Young Diplomats

On Saturday, Chinese President Xi Jinping will have a 20-minute meeting with his counterpart from across the Taiwan Strait, President Ma Ying-jeou, followed by dinner in Singapore’s Shangri-La Hotel. Both the Communist-ruled People’s Republic of China and Taiwan (officially known as the Republic of China) claim to be the sole rightful government of all of China. This state of affairs precluded all government-to-government contact between China and Taiwan until 2013, when the minister of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office met with the minister of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council in a hotel lobby on the sidelines of the 2013 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit. This modest start to low-key official contacts laid the groundwork for Saturday’s meeting — the first between the heads of state on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

With both sides cognizant of the strange formalities involved in even the most minor government-to-government interaction, the meeting was tightly orchestrated to manage public perception. The sides will split the cost of the dinner and the venue to avoid the impression of an unequal relationship and will hold separate press conferences after the fact. The tight choreography extends down to terminology. Xi and Ma will refer to each other as “mister,” carefully dodging the use of the term “president” — particularly important given that neither side officially recognizes the other as a legitimate state. Artfully ambiguous terminology aside, this is a historic face-to-face meeting between two presidents in their capacity as heads of state. There had been speculation that the two might meet as heads of their political parties — not as heads of state — at some point, but Ma resigned as chairman of Taiwan’s ruling Kuomintang (KMT) party in December 2014.

Although this is a landmark meeting, its significance — as the attention to appearances suggests — lies in its symbolic value. Taiwan’s opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), has already accused Ma of using the meeting to attempt to influence Taiwan’s upcoming presidential and legislative elections in January 2016. Given that the main source of Ma’s unpopularity (and, by extension, that of the KMT) in Taiwan was the impression that his drive to build tighter economic ties with the mainland was enriching wealthy businessmen and compromising national security while the economy as a whole stagnated, however, a meeting with Xi is unlikely to significantly benefit the KMT’s electoral performance in 2016.

Others have raised alarm that Ma could use the opportunity to sign secret deals with China, achieving some sort of fait accompli before his presidential term ends in January 2016. Countering these rumors, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council has promised that no secret deals would be signed during the short meeting. While it is not totally outside the realm of possibility for the government to attempt anyway, this would make little political sense on the eve of elections, when it would be most difficult to maintain secrecy. The KMT was severely punished in November 2014’s local elections following its legislative bid to pass the Cross-Strait Service Agreement through procedure, widely seen as an under-the-table attempt to bypass public opinion. Any significant deal signed at this meeting would have the potential to damage KMT prospects for multiple rounds of elections to come. For Ma, a lame-duck president with only limited ability to direct his own party, the milestone meeting is likely to deliver more personal satisfaction than political gain.

For Xi’s part, although he is meeting with Ma, he almost certainly has his eyes on the post-Ma future. Barring a major upset in Taiwanese elections — currently, KMT candidate Eric Chu lags behind the DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen 16.4 percent to 47.1 percent in polls — this will almost certainly be a world in which the DPP controls the Taiwanese presidency (and most likely Taiwan’s legislature). This potential future has been in the making since demonstrations against the Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement in the first half of 2014 delineated the Taiwanese public’s tolerance of economic integration with the mainland. After these protests, the KMT suffered massive reversals  in local government elections and switched presidential candidates midway through the campaign season in 2015. At every stage of the process, the mainland found itself with few tools to influence the outcome in its favor.

The mainland now fears that the DPP, with a strong position in the Taiwanese government, would be in a position to greatly alter cross-strait relations, potentially doing away with what little alignement there is between Taiwan’s interests and the mainland’s. Although the mainland has traditionally detested dealing with the DPP, which it views as being pro-independence, it appears that Beijing is simply accepting reality. Although the mainland made a strong point to ensure that the first meeting between Chinese and Taiwanese heads of state was held with a KMT president, the door has now been opened for the mainland to meet with any Taiwanese head of state — ostensibly without regard for their party orientation. The meeting is a sign that the mainland recognizes that contacts by nongovernmental organizations and fleeting government-to-government meetings may no longer be sufficient if it wants to preserve its interests.

Several years into a Chinese economic slowdown, the Latin American economies that relied on China to buy up their key exports are feeling the pain. With less hard currency coming in, governments across the region are rapidly readjusting their spending plans and preparing to govern in an environment in which they will have fewer resources to secure their key constituents’ political loyalties.

