Young Diplomats

Bavaria is one of those rare places where the monumental and the austere coexist, where tradition is strong but so is the desire for innovation. It is a place where villagers gather to continue the folk practice of erecting tall wooden poles to dance around them, and also where massive companies such as BMW and Siemens were born. It is a region where a nostalgic king built the most impressive castle in Europe and decorated each room with themes taken from the works of composer Richard Wagner, but it is also a devout Catholic region where frugality is seen as a virtue.

For foreigners, Bavaria is the pinnacle of the German identity — an Alpine wonderland where people wear lederhosen, drink gallons of beer and eat strange dishes. What many do not realize is that Bavaria is just one of Germany’s many federal states, and some of its customs and dialects are alien to many Germans. More important, while Bavaria’s history is deeply intertwined with Germany’s, the region has traditionally fought for its autonomy, if not independence.

Bavaria is making headlines these days as thousands of asylum seekers enter Germany through its southern border. This is raising concerns in the region, because voters and politicians worry about the economic, social and political impact of the constant arrival of foreigners. The Bavarian government recently asked Berlin to toughen its position on refugees, and regional president Horst Seehofer threatened to impose unspecified “self-defense” measures if the German government does not reverse course on immigration. On the surface, these actions might seem surprising, but they are connected to Bavaria’s history and geography.

The Struggle for Self-Governance

Bavaria’s behavior is shaped by its geographic position. To the south, it is protected by the Alps, a natural border with Austria. To the east, it is sheltered by the Bavarian Forest, a less impressive barrier that nevertheless separates it from the Czech Republic. This distinguishes Bavaria from most Central European regions, which have historically been vulnerable to invasion. It also makes Bavaria a coherent political entity that throughout its history has enjoyed different degrees of self-governance. Bavaria’s position in Central Europe have also made it a significant trading center, while two major rivers, the Danube and the Main (which is a part of the Rhine system) connect it with northern and southeastern Europe.

This geography explains Bavaria’s wealth and impressive dynastic continuity. Members of the Wittelsbach family ruled as dukes, electors and kings of Bavaria between 1180 and 1918 — an impressive record that surpasses even that of the Habsburg family in Austria. At different times in history Bavaria became a significant political player in Europe; two members of the Wittelsbach family became Holy Roman Emperors, and others became kings in places as diverse as Norway and Greece.

However, Bavaria’s geography has also put it in the path of larger military forces, and the region was never completely insulated from political developments in Central Europe. Bavaria was first a Merovingian and then a Carolingian vassal state before joining the Holy Roman Empire. When Prussia rose to power in the 18th century, Bavaria was forced to play rivals Prussia and Austria against each other, only to join the German Empire after Austria’s defeat in the Austro-Prussian war. This highlights Bavaria’s main geopolitical imperative: to be part of larger institutional frameworks for protection, while also trying to maintain as much autonomy as possible.

Because of this imperative, Bavaria has traditionally had a complex relationship with its Germanic neighbors. A German-speaking region, Bavaria has a very strong connection with the rest of Germany. The need for protection explains its membership in the German Empire, though it joined only after it was promised that it would control its own army, railways and postal service.

The desire for autonomy explains Bavaria’s decision not to ratify the Constitution of West Germany in 1949, mostly because it felt the law did not give enough powers to the country’s regions. Bavaria only agreed to enforce the German Constitution after the rest of the German regions ratified it. Bavaria’s official name, Free State of Bavaria, is purely symbolic because the German Constitution does not distinguish between states and free states, though the name acknowledges the region’s aspirations for self-rule.

As Germany’s second richest region in terms of GDP, Bavaria has repeatedly questioned the country’s complex transfer system, under which resources are transferred from wealthier to poorer regions in an attempt to secure similar standards of living for all Germans. Bavarian governments have described the system as unfair and criticized regions in eastern Germany for not being fiscally responsible — much as Germany has criticized other eurozone countries such as Greece.

But Bavaria is also very close to a fellow Catholic entity; Austria. Bavaria’s landscape, architecture and language are closely connected with those of Austria, especially in the bordering Tyrol area. When Bavaria joined the German Empire in 1871, Bavarian nationalists were against the idea of being ruled by protestant Prussia and demanded independence. After Germany’s defeat in World War I, some Bavarian nationalists proposed that Bavaria join Austria.

A Laboratory for Extreme Political Ideas

Bavaria has often been a center for new political experiments in Germany. In times of deep social upheaval, this involved embracing extreme positions. In the tumultuous months that followed the collapse of the German Empire after World War I, an independent Bavarian Soviet Republic was proclaimed. With its capital in Munich, the republic’s goal was to establish a communist regime that would be independent from the also recently proclaimed Weimar Republic. The experiment only lasted for only few months and in May 1919 the rebel government was deposed by remaining loyal elements of the German army.

These events contributed to the emergence of Bavaria’s next extremist experiment, Nazism. In the early 1920s, the region was a hotbed of right-wing nationalist opposition to the Weimar Republic, and a natural place for a failed Austrian painter and former soldier to find a receptive audience for his new political ideas.

