Young Diplomats

It goes without saying that the regional security outlook invariably suggest that a nation shall always re-consider its approach or strategy for its own survival, especially on its foreign policy and defence conducts. This is by no means but to keep it fresh, anew and importantly to ensure its conducts are always in line with the dynamic international surrounding.

The reason why it is important to secure peace and stability in the region is because a stable regional outlook would mean a flourish economy too. This is indeed a crucial ingredient of country’s survival in the course of the world. A stable region would see countries prosper and enjoy peace dividend.

Speaking of which, what is the Asia-Pacific region security outlooks? In this article, I have listed down four major security issues that the Asian countries need to contend with.

(i) North Korea’s nuclearisation;

(ii) Territorial and maritime disputes;

(iii) China’s economic and political rise, and;

(iv) IS-threat.

Not necessarily the above-mentioned follows the order of importance, but all of these suggest a turbulent and uncharted water of international environment is the backdrop of the Asian countries.

First, the North Korea’s nuclearisation development issue. On July 4 2017, Pyongyang announced that it had launched an inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) which flew off 2,802 kilometres and landed in waters within Japan’s exclusive economic zone, in its latest bid of nuclear advancement. This suggests that over time, the nuclearisation development in the hermit country has been progressed exponentially. Though the world is looking at China to rein in Kim Jong Un’s regime because the former is the sole economic source of North Korea, however Beijing appears cautious in its approach with the regime.

On the US’ role, on the one hand, with the recent concluded G20 meeting last weekend, even though President Trump had a the window of opportunity to meet North Korea’s prominent nemesis, namely leaders from Japan, China and South Korea, but no joint-statement condemning North Korea coming into reality. This by no means hardens the efforts to put more sanctions and pressure to hermit country. Even though the Sino-US major power relations have come on the same page, mostly on the nuclear threat, but the major powers still yet to find an effective strategy to halt the Kim Jong Un’s missile ambition.

As the issue of nuclear development in the Korean peninsula deescalates, other nations in the vicinity, particularly the Southeast Asian countries, have other issue to contend with too.

The issue is the second point of the article – the territorial and maritime disputes issue. The Southeast Asian countries need to deal with the militarised artificial islands that China has built in recent years in the South China Sea. Except that the CoC (Code of Conduct) is yet to be finalised this year, from the year of 2002 no less – which aims to set the ground-rules of how the states involve should conduct themselves in the event of unintended counter, unfortunately, is likely to favor more to the Chinese. Why? The reason being is the economic lure, no doubt. Following the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Forum that just concluded in May, many countries have enjoyed the lucrative economic injection from the second world economic powerhouse – China, and may have, in some parts, explain their foreign policy and defence conducts on the South China Sea issue.

With the intensified militarisation development in the artificial islands across the South China Sea, it gives the Chinese a huge leverage to control one of the busiest sea lanes in the world and surely strengthens Beijing’s control in its own backyard.

Whilst the Southeast Asian countries would meet again in their own annual summit later this year – East Asia Summit and ASEAN Regional Forum, which sees participation from major powers too (including the Chinese, amongst others), no doubt the possibility for the contradict opinions vis-a-vis South China Sea dispute amongst the ASEAN states would come into play, thanks to the influence of the major powers.

On the one hand, this might not be the same case with the East China Sea dispute (China and Japan assert claims over Senkaku/Diaoyu islands). Even though the tension started as early as 1970s, the East China Sea dispute is still looming nowadays and yet to resolve, following both countries’ claims are never to give in. However, if we were to compare to China’s strategy with the ASEAN states on the South China Sea dispute, Japan, on the contrary, is economically self-independent from China. It depends less on the latter on economic terms, which then makes the sun rising country’s approach with Beijing a little different from the ASEAN countries. Also, given the consideration that Japan is enjoying the US’ military assurance in its soil, partly countering the Chinese hegemony whilst mainly counterbalancing the North Korea’s threat – it suggests that the Japanese are pulling its balancing act amidst the China’s assertiveness.

Thirdly, on the China’s rise. On economical term, China comes second after the US and according to a new study by PriceWaterHouse Coppers, it forecasts China’s economy will surpass the US before 2030. Whilst on military spending, though China is second after the US, its relative percentage and amount’s gap is filling in. Furthermore, China’s influence across Asia, currently, is gigantic. China has come out with its grandiose planning for the world – Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and often speak on behalf of other Asian countries, for instance Asian is for Asian – these all mean that of major power playbook. Following Beijing’s rise in economic and political-security terms, it is undeniable fact that China is weighing in for an important role in international spectrum.

However, the concern now is on China’s rise of which its engagement with other countries is the definition of its behavior. Though clouded with promising economic injection, China’s tendency to set the rules which tantamount to the might makes it right is the recent approach of China’s nowadays.

Last but not least, the IS-threat in the region especially when it is now evidently visible in the Marawi province, the Philippines. The fact remains that undoubtedly, the IS is bidding to gain foothold in the region. Though prior to this it was just a local terrorist individual/group, it seems now the group have subscribed to the ideology of ISIS. This then gives a disturbing prospect that the Asia-Pacific is now in Daesh’s cross-hairs. Whilst the Philippines is fighting hard in its soil, other nations too shouldn’t sit idly by from the IS threat.

Definitely, these four major security issues is the reflection of Asia’s security outlooks. However, the degrees to which all four issues are addressed, however, remain in line with domestic political will of the Asian countries and most importantly, are a crucial factor in determining the peace and stable regional outlooks in coming years.

 Update : About the Author : The author required to remain anonymous

It is often seen in the media, how protests in defense of immigrants’ rights and especially of their place in the host countries  have been characterized by banners that emphasize how much value they add to the society, how they ‘get the job done’ or how they ‘do the jobs no one else wants to do.’

There is no doubt that what happens often in a country that hosts immigrants, is that they end up becoming  the part of the society that has to work harder to provide for themselves and their families. However, in the eyes of the local people, immigrants tend to become reduced to only their function in the society and how useful they are. It is unusual to hear them being portrayed as more than that, as human beings that don’t differ much from the local people and do the same things as they do. Immigrants become ‘othered’ in the society; it is them vs the ‘hosts’.

It is important to say it loud and clear that immigrants are not instruments to better your society and their worth is not determined by how much they work or if they bring any substantial change to the community they are part of.

To the people that complain about the flood of immigrants in their countries, I would say this: immigrants are  human beings who have left their homes because they were forced by some risky circumstances or lack of economic opportunities. They are not in your country to ‘steal your job’ or ‘invade your country’. Nobody would willingly stay in a society in which they are oppressed and have to prove themselves all the time just because the color of their skin isn’t ‘the right one’, or because their accent is ‘too strong’ to fit the accent of the Native speakers.

They get the job done, especially the job that you don’t want. And when they get the job that YOU want, they have to fight against all the prejudices and the systemic oppression they have on a daily basis and even end up being underpaid due to their legal status. They suffer and earn it.

If you are a supporter of immigrants but emphasize the whole ‘immigrants are hardworking’ rhetoric, you are wrong too. ‘Immigrant’ is just a legal name and doesn’t define a person. The individual you call an ‘immigrant’, it is a human being first, just like you. And just like you, they face the same personal problems.

Not all immigrants are very hardworking, and that’s fine. Not all immigrants are stable and strong. Some of them face mental health issues and deal with trauma. Some of them have to deal with their own concerns. As soon as the ‘hardworking immigrant’ narrative starts to fade, many turn their backs on them. Suddenly, they don’t ‘deserve’ their place in that society anymore. Suddenly, they have to go where they came back from. Unfortunately, immigrants are important to you because of the benefits they bring to your community.

