Young Diplomats

2015 was the year authoritarian governments struck back against democratic pressures.

The story of 2015 in Southeast Asia was Myanmar’s November election. In giving the National League for Democracy and its leader Aung San Suu Kyi a landslide, Myanmar citizens signaled their strong support for democratic change and better governance.

These calls have been loud in recent years — in Malaysia’s 2008 and 2013 elections, in Thailand’s repeated electoral victories for a non-military aligned government, in Cambodia’s 2013 and Singapore’s 2011 polls as well as strong electoral support for democracy in the Philippines and Indonesia. Democratic pressures on Southeast Asian governments have been increasing, and are not likely to recede in the near future.

2015 was the year authoritarian governments in the region struck back. Behind the Myanmar headlines there is a worrying trend of a significant democratic contraction taking place. The use of the authoritarian arsenal by Southeast Asian governments are not new, but in the course of the year regional governments expanded their use of incumbency and control of institutions to shore up their positions.

The most obvious trend has been the increased use of repression, especially targeted toward opposition politicians and critics. In Malaysia, opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim was jailed in February. In Thailand, a trial began against ousted PM Yingluck Shinawarta as she was denied the right to travel. In Cambodia, opposition politicians were physically attacked. The leader of the opposition Sam Rainsy has delayed his return to Cambodia from November as a result of jail threat. Malaysia has the highest number of opposition politicians facing various charges from sedition to violations of banking finance regulations.

The threats opposition members across the region face in calling for change extend from being physically attacked on the campaign trial (as occurred for Myanmar’s Naing Ngan Lin NLD candidate who was slashed by a machete) to potential bankruptcy.

The use of the law for political ends moves beyond opposition members. Journalists and bloggers remain targeted. Radio reporter Jose Bernardo was shot dead at a restaurant in Manila in November. He joins the other 77 journalists who have been killed in the Philippines since 1992, making this country one of the most dangerous places for media professionals in the world.

Myanmar tops the region’s list with the most number of journalists jailed, pipping Vietnam this year who released some of its bloggers. Notably, blogger Ta Phong Tan was released after 10 years in jail. The situation for bloggers in Vietnam remains serious, with a number of incidents where bloggers and associates were beaten up in mysterious circumstances rather than jailed. In Singapore, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong won his defamation case against a blogger critic Roy Ngerng, who was asked to pay PM Lee S $150,000. Lee joins Malaysia’s Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak as the second current leader in the region who filed charges for public criticism.

The crackdowns on freedom of expression extend to ordinary citizens, from artists and academics to taxi drivers.

Young Chaw Sandi Tun was sentenced to six months jail for insulting Myanmar’s army in her Facebook post noting the similarity in color between the Tatmadaw’s uniform and the opposition leader’s clothing. In Thailand, the cases involving lese majeste have extended the boundaries to include insults to the king’s dog. Thanakorn faces up to 15 years in jail for this reference, and joins a long list of cases that have involved jailing of university students for a play, taxi cab conversations, novelists and more.

A mother of two was sentenced to 28 years for her Facebook comments, while a hotel employee received 56 years for his posts in August as part of the lese majeste unending prosecutions. Cartoonist Zunar in Malaysia faces up to 43 years for his satirical art work. These developments have had chilling effects on public discourse. Even in more open Indonesia, discussion of the 1965 attacks on communists were shut down.

As power has been used to quiet alternative voices, the rule of law itself has faced erosion. In some cases the law is not being implemented. In July, the co-Investigating International judge Mark Harmon of the Khmer Rouge tribunal in Cambodia resigned his position after the tribunal declined to arrest two former Khmer Rouge leaders for whom the court had issued warrants.

Despite having the technology to find the daughter separated from her mother Indira Gandhi for seven years by a husband who is abusing religion in a personal vendetta against his ex-wife, the Malaysian police have proven to be unwilling to use its tools to follow the court order to return the daughter to the mother.

In other cases, constitutional frameworks protecting rights have been by-passed through the introduction of military courts – as has been the case in Thailand and called for in Malaysia – and new measures that empower leaders to declare ‘security areas’ without checks on their authority, as occurred with the hurried passage of the National Security Council law in Malaysia. This law is being seen as a measure that will allow unpopular Prime Minister Najib to stay in office if he loses an election. In Myanmar, there are potential laws being considered that may give military impunity for alleged past crimes.

The area where the laws are under real scrutiny continues to be corruption. 2015 showcased some shocking scandals.

In Malaysia the 1MDB $700 million ‘donation’ into Najib’s personal accounts remains inadequately explained, as the rule of law has not been properly applied to the premier and impunity appears to have allowed the premier to hold onto office even with his personal reputation in shatters. Efforts to undermine Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and the recent demands for payments from Freeport to politicians to conduct business have showcased that persistent problem of bribery, lack of transparency and abuse of position.