Munich was both the founding city and the spiritual center of the National Socialists, who held their first meetings in the city’s beer halls. In 1923 Munich was the stage of Adolf Hitler’s first attempt to seize power, in the so-called Beer Hall Putsch. The city had a special place in the Nazi pantheon, and in 1935 Hitler declared it “the capital of the (Nazi) movement.” Interestingly enough, Hitler had to rely on the support from other German regions in his rise to power, as a large segment of the Catholic electorate in Bavaria remained loyal to moderate parties.

Conservative and Slightly Euroskeptical

Bavaria’s political exceptionalism is also represented by the fact it is the only part of Germany where Chancellor Angela Merkel’s conservative Christian Democratic Union is not present. Instead, a sister party, the Christian Social Union, represents Merkel’s party in Bavaria. The two parties are closely connected and form a common faction in the Bundestag, but formally they are separate entities. The Christian Social Union has governed Bavaria uninterrupted since the late 1950s, in another case of impressive political continuity.

The two forces are ideologically close, but the Christian Social Union tends to be more conservative regarding social issues. It is also slightly Euroskeptical and more interested in protecting regional rights. This creates friction every time a Christian Democratic Union federal government moves to the political center or makes decisions on big EU issues.

Christian Social Union lawmakers are not afraid of defending their ideological independence and challenging the central government in Berlin. In August, several Christian Social Union parliamentarians voted against the third Greek bailout, and in October a parliament member from the Bavarian party went so far as to say that Merkel could face a no-confidence vote if she did not change her position on asylum seekers. A core element of the Christian Social Union strategy is to prevent the emergence of any political movements to its right. This involves toughening its own position if it has to. For example, since the beginning of the refugee crisis, Bavarian politicians have demanded that Germany close its southern border and automatically deport migrants who do not qualify for asylum.

Because of its size, the Christian Democratic Union is more influential than its sister party when appointing electoral candidates and proposing policy at the federal level. However, this does not mean the Christian Social Union readily accepts its subordinate role in the alliance. In 2002, former Bavarian president and Christian Social Union leader Edmund Stoiber successfully challenged Christian Democratic Union leader Merkel and became the conservative candidate for the general elections. The strategy did not work in the long run, however, and the alliance lost the 2002 election to the center-left. Merkel would have a rematch only three years later, when she won the election and became German chancellor.

Just as Bavaria is unwilling or unable to sever its ties with Germany, the Christian Social Union is interested in preserving its alliance with the Christian Democratic Union, although it remains willing to challenge the federal government whenever it feels its interests are at stake. This will continue to constrain the administration in Berlin, especially as the European Union’s long list of recurring problems continues expanding.

Bavaria is a fascinating example of a territory that is powerful enough to demand special treatment from its neighbors, but not strong enough to completely control its destiny. As British historian Simon Winder put it, “Bavaria … is one of those strange semi-kingdoms that has throughout its history come close to being a real and independent state but has always been subsumed or subverted.” Because of its proud history and powerful sense of identity, Bavaria will continue to be a strong-willed force in Germany and beyond.

Up to three gunmen stormed the Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako, the capital of Mali, taking as many as 170 occupants hostage Nov. 20. They reportedly entered the hotel using diplomatic license plates – a security oversight likely observed by the attackers. The hotel’s popularity among diplomats and tourists made it a highly desirable target for attack.

The attack comes just days after militants affiliated with the Islamic State staged coordinated attacks in France. It is unclear if the two incidents are related — the Islamic State and the ethnic Tuareg militant groups that dominate in Mali have competing interests – but the Paris attack may well have inspired the raid in Bamako.

French paramilitary forces have been deployed to the scene of attack, and Malian security forces have launched a rapid counterassault to clear the hotel. Dozens of the hotel’s occupants have locked themselves in their rooms, and as many as 80 have fled the building. The militaries of several countries, including France and the United States, are active in Mali and can be expected to support Mali’s security forces.

Sources in Mali have blamed the attack on Ansar Dine, an Islamist militant group headed by a Tuareg leader named Iyad Ag Ghali. The group served as the Malian branch of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. With the help of al Qaeda, Ansar Dine briefly gained control of nearly all of northern Mali during its insurgency in 2012-2013. France subsequently retook northern Mali in a military intervention, and European and African troops have remained there ever since.

Tuareg militants attack Malian and foreign military and diplomatic personnel in northern Mali intermittently, but attacks in southern Mali are relatively rare. Attacks in Bamako are rarer still. If Ansar Dine is in fact behind the attack, it would be the most prominent and sophisticated by the group.

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is known to take hostages to generate income, but this is not the type of hostage situation that would produce ransoms. The intent of this attack was to terrorize, destabilize and promote Tuareg interests and remind the world that al Qaeda is still a force to be reckoned with.

On the evening of Friday, Nov. 13, eight people armed with assault rifles and suicide vests attacked several targets in Paris,France, killing 129 civilians. At least five of the attackers were French nationals and two were Belgians; all eight appear to have been radical Islamists, and the Islamic State has claimed responsibility for the attacks. French President Francois Hollande declared the killings to be an act of war and immediately scaled up France’s military operations, primarily by increasing its airstrikes in Islamic State territory. Taking advantage of a temporary state of emergency, French police have conducted more than 100 raids each night since the attack as they track down suspects.