There is a simple thing you should do : Consider them as you would consider yourself. Don’t other them. Don’t categorize them. Don’t diminish them to one thing only. Don’t make them objects, don’t use them for your ‘so-called activism’. Support and help them because they are humans not because they are immigrants. Don’t ever pity them, because that’s the worst you could do for them. They don’t need you to feel sorry for them. What they need is solidarity, unconditional solidarity.

About the Author :

 Rina Cakrani is a graduate of the United World College of the Adriatic and is currently studying Politics and Spanish at Whitman College in Washington. She has a keen interest in international relations and affairs and is also very passionate about writing.

Part 2 : This policy paper suggests a two-fold strategy for the Russian Federation over Nagorno Karabakh, one for the short-term, another one for the long-term.

In the short-run, a “wait and see” policy maintaining the “frozen” status quo is necessary because at the moment it is impossible to assess the future geopolitical situation given the election of Donald Trump as the new President of the United States. On the other hand, the Russian Federation needs a long-term policy to settle the issue definitively, because this conflict is inherently unstable. A full-fledged war in Nagorno Karabakh would be a threat not only for the stability in the South Caucasus, but also for the stability of the Russian Federation.

Long-term policy: settle the conflict in Nagorno Karabakh definitively

The most important issue in the long-term will be how Russia can maintain its leverage on both Armenia and Azerbaijan once that Nagorno Karabakh dispute will be settled. This means that Russia should avoid that other countries, in particular Turkey and USA increase their influence in the region. The current situation in the international arena offers a window of opportunity for Russia to settle the conflict under circumstances favourable to Russia.

In last April, Nagorno Karabakh witnessed the worst skirmishes between Azerbaijan and Armenia since the ceasefire was signed in 1994. The international scenario looked very different at that moment:

• Russia-Turkey relation had worsened because of the incident with the Russian Su-24 jet in September 2015.
• Russia relations with the US and EU were weak due to the economic sanctions imposed after the Ukrainian crisis.

Since then, the circumstances concerning Russia’s relations with the two major “rivals” in the Caucasus region – Turkey and the USA – have dramatically changed:

Turkey now has an interest in improving relations with Russia for the following reasons:

• The current deterioration of relations with EU undermines Turkey’s hope and will for an accession to the European Union. On the contrary, Ankara might consider joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation given the growing importance of Eurasia for this country.
• In the ongoing war in Syria, Turkey needs support to limit Kurds’ expansion in Syria. Russia could be the only ally in this sense, given that PKK and YPG has been supported by USA over the last years.

Speaking about the USA, there are several reasons that could make Russia hopeful about a drop in Washington’s interest in the South Caucasus region.

• Trump’s election in the USA could encourage a détente in the relations with the US and possibly with EU, too. Indeed, the president-elect declared: “We desire to live peacefully and in friendship with Russia and China. We should seek common ground based on shared interests”.[1]
• . Trump’s probable focus on domestic issues rather than on external one.
• It seems that Trump is more interested in the relationship with the major powers rather than with minor ones.
• Trump’s will to develop United States’ shale oil industry could lessen Washington’s interest in South Caucasus’ resources

.

This more peaceful and comfortable international scenario will increase Russia’s capability to settle this conflict without risking to lose its own influence on these territories. Consequently, the Russian Federation should pursue the following policies:

1. Russia should become a direct mediator between the two countries. 

Russia should, as soon as possible, initiate new negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The Russian government should try to restore confidence in the Madrid Principle as a useful starting point for a final settlement of the conflict.

2. Resolve the issue of Nagorno Karabakh’s status: autonomous, but not independent

The future status of Nagorno Karabakh is the first problem that needs to be addressed. Indeed, it will not be possible to settle the conflict until this issue will be resolved.

The Madrid Principles already provided for a referendum. The task of this plebiscite would have been “allowing the free and genuine expression of the will of the population of NK”. However, the independence of Nagorno will not be easily accepted by Azerbaijan, which has already declared that the status of Nagorno is not a topic of discussion. Furthermore, such a secession would violate several UNSC’s resolutions, which have recognized the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and moreover could be also a dangerous precedent for autonomous regions in Russia itself.

However, a more comfortable solution could be found. To this end, I am suggesting: A more autonomous, but not independent Nagorno Karabakh.  That way, it will still be a region of Azerbaijan, but it will have a stronger degree of autonomy, a solution that could fit both States.

3. Lachin corridor demilitarised and under international control.

The issue of Lachin corridor has been one of the most important problems in the settlement of the conflict. Demilitarisation and international control will be important in order to stabilise this piece of land and in order to secure the access to this territory to everyone.

At the same time, Russia should try to improve economic and political ties between these two States, because it could be a useful mean to make Armenia and Azerbaijan more willing to cooperate.

1. Russia should encourage Azerbaijan to become a member of Eurasian Economic Union.

Strengthening economic ties between Armenia and Azerbaijan through mutual membership in the EEU can be an important tool to prevent a future war between them. Indeed, close economic ties reduce the risk of the break out of war in the future.

A way to convince Baku to become a member of this organisation is to make it more appealing. Indeed, until now Eurasian Union has not worked as well as it possibly could. The Russian Federation should work to broaden Eurasian Union membership, as a wider Eurasian Union could increase its own appeal as a major trade area. However, Eurasian Union should remain just a free trade association, due to the fact that political integration could discourage Azerbaijan from becoming a member of Eurasian Union, given the membership of Armenia.

To convince Azerbaijan to become a member of Eurasian Union, Russian Federation should also use some leverage such as the possible denial of access to Russian oil resource if Azerbaijan refused to become a member of the Union.

2. Russian Federation should also encourage Azerbaijan’s return in CSTO.

Indeed, the participation of Azerbaijan and Armenia in a military alliance will reduce drastically the possibility that conflict could break out anew once it had been settled. However, this could be consider as a long-standing policy. Indeed, it will not be a viable option until the conflict will not be resolved. Nevertheless, it could be important just once the conflict has been solved to try to establish also a military relation within the two countries.

3. Russia should make sure that Armenia remains a member of these organisation.

To avoid an Armenian withdrawal from these organisations, Russian Federation must use the influence that it has upon Yerevan, amongst others by threatening the Armenian government to withdraw Russian support if necessary.

However, it will be impossible to definitively resolve the conflict if the historical rivalry will not be reduced. The best way to achieve such a result will be to strengthen political and economic ties between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Membership of Azerbaijan in the Eurasian Union and CSTO might be possible solutions to achieve this result.