From corruption concerns tied to the Aquino administration in the Philippines to persistent effects of corruption trails associated with Vietnam’s elite, there lacks effective leadership in tackling the region’s most serious governance problem. The end effect is that leaders at the top are seen to engage in graft, reinforcing a system where office is used for personal wealth rather than public service.

Control over resources and alliances with cronies remains a dominant feature of Southeast Asia’s political economy. Four countries in the region – Malaysia (3), Singapore (5), Philippines (6), Indonesia (10) – were in The Economist’s crony capitalist list, which measures the favoritism of wealth toward tycoons and politically-affiliated business interests.

Measures to enhance this favoritism expanded in 2015 through the introduction of consumption taxes in Malaysia and Myanmar, regulations that facilitated more burning rather than less in the haze-affected region in Indonesia and service fees in areas such as tolls to crony-companies. The region’s most vulnerable populations are feeling the economic pain, with depreciating currencies and a slowdown in growth in the region as a whole. These conditions have contributed to conditions where the use of state resources through populist policies have boosted incumbent governments, a factor that contributed to the People’s Action Party’s September 2015 electoral victory.

Those on the margins are being particularly impacted, with serious implications for rights. Southeast Asia was not immune from the global refugee crisis affecting over 60 million people worldwide. Conditions affecting the livelihoods of the Rohingyas in Myanmar remain severe, with conditions in camps across the region not much better. The shocking findings of death camps in Thailand and Malaysia involving torture, rape and human and organ trafficking in May have yet to be properly accounted for.

One reason for this lack of accountability lies with the upgrade the Obama administration gave Malaysia on its human trafficking assessment in the wake of the discovery of the gruesome murders. The Obama administration’s sell out of human rights principles was especially acute in 2015, where interests associated with the Trans-Pacific Partnership overrode other concerns.

From questions tied to the trial of Burmese migrant workers in killing British backpackers Thailand to the persistent practice of ‘sea slaves’ with citizens hauled onto fishing boats, those that are vulnerable remain so at the end of the year, which limited measures to point to strengthening protections.

Vulnerability in 2015 extended to religious and ethnic minorities as well. Bogor was labeled Indonesia’s most intolerant city when it declared a ban of the Shia faith in the city. Hate speech toward Muslims persists in Myanmar, in spite of the electoral victory signaling greater inclusiveness. Churches were burned in Aceh. Christmas celebrations were banned in Brunei. Rights of religious minorities were curbed in Malaysia in cases involving child custody and worship.

Measures to forge peace with minorities fell apart, as the Philippines’ Bansamoro Basic Law did not pass the legislatures. In other places such as Myanmar, Protection Race and Religion Bills denying rights to marriage and religious freedom were introduced, as protections for rights were in fact eroded.

There were nevertheless bright spots in greater freedom across the region – a gender rights bill in Thailand, the end of the persecution of a book seller and academic by religious authorities in Malaysia, the reinstatement of direct local elections in Indonesia and the subsequent peaceful elections in December, to name but a few.

Southeast Asians continue to fight for their freedoms valiantly, over cyberspace, in courtrooms and in communities. The climate however has not been conducive to greater freedoms as those in office continue to use their offices to hold on to power.

As we look ahead, with a slowing economy and persistent insecurities by incumbents, the prospects for expanding rights does not appear promising in 2016. Last year has shown us however that we can expect the unexpected, with the military’s acceptance of the Myanmar’s electoral results as an example.

As ASEAN formally announced its community on 31 December 2015, many hold on to a potentially different ‘imagined community,’ where the ideas of brilliant scholar Benedict Anderson of shared belonging, human dignity and decency live on.

Bridget Welsh is Professor of Political Science at Ipek University, Senior Research Associate at the Center for East Asian Democratic Studies of National Taiwan University, Senior Associate Fellow of The Habibie Center, and University Fellow of Charles Darwin University.

As I entered the villager’s house in coastal Papua and removed my shoes, I was told to bring them in inside – otherwise the Orang Wamena (mountain clan) would steal them.

Noticing the ruins of a house nearby, I asked what the story was; Orang Wamena was the reply.

During my 10 months of fieldwork in the small village inside Jayapura district in Indonesia’s Papua region, I heard Orang Wamena, Orang Wamena, time and time again. These words were often uttered whenever anything went wrong or something bad happened.

So feared are they, that I was warned not to mess or deal with the group.

Alongside the existing decades of cleavage between migrants and indigenous people in the region, sits the longstanding cleavage between Indonesia Papua’s coastal and the mountain clan.

So bad is the current situation, that when Papua independence activist Filep Karma was released from 11 years in jail (for waving a flag) by Indonesia authorities last month, one of the first things he noted was the acute tensions between the two groups. He described them as a “time bomb.”

“If Papua succeeded and the Indonesians went home, there would already be a time bomb that may go off any time. I don’t want that to happen,” he said.