While the attacks are obviously shocking, they probably will not have the same transformative effect as other major incidents such as 9/11 or the Madrid bombings, which led the states that were targeted to change their strategies. (9/11 prompted the United States to invade Afghanistan and ultimately Iraq, while the Madrid bombings persuaded Spain to withdraw its troops from Iraq.) By comparison, the French attacks, which are more akin to the July 2005 bombings in the United Kingdom, will likely accelerate the strategies France already had for achieving its domestic and foreign interests.

Domestic Concerns

From France’s perspective, the most immediate concern the Paris attacks raise is that French citizens were killed. Any government that fails to protect its citizenry risks being replaced, meaning that officials must work quickly to neutralize the attackers before doing the same for any accomplices who were directly involved. Then the government must try to prevent similar attacks from taking place in the future. The first two of these actions are already well underway, and progress toward the third is evident. Hollande has asked to extend emergency powers for three months, to deploy an extra 5,000 police officers over the course of two years, and to amend the constitution to broaden surveillance powers. By all appearances, France seems to be on the verge of becoming a closely watched state in the coming years — much like the United Kingdom, which has one surveillance camera in place for every 11 Britons.

The Nov. 13 attacks also play into domestic politics, and the government will want to be seen avenging its citizens and punishing the offending party for its actions. This appears to be a large part of the motivation behind Paris’ increased bombings of Islamic State targets overseas. Hollande is the leader of the center-left Socialist Party, which traditionally takes a softer line on social, security and privacy issues and is therefore vulnerable to recriminations from the public that it has not done enough to protect French citizens. Adding to this problem, France has experienced other terrorist attacks this year, most notably in January when gunmen attacked the offices of the Charlie Hebdo newspaper, and people expected the government to have learned from these experiences in addressing security threats.

Regional elections in December will give voters across the country a chance to show their displeasure with the government’s response, making the situation even more urgent for Hollande. The anti-immigration National Front has enjoyed a surge in support in recent years, with party leader Marine Le Pen polling strongly ahead of the 2017 presidential election. For the more moderate voter, there is also the center-right Republicans party headed by former President Nicolas Sarkozy. The former president has long divided public opinion with his tough stance on immigrants and security, which dates back at least to his time as France’s interior minister in the early to mid-2000s.

Implications for France’s European Ties

The Paris attacks have also exacerbated problems that have been brewing in France’s relationship with the rest of Europe. A passport found at the scene of the crime appears to be linked to an immigrant who passed through Greece and up through the Balkans to get to France within the past two months. Doubts have since been raised about the authenticity of the passport, but the damage has been done, and many in France are linking the attacks to immigrant flows. As a result, the Schengen Agreement, which allows free travel across borders within member states, is under serious threat. The immigrant link may or may not prove valid, but an even more damning piece of evidence has arisen against Schengen: the Belgian connection. Belgium has emerged as a key staging point of the attacks, and the perpetrators seem to have done a great deal of their planning in Brussels. Belgium’s connectivity, small size and membership in the Schengen area mean that it is extremely easy to enter several countries from Belgium within a short time. Consequently, many see the Schengen Agreement as a facilitator in the attacks.

The events of Nov. 13 have also altered France’s budgetary situation. In November 2014, France fell afoul of the European Commission for its fiscal laxity, and its 2015 budget wasn’t approved until several months into the year. This time around, the commission has been considerably less strict with its charges for the most part, mainly because of improvements in the overall economic climate, but it is still tasked with maintaining the union’s economic guidelines. Hollande’s Nov. 16 announcement that security concerns trump austerity, and that budgetary requirements will take a back seat since France is at war, cannot have been received well in Brussels, whether true or not.

Aside from the immediate considerations of the commission’s mood, France may still be able to borrow at extremely cheap rates largely because of the European Central Bank’s quantitative easing program, but this will not help its fiscal position. Borrowing to finance France’s heightened spending will layer onto the country’s already high debt levels. As a result, France will become even more firmly enmeshed in the Mediterranean group of eurozone countries with heavy debt burdens, relying on the European Central Bank and the prevailing economic climate to keep interest repayments low. At best, this will increase the chances of friction with Germany, and at worst, it will precipitate a debt crisis.

Older Problems

But France’s biggest concerns in the wake of the Paris attacks speak to some of the country’s much more deeply-rooted issues. Half of the attackers were Frenchmen. French law prohibits the inclusion of religious affiliation on national censuses, but estimates suggest that around 7.5 percent of France’s population is Muslim, with a great portion of that group of North African extraction. Most of the recent terrorist incidents in France have stemmed from this part of the population, which tends to be poorer and more isolated than other groups.

