Young Diplomats

Summary

Russia wants to expand its transit networks – and its influence – south, but doing so will not be easy. Over the past two years, Russia has been busy expanding its road and rail networks southward, through the North Caucasus and down both sides of the Caspian Sea toward Iran. Moscow has many good reasons for its drive south: Iran’s economy is poised to become more influential in the region as international sanctions are lifted,Russian troops in Syria need a reliable land route for supplies, and the Kremlin must confront the growing economic and military cooperation between Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan.

But pushing all the way to the Iran border is easier said than done. The region is full of difficult terrain, and few of the Caucasus transit states could be considered Russia’s friends. These factors will make it harder for Russia to build infrastructure that transits the region completely, but, in the end, Moscow and Tehran will likely work together to try to overcome the significant obstacles in the Caucasus and to curb the presence of other major powers in the region.

Analysis

For the Russians, no geographic barrier has ever proved as daunting as the Caucasus Mountains. During Russia’s invasion of the South Caucasus in the early 19th century, Moscow had few natural passages through the mountain range — fewer even than the number of artificially created routes it has today. The invasion’s success was made possible only by Russia’s military strength and organization, as well as the assistance provided by the mostly Christian Georgians and Armenians, who had lived under Muslim Turkish and Persian rulers for some two-and-a-half centuries.

The conflict underscored two important imperatives for Russia: First, to expel the Muslim powers from the region, and, second, to find a way to control the geographically separate South Caucasus. These concerns persisted throughout the second half of the 19th century and into the Soviet era. Still, with no other major power to contend with in the region, Russia’s presence remained relatively unchallenged, with the exception of from 1918 to 1921 and in 1942.

But since the collapse and dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin’s dominance in the Caucasus has been called into question. Georgia has taken concrete steps to integrate with the West, and Russia has been forced to withdraw its troops from Azerbaijan. In addition to Baku’s resistance to allowing Russian military equipment to pass through its territory, the Azerbaijani government’s tense relationship with Tehran has made Baku even less willing to permit the country to be used as a transit state between Russia and Iran.

Yet as the obstacles to Russia’s presence in the Caucasus have grown, its reasons for being there have too. The potential for military escalation is rising in the region, and the Kremlin is preparing itself to respond effectively in the event that conflict breaks out. Such a threat could take many forms: It could be an all-out war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, or increased military cooperation between Turkey and Georgia and Azerbaijan, or even perhaps a NATO build-up in the area. Meanwhile, the lifting of Western sanctions has cleared a path for Iran to start playing a more active economic role, whether in the South Caucasus specifically or in Central Asia more broadly. Russia now has a new sense of urgency in building a direct link to Iran — a drive that has only been further fueled by Moscow’s need for a land route to its Syrian front. Finally, road and rail infrastructure between Russia and Iran could help undermine competing pipeline and railway projects in the region, including the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku railway and the Trans-Caspian project, both of which connect the Caspian and Black seas.

Many Attempts, but Few Successes

So far, Russia has managed to build two roads through the South Caucasus to Iran. The first runs along the Caspian Sea, through Dagestan and Azerbaijan, while the second follows the Georgian Military Road through the Jvari Pass in the Caucasus Mountains. However, the first road’s use is limited by the historically unfriendly relationship between Azerbaijan and Iran. The second is often closed during the winter and cannot be used easily by the larger trucks that would be necessary in any expansion of overland trade between Russia and Iran or Armenia.

Because of these issues, Russia has actively sought more reliable connections to Iran over the past few years. One solution was to lay down railway lines that extend southward from Russia, down both sides of the Caspian Sea. In late 2014, the Russian railway system was connected to Iran’s in this way, with links that passed through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Meanwhile, Iran is still building the Kazvin-Rasht line on its Caspian shore, directly connecting to the Iranian city of Astara on Azerbaijan’s border. When complete, the line will link Iran’s northern railway branch to the rail network in Azerbaijan and onward to Russia. Still, like Russia’s roads, neither railway is a foolproof solution: Both Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan refuse to allow Russia to transport military equipment through their territories, which limits Moscow’s uses for the lines.

With transit states hindering Russia’s use of road and rail, Moscow has begun to widen its search for alternative routes. One possibility is a road leading from the North Caucasus to the Georgian breakaway territory of South Ossetia before connecting with the important East-West highway, which links Azerbaijan to Georgia’s Black Sea ports. Another would be to build 160 kilometers (about 100 miles) of railway between Alagir, in the North Caucasus, to Gori, in Georgia. Each of these options would enable Russia to reach the railway system of every South Caucasus country using the shortest and quickest routes available. The final possibility is a railway through Abkhazia, another Georgian breakaway territory. In October 2015, Russian forces finished reconstructing part of the rail line, which now extends to the territory’s demarcation line with the rest of Georgia. Abkhazian officials have hailed the event as a precursor to the railway’s full restoration, but given Moscow’s support for Georgia’s breakaway territories, it is highly unlikely that Tbilisi will ever agree to allow Russia to follow through with this plan.

Russia, Iran Team up Against the West

But Russia’s renewed race for rail and road links in the Caucasus is about more than economics or military logistics: It is about the wider competition for the former Soviet periphery. Russia is squaring off against the West, and both sides are vying for influence within the buffer countries between them. So far, the European Union has successfully solidified its partnership with Georgia through several political and economic treaties. Meanwhile, Western-backed projects — including the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku railway, which launched in 2015 and is mainly used to transport goods to European consumers — are bringing the possibility of a West-East economic corridor closer to a reality. As they do, they simultaneously undermine Russia’s economic and political clout in the region.

Iran, for its part, shares Russia’s interest in forestalling these Western inroads into the Caucasus, though its agenda for the region does not always align with Moscow’s. To this end, Tehran is still working with Russia to complete the North-South Transport Corridor, a combined shipping, rail and road route that runs through Azerbaijan to Russia’s Baltic Sea ports. Iran is also considering the construction of a railway through Armenia to link to ports on the Black Sea.

Like Russia, Iran has encountered significant reluctance from transit states to allow foreign powers — especially Russia — to use the transportation routes running through their territories without restrictions. But neither Moscow nor Tehran has backed down because of this opposition. As completed and ongoing projects in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Azerbaijan show, both Iran and Russia appear willing to work together to try to find partial solutions to the problem of securing reliable transit in the Caucasus while keeping other foreign competitors out.

Analysis

A powerful explosion went off in Istanbul near the city’s most prominent tourist attractions on Jan. 12, killing at least 10 people and injuring six foreign tourists. The blast, which took place in front of the ancient Egyptian Obelisk of Theodosius and near the Blue Mosque in the Sultanahmet district, reportedly involved a suicide bomber. Though the Turkish government is currently in conflict with numerous terrorist and non-state militant groups, the location, target and method of attack point to the Islamic State as the primary suspect behind the operation. In comments made after an hourlong meeting of the country’s National Security Council, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said the suicide bomber was of Syrian origin.