The Role of Geography

Ever since commodity prices began dropping several years ago, much has been written about how slow economic growth and potential political instability will plague Latin America in coming years. But what will Latin America as a whole look like in a decade as a result of the Chinese economic downturn? What ideologies will dominate in a continent that over the past decade shifted toward leftist populism ? And what issues will define its relationship with the United States, the hemisphere’s undisputed hegemon?

The region’s geopolitics hold the beginning of an answer. The first step is to view Latin America’s geographic regions and countries as a series of divided islands rather than a united entity. Unlike Western Europe, where the relative absence of natural obstacles eventually gave rise to interconnected political entities, South America is bisected by the dense Amazon rainforest and divided lengthwise by the nearly insurmountable Andean mountain range. Latin American colonies were divided even before the collapse of the Spanish Empire in the Americas more than two centuries ago. After independence, this disconnected geographic landscape created dozens of economies of wildly varying sizes often more linked by trade with partners outside the region than with each other . With few unbroken expanses of arable land and high transport costs  across the forests and mountains, Latin America was simply not in a position to create capital on the scale of the United States or Western Europe. Consequently, even major Latin American states such as Brazil or Mexico remain highly reliant on inflows of cash from abroad to keep their economies afloat and rely on exports to China or the United States for a significant part of their foreign trade.

Unsurprisingly, the goal of forming institutions that can provide lasting political and economic unity has eluded Latin American statesmen. Numerous attempts have been made to unite the fractious region: Simon Bolivar’s ill-fated 19th-century bid to unite South America, a similar attempt at uniting the Central American states into a federation and the more recent creation of separate economic blocs in Latin America. Yet the isolation created by geographic barriers has foiled leaders’ attempts to unite the region’s countries into a real economic or political union on the scale of the European Union or even the North American Free Trade Agreement. In recent history, the closest that Latin American states came to some sort of unity — besides regional trading blocs such as the Common Market of the South and the Pacific Alliance — was the wave of leftist populist governments that swept the continent beginning in the early 2000s. But after a decade of budgets and politics buoyed by high commodity prices, the raw realities of geopolitics are back with a vengeance.

The Shape of Governments to Come

We cannot define the exact nature of the national governments that will emerge during the next decade; short-term actions are less predictable than long-term trends, and attempting to forecast which people or parties will lead countries such as Brazil after its 2018 elections or Venezuela after its presidential election in 2019 is very risky. However, we have a rough idea of the shape these governments will take. With less revenue available to pacify restive populations, the new governments will likely be more economically pragmatic than their predecessors. This is not to say that populism as a means of governance in Latin America will subside; rather, rulers are likely to take more care in how they relate to their voters and the outside world.

Because the region is so dependent on foreign capital for continued economic growth, and because states’ export revenues are so depleted (in Bolivia, for example, export revenue is down by nearly a third compared with last year), leaders are more likely to refrain from mass nationalizations or hostility to foreign companies. During the past decade, leftist governments seized numerous private assets in disputes with private firms. Except for extreme cases such as Venezuela  — which, because of its default risk, economic problems and past expropriations, is already de facto cut off from most foreign lending and many investments — most states will likely now try to encourage investments rather than scare them off. Consequently, Latin America is likely entering an era in which the grand populist gestures of the past decade will no longer yield the same results as before and can, in fact, be counterproductive for leaders trying to restart their faltering economies.

The weakening of Latin American left is another factor that will shape the coming decade. In the next 10 years, the governments that came to power during the boom times will reach the end of their tenures. The list of states that will evolve from leftist administrations into some other type of government is lengthy. Venezuela will reach the painful point of reckoning in which its ruling United Socialist Party will split apart. And as the party splits, Venezuela will undergo a painful economic restructuring and a political shift away from extreme populism. In Ecuador, leftist President Rafael Correa may not secure even another four-year term. In Bolivia, low export prices for natural gas will put President Evo Morales’ ability to secure another decade in office to the test.

Perhaps the only exception will be Colombia, where a possible peace deal with rebels grouo could bring the left into the national fold, which could lead other parties to co-opt more leftist ideas. But even Cuba, long the bastion of Latin America’s left and its ideological center, will eventually move into the United States’ political orbit, likely in exchange for the lifting of the five-decade trade embargo.