By enacting all this proposed measures, Russia should be able to settle this dangerous conflict, whose perseverance is a risk for the stability of the Russian Southern border.  Moreover, if Russia will be the only mediator, the resolution of the conflict will not lead towards a loosening of Russian influence in the South Caucasus, but on the contrary Russia will maintain high leverage on both Armenia and Azerbaijan, but working in a peaceful context.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

168 hours news and analysis (2016), Status Quo in Karabakh is not Acceptable, it’s Necessary to Withdraw Armenian troops: Aliyev, https://en.168.am/2016/06/20/8098.html, [25/11/2016]

Averko, Michael (2016), Settling Nagorno-Karabakh And Reviewing The Peripheral Talking Points – Analysis, http://www.eurasiareview.com/16042016-settling-nagorno-karabakh-and-reviewing-the-peripheral-talking-points-analysis, [27/11/2016]

Altstadt, Audrey and Menon, Rajan (2016), Unfrozen conflict in Nagorno Karabakh: why violence persists?,  https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/armenia/2016-04-12/unfrozen-conflict-nagorno-karabakh, [25/11/2016

Bystritskiy, Andrey (2016), Nagorno-Karabakh: ups and downs, http://valdaiclub.com/about/speech/nagorno-karabakh-ups-and-downs/, [25/11/2016]

Grono, Magdalena (2016), What’s Behind the Flare-up in Nagorno-Karabakh?, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/nagorno-karabakh-azerbaijan/what-s-behind-flare-nagorno-karabakh, [25/11/2016]

Cucciolla, Riccardo Mario (2016), Nagorno-Karabakh la guerra fredda che conviene quasi a tutti,  http://www.limesonline.com/nagorno-karabakh-la-guerra-fredda-che-conviene-quasi-a-tutti/91005?prv=true, [27/11/2016]

De Bonis, Mauro (2016), Putin-Erdogan andata e ritorno, http://www.limesonline.com/cartaceo/putin-erdogan-andata-e-ritorno?prv=true, [28/11/2016]

De Sanctis, Alberto (2016), La Russia arma l’Armenia, http://www.limesonline.com/iskander-russia-armenia-referendum-ticino-bosnia-erzegovina-boko-haram-siria-aleppo-notizie-mondo-oggi/94344, [24/11/2016]

De Waal Thomas (2016), Solve the Nagorno Karabakh conflict before it explodes, http://carnegieeurope.eu/2016/04/07/solve-nagorno-karabakh-conflict-before-it-explodes-pub-63271,  [25/11/2016]

Dermenijan, Alyss (2016), Time to get rid of Madrid Principles, http://armenianweekly.com/2016/08/10/time-to-get-rid-of-the-madrid-principles/, [25/11/2016]

Elkhan, Nuryiev (2016), How Russia could succeed in Nagorno, http://www.russia-direct.org/opinion/how-putin-can-succeed-nagorno-karabakh, [27/11/2016]

Fenenko, Alexey (2016), Three ways for peaceful resolution of Nagorno Karabakh conflict, http://www.russia-direct.org/opinion/three-ways-peaceful-resolution-nagorno-karabakh-conflict, [24/11/2016

International Crisis Group (2016), report n.239, Nagorno-Karabakh: New Opening, or More Peril?, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/azerbaijan/nagorno-karabakh-new-opening-or-more-peril, [26/11/2016]]

Mammadov, Farhad, Minaysyan, Sergey, Sushentov, Andrey (2016), When will Nagorno Karabakh stop being a front line?, http://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/when-will-nagorno-karabakh-stop-being-a-frontline/, [27/11/2016]

Markedonov, Sergei (2016), Nagorno Karabakh: resolving a complicated puzzle, http://www.russia-direct.org/opinion/nagorno-karabakh-resolving-complicated-puzzle, [25/11/2016]

OSCE Minsk Group agreement on Nagorno Karabakh, Madrid, 27/11/2009.

Paolini, Margherita (2016), Trump vuole l’indipendenza energetica per rifare grande l’America, http://www.limesonline.com/trump-vuole-lindipendenza-energetica-per-rifare-grande-lamerica/95474?prv=true&refresh_ce, [27/11/2016]

Santoro, Daniele (2016), Perché la Turchia ha bisogno della Russia, http://www.limesonline.com/cartaceo/perche-la-turchia-ha-bisogno-della-russia?prv=true, [28/11/2016]

Scapini, Bruno (2016), Nagorno-Karabakh: una doppia analisi,  http://www.occhidellaguerra.it/nagorno-karabakh-la-versione-armena/,  [28/11/2016]

Sushentov, Andrey (2016), Status in Nagorno Karabakh its detrimental to Russia and its allies, http://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/status-quo-in-nagorno-karabakh-conflict-is-detrimental/, [27/11/2016]

United Nations Security Council Resolution of the 12/11/1993 n.884

United Nations Security Council Resolution 30/4/1993 n. 822

[1] Donald J Trump, Trump on Foreign Policy, The National Interest, 27/4/2016.

The current race for control of territory in Syria now appears to be a competition between Iran and the United States, which have established two respective axes – with a vertical American (north-south) effort on the one hand, and a horizontal Iranian (east-west) effort on the other hand. In practice, this is another stage in the shaping of Syria in preparation for the day after the Islamic State. In the meantime, the country’s southwestern region, from Daraa to the Golan Heights, remains open for activity and influence by Israel and Jordan, which must begin taking action before it is too late.

Contacts are apparently underway to formulate a joint Israeli-Jordanian-American strategy aimed at preventing Iranian influence and the presence of its proxies, especially Hezbollah and Shiite militias, in the southern Syria.

Increasing signs are pointing to the impending fall of the Islamic State in Syria, which has suffered a series of defeats in recent months. The territory in eastern Syria that will be freed of Islamic State control now constitutes a focus of the major struggle between the United States and Iran in Syria, as both are striving to seize the area.

Early June marked the onset of the final phase of the US-led coalition’s offensive to conquer the city of Raqqa, the capital of the Islamic State in Syria, with a combined Kurdish-Arab (though predominantly Kurdish) ground force – the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – and air support provided by the international coalition, including the  United States, other Western countries, and Arab states. At the same time, Iran and its proxies have also started intensifying efforts aimed at shaping Syria the day after the fall of the Islamic State. Forces of the pro-Assad coalition are currently trying to expand their control in the Deir ez-Zor region and improve their access to Raqqa and the surrounding area, and also seize key positions along the Syrian-Iraqi border.

A Collision between the Two Axes of Influence  

The race to shape the Syrian arena, which is currently focused on the campaign to conquer Raqqa and defeat the Islamic State, encompasses two main strategic efforts. One, led by Iran, aims at laying the foundation for a Shiite axis land bridge from Iran in the east, via Iraq, to Syria and Lebanon in the west. Its primary mode of operation is the seizure, by Iranian proxies, of major points of passage between Iraq and Syria – with Iraqi Shiite militias (al-Hashd al-Sha’abi  the People’s Mobilization Forces) on the Iraqi side of the border and forces of the pro-Assad coalition, including the remnants of the Syrian army under the authority of Bashar al-Assad, Hezbollah, and Shiite militias on the Syrian side of the border. According to Ali Akbar Velayati, an advisor to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, “a relationship has been forged between the popular forces, the forces of the Iraqi government and military, and the unified forces in Syria. In practice, this is a strategic victory for Iran’s allies and for the ring of resistance to Zionism that begins in Tehran and reaches Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.”

In a rival strategic effort, the US-led coalition has been operating to create a wedge running north-south to sever the Iranian land bridge and cut off Iranian influence in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and west of the Persian Gulf. This effort is aimed at creating a buffer zone-security strip controlled by US allies, extending from Turkey in the north, via eastern Syria, southward to Jordan and to Saudi Arabia. Over the past weeks, a number of attacks have been carried out by US air forces against forces of the pro-Assad coalition along the southeastern segment of the Syrian-Iraqi border, in the region of the Syrian city of al-Tanf, located near the tripartite border between Jordan-Syria-Iraq. The United States has declared this area to be a “de-confliction” zone under its influence and will therefore not allow the deployment of forces belonging to Assad or to Iranian proxies in the region. On June 18, a Syrian fighter plane was shot down in the Raqqa region of eastern Syria as part of the air cover that the United States is providing to the Syrian Democratic Forces fighting to liberate Raqqa.