By cracking down on the Islamic State and actively supporting rebel operations against the extremist group in Syria, Turkey has knowingly made itself a target of the many groups loyal to the Islamic State. Furious at the disruption of their vital supply lines through Turkey because of the crackdown, which has steadily intensified since July 2015, Islamic State leaders have repeatedly vowed to launch severe retaliatory attacks. The first serious attack occurred last year on July 20, when the group staged a suicide bombing attack in the Turkish town of Suruc, near the Syrian border. Turkish raids and arrests stopped several other planned attacks, but not all of them; on Oct. 10, the group struck again in Ankara.

The latest attack, which hit in the heart of Istanbul’s oldest quarter, could galvanize an even stronger Turkish response against the Islamic State. Indeed, Ankara has already been pushing its allies to support it in an operation in Syria’s northern Aleppo province that aims to create a buffer zone in the Azaz-Jarablus zone. A successful operation would serve Turkish interests by hurting the Islamic State, strengthening the rebel position in northern Syria, preventing the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) from expanding farther westward and — because Turkey does not want to go it alone — drawing the United States deeper into the conflict.

However, Russia’s intervention in Syria has greatly complicated Turkey’s plans for the operation, and in the wake of Turkey shooting down a Russian Su-24 warplane, Moscow continues to frustrate Turkish ambitions in the country. The Russians, for instance, have reinforced their air defense assets in Syria, and in a Dec. 17 interview, Russian President Vladimir Putin dared Turkey to fly over Syrian airspace with the implication that the aircraft would be shot down if it did. Faced with the prospect of a potential war with Russia if it proceeded with an armed incursion into Syria, Ankara has been forced to revise its plans for northern Aleppo.

In spite of the risk that Russia poses, Turkey could increase its involvement in Syria. This latest Islamic State attack on a Turkish city comes at a time when the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces have crossed the Euphrates River in their push westward and Russian- and Iranian-backed loyalist offensives have ratcheted up the pressure on Turkey’s Syrian rebel proxies. The Turks may choose to carry out intensified strikes with long-range missiles from the safety of their own borders, but a greater Turkish incursion into Syria cannot be ruled out.

Summary

Three and a half months after regional elections concluded, the Catalan Parliament finally appointed a government Jan. 10. The new regional president, Carles Puigdemont, promised that his administration would proceed with a plan to declare independence from Spain within 18 months. But the new government will encounter the same problems that have undermined previous secession campaigns.

Analysis

Puigdemont’s appointment was the result of long and difficult negotiations between pro-independence forces. Together for Yes, a coalition of conservative and center-left parties that supports secession, won the regional elections Sept. 27 but failed to secure enough seats in the regional parliament to appoint a government. Forced to seek a partner, Together for Yes turned to the Popular Unity Candidacy (CUP), a small left-wing party that supports independence but is critical of Catalonia’s political establishment. The CUP’s refusal to support another term for Catalonia’s former president, Artur Mas, impeded negotiations for months. They finally agreed on Puigdemont, the mayor of Girona and a member of Mas’ party.

The agreement has exposed the fragility of the pro-secession camp. Some members of Together for Yes believe their party has made too many concessions to the CUP and will probably resist compromise in the future. More important, Together for Yes and the CUP have different views on economic matters and the handling of the Catalan state. Although the CUP will not be a formal member of the Catalan government, friction between it and Together for Yes could re-emerge and again threaten the secession process.

Madrid’s Many Options

According to a roadmap to independence presented in November, Catalonia will begin creating the institutions and structures of an independent state over the next 18 months. This involves the creation of new ministries and a central bank and the drafting of a constitution. Catalonia will then hold a referendum to ratify the constitution once it is ready, according to the roadmap. If the secessionists have their way, Catalonia will become independent in early to mid-2017.

Spain has many options to stop the process. The most drastic would be to suspend Catalonia’s regional autonomy and take direct control of the Catalan regional government itself. This option is nothing short of a last resort because it would aggravate tension with Catalonia and call into question the entire system of regional autonomies created in the late 1970s.

Instead, Madrid will gradually put the squeeze on Catalonia, which relies on regional funds controlled by Madrid. The Spanish government also will rely on the Constitutional Court, which last year gained the authority to introduce penal and financial sanctions on regional governments that violate the Spanish Constitution. So far, most of Catalonia’s steps toward secession have been symbolic, such as the approval of a “solemn proclamation” of the beginning of the process of independence. These measures are inconsequential. But if Catalonia takes steps that change its relationship with Madrid, the Constitutional Court could impose fines or even order the arrest of Catalan politicians.

Catalonia’s National Impact

Even if Madrid can resist Catalonia’s secessionist push, some significant problems remain. To begin with, a caretaker government is in charge in Madrid because the general elections in December produced a hung parliament. The Spanish parliament will restart sessions the week of Jan. 18 and, under King Felipe’s supervision, will begin formal negotiations to create a government. The formation of a government in Catalonia probably will add a sense of urgency to this process, but Spain’s four largest parties (the Popular Party, Ciudadanos, the Socialist Party and Podemos) still have to overcome important ideological and strategic differences before they can agree on a government.

Acting Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy’s conservative Popular Party is seeking support from the centrist Ciudadanos and the center-left Socialist Party to remain in power. Even if these parties do not actively support the Popular Party, if they both abstain during a vote in parliament, the Popular Party could form a minority government. Ciudadanos said it could help the Popular Party get reappointed, but the Socialist Party said it would not.

The appointment of a Catalan government lowers the likelihood of an alliance between the Socialist Party and left-wing Podemos because Podemos supports an independence referendum in Catalonia and the Socialists do not. In fact, one of the reasons the Socialists are reluctant to support Rajoy’s Popular Party is the fear that doing so would strengthen the anti-establishment Podemos because voters would see Podemos as the only force opposing the Popular Party.

The Socialist Party said Jan. 11 it would support any measure to protect Spain’s territorial unity but insisted it would not enter a grand coalition with the Popular Party. However, the Socialists will encounter greater political pressure to allow the Popular Party — their traditional rival — to form a government, or even to be a part of a Popular Party-led government. Catalonia’s renewed push for independence, along with King Felipe’s intervention in talks to form a government in Madrid, could soften the Socialists’ resistance to a new government led by the Popular Party.

The second problem related to Catalonia’s push for independence is whether the rebel government in Barcelona will respect any decisions by the Constitutional Court and whether Madrid will use security forces to enforce court decisions. Madrid hopes that internal tensions, financial pressure and legal threats will cause the Catalan government to collapse. Stratfor believes this is the most likely scenario. But should Catalan authorities ignore the rulings by the Constitutional Court, Catalan police could be given the order to arrest local politicians.

In the past, Catalan police have said they would respect the chain of command and obey any orders given by the Spanish court. However, the use of security forces against Catalan officials probably would lead to social unrest; almost half the electorate in Catalonia voted for pro-independence parties and could be moved to protest the use of police against Catalan elected officials. As a result, Spanish authorities will continue to follow a gradual and cautious strategy when dealing with Catalonia.

