputation for being involved in shady business deals, and claims against him go back at least five years. He has denied any wrongdoing.

South Asia

Pakistan

Some 500 Indians and 200 Pakistanis were implicated in the Panama Papers, the most prominent of them being three of Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s children. Although Sharif himself was not implicated, he went so far as to give a televised national address on April 5 to exonerate his family and announce the launch of a judicial probe to investigate the matter. But opposition lawmaker Imran Khan of the Tehreek-e-Insaf party quickly demanded that the prime minister allow the National Accountability Bureau, which leads Pakistan’s anti-corruption efforts, to take charge of the probe. The leak is unlikely to lead to Sharif’s resignation, but opposition parties will make political gains at the expense of the premier’s Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz party.

Security, Counter-Terrorism, Foreign Relations and the Star of David. How the promotion of relations with the State of Israel is mandatory in the 21^st century.

Throughout the past months we are witnessing the increasing tensions in the European Union. The wanted terrorist organization, ISIS, has turned to a strategy of deterrence through terrorism upon the international community abroad. In these difficult times we also see an increase in anti-Semitism; as associations such as the BDS are making their grounds with the assistance of organized display of propaganda.

Many governments devote millions of euros to fight the worrying takeover of anti-Semitism and preserve the privileges of the Jewish communities within their borders, and with justified reasons no less – the State of Israel has become a leading party, and is one of the central players in the international community regarding anything there is to know about counter-terrorism.

Keeping neutrality in its foreign policy regarding other feuds in the middle-east, the same people prosecuted by the Nazi party throughout WWII have become, over the period of a few decades, to experts in the fields of economy, energy, culture, tourism, and last but not least – military strategy. As such, it is only logical that it will gain admiration from some of the more important countries in the west (and east).

The contribution of Israel’s knowledge to preserving the security in the European countries is apparent to say the least, and many European countries have already been taken by the beautiful candy that is the art of studying. A good example would be the usage of the Israeli knowledge regarding counter-terrorism to detain some of the terrorists responsible for the Paris Terror Attacks back in November 2015. It was mentioned by the French Chief Inspector in the scene of the 7-hour raid of the terrorists’ home that they have managed to succeed with the help of techniques used by the Israeli “special counter-terrorism units”.

Faced with the constant, never-ending threat of abrupt terrorism and tunnel-warfare within its borders, it is only natural that with the uprising of ISIS that Israel is becoming a role model for the “untrained” countries, who are relatively new to the subject of terrorism within their territories. Many clients have already been standing in line, all with the purpose of preventing the next terrorism attempt within their borders.

The dreadful thought of the September 11 attacks repeating themselves in the European playgrounds by ISIS, which is ironically a descendant of Al-Qaeda, is putting many governments on the edge of their seats. Some have already recognized what is already a great potential – adaptation with the help of constructivism, while others are desperate on inventing their own wheel while the car is already being sold on the market, with a discount no less. Too many strings are attached to a simple lift of a finger from the higher-ups, and relating to the State of Israel can be the downfall of governments and politicians present in Islamic countries.

The State of Israel itself is wasting no time in the process of building bridges with the European community, which is very much in favor of such efforts. The existence of the “Energy Triangle”, a pact formed between Israel, Cyprus and Greece in the fields of energy and gas resources sharing, is a dominant game-changer in the fields of foreign relations with the Land of Milk, Honey and Counter-Terrorism.

The rules have changed in the 21^st century – to preserve the security of your people you no longer need to fight back the charging army of Spartans, but rather be able to neutralize, in split seconds, a terrorist fanatic who built an improvised gun from spare parts found in an abandoned shack. The international community is catching up fast, with every terrorist attack only clarifying the need for a good counter-terrorism infrastructure. ISIS is no longer a simple terrorist organization, but a sophisticated system with high intelligence capabilities, academies dedicated to teaching the art of Terror, banks, communication channels, websites and recruiting offices. An ISIS POC is no longer the shady man who comes up to you in that remote bar at the slums, but rather that beautiful woman chatting with you on Facebook. The evolution of ISIS forces the international community to react accordingly.

