December 4th marked an important occasion in Chinese-African relations, signalling, as it did, the 15th anniversary of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). This is a relationship that has been largely overlooked, and yet it is one of the world’s most significant. China is Africa’s largest trading partner by far, and trade between the two is predicted to reach $300 billion by the end of 2015. However, despite pledges by Beijing to invest $60 billion in strengthening infrastructure and development projects, there are those who have been swift to point out that China’s resource hungry nature is something less to be welcomed than to be wary of. In its greed to exploit the continent’s resources, some are asking, what might the social and environmental consequences of its policies be?

A Zambian national, labouring in one of the very poorly ventilated and incredibly dangerous Chinese run copper mines, would no doubt have his own ideas on this matter. Indeed, so cavalier an attitude do China’s captains of industry have towards their worker’s safety, that employees must work 2 years before they even get safety helmets. And woe betide those who have the audacity to rage against the machine, with sackings of obstructive union officials routinely administered; protest assemblies typically dispersed with swift and unforgiving violence. Africa’s environment has suffered little better at the hands of its Chinese investors, and illegal gold mining has led to a number of issues. Indeed, research by WACAM has shown that as many as 250 rivers in Ghana have been polluted by those cyanides and heavy metals that are a by-product of the local Chinese community’s illegal gold mining activities. To rub salt in the wound, laws introduced disallowing foreign nationals to either mine or sell gold have been circumvented by dubious practices lower down the retail chain. However, despite the evident risks associated, African governments continue to embrace vast Chinese investments in their commodity industries. In March 2015, China Hongqiao Group secured a mining and port investment deal for the development of Guinea’s bauxite reserves– the largest in the world – with the first shipment unloaded in Yantai port a mere 8 months later. While Guinea has been keen to attract investors to this highly lucrative industry, looking farther afield, the country’s desire for Chinese investment might turn out to be a poisoned chalice.

Indeed, while China’s presence on the African continent is rather new and African leaders are enthusiastic at basking in Beijing’s deep pockets, the example of several Southeast Asian countries should give them a moment of pause before popping open the champagne. Why? Because in their mad dash for resources, Beijing has turned a blind eye to the massive environmental damages done by mining companies.

Malaysia’s case is but one of these and, if it is any indication of how sustainable China’s investments in Africa are to be, then the future looks bleak. Bauxite, the most plentiful source of aluminium ore and a huge part of China’s plans to modernize heavy industry, is a hugely valuable commodity to Malaysia – raking in profits of almost $200 million in 2014. Unfortunately, industries of this value are naturally resistant to the kind of political will needed to deal with the inherent issues, where significant short term gain is inevitably made at the expense of longer term interests, especially when an industrial giant of China’s stature is cracking the whip. And the issues are significant. In areas where bauxite mining is most prevalent, there have been complaints of the sea ‘turning to blood’, a side effect of poor waste management and allowing by-products to seep into the water. In addition, road transportation of bauxite ore has led to significant air pollution, adversely affecting the health of local populations, as drivers fail to adhere to containment regulations in an industry where minutes lost are a fortune squandered. The Malaysian government has made some progress towards dealing with these and other related problems but, as observers point out, the lip service paid to the environment over the gains to be had by exporting bauxite under China’s demand has been perfunctory to say the least.

This issue is not Malaysia’s alone, however, as neighbouring Vietnam has had its own problems. The source of the world’s third largest natural deposit of bauxite, Vietnam was also a victim of China’s resource hungry policies, and while initially welcoming Chinese investment to develop its bauxite reserves, Vietnam might now be wondering whose victory this actually was. Whilst China has benefited to no end, the Vietnamese authorities have become so entrenched in efforts to protect this relationship that those who object have been met with surveillance, restrictions on their movement, and even violence. Typically, such objections revolve again around environmental concerns, with tales of “red seas”, air pollution and waste spillage once more doing the rounds. Most worryingly, Vietnam seems even less inclined to implement proper regulatory controls in an industry which is careering out of control in the wake of China’s gluttonous demand.

In hitching itself to China’s rising star, Africa has developed a relationship in which aspiration is no longer the pipe-dream it once seemed. With Chinese investment offering significant promises for developing African nations, cooperation with China is proving to be a significant stepping stone on the road to development. However, with the negative long term social and environmental impact that this cooperation potentially threatens – regarding bauxite mining, gold mining, or any other venture – it would wise of African governments to tread cautiously before committing to a course of action which might have entirely the opposite effect to that intended. China’s rise on the African continent might indeed provide an opportunity not to be missed, but denied the proper checks and balances it could prove less a win-win relationship. The example of Southeast Asia should be warning enough.