Iranian parties have explained that the deployment of forces loyal to Iran along the Iraqi-Syrian-Jordanian border is meant to thwart the US plan to divide Syria. According to the Iranians, the United States seeks to link the northeastern part of Syria that is under Kurdish control to the southeastern section of the country, up to the Jordanian border, and has therefore increased its activities and attacks in the Tanf region. The voices from Iran indicate that their forces aim: (a) to defend Iran’s dominance in Iraq, the survival of the Assad regime, and Iranian strategic depth by means of a land corridor from Tehran to Beirut; (b) to destroy the Islamic State along the Syrian-Iraqi border; (c) to neutralize the US plan to dismantle Syria; and (d) to prevent US-supported forces from establishing control over eastern Syria. It is therefore no coincidence that Iran chose to respond to the Islamic State attack in Tehran by launching six surface-to-surface missiles from Iranian territory at an Islamic State target in the Deir ez-Zor region of eastern Syria. In doing so, it demonstrated its potential in the field of ballistic missiles and leveraged its message that it is at war with the Islamic State and is unafraid of operating in a sector in which the United States is working to establish its influence.

Russia’s position in this context is not entirely clear. On the one hand, both the Assad regime and sources in Moscow report that Russia is a partner in the Assad regime’s efforts in eastern Syria, aided by Iran and Hezbollah, to derail the American plan. On May 8, the Syrian newspaper al-Watan, which has close relations with the regime, reported that “massive reinforcements of Syrian and Russian military forces have arrived in the Syrian desert, in addition to the forces of friends, in preparation for an operation to take control of Deir ez-Zor and the Iraqi border.” At the same time, there have been reports of coordination efforts in Jordan between US and Russian representatives. There have also been reports that Russia is working to prevent friction between forces of the Syrian regime and its allies and US forces, and strives to reach understandings with the United States and Jordan regarding a de-confliction zone, a de-escalation zone, and mutual attacks in southern Syria. In response to the intercepting of the Syrian plane in the Deir ez-Zor region, Russia announced that “all aircraft, manned and unmanned, of the international coalition operating west of the Euphrates River, will be identified as targets by Russian air defense systems,” appearing to create a Russian-controlled no-fly zone west of the Euphrates.

As part of the struggle for control of southeastern Syria, the United States has deployed two HIMARS multiple launch rocket batteries to the American special forces base near al-Tanf. In response, the Russian Defense Ministry stated that every entry of a foreign weapon system into Syria requires authorization by the central government in Damascus, and that the deployment indicates that the United States is not focused on fighting the Islamic State as its claims to be. The United States was then charged with failing to prevent Islamic State fighters from fleeing Raqqa toward Deir ez-Zor.

The pro-Assad coalition led by Russia and Iran appears to be following the American activity in southern and eastern Syria with great concern. In addition to the establishment of a special security zone north of the Jordanian-Syrian border and attacks on forces supporting the Assad regime, this activity has included use of a training infrastructure for forces of the Syrian opposition, the deployment of US special forces reinforced by artillery support, and an air umbrella provided by the Western coalition. From an Iranian perspective, and perhaps also from a Russian point of view, this marks a new phase in the US campaign to shape Syria in preparation for the day after the Islamic State, which is aimed at neutralizing the Iranian presence and influence in Syria.

The Potential for Escalation between the US and Iran in Syria and Iraq

The Trump administration includes elements that are extremely hostile to Iran and are pushing to expand the war in Syria as an opportunity to clash with Iran on a “comfortable” playing field. These elements have apparently suggested the idea of establishing an American-dominated north-to south running strip through eastern Syria with the aim of blocking and containing Iran’s regional aspirations. At the same time, Secretary of State James Mattis and US military leaders oppose the opening of a broad front against Iran and its proxies in Syria and regard it as endangering the capacity for a focused effort to advance the primary goal: the dismantling and defeat of the Islamic State. Therefore, at least at this stage, the US military leadership is seeking to avoid friction with the Iranians and Russians.

In the meantime, Iran is resolutely striving to progress toward its goals – i.e., more than other actors in the Middle East. It is checking the limits of US intervention, without any capacity to estimate the intensity of the United States commitment in the race to achieve control over eastern Syria. As a result, there is currently a potential for US-Iranian escalation in Syria that could spread to Iraq – either intentionally or as a result of miscalculated assessments.

Conclusion

The current race for control of territory in Syria now appears to be a competition between Iran and the United States, which have established two respective axes –with a vertical American (north-south) effort on the one hand, and a horizontal Iranian (east-west) effort on the other hand. In practice, this is another stage in the shaping of Syria in preparation for the day after the Islamic State. Thus far, the Syrian arena could be viewed as a game board with multiple squares, with the move of pieces in each square having an impact on the state of affairs in the others. First, Russia set up its pieces on the board’s central-western sector, between Aleppo and Damascus, including the coastal region. Turkey followed suit, arranging its forces in the board’s northern sector along the Syrian-Turkish border, including an effort to safeguard its interests in the Kurdish region. The United States focused its warfare against the Islamic State primarily in northeastern Syria, and is now trying to reorganize its pieces in the southeastern square of the Syria game board.

As a result, the country’s southwestern region, from Daraa to the Golan Heights, remains open for activity and influence by Israel and Jordan, which must begin taking action before it is too late. Contacts are apparently underway to formulate a joint Israeli-Jordanian-American strategy aimed at preventing Iranian influence and the presence of its proxies, especially Hezbollah and Shiite militias, in the southern square of the Syrian game board. Israel and Jordan must also prepare themselves for the possibility that Islamic State fighters fleeing northeastern Syria could move southward and link up with the Islamic State branch at the border in the Golan Heights. Moreover, Israel must not forget Russia’s influence in Syria and the need to reach understandings with Moscow, at least on a clandestine level, regarding every move in this direction. Syria may have understood as much, which would explain the increased intensity of the pro-Assad coalition’s attacks in the Daraa region over the past few weeks, primarily from the air. Still, Russia understands that Israel possess the capacity to cause significant damage in Syria, and therefore prefers to maintain understandings with Israel and take Israel’s concerns seriously.

This article was previously published in the excellent INSS website : http://www.inss.org.il/publication/east-west-north-south-race-syria-islamic-state/ 

Little did Gambians know that the 22-year brutal rule they had gone through under former tyrant Yahya Jammeh would come to an abrupt end in the December 1, 2016 presidential election.

The tiny West African nation of roughly 1.8 million people had endured forced disappearances, torture, extra-judicial killings, unlawful detentions and wanton dismissal of senior government officials, just to name a few.

The regime has literally muzzled the independent media, hence dissenting views were not entertained at all, forcing the crème of the country’s media practitioners into exile, including the current Minister of Information and Communications Infrastructure Demba Jawo

. Gambians had seemed to have resigned to their fate until April 14, 2016 when a group of political activists took to the streets on a rare peaceful protest to demand electoral reforms given that the existing ones were crafted and meant to ensure the perpetuation of the former ruling Alliance for Patriotic Re-orientation and Construction (APRC) regime at all costs.

The amendments on the electoral reforms by the rubber-stamp APRC dominated Parliament have favored the regime, fueling frustration and constipation amongst opposition parties, chiefly the United Democratic Party, whose Youth Leader Solo Sandeng led the demonstration . The protest march was short-lived as it was mercilessly and violently crushed by the regime with the demonstrators rounded up and whisked away to the notorious and dreaded National Intelligence Agency where they have been severely tortured. Sandeng, the mastermind of the protest march, was tortured to death.