A good example of how the milestones of the 21^st Century Terrorism impacted the foreign policy of certain countries toward Israel is one of the latest victims of ISIS terrorist attacks – Turkey. Even before the horrifying Istanbul bombing on May 19^th, President Erdogan’s gut finally clenched. The Marmara incident back in May 2010 served as a wrecking ball to the once-warm relations between Turkey and Israel. Now, with 6 terrorist attacks in the last four months since the start of 2016, the Turkish government starts having second-thoughts. Even before the Istanbul incident, back in December 14^th, Erdogan clarified his will to normalize the relations between Turkey and Israel, claiming it to be beneficial to the basis of stability in the Middle East. Trying to preserve his country’s own interests for an Israeli lift of embargo on the Gaza strip, the West Bank, and a compensation for the Marmara incident, however, caused the Turkish President’s endeavors to backfire.

The Israeli casualties in the Istanbul terrorist attack, however, brought forth a temporary unification of the two opposing sides against a common enemy- terrorism. The Turkish PM Ahmet Davutoglu made no hesitations sending a letter of deep-condolences to Israel’s PM Benjamin Netanyahu, where he expressed his desire for a normalization in Turkey-Israeli relations in order to combat the terrorism within Turkey’s borders more efficiently.

A few days later, March 23^rd, PM Benjamin Netanyahu mentioned that he hopes for a full restoration of Israel-Turkey relations in the near future. Erdogan responded with a proposed meeting which was held in Turkey between the Turkish government and Jewish Associations from the US to discuss the subjects of fighting the growing anti-Semitism in the West and in Europe.

Turkey is only a single name in long list of countries who realized what was already obvious – in the 21^st century, when the terror is lurking around every corner, when the EU is standing on its feet in fear of terror leakage of ISIS activists in the migrant influx from the middle east, when everything seem bleak, they need someone to lean on. In the 21^st century – the guiding light is the State of Israel.

Summary

A string of mysterious disappearances of Chinese nationals could signal that Chinese President Xi Jinping is taking his effort to consolidate power to new heights ahead of the next National Congress of the Communist Party in 2017. It appears that Chinese intelligence agents have recently carried out a number of renditions targeting Chinese citizens living abroad, including some who hold dual nationalities. Many of these renditions occurred in Thailand, though one took place in Hong Kong, where the “one country, two systems” principle legally bans Chinese intelligence services from operating.

If the disappearances were in fact secret renditions, they would mark a substantial shift in the behavior of Chinese intelligence services, which until now have not been known to engage in kidnapping or assassination campaigns beyond China’s borders. They would also point to great strain within China’s political system as Xi and those loyal to him move to centralize power by cracking down on dissent, increasing control over the media, calling for loyalty, and implementing an extensive anti-corruption campaign. As China’s social and economic challenges grow in the lead-up to the power shuffle slated to take place at the next Party Congress, the latest development could be a sign that Xi’s government will show less restraint and more assertiveness in its responses to stressors at home and abroad.

Analysis

Last summer, China launched a campaign against publications that it believed could “poison the hearts and minds” of China’s youth. At the time, Beijing reportedly identified several publishers in Hong Kong and Taiwan as the campaign’s primary targets.

A handful of other odd missing persons cases has further fueled speculation that Xi might be upping the ante in his quest to consolidate power. Bao Zhuoxuan, the son of a prominent human rights lawyer, was kidnapped in Myanmar in October 2015 while trying to flee to the United States. Li Xin, a former journalist for the China-based Southern Metropolis Daily in Pattaya, Thailand, disappeared not long after in January; Li fled China when Chinese agents pressured him to spy on activists, and he reportedly leaked confidential information on the Communist Party’s propaganda system. Finally, Chinese agents have allegedly tried to capture or kill Ling Wancheng, a businessman and the brother of former President Hu Jintao’s former aide, Ling Jihua, after failing to secure his deportation from the United States. (Ling Jihua is currently facing corruption charges that many believe to be politically motivated.) Ling Wancheng is thought to be in possession of a number of Chinese state secrets, including information on the country’s leaders and nuclear capabilities.

A Wider Struggle for Power

The renditions come at a time when the Party is taking steps to purge corruption from its political ranks. In 2014 and 2015, Beijing launched its respective Operation Fox Hunt and Skynet programs with the goal of repatriating Chinese fugitives on corruption charges and recovering their ill-gotten financial assets. Since the operations began, China has brought more than 930 nationals back within its borders, and agents belonging to its Ministry of Public Security — the organization in charge of the operations — operate in at least 56 countries.