Uju Okoye writes for The Diplomatic Courier

A positive approach to the drop in oil prices

Oil prices have dropped the lowest since 2003 with a price under 27 dollars per barrel. Politically, it doesn’t look too tragic – The key here is to understand that oil usually undermines authoritarian regimes of all stripes that use populist policies to maintain power, and with the latest drop, many of them will be forced to cut public budgets and subsidies, risking popularity and mass support.

Oil makes 68 percent of Russia’s total export revenues and 50 percent of its federal-budget revenues, therefore Putin might have to reconsider its expensive actions in Syria (which may also be worthless given the fact that his friendship with the al-Assad government was fueled by oil interests, which again, has now just now lost value). Iran will lack oil money to finance Shia groups like Hezbollah, The Venezuelan government, which has been in the border of collapse for quite a while, will not have any funding for its populist programs that keep people distracted from all corruption and crime, and may – just may- bring up a revolution from the poor population. Maduro will also be unable to keep supporting other countries’ failed Bolivarian projects that Hugo Chavez started in some of the golden years of high oil price, probably making Cuba even closer to the United States. Last but not least (actually, our key point here):

Terrorism will lack funding, weakening ISIS dramatically. According to NYT data, 8% of ISIS funding come from Oil sales, whereas 49% come from extortion and taxation in Iraq, 41% of stolen from state-owned banks and 2 % from kidnapping ransoms. But Iraq is devastated and the money ISIS is stealing from people is eventually coming to an end. The fundamentalist group has tried repeatedly to attack refineries in the Kurdish and Shiite areas, but most of these attempts have failed. Therefore, its only reliable source is external funding from Gulf Countries, which with low oil prices can come to an end making ISIS fighters try to use blow things up with matches instead of the use of expensive artillery. Only if the Islamic State has a good plan B can come out well out of this.

Saudi Arabia has become a rich state thanks to the past two decades of oil-price glory, usually always fluctuating above the 100$. This money not only helped strengthen the Monarchy in an era of republicanism, but also has funded many Islamic Fundamentalist groups, like the above-mentioned ISIS. Saudi Arabia has been openly accused of being just like ISIS in its fundamentalist policies, and an economic crisis perhaps may be all that’s needed for a revolution.

Along its western front, Pakistan shares a 2250 km long border with the war-torn country of Afghanistan. The fact that the border is porous and poorly managed has contributed to multifarious problems for Pakistan. One major problem that does not usually make headlines is the export of opium to Pakistan, with the drug now making its way deep into Pakistani society.

The statistics of opium production in Afghanistan should be truly worrisome for its southeastern neighbor. According to the latest Afghanistan opium survey, the area under cultivation in 2015 is around 183,000 hectares and potential opium production in Afghanistan amounts to 3,300 tons. If we were to rely on the figures provided by the Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), opium production in comparison with 2014 has decreased. Yet the number of poppy-free provinces fell in 2015.Pakistan

Helmand province, which borders Pakistan, tops the list of poppy producers. It represents 47 percent of the total area under cultivation in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, as The Guardian reports, the Taliban presence in Helmand is returning.

Implications for Pakistan

On the other side of the border, as it looks, the culture of substance abuse appears to be of grave concern to no one, with the authorities having virtually made peace with the inflow of various forms of drugs. The supply and demand side of this phenomenon makes it a workable business which benefits many and feeds into terror financing and narco-terrorism. It is a massive cross-border drug trade with enormous sums of money involved. For instance, a U.N. report valued 2014’s crop at $22 billion in Afghanistan (or 4 percent of the country’s GDP). Now the business has taken root in Pakistan.

Narcotics control comes under the Ministry of Interior and Narcotics Control. The ministry’s narcotics control division is the policy body and its anti-narcotics force is the law enforcement agency.

According to Pakistan’s Anti Narcotics Force Act 1997, besides maintaining a liaison with international narcotics control authorities and representing Pakistan at conferences and seminars, among other duties, the anti-narcotics force (ANF) is tasked with coordinating the elimination and destruction of poppy cultivation.

As evidenced by the ground realities, however, the ANF has not done anything visibly remarkable on the poppy cultivation (and distribution) front.

Generally, youngsters are more likely to know where they can get, for instance, hashish than they are about the consequences or the state authority that deals with drugs control.

“Policy on drug education, treatment and rehabilitation of narcotics/drugs addicts” is one of the functions of the Narcotics Control Division. However, a lack of awareness and drug education is a major policy implementation lapse today.

An emerging culture of substance abuse, especially among Pakistani youth, is worrisome and dangerous for obvious reasons. According to a 2013 report, Drug Use in Pakistan 2013 (a collaborative research effort between the Ministry of Narcotics Control, Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, and UNODC), “Approximately six per cent of the population, or 6.7 million people had used any controlled substance including misuse of prescription drugs, in the last year” and “Cannabis is the most commonly used drug, with a prevalence of 3.6 per cent of the population, equivalent to four million users nationwide.”