Forecast

• Following its upcoming leadership transition, Vietnam will continue to integrate with the global economy and pursue security cooperation with Russia, India and its Southeast Asian neighbors.
• The country’s imperatives, aligned with those of the Communist Party, will prevent a wholehearted embrace of the United States.
• Divisions within the party will limit Vietnam’s ties with China, risking indecision during any short, sharp crises in the South China Sea.

Analysis

The past two decades brought about sweeping changes in Southeast Asia — no country knows this better than Vietnam. Much like China, a strongly centralized Communist Party rules Vietnam, and from Jan. 20 to Jan. 28 the party will gather for its national congress. Held every five years, this Communist assembly will select a new general secretary, Politburo and Central Committee. But rather than being progressive, in many ways, this leadership transition will simply solidify the country’s existing strategic configuration.

The party’s intent is to publicly display a consensus on Vietnam’s path over the next five years. However, the plenum will serve to showcase the enduring rifts that exist between competing factions, divided when it comes to Vietnam’s future. One of the main disagreements centers on Hanoi’s contentious but indispensable relationship with Beijing. Such divisions have prevented an orderly succession plan from taking shape ahead of the plenum and point to a longer-term breakdown in unity if matters cannot be resolved. Geopolitically speaking, Vietnam’s imperatives — coupled with the Communist Party’s own internal logic — mean the country will not become dramatically more antagonistic toward China: But neither will it wholeheartedly embrace the United States.

The East-West Divide

After the United States pulled its troops out of Vietnam in 1975, diplomatic relations between the two countries have been inconsistent. With the West out of the picture, Vietnam went on to repeatedly clash with China in the decade following the U.S. withdrawal, including a brief border war in 1979 and a 1988 naval skirmish in the South China Sea that ended badly for the Vietnamese. This recent history still colors Hanoi’s outlook today. When Soviet aid dried up in the final days of the Cold War, Vietnam recognized the need to integrate with international markets and the importance of attracting foreign investment. Hanoi was divided when it came to accepting its Cold War foes. With a U.S. trade embargo in place, normalization with China came first in 1991, empowering the Vietnamese Communist Party’s mostly northern conservative blocs, which favored continued hostility toward the West. Despite this, Washington and Hanoi eventually normalized relations in 1995. Beijing’s repeated efforts to insert oil rigs into contested waters have given U.S.-Vietnamese relations an unexpected boost.

However, the country has never been one for unanimity. Today, Vietnam’s senior leadership can be roughly divided into three broad camps: pro-West reformists, led by the powerful Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung; pro-China conservatives, led by current Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong; and a relatively moderate wing of improvers led by President Truong Tan Sang. For much of Prime Minister Dung’s 10 years in office, the clout of the reformist wing has surged, bolstered by the economic heft of the south. And its emphasis on statecraft over socialist ideology is believed to match the prevailing mood in the party’s 175-person Central Committee.

During Vietnam’s 2014 oil rig standoff with China, the charismatic prime minister took a more nationalist stance than many of his counterparts, which appealed to the public. Dung also emerged relatively unscathed following two attempts to remove him from office with a no confidence vote in the Central Committee (engineered by the pro-China camp, first in 2012 and again last January). Dung also gained substantial support from the conservative military elite through his military modernization drive, which has led Vietnam to develop one of Southeast Asia’s strongest maritime and missile capabilities, with considerable help from Russia. Though the 66-year-old is technically required to retire if he plans to pursue the general secretary post, Dung is expected to seek an exemption similar to the one granted to Trong in 2011. The pro-China camp has no comparably strong candidate, but the conservatives are rumored to be seeking a two-year extension for Trong to cultivate a successor and thwart Dung’s ambitions.

Vietnam’s Embrace of the West

If Dung or one of his reformist allies takes the top spot at the head of the party — an outcome far less likely than it once — it would further confirm Vietnam’s ongoing shift to the West. However, Vietnam’s strategic direction over the next five years will not significantly hinge on individuals.

For example, the party’s draft Political Report and Socio-Economic Plan for 2016-2020 — composed by party reformists and conservatives alike and expected to be ratified at the upcoming congress — makes Western integration a major priority. And even under Trong’s guidance as general secretary, the Vietnamese Communist Party has signed off on a number of significant measures, including World Trade Organization accession in 2007. Trong himself made a landmark visit to Washington last summer.

Most notable has been Hanoi’s willingness to stay the course through contentious negotiations over the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership. Vietnam is positioned to benefit greatly from the 12-nation trade pact, but the deal, along with the free trade agreement it has finalized with the European Union last month, is not without risk for Hanoi. Implementation requires the party to relinquish some degree of control over the country’s delicate economic liberalization process. This could lead to contentious regulatory overhauls and labor reforms. Some of these measures, in addition to opening Vietnamese industries to global competition, will threaten the direct interests of the country’s dominant and largely autonomous state-owned enterprises, whose influence is interwoven with party patronage networks. Yet, Hanoi would not have stuck through the negotiations if it were not relatively united on the overriding imperative to diversify away from Chinese investors.

Meanwhile, China’s push into the South China Sea has compelled Vietnam to strengthen defense ties with a range of other partners. Most alarming to China is Vietnam’s growing acceptance of the resurgent Japanese navy, with Hanoi agreeing in November 2015 to construct new port facilities ahead of a Japanese port call, foreshadowing long-term cooperation. International economic integration, along with greater security cooperation with outside powers such as Japan, India and the United States, will be a core focus for Vietnam’s future leaders, regardless of who is in charge.

Caution and Consensus

Nonetheless, in military matters and in trade, Hanoi will move carefully to keep its strategic options open and avoid an overreliance on any single outside power. Greater economic integration with the rest of the world will not fully offset Vietnam’s heavy dependence on the Chinese economy, and the Communist Party will not risk provoking a breakdown in relations with China that disrupts its economic trajectory, thereby fomenting popular discontent.

Militarily, Vietnam needs outside help. Hanoi will accept assistance, too, but it remains wary of serving as a battleground for competing great powers — lingering memories of the Cold War run deep. In a 2014 speech, Dung himself lambasted U.S. imperialism. Japan and South Korea’s recent deal over the treatment of wartime “comfort women” more than 70 years ago highlights how long such issues can remain politically volatile. Regardless of how Hanoi views China’s pursuit of its territorial claims, Vietnam will avoid provoking a prolonged military standoff with the Chinese — or provide the United States a base from which to do the same. In fact, Hanoi will prefer to look beyond the United States and China for support, bolstering existing partnerships with countries that do not carry the threat of domination, namely India, Russia and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Ultimately, though, only the United States is capable of maintaining the status quo in the South China Sea and of ensuring Vietnamese territorial integrity.