The incident did not go down well with the UDP whose leader Ousainou Darboe swiftly reacted to the news of the death of their comrade by taking to the streets with his top executive urging the authorities to release the body of Solo Sandeng dead or live. Darboe, who now serves as Foreign Minister, and co were immediately arrested and subjected to all forms of inhumane treatment at the hands of the security forces. They were eventually tried and sentenced to various jail terms.

These developments coupled with Jammeh’s unprovoked stream of invective against the majority Mandinka ethnic group have isolated the regime and gave rise to Gambia’s silent revolution with citizens starting to call for change, after they had always maintained silence for fear of maltreatment or revenge. Due to ex-president’s myopic and nonchalant attitude to the resurgence of the people, Jammeh was abysmally oblivious to an eminent downfall of the regime he had nurtured with an iron fist at the hands of the very opposition Jammeh has always besmirched as illegitimate. As such, Jammeh had the audacity to announce that he will not campaign for re-election suggesting that his development projects speak for themselves.

Watching the opposition embolden and support base grow, the ex-dictator has unceremoniously embarked on a nation-wide tour to canvass votes, hence reneging his own pledge to abstain from campaigning. However, it was already too late as the people had already decided to boot him out in the presidential election that was just few weeks away, particularly that the opposition had finally formed a Coalition and rallied behind their flag bearer Adama Barrow, a little-known figure who propelled to the apex of power due to the incarceration of the UDP top brass for he won the election.

To everyone’s surprise, Jammeh, who once thumped his chest that he would rule the country for one billion years, conceded defeat but a week later he made the infamous U-Turn, hence throwing the entire nation into an unprecedented political impasse. Jammeh’s attempt to cling to power was roundly condemned regionally and beyond which eventually forced him to yield on January 21 and fled to exile in Equatorial Guinea. Since his departure, Gambians have been relishing their new-found freedom.

The citizenry now express convergent and divergent political views without fear of reprisal.  The country has just successfully conducted parliamentary elections dubbed by local, regional and international observers as free, fair and transparent culminating the new democratic dispensation. Many Gambians are optimistic that the dawn of a new political dispensation in the country will be a boon for the nation in terms of progress and prosperity.  The Gambia is enjoying an unprecedented goodwill on the part of the international community with high profile dignitaries jetting in and out of Banjul with pledges of financial support for the new Administration in order to pursue its ambitious socio-economic development. Agenda.

In conclusion, African nations that are under dictatorships should draw crucial lessons from the smallest country on the Mainland Africa to effect positive change, as democracy increasingly takes root and shape in Mama Africa.

About the Author : Basidia Drammeh is a collaborator of Young Diplomats Africa.

The Israel Defense Forces recently completed a military exercise on the island of Cyprus. The exercise involved some 500 soldiers from the Commando Brigade, including the Egoz Unit (which specializes in operating on rough terrain, fieldcraft, camouflage, and counter-guerrilla warfare); teams of dog handling soldiers; combat engineering soldiers; and another 200 air force personnel. Reports indicated that the exercise included flying the forces from Israel’s Nevatim Air Base in C-130J Super Hercules aircraft, joining up with Black Hawk helicopters in Cyprus, and from there flying to an ongoing exercise in the Trodos Mountains. The soldiers practiced incursions, land and urban warfare, taking control of areas from which rockets are fired, and tunnel warfare. The reports also stated that IDF forces were joined in the exercise by 100 fighters from the special forces of the Cypriot National Guard.

For several years the IDF has carried out joint exercises with foreign armies in friendly countries, such as the Red Flag aerial training that takes place in the United States. Most of the participants and equipment used in these exercises are from the air and marine branches. In addition, the Israeli Air Force holds a series of joint training exercises with the Greek Air Force, which enable it to practice long range missions and capabilities when facing a system of Russian-made S-300 anti-aircraft missiles, such as possessed by the Syrian and Iranian armies.

Ground forces were first involved in this activity about 6 months ago, when the Maglan Unit, also part of the Commando Brigade, carried out a smaller training exercise on the Greek island of Crete. Press reports of the training in Cyprus provide a glimpse of the development of IDF training methods and the advantages of training in neighboring countries, in both military terms and strengthened regional ties.

One IDF commander told the press that the advantage of training on foreign territory was its unfamiliarity to all the solders and commanders. The commander of the Egoz elite unit said, “We landed deep in enemy territory and received our mission on the plane on the way to the destination. We had a range of enemy scenarios and many different type of terrain for fighting.” The Cypriot Air Force even deployed anti-aircraft systems to simulate a real threat to the IAF helicopters.

Although the commanders of the exercise did not refer to this specifically, the topographic outline of Cyprus is clearly similar to that of the Lebanese mountains. Training in unfamiliar territory, and particularly when it resembles areas beyond the border where the troops may well have to operate, is highly important. The training areas within Israel are very limited, which makes it very difficult to create an environment that meets the IDF needs for training ground fighting against Hezbollah in the north and Hamas and jihad organizations in the south. Landing by helicopter, maneuvering, navigating, and fighting in unfamiliar territory far from home create a significant challenge for the commanders and the troops, and an opportunity to develop campaign knowledge and fighting capabilities.

The decision to strengthen the commando element of the army reflects a further understanding. MK Ofer Shelah, a former Paratroopers company commander, describes the importance of incursions as a means of dealing with the current IDF threat references in his book, Dare to Win. In his view, “Building the IDF as an attacking, initiating force in the 1950s and the pattern of the IDF’s actions led over the years to the concept of the incursion. Contrary to automatic connotations, an incursion is not just a nighttime raid by a small force that returns home at dawn. Rather, it is the whole concept of operating the force in mobile actions of various sizes, in order to undermine the enemy and create a surprise, a sense of being chased and vulnerable, after which they go back over the border.”

Although there were no public statements to this effect, the exercise presumably created tension with Turkey, which chose to hold a training exercise for the Turkish Navy south of Paphos. In spite of the reconciliation agreement between Israel and Turkey signed in 2016, and the return of ambassadors to Ankara and Tel Aviv, Turkey continues to maintain close ties with Hamas. Turkey houses a headquarters of the Hamas military wing, which in 2014 was the element that instructed Hamas activists to kidnap and murder three teenagers in Gush Etzion, which ultimately led to the war in the Gaza Strip (Operation Protective Edge). Although the reconciliation agreement requires Turkey to prevent any terrorist or military activity against Israel from its territory, including fundraising, Ankara has failed to comply fully with this clause. The senior figure in the military wing, Saleh al-Arouri, has left the country, but military activists continue to operate against Israel from Turkish territory. The Erdogan government has ignored Israeli protests about this.

Israel’s cooperation with Cyprus is not limited to military activities. The countries have signed an agreement to provide assistance in emergencies. Indeed, Cyprus was the first to send firefighting planes to Israel during the Carmel fire disaster in 2010. In 2016, when a giant fire broke out in the town of Paphos, Israel in turn sent an aid delegation, including three firefighting planes and an IDF transport plane. The Israel Navy has also held a number of joint exercises with the Cypriot Navy. Ties between Israel and Greece grew stronger following the deterioration of relations with Turkey, and the process accelerated after the Marmara incident in 2010, which was perceived by the Greeks and the Cypriots as an expression of Turkish assertiveness. As a result, in 2011 the Greek government stopped about a dozen ships from leaving Greek ports for another protest flotilla to the Gaza Strip.