More worrisome is the rapid increase in drug use among college students in the cities, including and not restricted to Lahore, Karachi, and Islamabad. Peddlers, operating under the noses of local administration, or rather with their alleged blessing, have comfortably carved out markets among adult students residing in hostels. And the practice of substance abuse has become very common (albeit under-reported) among elite students studying in universities in Pakistan’s urban centers. Shrines, private farm houses, cafes in basements and rooftops, rented houses, and bungalows have turned into hotspots for drug use. Above the peddlers sit drug trafficking organizations and gangs that have turned into a powerful mafia. With their links to bureaucracy and law enforcement agencies, they are well connected and very powerful. These gangs are wallowing in cash and can quickly turn to narco-terrorism as their safety net.

The availability of a variety of drugs for a large pool of youth paints a very grim picture and partially explains the criminal activities, rapes, street crimes, domestic violence, mental unrestm and fatal health hazards. A press release by the ANF appraising its performance for the year 2014-15 categorized the seized narcotics and precursors into 14 categories: heroin, charas, opium, morphine, cocaine, amphetamine, methamphetamine, ecstasy tablets, psychotropic tablets, xanax tablets, cannabis, acetic anhydride, sulfuric acid and hydrochloric acid.

What Should Be Done?

But the odd seizure won’t do much to eliminate drug trafficking. A holistic and meaningful effort in terms of both policy and action is required.

Terrorist activities on both sides of the borders are funded with the money earned from the drug trade. Hence, the vicious chain of drugs, narco-money and narco-terrorism needs to be broken. For a start, effective border management is required to plug the routes drugs take across the border. Intelligence sharing between Pakistan and Afghanistan could be a starting point. And meaningful cooperation among the ministries of interior, counter narcotics forces and border police is required for the long term.

Pakistan has the law, but lacks enforcement, enabling those involved in the drug trade to act with impunity. Guided by a long-term policy and concerted efforts, those elements of the Pakistani establishment and law enforcement agencies who benefit from this trade have to held to account across the board.

The media could play an effective role in drug education and awareness, especially among younger Pakistanis. It should engage with the civil society, government and non-government organizations, doctors and experts to launch an effective anti-drugs campaign through seminars, debates, TV discussions and educational curriculums.

To defeat the lucrative appeal of the business of drugs and drug use, it must be fought from both the demand and supply sides.

It is perhaps worth recalling the 2015 theme of the International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking: Lets Develop – Our Lives – Our Communities – Our Identities – Without Drugs.

Mahboob Mohsin is a political scientist from LUMS, Pakistan. He is a media professional and works as a research analyst at the country head office of Channel 24 News in Lahore. He was part of the seventh Youth Parliament Pakistan.

The world watched transfixed as West Africa battled the Ebola virus during the epidemic that peaked in 2014. Borders and airports closed, but a few cases managed to escape the continent, creating international panic. Even though the threat of a global Ebola epidemic was quite low, given how difficult the disease is to transmit, its economic impact on the small nations of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone continues to be very real.

The Ebola outbreak was not the first to capture the media’s attention. Before it came the Middle East respiratory syndrome outbreak in Saudi Arabia, the H1N1 pandemic, the emergence of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome cases in China, the HIV crisis, the bubonic plague and leprosy. The list goes on, but each outbreak has left a lasting mark on the societies it touched, and in some cases, on the world.

Predicting the Next Outbreak

Every new outbreak has the potential to create significant geopolitical consequences, whether they be regional or global. Not only can the spread of disease lead to extensive loss of life, but it can also disrupt trade and economic productivity. The chances of it doing so depend on several factors, including how the disease spreads, how deadly it is and how connected its country of origin is to the rest of the world.

Disease can also affect ongoing conflicts, though it is rarely a deciding factor in their outcomes. For example, European explorers brought smallpox to the Americas. While the smallpox did not eradicate the Incas, Mayans and Aztecs as some historical accounts suggest, it did take a horrific toll on the native populations, and some scholars believe it gave the conquistadors a tactical advantage. Likewise, geopolitical dynamics can influence the behavior of disease. One of the reasons the Spanish flu spread as far as it did in the early 1900s was the unprecedented movement of people that took place during World War I.

The historical perspective is useful for understanding the ramifications that the spread of disease can have. But each outbreak — and the subsequent epidemic — is unique, and forecasting what shape each might take requires an evaluation of two other types of information as well: the factors that make an outbreak more likely, and the factors that influence its spread and impact once it has begun.

While it is impossible to predict where the next outbreak will be, some places are at higher risk than others. War, unrest, rapid urbanization, certain climates and low levels of social services such as basic sanitation and running water can each increase the chances of an outbreak occurring or an epidemic taking hold in a given location.