While the operations include many legitimate cases, Xi’s critics have accused him of using them to persecute his political rivals and silence dissenters. In the face of these charges, the Chinese government has framed the programs — in part for its international audience — as a victory in its larger effort to respect the rule of law. Its media campaigns about the operations have included photographs of fugitives marching off planes and into the custody of uniformed Ministry of Public Security officers.

Though the latest renditions can be interpreted, in some respects, as the next logical step in an intensifying crackdown on Beijing’s part, their considerable departure from China’s traditional methods of repatriating fugitives should not be ignored. In the past, Beijing has taken great care to try to allay international concerns about its respect for the rule of law. But this time seems to be different. China’s attempts to mask the true nature of its renditions, or give them the appearance of legitimacy under international law, have been halfhearted at best. In fact, Chinese state media have shown more interest in airing the confessions, which themselves seem formulated, to domestic audiences. This suggests that Beijing’s primary goal is to send a message to viewers at home rather than to those abroad.

And that message is clear, to those who can read between the lines: Anyone who tries to discredit the Chinese leadership by using Hong Kong’s once-untouchable publishing houses will be stopped. Such a warning hints at the unease that lies beneath the surface of Chinese politics, and perhaps the existence of strong factions that may be angling to challenge Xi’s grip on power. Given when the renditions began, it is likely this political struggle has been intensifying since mid-2015, even as Xi escalated the anti-corruption campaign meant in part to suppress any hostile opponents.

With the renditions, Beijing has made it clear that it is willing to accept serious blows to what were previously high-priority objectives, including cultivating its image as a legitimate enforcer of law and framing the one country, two systems model as a viable avenue for peaceful reunification with Taiwan. However, the benefits of these sacrifices are confined to a small group — Xi’s political network — as it fends off challengers ahead of the 2017 Communist Party Congress, where Xi’s presidential successor may be named. As the short-term interests of this narrow unit begin to increasingly outweigh the interests of the country as a whole, China may begin to make erratic moves that would otherwise be out of character for a Communist Party ruled by consensus. Renditions could therefore be just one of many long-standing taboos that will be broken in the struggle for political survival in Beijing — a competition that appears to be much more intense than China’s placid exterior reveals.

Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), Hard Power, and how they are related to the promotion of stability.

Throughout the known history arming oneself with power, both physical and militaristic, was always perceived as a threat to the international community. Therefore, it was swiftly condemned for being a destabilizing source to the regional equilibrium of neighboring countries. Today, in the 21^st Century, post-Cold War,  many international Human Rights and Peacekeeping organizations are quick to pull the curtain on such cases in fear of dire consequences.

The process itself, however, may not be as destructive as meets the eye. Guy Golan , an Israeli specialist of the Middle Eastern landscapes and of the nuclear issue explains us.

Military Strategic studies and National Security Policy doctrines shed light on a more complicated phenomenon known as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) – an instantaneous use of two or more opposing sides’ weapons for mass annihilation of each other with the purpose of preventing their enemy the use of said weapons. While the thought of an all-out nuclear war is dreadful to the average person, the concept of MAD provides a profound basis of how the directly contradictory consequences may be achieved from such a threat.

The word “deterrence” serves a crucial role in the implementation of said consequences. If a country has enough militaristic capabilities to be perceived as an equal threat to the regional stability by its adversaries, such capabilities may be the border between a threat to the stability and a regional crisis.

But where exactly is that border?

Even when two countries boast equal nuclear and militaristic capabilities, the basis of an all-out attack would be phrased as “first-come, first-serve”, “the early bird catches the worm”, “first country to carpet-nuclear-bomb the other wins”, and the list can go on and on. The deterrence is not effective if opposite countries have a military solution that can swiftly break the cycle. A certain example to that situation would be the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States of America back in World War II – perhaps they were not the ideal way to bring the feud between the US and Japan to an end, but it sure served as a factor to the abrupt, bloody finale.

In a more militaristic point of view, the MAD refers to the complete and utter annihilation of a country, its army and its infrastructure, to the point where it cannot fight back. But the border is crossed when a country’s constant armament is done for the purpose of being able to retaliate to such massive attacks by the opposite side.