In 2016 there was a summit meeting in Nicosia between the leaders of Greece, Israel, and Cyprus with the aim of creating a new geopolitical bloc in the Eastern Mediterranean, partly also as a counterweight to Turkey. The third trilateral meeting between the government heads took place earlier this month in Greece. At the last meeting in Saloniki, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that if the countries succeeded in implementing the idea of the East-Med pipeline (an ambitious idea to build a gas pipeline with a length of 2,000 km reaching Italy and passing through Cyprus and Greece), it would be a “revolution.”

The disclosure of the joint activity to the media likely lies in the desire by Israel – as well as Cyprus, and Greece – to send messages to countries and non-state organizations in the region at this time. The first message concerns the drive to exploit the potential of the gas reserves in the Mediterranean, which is a top priority for all the countries involved and is a source of tension between Greece and Cyprus on one hand, and Turkey on the other. In addition, the close ties between Turkey and Qatar and Hamas, the tension due to the electricity crisis in the Gaza Strip, and the belligerent rhetoric from Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in recent months may all have prompted Israel to publicize the exercise. This exercise joins a series of sudden exercises conducted by Israel recently in both the north and the south, including with the Galilee Division and with reserves formations, designed to strengthen the forces’ readiness for unexpected escalation.

From the military aspect, the exercise highlights the importance of more intensive training in unfamiliar territory, including for additional ground units, and even for integrated fighting involving infantry, armored corps, artillery, and engineering units. There is a process in the IDF for operational thinking and building the force with the aim of returning maneuvers on the ground to the center of attention as an important tool for reaching a decisive victory in the next round of hostilities. The special operations and training of the Commando Brigade could support the main effort in the campaign, but could not replace it. Therefore it is extremely important to extend and upgrade training for the IDF’s main ground troops and develop models for joint training exercises for these forces overseas, in spite of their high cost relative to the cost of training in Israel. It is these forces that bear the main burden of the effort to maneuver, whose purpose is to strike the enemy, capture territory, limit fire from captured territories into Israeli rear territory, seize and destroy military infrastructures, and undermine the survival of the enemy government.

There are no doubt that Africa’s militant Islamist groups like Ansar al-Sharia, AL-SHABAB, AQIM, The Movement for Monotheism and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and Boko Haram have undoubtedly benefited from these shifts in economic policies. If terrorism is to be defeated in Africa, then we need to see a return to the more economic and socialist policies that many countries followed after independence in the 1960s and 70s, policies that produced higher levels of employment and greater social justice, and policies that avoid sexual repression.

It is also worth mentioning that it is possible to construct a hypothesis that would relate the attack to more global dynamics and possibly to the recent strike in London and Paris. By hitting both Malian citizens and foreigners in Bamako, the group responsible for the attack might be trying to deliver a strong message of opposition to the African governments and the French intervention in Mali and, possibly also, on the risk for local states in associating themselves with Westerners, particularly Chad. – To this extent – it may be related to groups trying to punish or target France and its allies, a punishment that I am expecting it to happen again and again as long as these countries kept practicing the same counter terrorism strategies in Africa. I can see this incident, like those before it, quickly swept under the carpet, and perhaps more of the same happening in the future.

We’ve seen similar incidents in the past, not only in Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Kenya or even Mali, but even in France when a few weeks later, no major change in tactics or policies happens. Things would return to apparent normalcy only to see the same incidents occurring again and again… Policy makers and governments, even in advanced countries, cannot maintain a real state of alert for a long time, let alone in poor African countries. It’s not only very costly, but also, it’s nerve wracking to security personnel and to the population.

Perhaps, just like many observers around the globe, you may wonder what has gone wrong for Africa or what’s next for Mali and Africa. In reality, and despite the continued insecurity in Mali and in the Sahel, the Malian army has barely been a factor in the battle against extremists. French were highly sensitive to being perceived as an occupier of their former colony. In 2014, France transformed its mission into a regional program, Operation Barkhane, headquartered in Chad. Despite this, the Islamists appear to be growing in number.

Let’s be clear, the growing trend of terrorism and extremism in Africa has many powerful forces behind it; the most powerful driver of international terrorism is a very controversial one. It’s the West. Historically, western powers went to Africa mainly for minerals and for political control or military interventions, but have never invested heavily and seriously in economic or infrastructure and social development. Hence, they are accused of ignoring the suffering of the people of the African continent. In addition to that, corruption in administrative and political institutions plays a major role.

For example, al Qaida’s Osama bin Laden, took up arms because of the corruption, sexual repression and excess in Saudi Arabia and the Muslim World. However, terrorists in Africa take up arms primarily and firstly because of local challenges, not primarily international or religious issues like other terrorist organization in the Middle East.

What consequence does this leave for African governments who are struggling to fend off Africa’s militant Islamist groups? The main solution is both pretty simple-sounding and incredibly difficult to pull off; clean up the government, increase employment opportunities, stop sexual repression, improve education and social services, and make life better for all. This is my candid opinion, if these core issues are not addressed, you can only expect Mali to continue to be a favorable space for Africa’s militant Islamist groups that essentially rely on local complicity in order to stage successful attacks.

There’s also the fact that drawing too much attention to the advance of Boko Haram and al-Qaeda affiliates in Africa would make people wonder how these groups have become so powerful. That’s a complex question for which there is no one simple answer. While US forces have been training and helping certain countries in Africa in their battles against Africa’s militant Islamist groups, there’s no doubt too that Western policy has contributed significantly to the current problems, especially when one bears in mind that it was the NATO powers which toppled the Libyan government of Muammar Gaddafi, the main bulwark against al-Qaeda in Northern Africa. And now Africa has to deal with the mess and clean up the garbage of the foreign military interventions in Libya and Mali.

It is also worth mentioning and it must also be stressed here that the first step though is to give the problem of terrorism in Africa the attention it deserves by Africans themselves. Africa should care about its own security challenges. It’s best to deal with its security threats head-on, instead of burying head in the sand and praying it all goes away…!

Netanyahu’s unexpected confrontation with US Jews

The meeting that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had with Jerry Silverman, the CEO of the Jewish Federations of North America, on June 27 failed to allay the tempest that the prime minister had just stirred up over Israel’s relationship with American Jews.

Author Mazal Mualem Posted June 27, 2017 on Al Monitor

Translator : Danny Wool

A deep rift has been emerging in that relationship since June 25. In fact, that rift is so deep that there has never been anything like it in the relationship between the Jews of the United States and the Israeli government. The unrest was instigated by two volatile moves supported by Netanyahu. The first was a surprising decision that the prime minister brought before his Cabinet, suspending the Western Wall compromise, approved by the government in January 2016. This compromise involved the creation of a mixed-gender prayer space at the Western Wall, which would allow all denominations of Judaism to pray there.

The American Jewish community faced a second blow soon after that when the Ministerial Committee on Legislation approved the Conversion Law, circumventing a Supreme Court ruling and placing exclusive authority over conversions in the hands of the Chief Rabbinate. (To be enacted, the bill would have to be adopted by Knesset plenum.) Conversions performed by Reform and Conservative rabbis in Israel and abroad would not be recognized, and their converts would not be eligible for Israeli citizenship based on the Law of Return. This law offers all Jews — either by birth or conversion — Israeli citizenship upon arriving in Israel.

These two steps were rightfully deemed a major victory for the ultra-Orthodox parties. They got the prime minister to surrender to their demands and dragged him into an unprecedented crisis with the American Jewish community, most of which is identified with Reform and Conservative Judaism.