The roots of this reality trace back to France’s experiences in colonizing Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco in the 19th and early 20th centuries, and then to the messy independence processes these colonies underwent, particularly Algeria’s War of Independence from 1954 to 1962. Bombings, killings and police brutality on both sides of the Mediterranean created enmity between the two populations, which only continued as growing numbers of Algerians emigrated to France. After World War II, France experienced a significant growth spurt in its “Trente Glorieuses” (“Thirty Glorious Years”) and it needed cheap labor — a need North African emigres helped fill.

The newcomers made homes for themselves around France’s industrial centers, including Paris, Lyon and Marseilles, but their high numbers and low wealth, combined with existing antipathies, inhibited their ability to integrate. The country became dotted with pockets of poor, disaffected and mainly Muslim communities that struggled to find gainful employment and break the cycle of poverty in which they found themselves. It is from these communities that the Islamic State appears to have had some success in recruiting, and it is their problems that France must solve if it hopes to prevent the homegrown threats the Paris attacks brought to light.

A Russian Su-24 fighter jet was shot down near the Turkish-Syrian border on Nov. 24. According to a statement issued by the Turkish General Staff, the downed warplane was warned 10 times in five minutes by two intercepting Turkish F-16s while the Su-24 was flying over the town of Yaylidagi in Turkey’s Hatay province.

Turkey’s state-owned Anadolu Agency, citing unnamed officials at the president’s office, also stated that the plane was warned after violating Turkish airspace before being downed in line with Turkey’s rules of engagement. In contrast, the Russian Defense Ministry claims to have “objective monitoring” that proves the aircraft was flying over Syrian territory only, at an altitude of 6,000 meters. The Russians also said the crash was allegedly caused by gunfire from the ground and that preliminary information suggests the two pilots ejected. Local Turkmen rebels are claiming that they have captured the pilots, one of them injured and one in good health. A video with a Free Syrian Army logo shows a group of men walking up to a heavily forested area where a yellow parachute had landed.

A Context of Tensions

Since the early days of the Russian intervention in Syria, Turkey, the United States and other coalition partners have expressed significant concerns about the possibility of this exact scenario. Russian aircraft have increased the intensity of their operations across Syria, targeting both Islamic State and Syrian rebel forces. In some cases, Russian airstrikes have occurred in close proximity to where Turkey, the United States, and France have been carrying out their own air operations against the Islamic State, raising the risk of accidental collision. Turkey has warned Russian warplanes it claims were violating Turkish airspace before, but this would mark the first time Turkish forces have actually shot one down.

Ankara and Moscow have been engaged in military-to-military discussions to de-conflict their operations in Syria and have maintained a close diplomatic relationship. The downing of the Russian aircraft does not portend a direct military escalation between Turkey and Russia. The two sides will likely be able to manage the fallout from the incident through diplomatic means and through additional military contacts to better define their areas of operation.

Turkey’s hope will be that Russia exercises more caution in its operations in Syria to avoid such incidents in the future, especially as Turkey is gearing up to deepen its own military involvement in northern Syria west of the Euphrates River. Indeed, predominantly Turkmen rebels affiliated with the Free Syrian Army and backed by Turkey have had recent successes, such as seizing two Islamic State-held villages near the Turkish border. As Stratfor noted, this is the first step for Turkey, working alongside the United States, to begin flushing out Islamic State militants from the Turkey-Syria border. The operation would entail a heavy air campaign involving Turkish and U.S. fighter jets in northern Syria with the potential for Turkey to reinforce the rebels with ground troops to hold the territory and establish a “safe zone” along the border.

For Turkey to feel comfortable moving forward with such an operation, it would need to establish an understanding with Moscow to ensure Russian aircraft stay out of the way. Russia’s continued flights near Turkish airspace may have been intended to give Ankara pause in its military planning, but the downing of one of its own jets could place more of the onus on Moscow to steer clear of Turkish operations near the border.

A decade ago, Nicaragua’s sluggish economy relied primarily on agricultural exports, including coffee and beef. But during the past 10 years, Nicaragua has cultivated its longest run of political and economic stability since 1979. The country has leveraged its low wages and preferential trade with the United States to attract investment into clothing factories, helping the country’s export revenue quadruple between 2007 and 2014. And high oil prices enabled Venezuela to subsidize Nicaragua’s domestic spending and fuel imports through the Petrocaribe alliance, giving Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega more leeway in economic planning. Despite occasional bouts of political protest and confrontation between supporters of the government and the opposition, politically motivated violence has been relatively minimal. But with falling global oil prices and the subsequent decline of Venezuelan foreign assistance, Nicaragua’s fortunes could soon change.

A year away from elections, it seems Ortega may still have the strength to rule for another five-year term, but diminishing aid from Venezuela will complicate Nicaragua’s economic planning in the near term and could eventually erode the Sandinista National Liberation Front’s tight control over national politics.

Since the implementation of the Central American Free Trade Agreement in 2005, reduced tariff barriers have given Nicaragua greater access to the U.S. market, and foreign investors have increased their cash flow into Nicaragua accordingly. Nicaraguan clothing exports, largely to the United States, went from less than $2 million in 2005 to around $2.7 billion in 2014. The low cost of doing business in Nicaragua, even relative to other Central American countries, has also contributed to the uptick in investment. The Nicaraguan minimum wage is between $109 and $245 a month — the lowest among its immediate neighbors, which are its biggest regional competitors for low-end manufacturing jobs.