Once the initial outbreak has occurred, a different set of circumstances determines how it might then spread and affect afflicted regions. The properties of the disease itself, including how (and how fast) it spreads from host to host and how lethal it is, play a role, as do trade and migration patterns that influence how quickly cases can spread beyond the country of origin. Another factor to consider is how integrated a country is into the global marketplace: Endemic tuberculosis in Russia, which carries a persistently high economic price tag in a region that is heavily involved in global trade, has had a much wider geopolitical impact than the relatively contained Ebola outbreak in West Africa.

Over the past year or two, several trends have emerged that could increase the risks that disease poses to Europe and Latin America. Below, we discuss the circumstances affecting each region and forecast the impact outbreaks could have there.

Southern, Central and Eastern Europe

With civil war raging in Syria and the Islamic State’s fight for territory consuming Iraq, it is no surprise that diseases associated with poor sanitary conditions, such as cholera, have emerged there. Meanwhile, the World Health Organization has identified Lebanon, where nearly 2 million Syrian refugees have settled, as a high-risk location for cholera outbreaks. And in 2013, polio returned to Syria amid weakened immunity caused by lapses in vaccination programs.

People living in such dire circumstances often become displaced from their homes, and many refugees from these zones are fleeing to Europe. While the influx of people has temporarily slowed on the Continent because of winter weather conditions, another surge is expected once spring arrives. With it will come the potential for an outbreak; isolated cases of diphtheria have already been reported among refugees.

This will compound the already thorny issue of immigration that has been the focus of much debate among Europeans in recent months. Southern, Central and parts of Eastern Europe will be particularly at risk because they lie on the primary migration paths connecting the Middle East and North Africa to Europe, and they typically have less effective health care systems or lower vaccination rates than their Western European counterparts. Whereas sanitation-dependent and tropical diseases would be easy to contain in much of Europe, polio — a disease that vaccines have eliminated from most of the globe — could crop up in countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukraine and Romania, whose vaccination rates have slipped in recent years. (Indeed, Ukraine saw two cases of polio in 2015.) Even though polio presents asymptomatically in the bulk of cases, the fact that it primarily affects children and can be permanently debilitating elevates the social response to it, giving it a disproportionately large impact on society.

While parts of Europe may see isolated incidents of disease rise, the threat of a widespread outbreak stemming from refugee flows is very low. But much like the threat of terrorism, which is similarly improbable, the mere possibility of an epidemic caused by immigration patterns could fuel nationalistic tendencies already in place and exacerbate the widening fractures on the Continent.

Latin America

The threat of disease also looms in Latin America, but from a very different source. Multiple mosquito-borne epidemics are plaguing the region, putting fiscal strain on governments that are already grappling with political uncertainty and potential unrest.

Dengue fever is one such disease. Historically a disease of trade that occurred sporadically in ports and shipping centers, dengue fever has become more established over time thanks to urbanization and expanding populations. It became endemic to the tropical regions of the Asia-Pacific and the Americas in the latter half of the 20th century. With an estimated annual cost of between $1 billion and $4 billion in the Americas alone, dengue fever places a heavy economic burden on countries to which it is endemic. That said, Mexico recently approved a vaccine that may soon reduce the number of hospitalizations and costs associated with the disease, and Brazil may implement the vaccine by as early as 2016.

Two other mosquito-borne diseases that have taken root in the Caribbean and Central and South America in the past two years are chikungunya and the Zika virus. Chikungunya, originally identified in Africa in 1952, first appeared in the Caribbean in late 2013. Since then it has spread quickly throughout the region. While the disease usually is not lethal, its symptoms can be debilitating for years after infection, which could curtail the productivity of working-age populations in affected regions. So far, Colombia has seen more than 350,000 suspected cases, while Venezuela has had more than 15,000. Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador reported nearly 175,000 suspected cases combined. Meanwhile, the Zika virus has prompted the issuance of travel advisories in nine different countries: Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay, Suriname and Venezuela. Although the majority of cases are asymptomatic, scientists in Brazil are investigating possible links between the virus and birth defects.

Without mass eradication efforts like those of the mid-20th century, it is likely that several mosquito-borne diseases will remain endemic to Latin America. This could lead to sporadic spikes in the number of cases in the region. As the cost of treating and combating these diseases adds up, Latin American governments will come under additional pressure as their finances are strained.

For instance, endemic disease will create yet another economic hardship for Venezuela as it prepares for a likely political transition next year. Crippled by low oil prices and skyrocketing inflation, the Venezuelan economy is expected to contract by 10 percent in 2015. Regardless of who is in power, the government will have difficulty allocating its limited resources to managing the spread and persistent effects of endemic disease. Meanwhile, declining social services could contribute to isolated outbreaks around the country; in the past six months, there have been reports of possible cholera cases and low medical supplies in Venezuela.