The left’s decline will give the United States an exceptionally benign climate for managing its relationships and priorities to the south. To be sure, longstanding concerns — such as trade, drug trafficking and illegal migration — guiding the United States’ actions in much of Latin America will remain. But the bumper crop of leftist states that were often minor hindrances to U.S. political moves in the region will become less of a factor in the next decade. Washington’s new priorities in the region, such as cushioning Venezuela’s economic collapse and bringing Cuba into some sort of improved trade relationship, will occupy the United States’ time.

Of the states currently undergoing deep economic downturns, several seem poised to make a resurgence. Mexico is an outlier, given than it is so linked to the United States through trade. But those links will ensure that despite problematic public finances, Mexico will remain a major force in Latin American economic growth. For Peru and Colombia, international trade will drop over the next several years, but their stable public finances will likely ensure some degree of social stability. And even Brazil, in the midst of a massive corruption scandal at Petrobras, will ride out the crisis due to its strong (albeit currently strained) domestic manufacturing base and sheer economic size.

Re-Emerging Differences

The rampant populism of the past 15 years — bolstered by rapidly increasing exports to hungry markets abroad — imposed a false appearance of unity among the Latin American leftist states. Superficially, Nestor’s Kirchner Argentina appeared to have much in common with Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela, even though both countries’ individual geographic and political characteristics ultimately dictated the governments’ decisions. With the rise of another leftist bloc unlikely in the next decade, the divided nature of Latin America will again become evident.

And the continent’s divided nature means that the shortcomings of international bodies there, such as the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) and the Union of South American Nations (Unasur), will become even more self-evident. For example, Brasilia will use Mercosur to do what is in its own immediate benefit: increase trade links with Latin American states outside its immediate neighborhood, such as Mexico . But truly lucrative deals, such as a Mercosur-European Union trade agreement, will remain just out of reach because they require full approval of all the group’s members. Mercosur’s other key member, Argentina, opposes any such deals lest they harm its domestic industry. Consequently, Brazil will continue looking for small bilateral deals, but it will continue to be hamstrung by Mercosur. Unasur, on the other hand, which was originally conceived of as a sort of South American United Nations, is highly unlikely to progress beyond a regional body that meets a couple of times a year. It is not that there is no political will in Latin America to push toward greater unity, but unlike the European Union, such bodies cannot be superimposed onto a region whose trade ties and key political relationships are focused toward other continents rather than each other.

The next decade will bring with it some political and economic continuity. The region will maintain its fundamental relationship with the rest of the globe, in which its foreign trade is overwhelmingly skewed toward the export of raw materials and its economies are heavily reliant on foreign capital markets. But deeper internal changes are already in motion, and the states of the region will change accordingly. The parties at the helm of these states will be different, and the way these parties relate with the outside world on a political and economic level will be undeniably different. Over the next 10 years, the shortcomings of extreme reliance on the Chinese economy will spur cost-cutting and domestic economic diversification. The trappings of the Cold War will fade in Latin America as leaders are replaced and political institutions evolve, but the new Latin America will continue to be more defined by its divisions than by any idea of unity.

It is a shift in US strategy against terrorist movement Daech. Although the White House ensures that its “strategy in Syria has not changed,” the US has given the green light to sending ground troops in the north of Syria. Until now, Washington had refused any military presence on Syrian soil in order not to be drawn into the conflict such as in Iraq or in Afghanistan.

For the first time in four and a half years of conflict which left more than 300,000 dead, Barack Obama has “authorized the deployment of a small staff, fewer than 50, US Special Forces operations in northern Syria, “said Friday a part of the US administration. This small contingent of elite soldiers will be responsible for contributing to the war effort against the terrorist group Islamic State, said the US official. These special forces “will help coordinate local troops on the ground and coalition efforts to counter the IE,” he said. “These forces do not have a combat mission,” stressed the spokesman of the White House, Josh Earnest, during his press briefing Friday.

“These forces have no combat mission”

Officially, these forces will therefore be confined to an advisory role and support to armed rebel groups said Syrian moderated, and will therefore not directly involved in the fighting. However, they will be “equipped to defend themselves.” Because “it is undeniable that these military take real risks,” said the spokesman of Barack Obama.