The drama was only intensified by the fact that the Israeli government made these decisions while the board of trustees of the Jewish Agency for Israel was in Israel for a series of events to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the liberation of Jerusalem and the Western Wall and the 120th anniversary of the founding of the Zionist movement. Netanyahu not only rained on their parade, but he also succeeded in putting a crack in the sense of solidarity that American Jews felt toward Israel. To protest this decision, the trustees of the Jewish Agency for Israel decided to cancel a dinner with the prime minister.

Was Netanyahu even aware of the intensity of the crisis that would erupt when he made these decisions? And why did he go public with it when leading representatives of the American Jewish community were in Israel? Nothing would have happened if he would have held back until after their visit to Israel. It is safe to assume that Netanyahu did consider the unrest that his decision would cause, but was mistaken in assessing its scope. The leaders of the Jewish Agency called Netanyahu’s decision damaging and dangerous, even claiming that it undermined Zionism. Netanyahu did, in fact, try to lower the flames through his Cabinet Secretary Tzahi Braverman. He claimed that the reports were false and that everyone could still pray at the Western Wall, but no one was convinced.

Rabbi Rick Jacobs, who heads the Reform movement in North America, told Israeli daily Yedioth Ahronoth that “Jews like me, who stand beside Israel on a daily basis, who fight against BDS [boycott, divestment and sanctions movement against Israel] and de-legitimization … we were told by the Israeli government, ‘You are not legitimate.’ This poses a strategic risk to the State of Israel.”

As someone who is intimately familiar with the American Jewish community, Netanyahu is well-aware of how important its strategic bond with the State of Israel really is. Reform and Conservative Jews make up over half of American Jewry, and their enormous financial donations to Israel amount to hundreds of millions of dollars per year. This is in addition to their efforts to explain and advocate for Israeli positions. So why did Netanyahu do what he did?

Netanyahu could have continued to contain the ultra-Orthodox parties by quietly delaying the implementation of the Western Wall compromise, but he decided to suspend it instead. He made a formal decision to delay the implementation, thus confronting openly and aggressively the US Jewish community. It seems that Netanyahu’s need to curry favor with the ultra-Orthodox has become an overall priority for him.

For the Jews of the United States, the Western Wall is the ultimate bond between Judaism and the State of Israel. As such, any step seen as excluding them from the site will have far-reaching consequences. Doing this in such close proximity to the approval of the Conversion Law, which would make it difficult for hundreds of thousands of Jews to obtain rights in Israel through the Law of Return, causes the American Jewish leadership to feel that something important has changed in the way the Jewish State relates to them.

This is why the chairman of the Jewish Agency, Natan Sharansky, decided on Sunday to declare a state of emergency in the organization. Previously organized celebrations were canceled and replaced with a series of consultations and personal appeals to ministers and Knesset members in an effort to convince them to take action against the government’s decisions.

The only two ministers who opposed suspending the Western Wall compromise were Chairman of Yisrael Beitenu Avigdor Liberman and Minister of Infrastructure Yuval Steinitz of the Likud. The support of all the other ministers is a disturbing indication of the political mood at a time when the ultra-Orthodox parties are flexing their muscles and reaping one political victory after the other. These range from the repeal of the Enlistment Law for rabbinical college students, to decisions not to perform railroad maintenance and repairs on the Sabbath, to the suspension of the Western Wall compromise and the approval of the Conversion Law.

Even though Chairman of Mizrahi ultra-Orthodox Shas Party Aryeh Deri is tangled up in a criminal investigation, the ultra-Orthodox parties are acting as if they run the government. That is because they have realized that it would be impossible to form a coalition without them. When ultra-Orthodox politicians see the ultimate symbol of secular Israel — Yesh Atid Chairman Yair Lapid — act softly, cajole them and even try to reconcile with them, all the while refraining from attacking them directly, their self-confidence soars. So does their appetite for even more public victories.

This article was written and published by Al Monitor :

Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/06/israel-us-reform-conservative-ultra-orthodox-jews-netanyahu.html#ixzz4lIxbL4Rx

Tensions flare between IDF, UN peacekeepers in Lebanon

More and more voices in Israel are saying that the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has become a burden and its mission is no longer needed.

“UNIFIL was supposed to be the enforcement apparatus for Security Council Resolution 1701,” a high-placed Israeli military source said on condition of anonymity. “But in actual fact, it has become only a fig leaf for that resolution. UNIFIL whitewashes Hezbollah activity on the ‘Blue Line’ [border], and serves as an excuse for Hezbollah and the Lebanese government to violate the UN resolution and ratchet up tensions along the border. We no longer need this force here any longer. Better to remain with only the coordination and liaison units, and that’s all,” he added.

The confrontation between Israel and UNIFIL erupted at the beginning of the month, in the course of the June 7-9 visit of US Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley to Israel. Haley, who enjoys tremendous popularity in Israel, was taken for a patrol of the northern border line between Israel and Lebanon. She was accompanied by Maj. Gen. Aviv Kochavi, who recently served as the head of the Northern Command and is now deputy chief of staff, and Israel Defense Forces Brig. Gen. Amir Baram, the 91st Division commander.

In preparation for the visit, Kochavi and Baram had received special authorization to reveal hitherto secret intelligence information to Haley regarding Hezbollah’s deployment along the border in violation of Security Council Resolution 1701. To demonstrate that, Kochavi and Baram received approval to use sophisticated observation devices on the patrol. In addition, a female soldier from the local combat intelligence battalion participated in the patrol; she had recently immigrated to Israel from the United States and was tasked with providing accurate translations to the ambassador.

Kibbutz Misgav Am was chosen as the observation point where the ambassador received detailed explanations of the entire zone. The kibbutz is located on the fence along the border between Israel and Lebanon. Baram explained to Haley that the kibbutz’ fence is actually the border fence as marked by the UN after the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from southern Lebanon in 2000. According to sources who participated in the meeting, Haley was astonished when she learned that normal, everyday life characterizes the Israeli kibbutz on the border fence. The other side of the fence is where Hezbollah militants patrol. At this point, Baram whipped out Security Council Resolution 1701 that had been adopted at the conclusion of the Second Lebanon War in 2006, and read it out aloud. The resolution states that Hezbollah militants are not to be south of the Litani River. Then Haley was given intelligence information that Israel had collected in the recent year. In addition, via the special observation instruments brought there, Haley was able to discern observation points erected by Hezbollah along the length of the Lebanese border, camouflaged as a green environmental organization for nature protection.

At exactly this stage, the UNIFIL commander, Irish Maj. Gen. Michael Beary, arrived. Haley asked the general for his response to the information she received, and explained to him that she saw with her own eyes how Hezbollah militants are clearly present south of the Litani — areas where the Security Council resolution forbids them to have a presence. And UNIFIL is the body that is supposed to enforce this resolution. The general denied the information, and then a heated argument ensued between Beary and Kochavi — all this, in front of the American ambassador.

“We have a terrible crisis with UNIFIL,” a senior IDF officer told Al-Monitor on condition of anonymity. “Now, when the word is out and the whole world has seen the pictures, it will be impossible to deny Hezbollah’s violations any longer. Unfortunately, UNIFIL assists Hezbollah in whitewashing the truth. Under the current state of affairs, there is no point for UNIFIL battalions to remain on the scene. They cause more harm than good. They do what Hezbollah tells them to do. They don’t dare raise their heads and carry out their duties, so the appropriate thing now is for them to vacate the premises.” Several days later, the UN denied the Israeli information; this only served to heighten the distrust between the sides.