Caution is reflected in the party leadership’s emphasis on internal factional balance, which best serves its desire for geopolitical flexibility — and its mandate to maintain rule in a fractious country. And the party has proved capable of navigating internal competition without breaking apart. A win by the reformist camp is therefore unlikely to bring about purges, as is often the way in single-party states.

Vietnam’s curious dynamics limit the potential of an escalation in simmering hostility between Hanoi and Beijing, giving both sides space to defuse relatively common incidents such as last month’s sinking of a Vietnamese fishing boat, allegedly by a Chinese military vessel. But it also breeds policy incoherence and paralysis, making Vietnam somewhat unpredictable in a future crisis and limiting its ability to forge a coherent policy on China in advance. This adds further uncertainty to the increasingly militarized environment in the South China Sea. Hanoi’s main impulse today may be caution and consensus, but it is unclear how the party would maintain its internal balance in the face of intense nationalistic pressure — or how Hanoi would keep its options open if a great power conflict ever unfolds just off its shores.

Summary

The European Union is fragmenting, and Russia is becoming more active in its former Soviet sphere of influence. In such upheaval, it is no surprise that a string of countries running from the Baltic Sea down the Carpathians to the Black Sea is slowly developing a common interest in countering Moscow while chafing under Western European interference. This is especially true of Poland, which sees itself as the natural leader of Central and Eastern Europe. But uniting these countries, whose agendas often conflict with one another and with Poland’s, will not be easy.

Analysis

Since taking over the Polish government in October, the Law and Justice party has based its domestic governing strategy on introducing measures that extend the party’s political control of the country. Abroad, Warsaw has signaled that it will resist aspects of EU integration while seeking to strengthen its ties with other Central and Eastern European countries. Both strategies are meant to prepare Poland to handle EU divisions and potential Russian aggression.

In some ways, Poland is beginning to follow in Hungary’s footsteps by distancing itself from Brussels. Yet unlike Hungary, Poland is more ready toresist Russian influence in the region. Such contradicting trends pervade the countries between the Baltic and Black seas. Many share common features, including young democracies, painful memories of Soviet domination and growing doubts about the future security of the European Union. But these countries also have their own priorities and interests. Thus Poland’s cooperation with the rest of Central and Eastern Europe (specifically with Hungary, Romania, Lithuania and Slovakia) will most likely happen on a case-by-case basis, making a completely unified region unlikely but working with each country on specific interests no less important.

Criticizing Europe

As Europe becomes more divided, the economic and security benefits that should have come from partnering with the European Union are no longer apparent or certain for some Eastern and Central European countries. For that reason alone, Poland and Hungary are and will remain critical of EU institutions. They will defend measures to freeze the process of Continental integration while trying to take back national prerogatives that were transferred to Brussels. Warsaw and Budapest will work together to resist the European Union’s attempts to enforce a scheme to relocate asylum seekers across the Continental bloc. They will also support the United Kingdom’s push to introduce safeguard measures for EU members that are not part of the eurozone. Ultimately, Polish-Hungarian relations will improve, as a well-received meeting between Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Law and Justice leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski on Jan. 7 suggests. Simply put, Hungary’s ruling Fidesz party and Poland’s Law and Justice are ideologically close: Both seek to expand the central government’s influence on the economy, the media and the political system.

Poland will also work with other governments in the region. The Law and Justice government, like the previous administration, is interested in extending Poland’s alliances beyond the Visegrad Group (a political alliance that comprises Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) by strengthening ties with Romania. And while Poland and Romania, two of the largest recipients of EU agricultural and structural funds, will likely negotiate together to protect the continuity of both programs, they will also simultaneously resist Brussels’ plan to relocate asylum seekers by refusing to enforce it.

Similarly, Slovakia and Poland mistrust some EU policies, especially those concerning the immigration crisis. Under Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico and his socially conservative Smer-Socialist Democratic Party (Smer-SD), Slovakia was among the first to oppose an EU plan to relocate asylum seekers. Fico even threatened to take the plan to the European Court of Justice and said the country would not accept any Muslim asylum seekers after the Paris attacks were connected to the immigration debate. Since then, the government has been courting nationalist voters in an attempt to win a majority in parliament during upcoming general elections on March 5. Fico is currently leading the opinion polls, implying some support for his Euroskeptic vision and room for cooperation with Poland.

Countering Russia

To the east, the fear of Russian aggression is a unifying factor to some degree as well. Romania and Lithuania share Poland’s views when it comes to Russia, supporting stronger ties with NATO in the region and the existing regime of sanctions. Poland, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia are also concerned about the dominance of Russian energy and will cooperate to reduce their dependence on it. Poland and Lithuania recently opened LNG terminals, and in late December 2015, Lithuania inaugurated electrical links to Poland and Sweden that will reduce its reliance on Russian electricity. Romania and Poland also want to construct pipelines, interconnectors and LNG terminals while developing their own domestic energy resources.

Meanwhile, the Ukraine crisis has somewhat changed Slovakia’s calculations. First, Moscow reduced its natural gas supplies to Slovakia after Bratislava sent natural gas to Ukraine through reverse natural gas flows. Second, Slovakia is concerned about Russia’s plans to build pipelines that bypass Ukraine as a transit state. Consequently, Slovakia will join Poland in opposing Nord Stream II, a pipeline project that would deliver natural gas to northern Europe, bypassing Ukraine and Slovakia. Of course, Warsaw is mostly focused on Nord Stream II’s political implications, since the pipeline would bind Germany and Russia closer together — a worrying development given Poland’s history of insecurity between two regional powers. Slovakia is instead concerned about the financial impact of the project, which would cost it billions in lost revenue from transporting Russian natural gas exports to Europe.

Conflicting Interests

Yet differences between Poland and its peers abound. Poland and Hungary have different views when it comes to Russia that would stifle any nascent alliance. Law and Justice wants to take a hard stance against Moscow by extending the current EU sanctions and deploying NATO troops in Eastern Europe. Hungary, on the contrary, wants a more balanced approach that would include de-escalating tensions with Russia and lifting sanctions to normalize ties and protect Russian investment and energy supplies to Hungary.

Slovakia, like Hungary, also supports a more accommodating policy regarding Russia, because, though Ukraine’s crisis has disturbed its energy security, its natural gas and the fuel for its Russia-built nuclear power plants still come from Russia. In addition, Slovakia has more misgivings about NATO’s presence in the region than does Poland. Fico has said that he will preserve Slovakia’s strong ties with the military alliance but that he is against the permanent stationing of foreign troops on Slovakian soil. The Slovak government was critical of a recent move by Poland to raid a NATO counterintelligence center in Warsaw run jointly by Poland and Slovakia. Finally, Slovakia will assume the rotating presidency of the European Union in the second half of 2016, which will probably force Bratislava to mediate between the bloc’s conflicting interests.