Retaliation, or more specifically, “Second-Strike Capability”, is the last piece of the puzzle. It turns our chaotic scenery of regional instability to the complete form of absolute stability. It is a unique militaristic competence that establishes stability with the assistance of offensive means. If an opposed country can retaliate to an attack with equal, proportionate force, then the retaliation serves as a deterrence to the enemy. But retaliation only deters when it’s obsolete – many countries sought, and are still seeking, to secure an unconditional capability to retaliate in response to the opposed side’s all-out nuclear bombardment, and vice versa.

A vivid example to a “Second-Strike Capability” is a “Dead-Man’s Switch”, a mechanism which activates independently when certain conditions are met or usually when the user becomes incapacitated. Some forms of “Dead-Man’s Switches” were widely common during the Cold-War era in both the United States and the Soviet Union.

One of few known examples to “Secondary-Strike Capability” in the United States’ Armed Forces throughout the Cold War Era is the “Special Weapons Emergency Separation System” (SWESS), a nuclear bomb release system built into US nuclear bombers. The system’s purpose was to ensure the release of a bomber’s arsenal of nuclear weapons and cause them to detonate in the event of the crew becoming debilitated.

In the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union during the same period, they were sophisticated no less, and few are actually known to today’s expert Military Strategists. A good relic of such an era can be the “Dead-Hand” mechanism, which assured the activation of the Soviet Union’s Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles in response to a sensor-detected nuclear strike by an opposing country.

The “Second-Strike Capability” has been the goal for many races of armament such as the Cold War, as we can see, and it was also mandatorily implemented using independent, fail-deadly mechanisms. Those mechanisms are used today as forms of deterrence to contribute towards regional stability.

The concept of MAD studies in Military Strategy are mostly theoretical, and as they go on we dive deeper and deeper into many different subjects consisted in the theory such as traits of Decision Makers, how a country can obtain “Second-Strike Capabilities” without having powerful militaristic arms, and that is only the tip of the iceberg.

So as the constant armaments continue, in an era when nations seek to preserve the diplomatic solutions through the form of peace talks and the forming of agreements, the studies of MAD show us that perhaps there is also a militaristic level to peace.

But then again, when we stop beating around the bush, some questions have to be asked – Does ISIS possess “Second-Strike Capabilities”? Are Nuclear Agreements reliable mechanisms of deterrence? Can MAD be achieved in developing countries by the establishment of militaristic capabilities?

The process of armament may not always be destructive, but no one said it’s simple.

Forecast

• Countries will continue to develop anti-satellite weapons to counter space-based military assets, including existing communications satellites and potential weapons.
• However, as improved technology lowers costs and more countries deploy satellites and anti-satellite technology, space debris will become a bigger problem for all militaries with a stake in space.
• Ultimately, with the U.S. military the most reliant on space-based technologies, the United States will have the most to lose from advances in other countries’ anti-satellite systems. 

Analysis

The militarization of space started long ago, but true weaponization has yet to begin in earnest, at least publicly. Modern militaries depend on satellites for a number of vital functions. Orbital platforms act as a force multiplier for terrestrial operations and enable thermal image acquisition, weapons targeting through GPS and worldwide communications. Though space weapons have not yet been effectively deployed, the threat that they could be — and the widespread use of non-weaponized satellites for military purposes — has led countries to rush to create anti-satellite weapon technology as a deterrent. The problem is that this anti-satellite technology (widely referred to by the acronym ASAT) can also be used to target any satellites in orbit, particularly those used by the United States and its allies. The deployment of ASATs, though, comes at a price: The more anti-satellite weapons are used, the more debris from destroyed satellites is created as a result. This debris is continually and indiscriminately harmful to commercial and military satellites alike, and the situation is only getting worse.

ASAT technology first became apparent during the Cold War, but over the last decade it has become an area of intense competition for the world’s most capable militaries. And as these militaries develop and refine the associated technologies, ASAT capability will become cheaper and more accessible to smaller militaries. More nations will inevitably join the reinvigorated space race, as Iran and North Korea already have. The problem is that the more satellites are destroyed, the more space debris is created, which poses an indiscriminate threat. Yet there is little alternative. Larger militaries want the assurance that they can counter any attempt to weaponize and militarize space, and international endeavors have largely failed to provide those assurances through diplomatic means.

Space Race Redux

Once a country shows an interest in boosting its space capabilities, all others become concerned about the potential ramifications and follow suit.China began testing its ASAT capability as early as 2005 and in 2007 successfully destroyed a defunct weather satellite. This was the first successful, unclassified ASAT test by any country in more than two decades. Since then, Russia and the United States have also displayed their own ASAT capabilities, and in the last six months both China and Russia have carried out further tests, though they did not actually destroy a satellite.