Until Haley’s visit, Israel’s intelligence info about Hezbollah’s presence on the southern Lebanon border fence was kept under wraps. Since Haley represents the outlook of President Donald Trump, who views UN peacekeeping initiatives as a waste of money, it was decided to reveal the information to her. At the present time, various Israeli spokesmen are adopting harsh rhetoric against UNIFIL and its collaboration with Hezbollah.

In the coming weeks, the IDF will begin a new stage in constructing a land barrier throughout the entire length of its border with Lebanon (construction that was revealed in an earlier article in Al-Monitor). Israel plans to build a high wall in the western zone and another one in the Metula area. Metula, an Israeli border town, is viewed as especially vulnerable because Hezbollah controls two ridges that command a view of Metula from the west and east. The IDF is aware of Hezbollah’s plan to attempt to gain control of Israeli localities in the next confrontation, and it is preparing for all possible scenarios. Hezbollah does not have the ability to defeat Israel, but it can surprise the IDF with a sudden breakout of its Radwan special forces (commando units). This would allow the organization to take rapid control of an Israeli locality, even for a few hours, which could be a tremendous psychological victory over Israel, which has not lost territory to an Arab enemy since 1973. There are 22 Israeli localities adjacent to the fence, along the length of the Lebanon border. The IDF has a detailed plan for evacuating some of them in case of a conflict. Simultaneously, the IDF is planning to take steps that will avert the danger to the localities.

According to the IDF, Hezbollah has morphed from a local guerrilla organization into an army with a state — Lebanon. A senior Israeli source told Al-Monitor that Hezbollah already has dozens of tanks and no small amount of RPVs (drones), some of them armed. From Israel’s point of view, it is not clear if this is good news or bad. In the Second Lebanon War, the IDF suffered from a lack of Hezbollah targets. The next time around, they say in the IDF, things will look completely different.

According to an Israeli military source, Hezbollah has carved out a separate identity for itself. It is no longer an extension of the Iranian arm, and it shows more and more signs of independence. There is still a clear and powerful symbiosis between Tehran and Beirut, but Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah now has his own agenda. He does not necessarily follow every Iranian dictate. This summer, all these working assumptions may be put to the test on the ground. The construction of a wall by Israel is viewed as an act that can cause friction. But the fact that Iran is building factories in Lebanon to produce rockets and missiles is viewed by Israel as the clear crossing of a red line.

A high-ranking Israeli politician, speaking on condition of anonymity, said, “Although both sides have no interest at the moment in being dragged into a conflict, the situation on the ground can definitely deteriorate quickly, even to an all-out conflagration.”

Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/06/israel-hezbollah-unifil-lebanon-wall-war-security-idf-us.html#ixzz4lIxgQHgR

On June 23, Iranian hard-liners once again attacked moderate President Hassan Rouhani, but this time was different. A group of hard-liners approached the president and chanted harsh slogans while he was marching in the streets to mark International Quds Day. 

Every year, Iranians take to the streets on the last Friday of the month of Ramadan to decry Israel for “occupying Palestinian lands.” Various figures, including high-ranking officials, take part in the marches, but this time, a group of hard-liners came close to the president and chanted slogans against him that were interpreted as impolite and insulting. Among the slogans shouted at Rouhani, who was re-elected by a landslide on May 19, were “The American sheikh,” “Rouhani, Banisadr, congratulations on your linkage” (in reference to Abolhassan Banisadr, Iran’s first president who was impeached and later exiled), and “Down with hypocrites” (in reference to the outlawed opposition group Mujahedeen-e-Khalq).

Minutes after the attack, Rouhani’s supporters on social networks backed him, using the hashtag “I’m a supporter of Rouhani,” which became a top trend on Twitter on June 23. In fact, every time the hard-liners have attacked Rouhani, the atmosphere has turned in favor of him, as many of his supporters become mobilized on social networks and denounce the attacks. Furthermore, the attacks of hard-liners are sometimes so harsh that even critics of Rouhani, including conservatives, rally to his side.

Reformists and moderates soon pointed their fingers at conservatives and hard-liners who had lost the election to Rouhani. In this vein, some conservative figures tried to exonerate their camp from this controversy. This, in turn, portrayed the hard-liners as more violent in the eyes of ordinary people and labeled the conservatives as “unity breakers.” In fact, moderates and Reformists opined that instead of demonstrating unity and condemning Israel on International Quds Day, the hard-liners served Israel’s purposes by breaking the unity sought with such marches.

Conservative cleric Mohammad Taghi Rahbar slammed the group of hard-liners who chanted slogans, saying that they aren’t “real Hezbollahis [hard-liners],” distancing them from the Principlist camp.

Moreover, as Reformists and moderates stated that the chanting of slogans against Rouhani was pre-planned and organized by the hard-liners, conservative Gholam Ali Haddad-Adel described the mob as ordinary people and said people were critical of Rouhani, but they had to express it politely.

Some of the hard-liners believe that their actions were based on the supreme leader’s comments and quote his recent remarks on June 7: “I constantly say to all intellectual, thinking jihadi and cultural nuclei throughout the country that each of them should work in an independent manner. As is said in military arenas, ‘fire at will’ when they want. Of course, during a war, there is a command center that issues orders, but if the command center cannot contact other bases and centers, the commander issues the ‘fire at will’ order. Well, you are the officers of the soft war. You are supposed to be the officers of the soft war. Whenever you feel that there is something wrong with the central organization and that it cannot work properly, you are free to fire at will. Under such circumstances, you are free to decide, to think, to move and to act.”

A few days after the supreme leader’s speech, the conservatives tried to correct what they believed to be a “misinterpretation” of his remarks by hard-liners. Asadullah Imani, the Friday prayer leader in Shiraz province, said June 18, “‘Fire at will’ doesn’t mean chaos.”

Following the new attack on Rouhani, conservatives sought to distance themselves from the group who chanted the slogans. In this vein, on June 24, the ultra-conservative Javan newspaper described the group of hard-liners who were chanting as “superficial.” The daily also wrote that what the hard-liners did against Rouhani turned the atmosphere in favor of the moderate president.

On June 26, in reaction to the hard-liners’ behavior against the president, the supreme leader tried to explain his previous remarks, saying, “‘Fire at will’ does not call for anarchy; it does not mean giving opportunities to those making thoughtless claims against the country’s revolutionary movement.”

However, three days after the events on International Quds Day, a few minutes before the beginning of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s speech at the Eid al-Fitr prayers, a eulogist recited a poem against Rouhani and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

The poem and eulogist were both criticized by Reformists and moderates who thought the poem was insulting. Although, in a move that shows that such harsh verbal attacks against Rouhani will persist, the conservatives defended the poem and the eulogist, who was described as 2017 presidential election conservative candidate Ebrahim Raisi’s eulogist. In this vein, hard-line activist Vahid Yaminpour tweeted June 26, “The poem of Meysam Motei [the eulogist] had a big difference from the slogans of Quds Day [against the president], and that is the neatness [of it]. Fire at will means [doing] a neat work.”

This article was written by Rohollah Faghihi. Rohollah is a journalist who has worked for various Iranian media outlets. The article was published previously by the excellent Al Monitor on the link below. We strongly invite you to visit their website :

Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/06/iran-rouhani-quds-day-american-sheikh-hardliner-attacks.html#ixzz4lfHTCLuG