In Indonesia’s Papua region there is a common stereotype about the mountain clan that is often projected when interacting with coastal villagers. The latter often express discomfort living and interacting with the mountain clan.

The reason is primarily based on the view that the mountain clan often solve problems with violence. This stereotype is not uncommon and it is generally held by coastal clan.

For example, ‘Ibu X’, a villager from a coastal clan who works as a health promoter told me that the mountain clan would do anything for money, including fighting. Surprisingly for me, this lady was too scared to interact with Orang Wamena.

I once asked her once if she was willing to accompany me to visit some of the mountain clan. She shook her head and advised me not to meet them.

Another villager told me that Orang Wamena are easily provoked and are not capable of considering the risks and consequences of their violent actions. Furthermore, he explained that they are troublemakers who, culturally, love war.

Those who felt least comfortable with the presence of Wamena even stated that it was the time for local government to ban their arrival in the village. They stated that Orang Wamena do not have the right to be a recipient of any village development program. They feared that if they were given access to such programs, more mountain clan members would come to the village.

In the village where I was based, the Orang Wamena live separately and isolated from the coastal clan housings. Based on my interviews with their leader in the village, theOrang Wamena came from various regions in the central mountainous  regions — not only Wamena (the capital of Jayawijaya), but also from Lanny Jaya, Intan Jaya and Puncak Jaya.

The mountain first settled in the village between 1982 and 1983 to study religion at the local College of Theology. A large majority of them work as students at the college.

Some of the students’ extended family or clan members, who are supporting their education, have joined them. After completing their education, most groups stay the village and only a few return to their hometown, especially if they are accepted to work as civil servants.

A lack of development – economic, health, education and infrastructure – in the highland regions, where most of the poor native Papuans live, is one of the reasons they decide to stay in the coastal area.

In the village where I lived, the mountain clan mainly work in agriculture, a role that uses the skill sets they have mastered living in the mountain regions. They plant various types of vegetables, fruits and cash crops.

They work hard, particularly the women, usually walking through the hills in the morning and then selling their produce at market in the late afternoon.

Besides farming, some small groups of Orang Wamena, usually male, also raise pigs and ducks, and work as construction labourers.

The leader of the mountain clan also feels unease that the Orang Wamena are always blamed for any violence that occurs in the village. According to him, the coastal leaders also contribute to this violence.

So what is actually happening?

The conflict between the mountain and coastal clans can be traced in part to land politics. In the past, when a member of the mountain clan arrived in the coastal area and requested land, this was usually granted with the provision that they would support the coastal land owner during elections or any potential conflict situations.

The traditional leaders who have rented their land usually used an informal oral agreement. Coastal land owners feel that the mountain clan are physically strong and aggressive, and thus they are feared by the coastal group.

They felt safe because they now had the protection in the form of the mountain clan ‘army’ if there was any conflict. On one occasion, when a land owner nominated for village chief, the support he received from the mountain clan contributed to his victory.

But not all coastal leaders rented out their land under the provision of political mobilisation and conflict resolution. One leader I spoke with proposed specific requirements to lease his land. The first requirement was not to conduct assaults or violence.  The second condition, was to not grow long-term crops. This particular leader even gave a statement to portray how some of the mountain clan were just victims, being used as a tool by some coastal clan leaders.

When Filep Karma voiced his concerns that the racism that occurred between Papuans will be a time bomb he was right. Clan unity is essential for Papuans, if they are to successfully fight for their human rights.  While acknowledging that the conflict between Papuans and Indonesia’s central government needs to be resolved, there also should be an effort to promote more dialogue to resolve conflict between Papuans.

Yulia (Indri) Sari is a PhD candidate at the Crawford School of Public Policy, the Australian National University.

As Ban Ki-moon’s current tenure comes to a close in 2016, January sees the start of the marathon campaign for the selection of a new UN Secretary-General. After months of anticipation, the UN General Assembly has now circulated a joint letter to all member states inviting nominations for the position detailing the qualities and requirements needed to lead the UN.

The UN convention of regional rotation means that, international politics permitting, the next Secretary-General should come from Eastern Europe. Pressure from advocacy groups such as ‘1 for 7 billion’ and ‘SheUnited’ as well as the Colombian-led initiative pushing for a woman Secretary General appear to have found fertile ground in the General Assembly and Security Council.

All potential candidates will undergo thorough and vigorous vetting from member states, and must somehow transcend regional and international political hurdles. They will also likely face hearings in the UN General Assembly. The next UNSG faces challenges both new and old, and each candidate will take the opportunity to articulate their vision for the organization and the global challenges that urgently need to be addressed under their leadership.

Emerging threats such as increased international terrorism and deepening religious intolerance are now recognized as destabilizing issues alongside more established issues of climate change, poverty and inequality, and the long overdue institutional reform of the UN itself.