Such tests are really a matter of deterrence rather than a response to space weapons. The United States still maintains that its testing was done to remove satellites with problems. The fact is that no offensive or defensive weapons have been deployed in space — at least none that have been publicly disclosed. The closest thing that exists to space weaponry today is the Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), which has a suborbital spaceflight trajectory that goes well into low-Earth orbit.

Actually putting weapons in space poses a number of problems. Any space-based arsenal, along with its associated systems, would be incredibly susceptible to attack and extremely cost inefficient. Satellites are vulnerable by nature, and weapons platforms would require some form of point-defense system, either integrated or stationed nearby. An effective space-based missile system would also require a massive number of satellites to sufficiently cover any given area of Earth. Reloading would also be expensive and time-consuming. For these practical reasons, the United States has suspended all of its unclassified space weaponization initiatives — including the “Star Wars” program of the 1980s — and has focused its attention instead on cheaper ground-based systems.

Despite the suspension of its space-based weapons programs, the United States continues to nurture its ASAT capabilities. Washington seeks to defend itself from other countries with a desire to weaponize space, while also protecting allied non-weapon satellites. Other countries remain interested in ASAT technology because it enables them to critically enfeeble the U.S. military. In effect, the United States’ technological advancement is also a potential weakness. Simply put, satellites are difficult to defend: Their orbits are relatively predictable and they are hard to hide and maneuver.

ASATs: A Short History

ASAT development was a major part of the Cold War space race. As soon as it became obvious that satellites would soon have military importance, ASAT technology became a national security priority for both Washington and Moscow. The United States and the Soviet Union successfully tested various ASAT platforms, demonstrating the ability to take down each other’s satellites. In a sense this game played out similar to nuclear deterrence theory, as both countries recognized that attacking the other’s military satellites would result in a proportional response — one that was largely indefensible.

During this period, there was also a great deal of mutual cooperation when it came to regulating space. There were several — albeit limited — treaties devoted to terms of competition, including a ban on deploying nuclear weapons to space or even on the moon. The first ASATs lacked sophisticated guidance systems and nuclear blasts were conceived as a way to compensate for this deficiency. However, an outright ban on anti-satellite weapons was never achieved, despite frequent diplomatic efforts and periodic voluntary bans by the United States and the Soviet Union. One thing did, however, become clear: ASATs do not simply pose a conventional security risk. The debris created by the destruction of satellites forms a significant environmental hazard for all countries with business in space.

As competition between Russia and the United States eased, so did the focus on ASAT technology. That changed in 2007, when China became the third country to destroy a satellite in orbit. Beijing staged further tests in 2013 — with the highest suborbital rocket launch in several decades — and again in October 2015. In response, Russia has become more aggressive in pursuit of its own ASAT program, essentially showcasing its capabilities, which had come under question since the fall of the Soviet Union and the demise of its associated military programs.

Russia conducted ASAT tests last November, and recently announced plans to modify some of its existing ICBMs to target 99942 Apophis, an asteroid that will come close to Earth in 2036. The United States, for its part, demonstrated its own ASAT capabilities in 2008, one year after China’s first test. Washington targeted a satellite that allegedly posed a threat to other satellites. Space is once again becoming an arena for multinational competition, even beyond the United States, Russia and China. Still, that does not mean there will be a massive weaponization of the near-Earth environment any time soon. Even the largest militaries are constrained by cost and efficiency when planning space programs. ASAT technology, though, will be the first focus. While technically not a space weapon, anti-satellite systems can deter further weaponization as well as attacks against satellites in general. North Korea, South Korea, Japan, India, Iran and Israel could all begin pursuing ASAT capabilities in the near future.

Protecting Space Assets

Various militaries are also trying to address the question of how best to defend against ASAT attacks. The major concern is that satellites are inherently vulnerable to existing surface-based systems. Anything circumnavigating the Earth is difficult to hide: Satellites follow predictable orbits and have minimal maneuverability because of physics and propellant limitations.

Redundancy is one of the most practical ways to limit the threat posed by ASATs. Drones could potentially replace some of the functionality of satellites in the near future, and the proliferation of tiny, comparatively cheap CubeSats offers tantalizing possibilities. But both of these options are complicated and resource intensive, meaning that only the United States could perhaps broadly adopt selected alternatives to satellites. China and Russia could pursue localized alternatives, but other countries would be severely constrained in their approaches.