Even still, waning assistance from Venezuela could threaten the continuance of this economic success story. Though Venezuelan aid to Nicaragua is a small portion of Venezuela’s total foreign aid, declining oil revenue has forced Caracas to make some cuts. At its height in 2012, Venezuelan aid to Nicaragua totaled $728.7 million — less than 1 percent of Venezuela’s reported oil export income for that year. But because Venezuela’s oil revenue was cut nearly in half this year and because Caracas is concentrated on making foreign debt payments and investments into the oil sector, Venezuela has cut some of its aid abroad. In Nicaragua’s case, aid in the first half of 2015 declined 23 percent from the year before, totaling some $193 million. Nicaragua depends on Venezuelan aid to augment public spending, and if assistance continues to fall, Nicaragua stands to lose a key source of political patronage.

Venezuela’s heavy subsidization of Nicaraguan public finances guaranteed some measure of financial stability throughout Ortega’s presidency. Direct loans from Venezuela’s state-owned oil firm, Petroleos de Venezuela, not only cushioned the blow of rapidly rising oil prices in the late 2000s but also helped Nicaragua fund food imports and subsidize public transport fares. Although the subsidies are only a small part of PDVSA’s total operating revenue, the aid given in 2014 represented about 32 percent of Nicaragua’s total budgeted income for 2015. And if Ortega’s government fails to fund socially sensitive programs such as public transport, on which it spent $16.5 million in the first half of 2015, it risks losing political support in the long run.

Still, the near term looks relatively benign for the ruling Sandinista National Liberation Front. The party has slightly more than a year until the next general election, slated for November 2016, and it faces a divided and politically weak opposition. The only coherent opposition bloc is composed of the leftist Sandinista Renewal Movement and the more centrist Independent Liberal Party. The coalition commands less than 30 votes in congress, compared to the Sandinista National Liberation Front’s 61. With only a year until the election, voters might not feel the effects of reduced subsidies before re-electing Ortega. However, if he serves another five-year term, Ortega may have to enact greater fiscal discipline if Venezuela’s patronage continues to decline. So far, Ortega’s popularity has depended on his support of programs that benefit the voters, and an erosion of that public assistance would complicate his ability to govern in the long term.

Overall, the pace of the decline in aid will greatly influence how the next presidential term plays out. A sharp drop in assistance, combined with a drop in Petrocaribe subsidies, could lead to a quick reining in of public spending — something that would almost certainly harm the next government’s approval rating and could contribute to popular unrest. But luckily for Nicaragua, its relatively small size means that Venezuela can likely fund it for some time. Moreover, barring major political upheaval in Venezuela, Caracas’ aid to Nicaragua is more likely to decline slowly than to collapse suddenly.

Analysis

Dacian Ciolos replaced Victor Ponta as the prime minister of Romania on Nov. 17. And though his ascension may seem like the result of a Romanian political system in chaos, in fact it is the result of Romania’s foreign policy goals, U.S. and EU strategic interests in the region, and a general exasperation among Romanian voters, fed up as they are with the malfeasance of their traditional political parties. Ultimately, it will be these factors that compel the new prime minister to follow the same foreign policy as his predecessor.  

Ponta resigned Nov. 4 after Romanians took to the streets to protest the country’s pervasive corruption. For months, Ponta had been accused of a variety of wrongdoings, and allegations that corruption led to a nightclub fire in late October was the last straw for the already troubled politician.

Romania’s fight against corruption received support from abroad. The United States considers Bucharest a critical ally in the former Soviet periphery, and it believes it will be less receptive to Russian influence if it is politically stable, more transparent and more attractive for foreign investment. Accordingly, the United States has worked closely with Romania to strengthen the National Anti-Corruption Directorate. In recent months the institution removed several high-level officials and stripped some politicians of their immunity.

And it appears as though Ciolos wants to reciprocate the West’s desires for alliance. Indeed, Ciolos’ Cabinet, which is composed mostly of technocrats and officials who are friendly toward the West, shows that the new government wants to preserve its relations with the White House, NATO and the European Union. Ciolos himself is a former EU Commissioner, and he was selected by President Klaus Iohannis – well known for his advocacy of U.S.-Romania relations – after the legislature failed to make its own submissions. Notably, his Cabinet includes former members of the European Parliament, ambassadors to Western countries and businessmen. Together, the list of new leaders shows Bucharest’s clear intent to remain aligned with the West, which in turn will likely support the new government.

But none of this makes Ciolos’ new job any easier. His administration has ambitious plans to reform the country’s electoral system, make public administration more efficient, reform education and health care systems, support Moldova’s EU accession plans, and strengthen Romania’s role in the European Union. As expected, the government also proposed to reinforce its alliance with the United States and NATO.