Lithuania, in turn, shares Poland’s views on Russia but does not support its Euroskeptic positions. A small nation surrounded by powerful countries, Lithuania is fully committed to EU integration. Unlike Poland, Lithuania is also a member of the eurozone. Germany could pressure Lithuania not to support Poland’s resistance to enforcing EU policies. Moreover, Poland’s nationalist government could clash with Lithuania on the protection of the rights of Polish minorities in the country. Still, because Poland will probably come into conflict with EU institutions several times this year, especially if the European Commission moves to punish Warsaw for its recent media reforms, Lithuania could become an honest broker to ease tension between Warsaw and Brussels.

In the meantime, Romania’s unsettled political system will continue to prevent a strong central government from emerging, let alone one that can emulate Poland’s, at least for another year. Romania has a semi-presidential system that distributes power between the president and the parliament. The Romanian president supports EU integration, but the caretaker government led by a former European commissioner is not strong enough to make bold moves. A victory by the conservatives in the general elections this December could make Romania more Euroskeptic, but such changes would only become apparent in 2017.

Looking Ahead

Poland’s new government will not dramatically change the country’s foreign policy or the geopolitics of Central and Eastern Europe. Many of the government’s priorities are in line with those of its predecessors. However, Law and Justice’s vocal policies will reaffirm the disenchantment with Continental integration already pervasive in the region. Warsaw’s ideological affinity with some of its peers could enable more regional cooperation to resist attempts by Brussels (and Berlin) to shape the direction of the bloc. Law and Justice will also push for a harder stance against Russia and a larger presence of NATO in the region.

But Central and Eastern Europe is still too heterogeneous to form a cohesive bloc. While Poland can partner with Hungary, Romania, Lithuania and Slovakia on a host of issues, their goals will also conflict on many others; the common interests that bind Warsaw with one potential ally distance it from another.

Beyond the European Union, Turkey could eventually become part of a loose alliance of countries encircling Russia. Polish assertiveness on Europe’s eastern front could easily complement Turkey’s influence on the Black Sea, especially as Ankara’s relationship with Moscow has worsened in recent months. Romania, the largest EU member with strategic interests in the Black Sea, would also be a key player in such a structure. After all, Bucharest is concerned about Russia’s military presence in Crimea and Moldova. Of course, this union is still undeveloped and may never materialize into a formal alliance. To be effective, it would also require more active support from the United States. But interests in Eastern Europe are becoming increasingly aligned, however slowly, and Poland will no doubt be a part of it.

At the tail end of 2015, Beijing introduced the ambitious first wave of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s comprehensive plan for military reform. The changes — which include a more powerful strategic weaponry command, a new ground force headquarters and an organization called the Strategic Support Force — are the culmination of a decadelong effort to improve the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The focus is on military capability and overcoming the deep-rooted political intransigencethat has stymied the development of China’s armed forces.

Analysis

China’s ground forces have never had their own headquarters until now. Previously, the People’s Liberation Army’s Four General Departments served as the de facto army headquarters, functioning together as the equivalent of a joint staff, to which the navy, air force and the newly renamed Rocket Force would report. Effectively, this meant that the navy, air force and strategic missile forces were treated as adjuncts of the army. The establishment of an army headquarters will improve the Four General Departments’ ability to serve as a joint staff and also help equalize the standing of the four branches of the PLA. This is a key prerequisite to developing the ability to conduct joint operations — necessary to prevail in modern warfare — and crafting a capable military that can operate far from the security of mainland China.

As of Dec. 31, 2015, what had been the Second Artillery Corps and in command of China’s nuclear and conventional strategic missiles, was reorganized as the PLA Rocket Force. It received an upgrade in organizational standing, from an “independent arm” (on the same level as an intra-service branch such as the infantry) to a full service, on par with the navy and air force — and for the first time, the army. This increases the importance and heft of the Rocket Force when it comes to military decision-making. In addition, all legs of China’s nuclear triad, including submarine-launched ballistic missiles and strategic bombers, are reportedly unified under the PLA Rocket Force’s command — a responsibility the Second Artillery Corps never held. Gen. Wei Fenghe, who had been the Second Artillery Corps commander, is serving as the PLA Rocket Force commander. Given that the force conducted missile drills early in the new year, it seems likely that most of the Second Artillery’s organizational structure has been maintained — at least to the point where normal operations are not significantly affected.

After the ground and rocket force headquarters, the People’s Liberation Army’s Strategic Support Force is the next new structure. Details are sparse at the moment, leading even Chinese state media to speculate, but this force has been rather blandly described by Chinese Ministry of Defense spokesman Yang Yujun as a combination of all support forces “with strong strategic, fundamental and supportive importance.” However, the appointment of a Second Artillery Corps general with a technical background as the new force’s commander supports the notion that this is not simply a logistics organization, as its name would suggest, but a group responsible for high-tech operations. Military commentators propose that the PLA Strategic Support Force’s portfolio includes space, cyberspace and electronic warfare operations. The inclusion of the Strategic Support Force in a raft of military reforms concerning two service-level organizations implies that the new force is intended to be a service in its own right, or an independent arm akin to the former Second Artillery Corps. This lends credence to rumors that emerged as early as 2014 that the PLA was planning to establish a space force.

Equally of interest are the anticipated changes that the People’s Liberation Army’s didn’t announce on Dec. 31. Though it was expected to be operational before 2016, a streamlined PLA military region structure was not mentioned at all. This suggests that the restructuring plans — including a reduction in the number of military regions from seven to five — could have undergone last-minute revisions. Alternatively, planned changes may be taking longer than expected to implement. Furthermore, a leaked list of commanders suggests that even after the restructuring, ground force officers — not naval or air force commanders — will continue to lead the five regions. In effect, this means the army will still oversee operations concerning all People’s Liberation Army branches until at least 2017. Next year, key leadership positions — including PLA leadership billets — will change as a result of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. If ground force officers — a cadre regarded as the greatest obstacle to reform — have managed to retain a significant degree of power and influence, they may still be able to preserve some of their interests going forward.

Although the Dec. 31 reforms are impressive, the changes made so far have focused mostly on the highest levels of command. Much work remains to be done at the lower echelons of the military. The People’s Liberation Army reportedly plans to consolidate the functions of the Four General Departments into a single Joint Staff Department. If this is the case, the amalgamation of the military regions and their staffs will likely be implemented in the year ahead. Additionally, a military reform guideline issued by the Central Military Commission stipulates that in 2016, China’s military will eliminate 300,000 personnel, improve the quality of combat personnel and military education, and reform domestic security forces. Carrying out these stipulations will be an arduous task for the Communist Party as it walks an increasingly fine line between maximizing the military’s ability to wage war and maintaining Party control over the armed forces.

Summary

As with many energy-exporting countries in the former Soviet Union, low global oil prices have hurt Azerbaijan, causing its economy to slow and its currency to tumble. And as oil prices continue to fall, protests are beginning to intensify. Led by long-serving President Ilham Aliyev, the government has a firm grip on power, but Azerbaijan will not be immune to instability if declining oil prices and the economic pain they bring continue. Protests across the country have been contained so far but will bear close watching if they grow and spread in the coming weeks.