The United States relies the most on space for military purposes, and in a way that is a significant departure from the deterrence dynamic of the Cold War. This dependence makes the United States particularly vulnerable to attack, and it reduces the potential cost to any attacker. However, a nation that deploys anti-satellite weapons to destroy enemy satellites creates a potential risk to its own space capabilities, thanks to the creation of debris. So, as militaries work to hone their ASAT capabilities, they must also work to find ways to reduce the creation of space debris and to protect their satellites from it. Japan has already begun testing a “space net” type satellite that would glide through space, capturing debris. A space net would have immediate applications in an anti-satellite role, if it were deployed that way. And, like any other threat, ample consideration must be given to effective countermeasures.

The development of space-based military systems as well as surface-based weapons to counter them is costly and not without challenges. As a result, the technology will be slow to develop. However, it is clear that the militarization of space will only increase. As noted, China, Russia, and the United States are already developing their space technology alongside the weapons needed to target opposing space technologies. Other nations will follow suit, if they are not already doing so. Unfortunately for the United States, as the country with the most reliance on space-based systems, it will continue to be the most vulnerable party as this new space race continues, at least for the foreseeable future.

The Prime Minister, David Cameron did not think that a UK exit was “the right answer” but promised “everything necessary to make it work” if a vote was set to leave the union. The referendum should be held this summer 2016, depending on a possible agreement with EU. Now several negotiations have been held between Cameron and representatives of the Union. But still, the final decision will remain in the hand of British citizens.

Economic consequences

Many analyzes developed different scenarios about the future Brexit. The Confederation of British Industry (CBI), which represents 240.000 companies gave first numbers about the interest for the UK to stay in the European Union. The first advantage will be a gain from 4 to 5 points of GDP.

In case of an exit, the United Kingdom could suffer a loss from 14% of its GDP according to the German foundation Bertelsmann Stiftung. The German foundation evaluated the consequences as a decrease of the GDP by 3% /inhabitants until 2030 as well as a decrease of the market power of London City. The total loss would lay at around £ 56 billion (€ 78 billion) each year for the upcoming 10 years due to new custom barriers and the exit of the European free market.

The think tank Open Europe evaluated the consequences of an exit and the stay of UK in the Union. An exit could, under certain conditions, boost UK GDP:

“On the one hand, UK GDP could be 2.2% lower in 2030 if Britain leaves the EU and fails to strike a deal with the EU or reverts into protectionism. In a best-case scenario, under which the UK manages to enter into liberal trade arrangements with the EU and the rest of the world, while pursuing large-scale deregulation at home, Britain could be better off by 1.6% of GDP in 2030.”

Consequences for UK boundaries

In case of a “Brexit”, the UK border will be regulated only by the British law. Moving to Britain will probably be harder than it is today: citizens from the Union will face queues and border checks upon entering the UK. A Brexit will also have consequences on the branch of culture, arts and higher education, as the European Union finances many cultural projects. Universities from the EU will have to pay tuition fees in order to create partnering programs. But the EU could also take major decisions concerning Brits living or travelling in Europe. Potentially, Brits would end up having to apply for visas every time they travel across the Channel. The Irish border will remain an important issue that could lead to passport checkpoints between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic.

The Consequences for the European Union

The EU will not either benefit from a future “Brexit”: The Bertelsmann foundation evaluated a 0,3% loss in GDP for France and Germany as a consequence of the “Brexit”. Also, the City of London plays a major role in the European finance sector: the Union will thus suffer even bigger losses. The European Union share in global exports of goods and services at current prices and exchange rates will also fall from 33,9 to 30,3%.

All these consequences are due to foreign trade. According to the World Trade Organization (WTO) last annual report, UK ranked at eighth in the list of exporting countries and sixth in the list of importing ones.

Since 1945, we can compare the international influence of Europe and UK in the world´s trade market: Europe has kept a constant influence on the international markets, whereas United Kingdom went from the first place to the third one.

The EU is UK’s first commercial partner. The special position of the United Kingdom in the Union gives them the chance to be part of the free trade union and to renounce to the trade barriers. Since its entry in the Union, United Kingdom has increased its commercial exchange with other EU countries by 55% .