Some of these goals could prove difficult to achieve. Despite Ponta’s resignation, the composition of the legislature has not changed. Ciolos’ government is supported by an unusual coalition, which comprises elements from Ponta’s center-left and its rivals among the center-right. Naturally, the policy priorities of these parties differ dramatically, and those differences will be more pronounced in the run-up to general elections in December 2016, during which parties will differentiate themselves to secure votes.

Ciolos’ appointment exemplifies how Romanian interests — its international affairs, its domestic social and political agenda — interact. Romanian politics may appear to be chaotic, but these impersonal geopolitical forces will continue to shape the country’s behavior despite electoral cycles and political conflicts.

Russia’s State Duma, the lower house of Russia’s Federal Assembly, and its Federal Council held an extraordinary session Nov. 20 to discuss issues related to terrorism. It is rare for both chambers to come together in session, let alone for a session to run into the night. The parliamentary meeting follows the release of a new poll showing that 65 percent of Russians fear that the Islamic State will carry out a terrorist attack inside Russia in 2016 — a number up from 48 percent last month.

Analysis

Russia has some experience when it comes to combating terrorism, especially in the Caucasus, but is seeking to expand its remit. Many of the proposals presented during the Nov. 20 session were more stringent penalties for terrorists and those aiding them. The leader of the Just Russia party, Sergei Mironov, even proposed restoring the death penalty — a highly controversial issue already denounced by the Kremlin. Other measures discussed included enhancing security at public events and transportation hubs such as airports and train stations, which have been targets in the past. Historically, Russia’s counterterrorism strategy focused on its own Muslim republics, such as Chechnya and Dagestan. Yet with the current threat emanating from abroad, many Russian lawmakers were quick to propose measures that would revoke travel passports issued to Russian citizens who visit conflict hot spots such as Syria and Iraq.

The FSB has done this before. When now-President Vladimir Putin came in to lead the FSB in 1998, he expanded the agency’s powers to combat threats in the North Caucasus. Since becoming president, Putin has sought to balance the power of the FSB with other intelligence and security services, though given the current risks and circumstances the FSB will probably seek to expand its responsibilities and authority.

Consolidating Power

The FSB wants more influence in a number of areas. First, it wants greater control of the Investigative Committee, which is comparable to the FBI in the United States, wielding judicial and police authority. The FSB has greatly influenced the Investigative Committee at times, but now the agency wants formal jurisdiction to influence the Investigative Committee’s actions. Second, the FSB wants more influence over its sister security service branch, the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), which oversees intelligence operations outside Russia. The FSB has jurisdiction over threats inside Russia and its borderlands, but because a threat to Russia’s heartland is originating from conflict zones such as Syria, that could give the FSB recourse to insinuate itself into its sister agency. Third, the FSB is highly interested in gaining greater access to Russia’s Chechen Republic. The FSB andChechen President Ramzan Kadyrov have long fought over control of security and intelligence operations in the Caucasus republic, with Kadyrov blocking much of the FSB’s activities in recent years. The death of prominent opposition leader Boris Nemtsov in 2015 did little to improve FSB-Chechen relations. The FSB could easily use the threat of Islamic State infiltration through Chechnya or the Northern Caucasus to expand the agency’s powers in the region.

Another consequence of Russia’s renewed focus on terrorism and external threats manifesting domestically could be another spike in xenophobic or nationalist movements. Nationalism is already at a record high in Russia following the conflict with Ukraine, anti-Russian sanctions enacted by the West, and the Russian annexation of Crimea. The Russian government has expounded these events into strong support for the Russian government, resulting in an approval rating for Putin currently around 89 percent. In the past, nationalist movements quickly turned into anti-Muslim or anti-foreigner sentiments. In 2013, non-state militias formed in the Volga region following a bus bombing. The militias ultimately ended up harassing and assaulting Muslims living in the region. In 2011, tens of thousands of Russians protested in Moscow and other large cities to “Stop Feeding the Caucasus,” a movement meant to pressure the Kremlin to cut federal subsidies to the Muslim Caucasus republics. Currently, the government is framing its newfound focus on terrorism in relation to the Islamic State and the Iraq and Syria battlespace, but this could easily mutate into an anti-Muslim reaction throughout Russia as the country comes to terms with its own history of domestic terrorism.

Beyond the threat of internal or external terrorism, the Kremlin could simply use the blanket reasoning of security as an excuse to increase the monitoring and coercion of opposition groups or other entities flagged as undesirable by the Kremlin. Russia will hold parliamentary elections in 2016, and the Kremlin has been particularly focused on preventing unsanctioned groups and individualsfrom making gains during a time of economic and political uncertainty. The Kremlin’s drive for control was evident during the 2015 local elections, when cities and regions were targeted based on their opposition to the Kremlin, which then swiftly derailed anti-government campaigns and movements before they could gain traction.

Summary

The Egyptian government failed to generate strong voter turnout for the first phase of its multi-step parliamentary elections ending Oct. 19. The government has delayed the election multiple times since the country’s last legislature was dissolved following the July 2013 military coup, citing at times logistical difficulties, security concerns or most recently difficulties drafting a fiercely debated electoral law. Voter turnout — which domestic media and government officials have put anywhere from 12 to 17 percent — fell far short of the over 60 percent that came out in May 2014 to elect incumbent President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.