Analysis

Like the economies of Russia and Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan’s economy depends on the energy industry. The hydrocarbons sector alone accounts for roughly 40 percent of Azerbaijan’s gross domestic product and more than 90 percent of its exports. It comes as no surprise, then, that the dramatic decline of global oil prices has contributed to the country’s economic slowdown. In 2015, Azerbaijan’s GDP grew by only 1 percent, down from 2.8 percent in 2014 and 5.8 percent in 2013.

Azerbaijan has also had tremendous trouble with its currency, the manat, over the past year. In February 2015, the government devalued the manat by 33 percent. Ten months later, the currency plunged again at the end of December when the Central Bank of Azerbaijan shifted to a free float after spending more than half its currency reserves to prop up the manat. By the end of 2015, the manat had lost roughly half its value, simultaneously raising inflation, with the cost of some goods reportedly increasing by as much as 100 percent.

The Azerbaijani government has responded with several measures to address the weakening currency and broader economic slowdown. First, the central bank announced Jan. 6 that as of Jan. 14, any currency exchange offices operating outside of traditional banks would be shut down until March. Second, on Jan. 12, Azerbaijani Finance Minister Samir Sharifov announced that the government would amend its budget and reduce spending from 2016 to 2019, though he did not give specific figures on the size of the reduction. Any cuts can be expected to lead to layoffs in the public and energy sectors, the latter of which has already seen hundreds of jobs slashed over the past year by firms such as BP and Azerbaijan’s own state-owned oil company, SOCAR.

A New Kind of Unrest

It seems protesters have taken notice. The same day the government announced it would reduce spending, several demonstrations were held across Azerbaijan in the districts of Lankaran, Fuzuli and Siyazan over the price hikes and growing unemployment resulting from the devaluation of the manat. These protests, which numbered from a few dozen to several hundred people in each city, have continued throughout the week. Security personnel were deployed to many of the areas, in certain cases detaining some of the protesters. In Lankaran and Siyazan there were minor clashes between security personnel and demonstrators. Meanwhile, the capital, Baku, has remained relatively quiet but no doubt has a sizable security force placed throughout the city to pre-empt possible protests.

Though Azerbaijan has been subject to protests in the past, they have typically been concentrated in Baku or nearby areas, such as Nardaran and Sumgait, and have largely dealt with political issues, mainly the government’s treatment of opposition parties, journalists or religious groups. All have been, until now, manageable for the Azerbaijani government. Led by Aliyev since 2003 — and by his father, Heydar Aliyev, for a decade before that — the country has seen a much weaker protest environment and less effective opposition than other countries in the region, such as Georgia and Armenia. Baku has typically allowed protests to be held outside of central areas of the city while selectively cracking down on others to dilute their effectiveness in challenging the government.

However, recent protests have spread through multiple cities and are focused on economic issues, not politics, presenting a more serious problem for the government. In response, Baku has announced measures to help relieve the economic hardship afflicting its people. On Jan. 6, Azerbaijani Labor and Social Welfare Minister Salim Muslimov said he would present proposals to increase welfare payments to the most vulnerable segments of the population by the end of the month. A day earlier, the Foreign Ministry said it would cut costs and personnel at its foreign embassies, and authorities in some of the protest cities have said they would review the price hikes on certain essential goods. Whether these efforts will be enough to offset or contain the protests is unclear.

How the Government Can Respond

But what should be noted in the coming weeks is how the size, scope and intensity of the protests develop. So far roughly several hundred to a thousand people in five to 10 cities and districts across the country have participated in the demonstrations. If the protests grow and spread to other cities, it could lead to a level of social and political pressure that Azerbaijan has not experienced in decades. Baku, the political and demographic core of the country, will be particularly important to watch, as will attempts by opposition groups such as the Musavat party to capitalize on the protests in an effort to gain new supporters and ratchet up pressure on the government.

The government’s reaction to the unrest will also be crucial, especially if protests expand. Baku has used a mix of detentions and bargaining to tamp down the demonstrations so far. If security forces use more aggressive tactics or if major clashes take place, the protests could intensify. But if the government relents and reverses price hikes or makes political concessions, it could curb the demonstrations and prevent greater upheaval.

Finally, the reactions and involvement of foreign actors could play a part in the unfolding drama. Other countries have a strategic interest in Azerbaijan, namely Russia, Turkey and Iran as well as the United States and the European Union. Azerbaijan has become an important component of the standoff between Russia and the West because of its sizable energy resources and location on the Southern Corridor energy route. U.S.-Azerbaijani relations have already been soured by Baku’s allegations that Washington has worked with the opposition to criticize and undermine the government. Protests will only add to Baku’s notable sensitivity to any notion of foreign meddling. Azerbaijan may also have reason to stir up its long-standing conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. Stoking nationalism would deflect attention away from the state of the country’s economy and perhaps force Russia to re-evaluate its relations with Armenia. Regardless, it will be important to watch whether the government manages to contain the unrest or if it intensifies in the coming weeks.

Forecast

• Persistent tension between Moscow and Kiev will encourage Russia to keep looking for pipeline routes to Europe that bypass Ukraine.
• TurkStream will probably remain shuttered until icy Russia-Turkey relations thaw.
• Given numerous political hurdles, South Stream’s prospects are similarly bleak.
• Nord Stream II could see more success, though Gazprom’s own financial problems and stronger European regulations may still stand in the way of its completion. 

Analysis

Editor’s Note: Stratfor closely monitors the ebbs and flows of world energy. Aside from production, the transportation of crude oil, natural gas and petroleum products is of paramount concern for oil-producing nations. For energy consumers, transit routes are indispensible lifelines. A huge amount of the world’s energy is transited through pipelines, across the Eurasian landmass in particular. In this periodic series we will examine some of the most geopolitically significant pipelines running through Europe and Asia. In this installment, Stratfor examines Russia’s options for finding a pipeline route that bypasses Ukraine. 

Russia is searching for new ways to send its natural gas to Europe, but with little success. Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke with Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi on Jan. 8 about Italy’s involvement in several of Moscow’s proposed energy projects, including the Nord Stream II pipeline, some aspects of which Rome has vocally opposed. The meeting came amid rumors that Russia had also resumed negotiations with Bulgaria over the defunct South Stream project, which was suspended in December 2014. Both governments denied the rumors.

With the Russia-Ukraine relationship on the rocks, Moscow is desperate to find a pipeline route to its Continental consumers that does not pass through Ukraine. However, every possible alternative on the table faces significant political, economic or technical constraints. With Russian energy giant Gazprom in financial distress and the European Union determined to break the firm’s near-monopoly hold in Central and Eastern Europe, fiscal pragmatism may force the Kremlin to re-evaluate its ambitious energy goals.