A future Europe à la carte ?

A special status for the United Kingdom in the European Union could lead to other protests from euro-skeptic countries and lead to an integration “a la carte” which will make the incentives and the EU decision making process even more complex and less transparent than now. Borders of certain countries could be closed again with new anti-integration arguments. A strong, fixed Europe will become a far and unrealistic idea.

Forecast

Analysis

For the first time in Iran’s history, its two elected national government bodies, the 290-seat parliament and the 88-seat Assembly of Experts, are up for popular election on the same day. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, whose overarching influence guides every move of the Iranian government, frequently comments on the workings of the government’s different bodies. He recently praised the role of the Assembly of Experts and parliament in adapting Iranian policy for the modern era, albeit under his careful supervision. Both elected bodies must walk a fine line to meet the dueling demands of progress and fidelity to Khamenei’s conservative principles, and the reshuffling that comes with elections may ever so slightly shift that ever-changing ideological balance.

The coalitions forming ahead of the Feb. 26 elections indicate a growing affinity between traditional conservatives — ideologically aligned with Khamenei — and pragmatic conservatives, more closely aligned with current President Hassan Rouhani and the change-oriented reformists. Should these more moderate conservatives win a large number of seats in both bodies, their success will indicate a degree of public satisfaction with Rouhani’s market-driven economic policies. Additionally, such wins would demonstrate a further shift in Iran’s government away from the hard-line conservatives that have held key roles in policymaking for decades. The supreme leader himself expressed reservations about some elements within Iran’s conservative power base, elements he sees as both corrupt and dangerous. In Khamenei’s view, the most conservative factions pose a threat to the clerically grounded government system and to Iran’s economic growth. Under former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a sub-group within the hard-liners — the populists — even challenged the supreme leader’s power. Even so, Khamenei and Iran’s hard-liners depend on one another for support.

A Moderate Alliance

Iran’s political system is a hybrid of democratic and theocratic elements, within which various factions coalesce around common economic and social goals. In general, political groupings fall into one of two camps: conservatives (sometimes called principlists) and moderates. The conservative group comprises the more highly educated traditionalists with the strongest links to the clerical establishment, the merchant class and the supreme leader. Among them are parliament Speaker Ali Larijani and Ali Akbar Velayati, a former foreign minister and now adviser to the supreme leader. The conservative camp also includes more populist and socially conservative hard-liners, such as Ahmadinejad and the current chair of the Guardian Council, Ahmad Jannati. The hard-liners have the strongest connection to Iran’s elite military force, the Islamic Republican Guard Corps (IRGC), and attract voters from the rural poor.

The moderate camp is a combination of pragmatic conservatives (sometimes known as centrists or moderates) and the more radical reformists. Rouhani, former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (currently running for another term in the Assembly of Experts) and Hassan Khomeini, grandson of the Islamic republic’s founder, are all prominent pragmatic conservatives. Their agenda couples social conservatism with more liberal economic and foreign policies, which they believe are necessary to attract critically needed foreign investment.

Echoing calls for economic and foreign policy change are Iran’s more radical reformists, whose enduring popularity despite the enforced silence of many reformist leaders testifies to the Iranian public’s thirst for change. Several prominent reformist leaders, including former President Mohammed Khatami as well as Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, have been banned from the news media or placed under house arrest. Reformists emerged from the Islamist coalitions of the 1980s, generally disappointed that the tenets they thought central to the 1979 Islamic Revolution — social justice, economic socialism and freedom from tyranny — had not been implemented. These Islamist revolutionaries transformed over time into champions of popular sovereignty and political pluralism. Prominent reformists today, such as former Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref, campaign cautiously so as not to incite the ire of Khamenei and the conservative establishment. As demonstrated by the government crackdown in 2009, Iran’s conservative leaders do not tolerate public protests of elections. And they depend on Iran’s military, including the IRGC as well as local Basij militias, to help to keep the peace.

Though they have less influence with the supreme leader than their traditional conservative counterparts, the moderate camp captures a greater share of the Iranian public. Pragmatic conservatives and reformists promise the most social and economic change and, with it, an answer to perceived sluggishness and inefficiency in government. According to the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and others, as sanctions slowly lift, Iran’s economic growth could soon jump to 6 percent. But with unemployment in Iran stubbornly high (at 10.6 percent) and with its persisting status as a challenging environment for investment — Iran ranks 118 out of 189 countries in the 2015 Doing Business rankings — Iran is still underperforming. Years of sanctions imposed as a result of Iran’s nuclear programs have left the economy stagnant, something the reformists and the pragmatic conservatives want to change by quickly opening the economy to the outside world.