At the same time, many states in Central America are still reeling from the effects of El Nino, which brought severe drought to the region. Endemic dengue fever, chikungunya or the Zika virus will only worsen these countries’ financial situations as they struggle to attract foreign investment and encourage economic growth in the face of political violence, scandals and upheavals. While these diseases are already present in other tropical regions and are unlikely to disrupt regional and global trade patterns, they will likely continue to be a burden on countries with high rates of infection.

Europe and Latin America are by no means the only regions at risk for an outbreak. Conflict in Yemen, densely packed populations and open poultry markets in China, rapidly expanding urban societies coupled with poor sanitation in India, and forced migration from Myanmar each carry their own risks of sparking the next significant outbreak; a number of countries in Africa also experience some combination of the factors listed above. Disease is a global concern, and one that often appears to emerge without warning. But with the right tools and the proper perspective, it becomes easier to discern where it may strike next.

While the recent Defense Intelligence Agency assessment that North Korea has mastered the miniaturization process highlights recent advances in North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile program, a number of key technological obstacles remain before Pyongyang can field a reliable nuclear arsenal. Even if North Korea has in fact constructed a nuclear device small enough to fit into a ballistic missile, that does not guarantee that the nuclear device — or the ballistic missile for that matter — would survive re-entry into the Earth’s atmosphere or detonate at the desired time, place and altitude.

Analysis

According to a passage from a classified March 2013 Defense Intelligence Agency report that was mistakenly read before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee on April 11, North Korea has made greater progress in its nuclear weapons program than previously thought. Specifically, the Defense Intelligence Agency believes with moderate confidence that North Korea “currently has nuclear weapons capable of delivery by ballistic missiles.” This assessment contained the caveat that the missiles’ reliability remains low.

The U.S. intelligence community, the Pentagon and the Obama administration quickly sought to clarify the report. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said the agency’s report did not represent the view of the broader U.S. intelligence community, while Secretary of State John Kerry stressed that the assessment did not reference a demonstrated capability.

Even so, the report does highlight progress made in North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile program in the last few years. In 2005, then-Defense Intelligence Agency chief Lowell Jacoby said that in his assessment, North Korea would eventually gain the ability to arm a missile with a nuclear device. Assuming the agency’s current assessment is correct, mastering or at least resolving the miniaturization process marks a key step forward. It does not, however, mean Pyongyang possesses a reliable nuclear arsenal.

For one, as Pentagon press secretary George Little indicated, North Korea has not tested a missile carrying a simulated nuclear warhead. This means Pyongyang is still far from a demonstrated nuclear missile capability. Achieving such a capability would require repeated testing of missiles to iron out the kinks that inevitably crop up. No ballistic missile has ever become fully operational without significant testing.

Pyongyang has not even tested its KN-08 intercontinental ballistic missiles. Both the KN-08 and the Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missile are road-mobile missiles carried on transporter erector launchers, which makes tracking them more difficult than tracking missiles launched from stationary launchpads.

Still, North Korea has demonstrated some progress on its missile program. The successful test of the Unha-3 satellite launch vehicle in December 2012 proved Pyongyang can successfully launch a long-range missile. But one success does not mean future missile launches will not fail. Furthermore, even if North Korea constructed a nuclear device small enough to fit into a ballistic missile, this would provide no guarantee that the nuclear device would survive re-entry and detonate as programmed.

By themselves, the tests are a key component of North Korea’s survival strategy. But Pyongyang also must carry out more missile and nuclear tests to enhance the reliability of its incipient nuclear arsenal. This explains why the impending Musudan missile test and other North Korean missile tests concern the United States and its allies — like many of North Korea’s previous missile tests, these too may fail, but failure is a key part of the learning process.

Abdelmalek Alaoui is a contributor for Forbes and writes about North Africa, the US and International Relations.

Three years have elapsed since a Tunisian fruit vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, triggered the biggest social and political upheaval of modern times in the Arab world by setting himself on fire. This turmoil, which would afterwards be called the “Arab Spring,” brought many promises to the people of the region. However, if it did help score some progress with regard to freedom of speech, it failed to deliver on peace, stability, and most of all on democracy.

The Arab revolutions in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt brought to power Islamists who soon proved that they did not have the same economic DNA as their Turkish cousins of the AKP. Indeed, despite AKP’s recent setbacks and the massive popular protest aiming at the destitution of Recep Tayyip Erdogan , Turkey’s AKP was able, ten years ago, to introduce massive economic reforms and to put the country on the path of emergence .

That has not been the case in North Africa where two major dynamics are now characterizing the new landscape of Maghreb geopolitics.