Ukraine: A Troublesome Partner

Moscow’s strained relationship with Kiev took a turn for the worse on Jan. 1, when Ukraine upped its transit tariffs on Russian natural gas passing through the country. Previously, Gazprom paid $0.07 per million British thermal units (mmbtu) of natural gas for every 100 kilometers (62 miles) it traveled. (The main segment of the Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod pipeline in Ukraine is about 1,160 kilometers long.) Now, Gazprom must pay a fee of $0.35 per mmbtu of natural gas that enters Ukraine and $0.48-$0.93 per mmbtu that exits the country.

Meanwhile, Ukraine is also getting ready to fully implement its new “On the Natural Gas Market” law on April 1. The legislation, which the Ukrainian parliament adopted last April, will overhaul the country’s natural gas regulatory market and bring it in line with the European Union’s Third Energy Package. Ukraine has been working toward these reforms since it joined the Brussels-led European Energy Community in December 2010. One of the organization’s goals is to extend legislation aimed at breaking Gazprom’s energy monopoly to non-EU countries in the bloc’s immediate periphery, including Ukraine and the Balkan states. Ukraine’s involvement in the European Energy Community and its EU association agreement indicate that it is finally taking concrete steps to integrate its economy and energy market with those on the Continent.

These developments have only increased Russia’s desire to pursue other pipeline routes that bypass Ukraine. TurkStream and South Stream were designed to do just that for markets in Southern Europe, while Nord Stream I and II do the same for Northern and Central Europe. Gazprom hopes to have at least one of these projects constructed by the end of 2019, when Russia’s transit contract with Ukraine ends. But given the many problems that Gazprom has consistently encountered with each of them, it looks increasingly unlikely that the firm will be able to have the infrastructure it needs in place by the start of 2020.

TurkStream

In the span of a year, the TurkStream pipeline has shifted from a fast-tracked proposal to a project on ice. For much of 2015, TurkStream was stalled by a deadlocked Turkish parliament. When the Justice and Development Party regained its legislative majority in November, it appeared that a major obstacle to the pipeline’s progress — getting approval from the Turkish parliament — had been cleared. However, this sense of optimism was quickly dashed when two Turkish jets shot down a Russian Su-24 warplane near the Turkey-Syria border on Nov. 24, 2015. Diplomatic ties between Moscow and Ankara have remained soured ever since, jeopardizing the future of the TurkStream project and prompting Gazprom to turn to other options, including South Stream and Nord Stream II.

South Stream

A year ago, Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller proclaimed: “South Stream is dead. For Europe there will be no other gas transit options to risky Ukraine other than the new ‘Turkish Stream’ pipeline.” At the time, this seemed to be the final nail in South Stream’s coffin. But with numerous political barriers standing in the way of TurkStream’s progress, rumors have begun to trickle out of Bulgaria that the South Stream pipeline may be resurrected. Though both Moscow and Sofia have denied the allegations that they are actively discussing the revival of South Stream, there are certainly reasons that the two might start the project back up.

Despite South Stream’s cancellation, Sofia has remained open to the pipeline proposal. On Jan. 11, Bulgarian Economy Minister Bozhidar Lukarski reiterated his government’s official position: South Stream has been suspended, not canceled. Bulgaria has been attempting to establish itself as a natural gas hub for Southern Europe for some time. As the poorest member of the European Union, it is also looking to attract as much investment and create as many jobs as it can. And indeed, Bulgaria is already making tangible progress toward its goals. On Dec. 11, after a meeting between Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borisov and German Chancellor Angela Merkel on natural gas markets in the region, the European Commission agreed to set up a working group to support the formation of a natural gas hub in Southeastern Europe. In fact, this development is what sparked the initial claims that South Stream was back on the table.

At the same time, investors made a final decision Dec. 10 to build the Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria pipeline, which is designed to deliver 5 billion cubic meters of natural gas from Greece to Bulgaria. Though each of these moves has put Bulgaria closer to achieving its new role in the region’s energy market, it will still need to find other sources of natural gas to turn the dream of a Balkan energy hub into a reality. The South Stream project and the Russian natural gas it would carry could be one such source.

That said, Russia and Bulgaria would still need to overcome a number of hurdles to pick the South Stream project back up. First, they would need the approval of the countries the pipeline would transit, including Serbia, Hungary and Italy. Moscow’s relationships with those countries are relatively friendly at the moment, but gaining their approval and organizing the project would still take time. Gazprom, which bought out the shares of Eni, EDF and Wintershall to become the sole stakeholder in the South Stream Transport BV consortium, will have to find new partners to join it or fund the project itself. The company is also still sorting out its dispute with Italy’s Saipem over debts owed after Gazprom canceled a pipe-laying contract.

Second, Russia would still need to get Turkey’s endorsement for the project, since the original plans called for South Stream to avoid Ukraine by running through Turkey’s waters in the Black Sea. Moscow’s only alternative would be to challenge Ukraine’s maritime claims by expanding Crimea’s exclusive economic zone — a risky move that the Kremlin is unlikely to make, since it would almost certainly prompt the United States and Europe to increase sanctions against Russia. Thus, no matter how interested Bulgaria is in pursuing the South Stream project, its outlook remains bleak.

Nord Stream II

Unlike TurkStream and South Stream, Nord Stream II would not deliver Russian natural gas to Southern Europe. Instead, it would expand Gazprom’s market share in the Continent’s north, especially in Germany and the Czech Republic. The project would enable Russia to take advantage of Germany’s recent efforts to move away from nuclear energy, as well as declining output from producers in the North Sea, such as the Netherlands.

But like Nord Stream I, Nord Stream II has received mixed support from Europe. The pipeline would signal Russia’s persistent energy ties to Germany at a time when Berlin is defending the continuation of sanctions against Russia because of events in Ukraine. As one would expect, countries that firmly oppose any sort of Russian encroachment on the Continent — perceived or otherwise — have pushed back against Nord Stream II. These countries include Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia and Slovakia.

Strangely enough, Italy also counts itself among the pipeline’s strongest European critics. Although Nord Stream II undermines Italy’s energy security to a minor degree, it is unlikely that Gazprom would stop sending natural gas through its Ukrainian pipeline unless it could continue supplying its second-largest customer on the Continent, Italy, through other means. Still, Nord Stream II would not easily provide those means, at least not to the extent that South Stream and TurkStream could.

Nevertheless, Italy’s opposition likely stems from Prime Minister Matteo Renzi’s irritation with the actions of Germany and the European Union as a whole. In recent months, Renzi has more openly challenged Berlin and Brussels on the issues of sanctions, immigration and security priorities. Therefore, Renzi’s resistance is likely as much a statement against Germany, which supported the Nord Stream project while opposing South Stream, as it is against the pipeline itself. Putin reportedly may be trying to secure Renzi’s support — or at the very least, indifference — for Nord Stream II in exchange for allowing Italy to be involved in the project. Regardless of the prime minister’s stance, though, Italy’s Saipem stands a good chance of being selected for the job, since it is a premier offshore contractor and was chosen to build Nord Stream I.