These numbers will they grow in the future? The White House does not exclude this possibility: “I do not want to predict the future,” said the spokesman. How long will they stay there? Here again, Josh Earnest was evasive: “I would not describe that mission as permanent.”

Furthermore, as part of the war effort, an official in Washington confirmed that the US military would deploy ground attack aircraft A-10 and F-15 fighters at an air base in Turkey, neighboring Syria and member of the coalition.

These military decisions came as US Secretary of State, John Kerry, participated Friday in Vienna, the Austrian capital in multilateral discussions on Syria to war with other key diplomatic players in the dossier. But no final decision on the future of Bashar al-Assad regime has been concluded. A new meeting is scheduled in two weeks.

Since the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in March 2011, Obama has long refused to get involved militarily in Syria. In September 2013, US President repeated that he “would not put American troops on the ground in Syria”, causing anger at the time of its allies,  including France and Sunni Gulf Countries, renouncing in time to militarily strike the regime of Bashar al Assad. Then in the summer of 2014, Washington has assembled a coalition of 65 countries to bomb the positions of IE and other jihadist groups in Syria and neighboring Iraq. For over a year, these strikes are almost daily.

Dana Chocron is a specialist of Middle East political landscapes. She is specialized in the Levant. She holds a BA in Government,Security and Diplomacy from the prestigious school of IDC. She is currently an analyst for a top Israeli Organization.

The great part of history is that it constantly repeats itself. Past events will probably reoccur in the future in a very similar nature; therefore, we know to extract lessons from them. However, the smart extraction of lessons does not necessarily promise the application of these into practice. Probably the gap between the two steps, extraction and application of lessons, is well reflected in the American history related to terrorism-dealing with.

This article aims to compare two big scenarios that the United States has been confronted with: the past war against the Afghan Taliban and the present war against the Islamic Iraq and Syria. When analyzing the lessons that the U.S. could have pulled out of their first combat against terrorism in Afghanistan, we can tell some of them have definitely been applied, while others seem to remain on the list of errors.

The historical analysis: a gap between theory and practice   

Talking about the eternal “American paranoia”: the year 2001 marked for the United States the starting point for the development of a strong feeling of mistrust and suspicious towards the world, and essentially, towards its biggest nightmare – the terrorists.

The 9/11 attacks conducted a tremendous amount of American troops towards the field in Afghanistan, convinced of the need to turn down the reason that caused a huge damage on the American strength and sense of indestructibility. The Taliban forces were far from imagining the long-lasting and bloody nature of the battle that they were about to face. Neither the American soldiers would have grasped the conditions and consequences that such battle would bring about.

This entire scenario ended up representing a fatal succession of events both for Afghanistan and the U.S., and meant the longest struggle that the U.S. military had ever been involved in. However, the drill, the amount of public critiques, the worrying instilled within society, and the political implications of it, the U.S. was forced to end the war, expose its mistakes and, above all, demonstrate it had managed to extract out of it meaningful lessons that would be applied in future similar scenarios. Have these lessons been indeed applied?

The answer to this question is probably, yes to the most. Indeed, the U.S. has firmly changed its attitude when facing the nightmare—the terrorist threat. Nevertheless, when analyzing a new current period in which dealing with terrorism has come to being a priority, some of those lessons have quite been put aside. In fact, it seems that the so-called American paranoia is stronger than it can allow for an ameliorated attitude vis-à-vis terrorism.

Currently, the battle against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, the claimed Islamic Caliphate has rather been shadowing the implementation of the learnt lessons, setting the U.S. back into an offensive mindset, which has once again conducted military forces to the respective scenario. The major critique received by the public back in Afghanistan was definitely the ground strategy employed, which had left a never-seen-before amount of deaths on the field. Since then, soldiers’ lives have needed increased protection. Today, the on-going situation in Iraq and Syria hasn’t conducted ground forces to the field, but, it has brought about airplanes strikes on the ground. As of now no casualties had been declared on the side of the American forces deployed, nevertheless, it didn’t take too long for the first death to be claimed by the U.S. military.

It is clearly not expected to reach death tolls like in Afghanistan; that would be ridiculous. Yet, it is interesting to try to think of how many soldiers will the U.S. be willing to sacrifice in today’s, more-then-ever dangerous, battlefield. Again, it seems that the U.S. has fallen into the spiral trap of terrorism and has again opted for a military deployment to the battlefield.