The first dynamic is the return of the traditional “elites”, composed of the military in Egypt and Libya, and of technocrats in Tunisia, embodied by Mehdi Jomaa.
The military and the technocrats are no new elites in North Africa. For over fifty years, they have been playing key roles in the region. For many analysts, their comeback is fueled by two main factors: the fear of instability and the quest for economic expertise in order to get Arab countries back on track. Yet, the return of North Africa’s old elites was only made possible by the combination of the fail of the Islamists’ experiment in ruling a country, and the support of economic forces that feared for their business in case instability continues.

In Tunisia, Jomaa’s start as head of government is so encouraging that the Islamists of Ennahda are contemplating the possibility to keep him as prime minister, even if they were to win the elections in November .

In short, Tunisian islamists want to win the elections but are ready to let go the executive power, at least temporarily.

Beyond internal transformations, the second major dynamic in North Africa is an external policy shift, especially of the two countries of its western facade, Morocco and Algeria.

There is intense historic rivalry between the two neighbors, fueled by a major dispute over the status of Western Sahara as well as a competition on who’s going to become the region’s dominant power.

Algeria and Morocco, which have both escaped the “Arab spring” unscathed-although for very different reasons- have both embarked on strategy shifts to magnify their leadership.

Morocco is clearly using the economy as its major vector of influence. The North African country is heading southwards, trying to design a new economic partnership with Africa, as clearly evidenced by the Moroccan King’s numerous journeys in West Africa .

For the Moroccan monarch, who’s about to celebrate his fifteenth year in power, a new agenda focused on Africa is clearly in the making, and all economic actors, including Moroccan multinational companies, are expected to follow the trend.

For Algeria, the main concern is to secure its southern borders with the Sahel and at the same time to become the security “power broker” of the region, mainly through cooperation with the US and mediation between rebel groups .

Another major concern for the Algerians is to amend the constitution the soonest possible in order to create the position of Vice President and thus secure the next presidential transition without holding elections. Many experts fear that Abdelaziz Bouteflika- who suffered last year a massive cerebral stroke and is since then on a wheelchair- will not be able to finish his mandate.

Algerians hate uncertainty more than anything else, so the new constitution was put on a fast-track led by Bouteflika’s Chief of staff and former prime minister, Ahmed Ouyahia, who will probably become Algeria’s next VP.

Overall, the new face of North Africa’s geopolitics may well serve individual countries’ agendas, but it is clearly hurting regional integration, which is the key to speeding up global development of the Maghreb.

By Eugene Chausovsky

Twenty years have passed since famed political scientist Samuel Huntington published his seminal work, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. To anyone interested in international relations, the book is as relevant today as it was when it was published in 1996, if not more so. It not only anticipated many of the conflicts that took place after the Cold War, but it also fitted them within a context that was starkly different from the view that was widely held at the end of the 20th century: that a more peaceful, democratic and liberal world order was upon us.

Yet The Clash of Civilizations failed to fully grasp and appreciate many of the important drivers of the post-Cold War global system, rooting itself in a civilization-centric perspective rather than adopting a more encompassing and nuanced geopolitical model. And so, 20 years later in a world that seemingly confirms Huntington’s predictions in many ways, it is just as illuminating to take a closer look at what he got wrong.

Analysis

Huntington believed that the ideological conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union — the Cold War era’s two superpowers — would not mark the “end of history,” as so many believed, but that it would eventually be replaced by a conflict between civilizations in the post-Cold War world. Huntington defined a civilization as the broadest level of shared identity between groups of people, and he divided the world into nine of them: Western, Orthodox, Islamic, African, Latin American, Sinic, Hindu, Buddhist and Japanese. It was these civilizational divides, Huntington argued, that would shape the relationships between states after the Cold War came to a close.

Within this broader framework, The Clash of Civilizations described a number of key themes, two of which are especially relevant to the current state of the global system. The first predicted that Western civilization (primarily made up of the United States and Western Europe) would find itself increasingly challenged by non-Western civilizations, especially the Islamic world and China. The second forecast that the fault lines between civilizations, the geographic areas where two or more distinct civilizations are in proximity to one another, would be major sites of conflict in the post-Cold War era.

Challenges to the West Grow

Huntington contended, in what was perhaps his most forward-looking insight, that clashes between the West and the Islamic world would intensify with the collapse of the Cold War rivalry. He astutely observed that the fall of the Soviet Union and much of the global communist movement in the early 1990s “removed a common enemy of the West and Islam and left each the perceived threat to the other.” Huntington argued that the shared universality of the Western and Islamic cultures, which espouse views that they believe all humans can adhere to, would generate competition and conflict between the two. He even went so far as to identify the manner in which this conflict would play out: “a war of terrorism versus air power.”