The Leading Eastern European Candidates

Several leading candidates are already in the rumor mill, but what has been lacking until now is a comprehensive analysis of each individual’s attributes and suitability for the role.  Having never held the position of UNSG, which like all senior UN posts is supposed to be rotated among the regions, Eastern Europe is now long overdue the opportunity to get this prestigious role. We examined the leading nominated and potential candidates from the region, and assessed their suitability for the position.

The likely leading candidates from within the region will include, in alphabetical order, IrinaBokova, Bulgaria’s former Foreign Minister and current UNESCO Director-General; European Commissioner for Budget and Human Resources Kristalina Georgieva; former Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić; the former Macedonian Minister of Foreign Affairs SrgjanKerim; Special Representative and Head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan JánKubiš from Slovakia; Miroslav Lajčák, his successor as Slovakia’s Foreign Minister; Igor Lukšić, the former Prime Minister and current Foreign Minister of Montenegro; Croatia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs Vesna Pusić; and Danilo Türk, the former President of Slovenia.

Criteria & Methodology

The September UNGA resolution established a series of qualifying recommendations and attributes that the most suitable candidate should possess. The contents of UNGA letter and the known attributes of previous candidates have provided enough data to allow for a thorough comparison of the current candidates. As part of our methodological approach, regional and international political experts from the permanent members of the Security Council as well as from across Eastern Europe provided their input on each candidate and in each criteria allowing for the creation of a comparative tableaux on the likely UNSG candidates.

The following criteria were examined, which we reclassified in three sets, the first pertaining in a sense to professional skills, the second to political acceptance, and the third to public acceptance at a time when the UN wants to modernize its image:

• UN and diplomatic-related experience
  • proven leadership;
  • managerial ability;
  • extensive international relations experience;
  • diplomatic and communications skills;
  • experience in the United Nations;
  • diplomatic record;
  • linguistic ability
• Acceptability within UN system
  • acceptability to the five Permanent Members of the Security Council
  • likely to gain support from the Eastern European region as a whole
  • likely to gain domestic support
• Acceptability to global public opinion at a time of key UN transformation
  • understanding and sensitivity to multicultural issues
  • gender

We examined the criteria and compared the candidates, assigning a mark between 1 for a poor score and 5 for an excellent score for each candidate in each criterion. Based on their experience and capabilities, an average score from each equally weighted criterion is assigned to every candidate with the exception of gender. In light of recent momentum for a woman SG, gender will have a significant impact on the scoring. In this matter however, giving only a full mark of 1 for men or 5 for women would have led to disproportionate effects even if it was only one of twelve parameters; thus we keep it as a sort of “dummy variable”: 2 vs. 4. Proven leadership and managerial abilities are seen as fundamental requirements, as are extensive international and diplomatic experience. An ability to converse easily in many of the official UN languages is a significant positive for any candidate, and any previous UN institutional experience will strengthen a candidate’s case. The final candidate must also be politically acceptable to the permanent members of the Security Council whilst bridging divisions in Eastern Europe’s regional politics.

Table 1: Results

Table 2: Gender-sensitivity and variance

The analysis of results shown in Table 1 identified three distinct groups of UNSG candidates.

The current head of UNESCO, Bulgaria’s Irina Bokova appears by far the strongest candidate from Eastern Europe. She scored above 3 on all criteria, and obtained the maximum score of for 8 criteria. Her total average score of 4.5 places her head and shoulders above the others. The low variance within her scores demonstrates consistency across all aspects of the profile.

A second group of candidates is led by Slovenia’s Danilo Türk, and includes the Croatian Vesna Pusić, Miroslav Lajčák, and Ján Kubiš equally of Slovakia, Macedonia’s Srgjan Kerim, and the Montenegrin Igor Lukšić. They all score between 3.0 and 4.0 and all enjoy strong reputations and solid profiles.

Our analysis reveals that the two weakest candidates by far are the Bulgarian European Commissioner for Budget and Human Resources Kristalina Georgieva and Serbia’s former Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić, who respectively score 2.9 and 2.8. Neither of them has a serious chance of succeeding Ban Ki-moon.

It is equally important to measure the variance (Table 2) of scoring to ensure that candidates have no gaps. The smaller the variance, the more consistency of the profile. Bokova scores 0.5 while all others are above a score of 1.1. Kubiš and Jeremić rise above 2.3 which is probably too high.  Last but not least, these results are not affected by counting or discounting gender as a factor (Table 2); so, all things being equal, we can expect to see a woman elected as UNSG through merit rather than by any question of affirmative action. At any rate a new time for the UN has come.

About the author: Joël Ruet is Chairman of the The Bridge Tank and writes for The Diplomatic Courier.

The year 2015 may have marked the end of an era in Chinese journalism. Until recently, liberal, commercial print media engaged in aggressive and influential reporting that also formed part of a successful business model. The decline of this sector is due to a combination of tighter government controls, targeted prosecutions, and the kinds of financial pressures facing print media worldwide.