Then, if military direct intervention is not to be the solution to combat terrorism, what should the U.S. move be instead? I’d argue: prevention instead of reaction to the threat. Acting before needing to cure the damage and deal with the already advanced problem. That is, preventing terrorist networks from expanding, limiting their extent, influence and impact in terms of recruitment of followers, interfere between the terrorist groups and their providing sources for weapons, censor their worldwide spread propaganda, prohibit French, Swiss, American nationals from quitting the country to join the cause of terror, and above all, de-legitimize their cause, their promises, their reason of being and the methods employed to achieve their purposes. Probably the major problem in dealing with terrorists is that the world waits too long, expects proofs, wants to see the potential of the threat before anticipating it.

In June, Turkey’s ruling AK Party lost its parliamentary majority for the first time in the 13 years since it came to power. But, following a landslide victory in the renewed elections held on Sunday, it is now firmly set to return to the helm of the country. Backed strongly by Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, AKP won 49 percent of the vote with a narrative emphasizing political stability. The scale of AKP’s victory will have significant ramifications for Turkey’s foreign policy.

The strong government that will now be established in Ankara will enjoy a considerable margin of maneuver on its foreign policy options. Compared with many other governments in Europe, it will not only have the luxury of being the exclusive owner of executive power, but it can also take advantage of the absence of any near-term electoral calculations, with the next electoral cycle slated for 2019.

The new government can therefore sign on to new foreign policy initiatives almost in isolation of the dynamics of the local environment. It has little to fear from any domestic backlash especially from the country’s strong nationalist constituency. The victory margin essentially creates an ideal setting for foreign policy-making that has the potential to allow Turkey to win back its diplomatic prestige and re-establish its role as the indispensable ally of the West.

The relationship with the rest of Europe will be among the first to be affected in this transformation. The new Turkish government can now firmly back a settlement for Cyprus at a time when the U.N.-sponsored negotiations between the two communities of the island are nearing their conclusion. The settlement of this frozen conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean will be a significant achievement for a region where other conflicts continue to rage. It will give a significant boost to the Turkey-EU relationship.

On the question of Syrian refugees, Turkey also has a strengthened hand. Ankara is now in a position to deliver what Europe needs. In order to maintain the cohesion of its plan for the resettlement of the Syrian refugees in European countries, the EU wants the long-term collaboration of Turkey with a firm commitment to manage the orderly outflow of Syrian refugees. Yet this expectation can be fulfilled only if the vast number of Syrians currently being hosted in Turkey are given economic prospects. Turkey can now more easily consider a gradual opening of its employment market to Syrians, allowing this large population sound options for integration and employment. In return, Turkey can press Europe for the acceptance of the principle of burden-sharing for the refugees, fast-tracking its demand for visa freedoms and a revitalization of the stalled process of accession.

An equally challenging task facing Turkish policy makers will be the settlement of the country’s Kurdish question. With its comfortable majority in Parliament, the new government should be expected to resuscitate the settlement talks with the representatives of the Kurdish political movement. A resolution will positively impact the quest for peace and stability in Syria. It will also ensure a better cohesion among the anti-Islamic State (ISIS) coalition, with Ankara becoming less concerned with the backing of the Syrian Kurds as an effective ground element against the jihadist entity.

These initiatives will complement the ongoing transformation of Ankara’s foreign policy vision. Faced with the ill-fated consequences of its activism in the Middle East, which has left Turkey with a diminishing influence and a smaller accolade of regional friends, Ankara had initiated a re-calibration of its foreign policy even before the elections. A more realistic assessment of its capabilities resulted in a shift of its policy on Syria, as Ankara dropped its categorical objection for allocating a role to the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in the negotiations on the future of Syria. At the same time, Turkey agreed to be in the vanguard of the fight against ISIS, eliminating a point of friction with its allies in the West.

But this more optimistic assessment of Turkish foreign policy will very much depend on how President Erdogan and the AKP leadership interpret their large electoral success. The hope is that they shall construe this vote as a support for the more recent transformation of Turkish foreign policy, driven by a more realistic and less ideological perspective on regional dynamics. The alternative is a return to the over-confident AKP policies of the post-Arab Spring underpinned by a romanticized narrative of the Ottoman legacy. It is this crucial choice that will shape the future trajectory of Turkey’s regional diplomacy.