Despite the fierce political debate over Nord Stream II, the countries that opposed it have few ways to actually block the pipeline from being constructed. Gazprom needs the approval of only Russia, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Germany, since the pipeline route passes through their waters; the European Commission has no formal mechanism through which to shut down the project. Nor does it necessarily have the will. The commission’s official stance has remained consistent: As long as Nord Stream II adheres to European regulations, it will not try to halt the pipeline’s construction.

Of course, the enforcement of European regulations presents a difficult roadblock to overcome on its own. In essence, Nord Stream II and all of its connecting onshore pipelines will have to satisfy the Continent’s third-party access provisions and other requirements. These rules created problems for Nord Stream I by limiting Gazprom’s use of the OPAL pipeline — one of the two offloading pipelines for Nord Stream at the German coast — to 50 percent. This in turn prevented Gazprom from operating Nord Stream I at its full capacity. In the case of Nord Stream II, Gazprom could and would negotiate for exemptions to circumvent the rules, as it ultimately did for Nord Stream I. However, Brussels would agree to those exemptions only if Gazprom made significant concessions to reduce its monopolistic hold on the European energy market.

In the End, Profit Is What Matters Most

With TurkStream talks at a standstill and South Stream stalled indefinitely, Nord Stream II may simply serve as the path of least resistance for Russia as it looks for another pipeline to Europe. Gazprom has sped up projects in Russia that will expand its capacity in the Baltic Sea so that it can theoretically feed the massive Nord Stream II pipeline someday. Its efforts include transferring 330,000 metric tons of pipeline, originally intended for the suspended Southern Corridor project, to the Bovanenkovo-Ukhta and Ukhta-Torzhok pipelines. These pipelines are intended to eventually feed into Nord Stream II from fields in the Yamal Basin.

However, Gazprom’s financial problems and a crackdown by Russia’s Federal Anti-Monopoly Service may have already slowed these plans. On Dec. 29, Gazprom canceled a $2.2 billion tender for the construction of roughly half the Power of Siberia pipeline. The following day, it canceled another tender for the Ukhta-Torzbok II pipeline, and on Jan. 11, the company bailed out of three tenders that collectively totaled about $171 million. In light of these funding issues and with little relief from low energy prices in sight, the calculus of cash-strapped Gazprom will likely change. Profit will become the most important factor in determining Nord Stream II’s future as Gazprom adjusts to the reality of a more competitive energy market in Europe.

We think we know what a terrorist looks like. Photos of angry-eyed young men toting machine guns top every news hour and confirm the same stereotype that even we in the security business often rely on to spot would-be attackers. Those who answer the call to jihad, we imagine, are overwhelmingly male. But last month, a husband-wife team of attackers in California overturned those assumptions. The rampage of Syed Farook and his wife, Tashfeen Malik, awakened the public to the unsettling reality that women are just as capable of picking up a gun or assembling a bomb.

Still, growing awareness is no true call for alarm. We are more afraid of terrorist attacks then ever, but as my levelheaded colleague here at Stratfor has pointed out, terrorism itself is nothing new. And the two shooters who sent bullets flying in San Bernardino last month were far from the first husband and wife team to wreak havoc in the name of a violent, revolutionary ideology.

On a shelf here in my office, I have a copy of my 2011 book, ChasingShadows, that on the inside cover bears the signature of a man named Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, along with a personalized note. Sanchez spent a career working as a gun for hire, orchestrating various bombings over the course of a decade and earning himself the nickname by which he is far better known today: “Carlos the Jackal.”

Like the terrorists we see today, he claimed that he was more than just an assassin, that the blood on his hands had all been shed for a greater cause: this time not extremist Islam, though he did convert to Islam in prison in 2001, but Marxism-Leninism.

The Jackal did not work alone. Throughout the 1970s, when he was at his most active, his closest partner in crime was none other than his German wife, Magdalena Kopp. The couple teamed up to plant bombs and conduct assassinations on behalf of, at various points over the years, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Russian KGB, East German Stasi and Moammar Gadhafi.

As I’ve told many agents over the years, any student of national security should know how Carlos operated and even how he failed. You can learn a lot by breaking down the attacks he orchestrated, including his failed 1973 PFLP assassination attempt on a Jewish businessman in London, or two years later, the successful attack on the OPEC Summit in Vienna. In 1985, when I worked in a cramped, three-man office at the Department of State Diplomatic Security Service, we had a thick brown accordion file stuffed full of news clippings, grainy surveillance photographs of Carlos and Kopp, foreign language magazines and various intelligence and Interpol reports on Carlos and his wife.

Carlos himself would go on to be arrested in the ’90s and brought back to France to stand trial for killing two French police officers in 1975. But the intriguing part to me about the two was Kopp. Before she passed away in June, I was able to correspond with her briefly to discuss some loose ends of an old case; she’d been living in Germany as a free woman for years. There is a common trope that women involved in crime have been manipulated or persuaded into joining the fight. But as a young woman in Germany, Kopp had become involved in the revolutionary effort of her own accord. She’d met Carlos already a radical in her own right.

In that sense, Kopp’s story presaged that of Malik. Like Kopp, Malik embraced her cause independently early on. Back in Pakistan before her emigration to the United States, she sent private messages to her friends online, saying she hoped to find a way to join violent jihad against the non-Muslim world. She was radicalized long before she joined her soon-to-be husband in the United States, and she likely helped plan the Dec. 2 assault in California.

Such husband and wife terror operatives are nothing new. And, whatever sensationalist headlines they may generate, neither are female assassins, terrorists and suicide bombers. Besides Carlos and Kopp, past husband-wife terrorist teams have included the famous Argentine revolutionary Che Guevara and his wife Aleida March, as well as Italian Red Brigades operatives Renato Curcio and Margherita Cagol, who kidnapped public figures and planted bombs in the quest for a communist Italy. The founder and leader of the Japanese Red Army was a woman, Fusako Shigenobu. Chechen “black widows” bombed planes in the struggle against Russia, and in 1991 it was a female suicide bomber who assassinated Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. U.S. President Gerald Ford twice almost died at the hands of would-be female assassins: first Lynette “Squeaky” Fromme, then two weeks later, Sara Jane Moore. And today such notorious criminals as British “White Widow” Samantha Lewthwaite capture headlines precisely because they do not wear our idea of a murderer’s face.

This is not to say that female terrorists today are numerous. Most suicide bombers and militants are still men. And jihadist organizations such as the Islamic State tend, at least officially, to keep women out of combat.

But terrorist organizations exist in part because they style themselves as champions for a cause, whether it be the liberation of the proletariat or the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. For those who accept them, regardless of gender, these are powerful ideologies. They inspire their adherents to commit atrocities they would otherwise never dream of. Under the right conditions they motivate people just as effectively as fear or want. And when their call to action becomes a call to arms, we should not be surprised that some women eagerly join the fray.