Although investigative journalists and commercial media have faced periodic reprisals for over a decade, and more pressure than usual since 2012, events in 2015 were decisive in reducing the space and influence these media outlets had tried to carve out for themselves in a politically restrictive and highly competitive market.

The Guangdong-based Southern Media Group has been hit especially hard. Last January, former Southern Weekly journalist Fang Kecheng lamented the failure of 2013 protests by reporters and others who sought to combat censorship at the paper, one of the country’s most influential liberal news outlets and a pioneer of serious investigative journalism in China. Fang said censorship demands had mounted since the protests, and an exodus of experienced journalists to various internet start-ups ensued.

In April, authorities revoked the publishing permit for Money Week and shut down the website of the 21st Century Business Herald. Staffers from the two Southern Media Group outlets had been detained in 2014 under allegations of extortion. In August, Guangdong authorities published a report listing various new requirements that had been imposed on the company, including an increase in the percentage of CCP members among its employees. In September, three of the group’s papers ran glowing coverage of a military parade held in Beijing, one of the CCP’s largest propaganda events of the year.

The final blow of 2015 came on Christmas Eve, when Shen Hao, the former chairman of the company’s 21st Century Media unit and a former Southern Weekly editor whose idealism and professionalism inspired a generation of journalism students, was sentenced to four years in prison on extortion charges that many colleagues believe to be fabricated. Amid the Southern Media Group’s political tribulations and falling readership, what was once among the most successful commercial media companies in China has reportedly been forced to accept millions of dollars in government subsidies. “The case of the 21st Century group showed that journalism has been annihilated in China,” Cheng Yizhong, a prominent journalist who has served time in prison for his reporting, told the Washington Post. “The ruling party has won the war it started in 2003, completely.”

Similar pressures have appeared at other commercial media outlets over the last two years, causing many to break up investigative reporting teams and even close down altogether. In a watershed moment in 2015, Wang Xiaolu, a reporter from Caijing, one of the country’s most respected financial magazines, was arrested and paraded on state television in August for an article that reported on the stock market around the time of one of the summer’s precipitous sell-offs. Wang’s case was widely seen as an attempt to scapegoat and intimidate financial reporters as the government attempted to prop up the market.

Adding to the shifting direction of news coverage in China, a number of new, state-subsidized digital media outlets are gaining readers and increasing the dominance of official narratives. The most prominent is the The Paper  a web-based publication entirely funded by the government under the Shanghai United Media Group. As Tabitha Speelman outlined in a recent article, the Paper is China’s first digital news organization to create a mobile application featuring its own content, which consists of an incongruous combination of social exposés that occasionally get censored, propaganda-like pieces, and arts and culture news. With this recipe, the Paper“has distinguished itself by successfully integrating into the media diet of many young Chinese, most of whom would normally not follow or share state media’s often stodgy coverage.” Its success has reportedly prompted satisfied reactions from the State Internet Information Office and copycat online platforms in at least six other provinces or municipalities.

Taken together, these developments paint a disheartening picture for China watchers who saw publications like those at the Southern Media Group as proof that quality journalism could survive — and even thrive — in one of the world’s most restrictive political environments.

A few journalistic stalwarts, like Hu Shuli’s Caixin, carry on. But with the regime’s thumb on the scale, the model of journalism that produced hard-hitting, popular investigative reporting on topics like official corruption and tainted vaccines is increasingly losing out to a format whose most prominent feature is sunny headlines about government work and the daily activities of Xi Jinping.

Outside of personal reasons, President Obama issued his executive order on guns for two reasons. First, he is not up for reelection. Second, the Congress is.

Most experts agree that the likely policy impact of those executive orders decided by Obama would be minimal. They were modest measures that wouldn’t actually do much in the real world.

But politically, it’s a smart move by Barack Obama this was a time bomb meant to explode in the faces of the Republican majorities controlling both the House and the Senate.

Most polls show that the gun issue skews dramatically in the favor of gun control advocates, although from a practical political angle, gun rights supporters are better mobilized and tend to have a more focused impact at the ballot box.

But for a president that has nothing to lose politically, getting guns in the political mix is a no-brainer. If Republicans make this a campaign issue by trying to shut the government down or otherwise try to force the president to reverse course, it could blow up in their faces.

Of course, for most conservatives, it is a matter of dogma that the Second Amendment is impregnable to any kind of limits.

And for many of the most avid gun rights supporters, it is not good public policy to have doctors the final arbiter of deciding who is mentally capable of owning a gun and who is not. They don’t trust their doctors any more than they trust the government.

But for the most vulnerable Republicans, especially those senators who represent blue states, this issue is at best 50/50, and worst, it cuts hard against them.