Al-Sisi’s government had been counting on strong turnout to legitimize the future legislature, empowering it to push through a series of significant economic reforms. If so few voters turn out for future stages of the election and public sentiment begins to turn against the still largely popular al-Sisi, dissent may delay political and economic reform initiatives, possibly defeating Cairo’s attempts to make itself less dependent on financial aid from Gulf states.

Analysis

As voters prepare to select their representatives, Egypt’s military-backed government is embroiled in political conflict with Islamist groups. It has been nearly four years since parliamentary elections in 2011 catapulted the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party into the political spotlight. This time, the Islamist party is banned from participating in elections. The president’s administration has conducted a far-reaching crackdown against the Freedom and Justice Party while simultaneously combating a rising insurgency along the Nile Valley and an entrenched Islamic State-affiliated militant presence in the Sinai Peninsula. In the face of such security threats, the Egyptian government needs a legislative body that can insulate the president from upcoming difficulties. But it must also be able to make necessary decisions regarding reform, security operations and the country’s political and economic profile. The economic aspect is especially important because Egypt is trying to meet the demands of financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and strategic backers such as the United States.

Islamist political forces, however, are not al-Sisi’s only concern. The years since the initial 2011 uprising against President Hosni Mubarak have not been easy for many Egyptians. Partially to blame for the general public’s current apathy and election fatigue is the fact that ordinary Egyptians have little confidence a future legislature will faithfully represent the public interest. Any parliament, they believe, will likely support the administration and its military backers. Many civil society groups and nongovernmental organizations fear that a parliament made up of former military and security figures, businessmen and pro-government forces will not be able to exercise sufficient oversight of the al-Sisi government.

The Need for Reform

Despite low voter turnout, the elections are significant in that the future legislature will have the ability to amend the constitution. Parliament has, among other powers, the ability to approve or dismiss the president’s selection for prime minister, withdraw confidence from the Cabinet and even impeach the president. It can also retroactively review the nearly 300 laws al-Sisi and his Cabinet have approved since the old legislature was dissolved in 2013. But a relatively pro-government legislature may refrain from exercising those prerogatives. Indeed, this is precisely the kind of parliament the al-Sisi government is hoping for: one that will willingly vote to reduce its own powers and largely lend support to government initiatives.

While trying to keep the legislature in check, al-Sisi will be watching carefully for dissent among his own supporters. The president’s struggling anti-insurgency campaign, Libya’s instability and Egypt’s tense relationship with the United States have all sown dissatisfaction and dissent in certain factions among the ruling elite. Similarly, Egypt’s lavish pension schemes — which are partially responsible for its vast military and the cohesiveness of its state bureaucracy — are becoming too expensive. The country’s industrialist class and the economic elite are competing for the state’s finite resources.

While the government is projecting the image of a stable and united administration, al-Sisi’s popularity is not absolute. Members of the military or security apparatus were allegedly behind the release earlier this year of several embarrassing recordings of the president speaking about international leaders, including the royal families of the Persian Gulf. The president is keen to drum up public support for the election, if only to push back against simmering opposition to his authority.

Egypt’s economic constraints will make it especially difficult for Cairo to follow its imperative of lessening financial and energy aid from outside powers, mainly long-term rivals in the Persian Gulf — the Gulf Cooperation Council. Following the onset of its own political and economic instability, Egypt has accepted GCC deposits, grants and oil shipments to manage its deficit spending. But in return for relieving Egypt’s economic stress, Gulf leaders such as Saudi Arabia expect Cairo to fall in line with their foreign policy priorities, such as committing forces to the fight in Yemen and providing support for Sunni rebels in Syria. But Egypt has little interest in Yemen. It would much rather redirect the GCC’s focus to Libya, where many of its own security problems originate. Moreover, Egypt has no tolerance for political Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood and is strongly opposed to facilitating a rebellion that has the potential to put Islamists in power in Damascus. The al-Sisi government has come out quite publicly endorsing Russia’s military reinforcement of the loyalists in Syria.

Until now, al-Sisi and his Cabinet have enjoyed relatively direct rule without legislative oversight, and upcoming elections are not likely to introduce much change. Based on Egyptian opinion polls and apathetic public sentiment, the new legislature will lack strong opposition groups that can check the president’s power. For now, al-Sisi’s direct control over policy will remain largely intact.

However, the more pressing challenge for the president will come not from the new parliament, but from among the political elite. Tensions within the ruling establishment may delay policies or exacerbate existing dissatisfaction among the general public. And as long as opposition constrains al-Sisi’s ability to enact much-needed structural reforms, the president will find it more difficult to restore Egypt’s economic independence and thereby reduce Egyptian dependence on the GCC for aid.

Bangladesh executed two opposition leaders for war crimes committed during the 1971 war to break away from Pakistan, a senior police official said Nov. 22, Reuters reported. Ali Ahsan Mohammad Mujahid, an Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami party leader, and Salauddin Quader Chowdhury, a former Bangladesh Nationalist Party member, were hanged at Dhaka’s central jail shortly after President Abdul Hamid rejected their appeals late Nov. 21 for clemency. The Border Guard Bangladesh paramilitary force has been deployed across the country to tighten security amid concerns of unrest following the execution.