Courting Reform-Oriented Voters

Partly because of this overlap in their economic views, conservatives and reformists are forging a unique coalition ahead of elections. To capitalize on the reformists’ demonstrated power to drive voter turnout, some prominent pragmatic conservatives are distancing themselves from their conservative camps by running independently or joining reformist-endorsed candidate lists. Candidates that meet requisite ideogical requirements may make their way onto these lists through personal connections with reformist politicians.​ By using those tactics, some pragmatic conservatives hope to guarantee their seats and help push Iran toward more growth-oriented economic policies while still remaining safely within the conservative establishment endorsed and controlled by the supreme leader.

That establishment is embodied in the ideologically conservative Guardian Council, a 12-member body charged with  reviewing legislation and approving candidates for elections. The council, chaired by Jannati, has blocked legislation deemed too reformist, and this year it disqualified the majority of reformist candidates for both Assembly of Experts and parliamentary elections. It also granted a scant number of disqualified candidates the chance to appeal their ousters. Six of the Guardian Council’s members are directly appointed by Khamenei, and the remaining six are appointed by the head of the judiciary, who is himself appointed by Khamenei.

In the past, even reformist candidates approved by the council have often chosen to boycott elections. But this year, reformist candidates for the Assembly of Experts plan to run, meaning voter turnout should be high. And because reformist and pragmatic conservative candidates tend to capture more votes than do hard-liner or traditional conservatives, the next Assembly of Experts could be slightly less conservative than assemblies past. That could affect the choice of the Islamic Republic’s next absolute leader, a powerful function of the assembly that is particularly relevant now that the current leader is ageing.

For the legislature, too, candidate calls for boycotts have been fewer this year, and pragmatic and traditional conservatives hope higher voter turnout will help them capture more seats. Ali Motahari and Larijani are among the traditional and pragmatic conservatives who are shifting further from hard-liner views to piggyback on reformist public appeal. Motahari, a conservative candidate in the important Tehran district, has put his name on a list put forth by a joint reformist and moderate alliance, the new Coalition of Reformists and Government Supporters. This week Motahari explained his appearance on the list by characterizing his own views as reformist. Larijani, a conservative known for whipping up parliamentary support for implementing the nuclear deal, refused requests from key hard-liners to join their coalition, instead choosing to run on an independent ticket. Though long considered a traditional conservative, Larijani is affiliating with some pragmatic conservatives and showing support for Rouhani, so much so that some are now calling him a pragmatic conservative, himself.

Calls for Economic Reform

No matter which faction wins the most seats on Feb. 26, the Iranian public is eager for economic rejuvenation and the full lifting of sanctions. Removing sanctions entirely, however, would shake up the domestic economy and could sap some of the IRGC’s economic power. The IRGC, charged as guardian of revolutionary values, also protects the supreme leader and holds some of the state’s wealth. The Iranian constitution prohibits the military organization from directly participating in politics. Nonetheless, it has steadily taken on more political power, in particular gaining strength during Ahmadinejad’s time in office thanks to its close relationship with the president. Under Rouhani, Iran’s outward-facing economic policies may benefit the country overall, but they will also erode some of the power the IRGC has built up — a process that could be accelerated by a more moderate legislature.

History tells us that the Iranian electorate, impatient to improve Iran’s economic lot, tends to vote for candidates who promise change. Aware of that public sentiment, conservatives are connecting their names to those of prominent reformists. Thus, even with most reformist candidates barred from running, Iranians still have some limited opportunity to vote for economic reform, simply by supporting conservatives who are rebranding themselves as moderates open to change.

In the upcoming parliamentary elections, a coalition of moderates has the opportunity to edge out hard-liner influence over economic policy while still toeing the ideological line laid out by Iran’s conservative establishment. The vote has little chance of fundamentally altering Iran’s overall foreign policy. Iran’s economic reopening, its interest in upholding the nuclear agreement and its focus on regional challenges will remain, regardless of which faction prevails. However, the Feb. 26 vote will be an important bellwether of shifting ideological currents in the country, which could have implications for Iran’s presidential election in 2017.