Sens. Mark Kirk of Illinois, Rob Portman of Ohio, Kelly Ayotte of New Hampshire, Ron Johnson of Wisconsin, and Pat Toomey of Pennsylvania all have potentially difficult races, and while they all have avid and committed gun rights owners in their state, they also have to do well beyond the Republican base to win reelection.

There are three approaches congressional leaders can take on this issue.

They can moan and groan about the executive order and then move on to other issues. They can go to the wall to force Obama’s hand, thereby increasing the odds that this becomes a real political issue in the November. Or they can plot a legislative strategy that allows the Congress to take this issue head on, allows both bodies to work their will, and see what the product is at the end of the process.

I assume that the leaders will decide to go down path No. 1, because it is the road of least resistance. But I admit I am intrigued by the third option.

Wouldn’t it be wonderful if the Congress would actually allow an open debate and attempt to solve a significant problem that faces the American people?

A man can dream.

Read the original article on Christian Science Monitor. Copyright 2016.

The coalition government ruling in India is in the middle of another corruption scandal. Indeed, India’s comptroller and auditor general (CAG) has after scrutinous examination, accused the government of losing 210 billions dollars in potential revunes by giving discounted coal fields to top industrialists and giving some of these companies “undue benefits”.

This latest scandal is likely to impact India’s credibility abroad and deter foreign investors at a time when the Indian economy is already struggling.

The 110-page report alleges that 155 coal blocks were sold without an auction between 2004 and 2009, and the opposition party is demanding a probe into the matter. A BJP leader told Times of India:

“The coal allotment scam is a major scam. We demand a CBI probe and a court should monitor the probe. It is a government of scamsters (that is) involved in knee-deep corruption.”

The CAG itself submitted a letter to the prime minister’s office saying this was just a preliminary report and is misleading:

“In fact it is not even our case that the unintended benefit to the allocatee is an equivalent loss to the exchequer. The leak of the initial draft causes great embarrassment as the Audit Report is still under preparation. Such leakage causes very deep anguish.”

Despite the CAG letter, a senior Indian official confirmed the report to the Financial Times and said that it is in fact close to its final draft.

Past scandals

India is the world’s third largest coal producer and has been rocked by a series of mining scandals, recently, former chief minister of Karnataka resigned after he was charged with being involved in a mining scandal. His case is expected to be heard by the Supreme Court  today with a ruling expected in April or May.

The coalition government is under significant pressure with assembly elections this year and general elections in 2014. The government has already been implicated in a telecom scam that is said to have cost the government $39 billion. And then there’s the corruption scandal that surfaced around India’s Commonwealth Games. At the time Suresh Kalmadi a politician from the ruling party coalition was accused of taking bribes from contractors.

Impact on the economy

India’s budget for 2012-2013 shows that the government is trying to cut its deficit to 5.1 percent of GDP in 2012, after having missed its target in 2011. Such losses in revenue make it significantly harder for India to meet such targets.

Moreover, India is currently ranked 87th on Transparency International’s 2010 corruption perceptions index. And all of this is weighing on India’s economy. Late last year we reported on India’s economic decline and wrote that foreign investors were pulling out of India in part because of corruption. SocGen analyst Joseph Lau said last November:

“General elections are not due for a while, but public outrage at alleged corruption and the government’s poor handling of the situation raise the risk of an early return to the ballot box. For now, the appetite for new polls is low even among opposition parties, but an improvement in political leadership and visible action to address public concerns (including inflation and delayed economic reforms) are needed to restore creditability to the government.”

Lau’s point is important. The government is losing credibility abroad, and reports of corruption are only going to keep investors away.

2016 is just around the corner and there’s a lot to keep an eye on in Asia in the first month of the year. In January 2016, we’ll see elections in Taiwan, the formal operational launch of China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the possible resumption of peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban, the first steps toward renewed comprehensive talks between India and China, and the possible disintegration of a recently concluded controversial deal between the Japanese and South Korean governments on comfort women. Here’s your guide to starting off the new year with an eye to some early developments of geopolitical significance in the Asia-Pacific:

Elections in Taiwan: Taiwanese citizens-who live in one of Asia hotspots-  will head to the polls on January 16 to vote in their latest general elections. Preliminary opinion polling suggests that a victory for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), led by its presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen, is likely. The ruling Kuomintang party may find its rule at an end in Taiwan. Should Tsai prevail in the elections, Taiwan will see its first female president and possibly some changes to its foreign policy and positioning vis-a-vis the mainland. The Kuomintang government’s most recent term has seen a controversial period of rapprochement with the mainland. Though the DPP and Tsai have said that they will largely avoid rocking the boat with China if they win, Beijing remains wary. In any case, the outcome of Taiwan’s election next month will be worth watching early in 2016.

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank goes live: The China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) took a major step toward becoming operational last week, when 17 of its founding members ratified the bank’s Articles of Agreement. In January, the inaugural meeting of the bank’s Board of Governors will take place, which will also signal the commencement of the bank’s operations. The AIIB is significant as an example of China’s growing ambitions as a multilateral leader, offering an alternative vision of global governance and development than those of Western-backed institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In 2016, we’ll see this new institution take off.