Support for Huntington’s theory came on Sept. 11, 2001, when al Qaeda launched its attacks against the United States and prompted the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. These events set Western powers on a collision course with many countries and groups within the Islamic world as the rise of radical Islamist militancies coincided with the United States’ becoming mired in conflicts throughout the Middle East. While the way in which the United States conducts its global war on terror has evolved over the past two decades, there is no question that a dynamic similar to the predicted Islamic-Western conflict has become an important driver of the modern world order. Indeed, the Islamic State’s recent attacks in Paris, which came amid increased Western airstrikes in Syria, seem to suggest exactly that.

That said, the tremendous diversity within the Islamic world serves as an important counterargument to Huntington’s theory. Islam is a faith with more than 1.3 billion followers around the world. They live under kings and presidents, prime ministers and caliphs, and in many cases they have less in common with each other than they do with their non-Muslim counterparts. One could argue that countries such as Tunisia, Malaysia and Turkey have more in common with the West than with Afghanistan or Saudi Arabia. The problem with Huntington’s concept of a broad civilizational clash between the Islamic world and the West is that it assumes there is a single, unified “West” and a single, unified “Islam,” when in fact the distinctions and variations within both worlds are myriad. And just as Huntington overstates the civilizational nature of conflicts in the Islamic world, he fails to address many of the geopolitical imperatives behind them, including the opening of fissures within Islam as the Sykes-Picot era declines and the weakening of centralized states’ ability to contain those divisions.

While Huntington attributed the Islamic world’s rise to its demographic expansion, he credited the post-Cold War ascent of China to its economic expansion. At a time when China had only begun to emerge as a major economic power, Huntington described it as a country that was “gradually emerging as the society most likely to challenge the West for global influence.” He argued that China would ultimately translate its growing economic strength into political and military might, which Beijing would then use to challenge the United States’ dominant position in East Asia.

Like the Islamic world, the Sinic civilization believes itself to be superior to the West, and Huntington predicted it would therefore seek to challenge the West and its designs for global influence. China’s resistance to Western supremacy stems from its Confucian values, which emphasize the importance of hierarchy, authority, consensus and the state’s dominion over society and which clash with American beliefs of liberty, equality, democracy and individualism. The chasm between the two makes a Western-style political structure incompatible with Chinese cultural and civilizational traditions, just as it is incompatible with the Islamic world’s rejection of the separation of church and state. As a result, the relationship between the two civilizations would become increasingly confrontational, especially as China’s economic and military power expands and Beijing begins to pursue a role as a regional hegemon.

The prediction that tension between China and the West would grow after the end of the Cold War has certainly come true. But Huntington’s reasoning behind it is less convincing. Confucianism is not what has created friction between China and the United States; trade and economic patterns have. In much the same way, it was not a unique Japanese culture that brought it into conflict with the rest of Asia and the United States during World War II, but more fundamental geopolitical interests such as securing supply lines for an economy that was heavily dependent on raw material imports. In Stratfor’s view, place matters far more in shaping the global system than does wide-reaching and all-inclusive themes like a civilizational clash.

Volatility at the Fault Lines of Civilization

In a separate but related point, Huntington speculated that conflict between the world’s different civilizations would flare up on the borders separating them. And in the years immediately following the Cold War, he had a number of examples to draw from. In the early 1990s, the Yugoslav Wars erupted, pulling Orthodox Serbs, Catholic (Western) Croats and Bosniaks into a bloody battle fought along civilizational lines. Not long after, the predominantly Orthodox Armenia and mostly Muslim Azerbaijan declared war over Nagorno-Karabakh, and both sides received outside support from patrons within their civilizational categories: The Turks backed their religious and cultural brethren in Azerbaijan, and the Russians came to the aid of their Orthodox comrades in Armenia. Each of these cases seemed to offer recent evidence that supported Huntington’s theory.

But Huntington also predicted that clashes would take place in other areas, with the caveat that tensions would likely simmer under the surface for a while before eventually materializing as conflicts. One such place was Ukraine, which he described as a “cleft country with two distinct cultures,” adding that “the civilizational fault line between the West and Orthodoxy runs through [Ukraine’s] heart and has done so for centuries.” He raised the possibility that Ukraine could “split along its fault line into two separate entities, the eastern of which would merge with Russia.”

This appears to be extremely prescient today, since Ukraine has, in a de facto sense, split after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of separatist conflict in the country’s east. But using the same civilization-centric logic, Huntington also predicted “if civilization is what counts … violence between Ukrainians and Russians is unlikely.” He went on to conclude that the most likely scenario was a Ukraine that remained whole and independent, if divided, and that cooperated closely with Russia. The events of the past two years clearly call this forecast into question, showing instead that violence between Ukrainians and Russians is in fact possible and that the catalyst of their conflict reaches well beyond civilizational differences. Instead, it is a struggle shaped by geopolitical interests: Russia’s imperative is to secure a buffer zone in the former Soviet periphery, while the United States’ imperative is to deny Russia that buffer and prevent the rise of a hegemonic power in Eurasia.