Capital punishment in Bangladesh is a legal form of punishment for anyone over the age of 16, but in practice is not applied to those under 18.

The death penalty may be used as a punishment for crimes such as murder, sedition, offences related to possession of or trafficking in drugs, offences related to trafficking in human beings, treason, espionage, military crimes, rape, hijacking planes, sabotage, or terrorism. It is carried out by hanging and firing squad, although the latter method has been contested since 1998.

There are over 1,000 people reported to be on death row. In November 2013, Dhaka Metropolitan Sessions Court sentenced 152 people to death for their role in the 2009 Bangladesh Rifles revolt.

Summary

Argentina is preparing to choose a new president, and the Kirchner-Fernandez clan’s 12-year rule is coming to an end. Argentines will head to the polls Nov. 22 in a vote that will pit the ruling Front for Victory’s Daniel Scioli against the more conservative Cambiemos coalition’s Mauricio Macri. Results from the first voting round, which was held Oct. 25, showed Scioli holding a three-point lead in the race.

Regardless of who wins, though, the next administration will bring with it some important economic and political changes. The new president will face the challenging tasks of reducing Argentina’s subsidy burden, encouraging foreign direct investment and negotiating renewed access to foreign credit markets. He will also face a sharply divided lower house of Congress, where intense political battles will be commonplace as Argentine parties vie for the votes they need to pass or block legislation.

Analysis

Results aside, the approaching presidential election could bring with it several benefits for the private firms operating in Argentina. The next administration will likely refrain from expropriations of private assets, which were a hallmark of former presidents Nestor Kirchner and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner. Macri has also promised to repeal the country’s supply law, which gives the government greater oversight of the private sector and strengthens price controls on goods sold in the country.

But Argentina’s primary challenges in the coming years will be economic. Many of the factors that have complicated the country’s finances and politics in the past few years will remain in place well into the next presidential term. First, Brazil’s slowing economy, combined with Argentina’s protectionist trade barriers, is steadily eroding bilateral trade. (Argentine exports to Brazil, its largest trading partner, declined by about 27 percent between 2013 and 2014 and are expected to drop further this year.) Brazil’s economy, which is expected to contract by about 3 percent in 2015, is set to see only sluggish growth for the next few years, meaning that Argentina will have to look elsewhere to make up for fewer trade opportunities with Brazil. But even this will be difficult, since Argentina is geographically isolated and uncompetitive in the market for manufacturing exports.

Second, Argentina lacks the financial resources to significantly open its domestic market to private sector imports in the near future. Capital flight, high levels of public spending and falling investment and exports have steadily depleted the country’s foreign currency reserves. Though projected to rise slightly thanks to next year’s soybean and grain exports, Argentina’s stock of foreign currency (currently at about $26.1 billion) will not rebound enough to solve the country’s financial woes. So while the next president may try to loosen some of the restrictions on imports and the disbursement of foreign currency to importers, Argentina will not be able to reverse its protectionist stance overnight, and the country’s depleted currency stocks will continue to be an issue.

Argentina will also have to grapple with a federal deficit of at least 3.5 percent of gross domestic product, if not higher, as well as high inflation caused by rapid monetary expansion. The next administration could try to rein in spending in an attempt to cut inflation, but it would likely encounter resistance from some of its constituencies. Similarly, efforts to repeal price freezes and remove energy subsidies could create political blowback, especially in legislative elections set for 2017. The elections, which will decide half of the 257 seats in the lower house of the Argentine Congress, will be of crucial concern for the incoming president, who will have to deal with an almost evenly split legislature for the first two years of his tenure. Since the Front for Victory holds 109 seats and Cambiemos holds 92, both sides will have to negotiate with Argentina’s smaller political blocs to achieve a simple majority. This process will likely spur an intense competition for votes in the lower house for at least the first half of the next president’s term.

Argentina’s growing financial concerns will encourage the future administration to negotiate with its foreign creditors, especially the holdouts that have demanded the repayment of more than $1.3 billion in debt left over from the country’s 2001 default. The dispute plunged Argentina back into default in 2014, which has hampered its ability to borrow abroad ever since. Finding a solution to the current impasse would change that, but negotiations could also open the country up to even bigger debt payments, as could an October ruling by a U.S. federal court that other bondholders could seek payment of the roughly $7.4 billion in Argentine bonds that have been in legal limbo since 2001. Though Fernandez took a tough stance with these bondholders as part of her political platform, her two potential successors have not. This fact, coupled with the country’s dire financial situation, make it more likely that the next government will pursue talks with Argentina’s creditors.

The Nov. 22 election will bring Argentina a new leader, but the country’s underlying political and economic problems will stay the same. So although some business-friendly changes and moves to open up the economy can be expected from the next administration, which will undoubtedly be hungry for cash, it is unlikely that we will see any drastic changes in how Argentina’s economy interacts with the rest of the world.