A major party congress in Vietnam: In early January, the Vietnamese Communist Party will convene to select a new generation of leadership for the country and the party. Vietnam will elect a new general secretary for the party, a new Politburo, and a new central commission.  Vietnam is an increasingly important actor in Southeast Asia and is a claimant in the South China Sea where tensions with China remain high. Hanoi is additionally being courted by the United States and Japan to balance against Beijing’s growing assertiveness in the region. The outcome of the party congress may not necessarily mean major changes to the country’s foreign policy or direction, but this will be an event to watch early in 2016.

An uncomfortable deal between Japan and South Korea: One of the unexpected bits of good news late in 2015 was the announcement of a historic deal between Japan and South Korea on the “comfort women” issue on December 28. The issue has long divided Seoul and Tokyo, two important U.S. allies in Northeast Asia. However, even though the two countries’ foreign ministers declared the issue “resolved finally and irreversibly,” a number of complications have already come up that suggest implementation of this agreement will not be easy. First, the South Korean survivors of sexual slavery at the hands of the Imperial Japanese Army—the “comfort women” themselves—have rejected the deal. Secondly, Tokyo is reportedly linking the disbursement of funds under the agreement to the dismantling of a statue depicting the plight of former “comfort women” near the Japanese embassy in South Korea. This issue appears far from resolved. Expect the first month of 2016 to be heavily dominated by continuing turbulence over the landmark agreement.

Comprehensive peace talks between India and Pakistan: Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s surprise Christmas stopover in Lahore, Pakistan, where he embraced and promenaded with his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif, sent an unmistakable message that the prospect of comprehensive peace talks between India and Pakistan in 2016 is real and carries momentum. Most of 2015 saw the two nuclear-armed rivals call off planned diplomatic talks, but the final weeks of the year have seen a convergence. Following the display of camaraderie between the two prime ministers, New Delhi and Islamabad are planning foreign secretary-level talks in mid-January to get the ball rolling toward a serious resumption of comprehensive peace talks. The outcome of those talks could set the tone for engagement between the two South Asian giants in 2016.

Peace talks with the Taliban: Afghanistan and Pakistan have seen a cautious rapprochement in the final weeks of 2015 as well. With Islamabad’s imprimatur, peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban could be back on early in 2016. The success or failure of those talks will be indicative of just what to expect in Afghanistan’s ongoing struggle against the militants, who have seized more territory than at any time since the U.S. invasion back in 2001.

Birth of the ASEAN Community. This one’s really an honorable mention of sorts, since there isn’t quite an “event” to anticipate, but ASEAN will usher the new year in by formally launching the ASEAN Community, which comprises the ASEAN Economic Community, the ASEAN Political-Security Community, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. In sum, these initiatives strive to bring more interconnectivity, prosperity, trade, and stability to the ten member states of ASEAN and their 600 million residents. If the ASEAN Community experiment sees early successes, 2016 may be the year we see the emergence of a unified southeast Asian economic bloc—a development that should surely transform how observers think about the economic landscape of the Asia-Pacific.

After 17 years of Chavismo — rule by former President Hugo Chavez and his supporters — Venezuela turned staunchly against the ruling United Socialist Party (PSUV) in parliamentary elections Dec. 6, giving the opposition a two-thirds supermajority in the National Assembly. Now with 112 seats, opposition coalition Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD), can unilaterally call a referendum, remove Cabinet ministers, overturn presidential vetoes and even revise and abrogate international treaties.

However, to effectively take advantage of their supermajority in 2016, MUD opposition leaders will have to negotiate both with key individuals and factions and with their own party members. Otherwise, the party risks months of political conflict and legislative gridlock that could increase the threat of widespread civil strife in the country. Moreover, MUD will have to defend itself against the ruling party, which is trying to neutralize it through the Supreme Court.

MUD’s Beginnings

For four decades, starting in 1958 with the deposition of Gen. Marco Perez Jimenez, Venezuela was governed mainly by two centrist parties: Democratic Action and Christian Democratic Party. However, because of the legacy of Perez’s austerity measures, rising social inequality and the failure of these two centrist parties to unite the public, Lt. Col. Hugo Chavez was able to rise to prominence and to win presidential elections in 1998 and, in 1999, the right to rewrite the constitution through constituent assembly. Despite Chavez’s controversial policies, he won every presidential election from 1998 to 2006, largely because of Venezuela’s weak and splintered opposition. In response, in 2007, the Democratic Action and Christian Democratic parties decided to band together along with the Movement Towards Socialism party to challenge Chavez in a presidential referendum. However, the alliance was still not large enough to succeed. So on Jan. 23, 2008, during the 50-year commemoration of Venezuela’s democracy, seven opposition parties coalesced into MUD.