What He Got Right

The failure of The Clash of Civilizations lies in its attempt to present civilizational differences as an all-encompassing explanation of global conflict. But this is not a viable model to use, at least on its own, to understand today’s world. Instead, geopolitics, which does not subscribe to any particular universalistic theme but examines how geography intersects with the political, economic, security and cultural ties within and between societies, is a far more effective way of analyzing international relations.

Still, this is not to completely discredit Huntington. The Clash of Civilizationsholds many insights that provided useful context for a good share of the conflicts that have taken place over the past 20 years and remain relevant to this day. With an eventful and volatile 2015 behind us and 2016 ahead, one of these insights is especially worth considering:

“Instead of promoting the supposedly universal features of one civilization, the requisites for cultural coexistence demand a search for what is common to most civilizations. In a multicivilizational world the constructive course is to renounce universalism, accept diversity, and seek commonalities.”

Of course, searching for common values and accepting the differences of others will not fully eliminate conflict, which has existed throughout human history and will continue to do so. But any effort to mitigate it in an increasingly dynamic and unpredictable world is surely, as Huntington argues, one that is worth pursuing.

New found freedoms and old restraints still control clash in modern China. 

My fascination with China began in 1989.

I was 14 then and the image of the man who stood in front of a column of tanks in protest during the Tiananmen incident left a permanent impression in my mind. Later in university, while studying Chinese history, I almost got the chance to visit China. Unfortunately the trip never materialised.

But this year, almost 14 years later, the opportunity presented itself once again, and I spent nine days in Beijing as part of a teaching exchange program.

Friends of mine who had visited or worked in Beijing often remarked about the remarkable transformation it has undergone since the scars of Mao’s Cultural Revolution and the decades where it languished as an impoverished backwater with its narrow streets and alleys.

Despite seeing the images of a truly modern Beijing on TV and in magazines, nothing prepared me for the visual spectacle in this fantasy city – Wangfujing Street, the city’s trendy district is flooded with fashionable boutiques, fast food restaurants and the ubiquitous Apple retail shop.

On the roads, it was not hard to spot the long line of exotic sports cars. The subway is extremely efficient and connects many parts of the city. Along the streets of Wangfujing, stylish Beijingers wield the latest in mobile technology. There was a long line of buses parked with tourists from all over the world outside the Lao She Teahouse and the Chaoyang Theatre.

It is also evident that Beijing provides a level of cultural capital by integrating restaurants, entertainment, shopping and cultural experiences to the consumer who seeks to immerse himself with personal knowledge and experiences. To an outsider, the perception is that China has become increasingly open.

But whatever optimism and faith one might have in the Chinese Communist Party to dismantle existing restraints and allow some level of openness, developments must be viewed with some scepticism.

Take for instance the government’s great firewall on social media sites, Google and even the New York Times, and the promotion of its own media systems such as Weibo and WeChat –  strictly monitored for material that is critical or undermines the legitimacy of the party. In 2014, it imposed a blackout on pro-democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong by censoring news reports and social media posts and pictures.

When I visited Tiananmen Square with a Singaporean colleague, we was stunned by dozens of security cameras that loomed over smiling tourists angling their mobile phones for photo opportunities and the deployment of numerous soldiers and plainclothes security personnel at numerous checkpoints around the Square and the Forbidden City.

We were subjected to constant security checks everywhere and on many instances a book my colleague was carrying with him, a research thesis on the spread of Christianity in China, was closely scrutinised.

According to a report by Associated Press, this expansion in monitoring technology is part of a broader ‘social management’ initiative to create an advanced system that stores information (such as tax details and educational history) on every citizen.

These forms of surveillance are used in Western countries, alongside  legal structures governing what type and how this information can be used. Yet it is quite unlikely that such safeguards exist in China.

In fact, the authorities have specifically sort to curb online discourse by artists and other intellectuals advocating social and political change. Take for instance, Wang Liming, the political cartoonist who lampooned Chinese President Xi Jinping, who had his home searched and his  blog shutdown.

This has only served to deter other artists like Bai Budan whose drawing of cupids pointing to security cameras in Tiananmen with the inscription ‘I love the security cameras in Beijing Tiananmen’ (a play on a popular children song, ‘I love Beijing Tiananmen’) may not even see publication in social media sites because of the inherent risks involved.

The people I spoke with were hesitant about commenting on anything that related to the communist party or the level of openness in society.  However one teacher in her late 40s said  that the situation now is vastly different compared to 30 years ago. She also mentioned that she is very excited about visiting her daughter who is currently enrolled as a first-year student at an Australian university.

When I asked her why she sent her daughter abroad, she answered, ‘More opportunities and flexibility.’

Patrick Sagaram lives in Singapore and works as a teacher.