But as in all multiparty coalitions, because of different political identities and ideologies, MUD has failed to unite for a common goal. Currently, there are roughly 21 parties within MUD. The younger leaders, including Leopoldo Lopez and Henrique Capriles Radonski, lead a faction of members from the most recently formed parties to join the coalition; pro-democracy and human rights activists, such as Maria Corina Machado, Diego Arria and David Smolansky, make up another powerful faction; and finally the older and experienced leaders who once belonged in the mainstream parties, particularly former Caracas Mayor Antonio Ledezma, Henry Ramos Allup, Teodoro Petkoff and Jesus Torrealba, represent the most experienced political faction of MUD. Unlike the ruling PSUV, which formed under one charismatic leader, MUD is divided among multiple leaders, each competing for a stake in Venezuelan politics.

The legacy of Chavez is strong. Even after the leader’s death, when MUD seemed convinced their young and polished candidate, Capriles, would win the presidency, Chavez loyalist Nicolas Maduro narrowly prevailed. The loss left the Venezuelan opposition in shambles, struggling to understand the enduring legacy of Chavez.

Yet, two years later, support for Chavismo finally seems to be coming to an end. Economic mismanagement has led to high inflation, instability and shortages of basic goods. The rivalry between Maduro and Assembly Speaker Diosdado Cabello has only worsened the problem. Therefore, it seems likely that MUD’s recent victory is more a sign of discontent with the PSUV than a sign that the opposition has coalesced into a more united and effective ruling force – something it now must do if it hopes to remedy Venezuela’s ailing economy and precarious political situation.

Competing Goals

MUD leaders have two different ideas on how to move forward. One option is to forcefully dismantle the legal protections built up over 17 years to guard the presidency and to eventually call a referendum against Maduro. The other is to negotiate legislative solutions to the country’s political and economic problems. Regardless of which option opposition leaders choose, they will have to negotiate with the most powerful components of Venezuelan politics, including the security elements, dissident chavistas and, most challenging of all, the multiple and unstructured political patronage networks known colloquially as ‘colectivos.’

MUD does not have the legislative power to oust Maduro, even with its two-thirds supermajority, because they can only legally do so through a referendum. In the meantime, Maduro is well prepared to defend himself: He will use the power of Venezuela’s Supreme Court to counter any laws the opposition votes to enact. And even though MUD has the authority to replace the country’s 12 Supreme Court justices, it is still a slow, bureaucratic process to do so, and one that must be supervised by the president. Additionally, the ruling party recently installed another legal gatekeeper: Newly elected People’s Ombudsman of Venezuela Susana Barreiros, who has the jurisdiction and power to slow MUD’s legislation. Moreover, on Dec. 29, the Supreme Court accepted legal challenges against the election of eight opposition legislators. If these elections are invalidated, it would cost the MUD its supermajority and greatly weaken its legislative power when the new congress assembles Jan. 5.

It is therefore likely that if MUD tries to forcefully remove Maduro, it will lead to months of political conflict and legislative gridlock, which will only fuel the protests over Venezuela’s collapsing economy. It could be that the opposition decides to take a softer approach right from the start and tries to negotiate with chavista elements to pressure Maduro to concede to its demands. However, the opposition announced in late December that it intends to remove Maduro in 2016 through legal maneuvers.

Finding Allies

High-ranking military officials would be key allies for the opposition against Maduro and Cabello, but they are not likely to cooperate unless they are given certain assurances that they will not be extradited and tried on drug charges in the United States. Dissident chavistas, who have challenged Maduro’s leadership and have criticized Cabello for being despotic, are also possible allies for the opposition. If the leftist faction of MUD can appeal to the dissident chavistas’ ideas about the economic and political future of Venezuela, it would bolster MUD’s standing among at least some of the PSUV power bases.

Because colectivos have substantial power locally, they will also need to be negotiated with, as difficult as that will be. Colectivos are well-armed, sometimes criminal, radical leftist forces within Venezuela, which have traditionally pledged allegiance to the PSUV. Though Chavez was the main unifier of these groups, currently there is no formal chain of command uniting various colectivos, making it logistically difficult to talk with the groups. Though these organizations are less powerful than the armed forces nationally, they are very influential in specific parts of the country, particularly in neighborhoods in western Caracas, including 23 de Enero, a neighborhood northwest of the city. If these groups completely lose their patronage links to the government, they may turn exclusively to crime or try to resist and pressure the government through violence. But such tactics have their limits, given the groups’ relatively small size.

Ultimately, MUD’s biggest challenge will be working together to solidify legislative priorities and to determine the best steps forward. In the short term, government officials are not likely to negotiate with MUD, but as civil strife intensifies, with the almost certain political gridlock ahead, leaders and supporters of the ruling party will become more willing to work with MUD leaders. In the meantime, Venezuela’s economic problems will only worsen in 2016.