Sinan Ulgen writes for Carnegie Europe and for Newsweek.

Renata Segura is an expert of Latin America. She currently works for the IPI Global Observatory.

Since the peace process between the government of Colombia and the guerrilla group Fuerzas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) began in October 2012, perhaps the greatest question has been if the negotiations will yield an agreement that both facilitates peace and also responds to the claims for justice. The justice architecture that was made public on September 23, 2015 addresses both, and while pending questions on how exactly will it operate remain, the newSistema Integral de Verdad, Justicia, Reparación y No Repetición(Cohesive System of Truth, Justice, Reparation and No Repetition) unveiled in Havana is an innovative take on transitional and restorative justice. By announcing this new agreement, together with a final date for the negotiations (March 2016), and that the FARC would demobilize and disarm 60 days after the signing, a peace process that at times seemed moribund has regained strength, with most (but certainly not all) Colombians celebrating the possibility of a near-end to the 60-year civil war.

A very important feature of this new system is that it aims to address all crimes committed during the conflict, and not only those of the FARC. This has been a salient feature of the process, which has infuriated its opponents. The FARC has consistently argued that their actions need to be reviewed within the context of a conflict that saw excesses from the state and the paramilitary. In fact, early in the negotiations, the FARC declared themselves a victim of the war. It is notable, then, that the FARC has decided to admit their responsibility. The system announced last week creates two main institutions to address these issues while seeking to have some balance between peace and justice:

• A Comisión para el Esclarecimiento de la Verdad, la Convivencia y la No Repetición (Commission for Truth, Coexistence, and No Repetition) will be created, and will focus on reparations for victims. With 7.6 million registered victims, achieving fair reparations will demand important resources. It hasn’t been established what assets will be used for that purpose.
• A Jurisdicción Especial de Paz (Special Jurisdiction for Peace), formed by Salas de Justicia (Justice Halls) and a Tribunal para la Paz (Peace Tribunal), will be staffed by a majority of Colombian Justices, and also some foreign ones. Besides contributing to the goal of finding truth and help with reparations, this will be the central tool to impart sanctions to those responsible for the gravest crimes committed during the conflict. The statement emphasizes they will focus on the most serious and representative crimes.

From the beginning of the process, a central tension was evident: as the FARC came to the table as a negotiating party and not a defeated army, they openly refused to “spend one day in jail.” At the same time, the Rome Statue and other international legislation that hadn’t been in place in previous peace negotiations with other armed groups in Colombia imposed new justice standards. Additionally, the question of how an already overwhelmed justice system could handle trying every single guerilla member remained.The agreement announced a law granting “the widest possible amnesty” for political crimes and the crimes associated with them. To satisfy the requirements of Humanitarian International Law, this amnesty law will exclude crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, including taking of hostages, torture, forced displacement, extrajudicial executions and sexual violence. These crimes will be investigated and judged by the Special Jurisdiction.The Special Jurisdiction has laid out two different processes. Those who are willing to acknowledge their responsibilities in the conflict will get sentences between five and eight years—sentencing guidelines that mirror those of the demobilization process of right wing paramilitaries in 2005. The announcement, however, refers to these sentences as “restrictions of freedoms and rights,” which means that these guerrillas won’t serve regular jail sentences, as they had stated from the beginning. It is important to note that the system will also apply to members of the Colombian Armed Forces or right wing groups. In particular, there has been a preoccupation that the almost 3,500 extrajudicial executions known as the “falsos positivos” were not left in impunity. Those unwilling to acknowledge their responsibilities, or do so late, will receive sentences of up to 20 years.To be sure, there are numerous open questions, and as always, the devil will be in the details. Who gets elected to the Tribunal and the Justice Halls, and how this endeavor will be financed are the first and most obvious ones, but far from the only ones. The agreement, for example, includes a component of restorative justice which states that the sentencing will guarantee the fulfillment of duties and work that satisfy victims’ rights. This vague description will no doubt invite complicated debates. Another important pending question is if drug trafficking can be conceived as a political crime (or an associated crime) and thus eligible for amnesty. A clue in this regard can be found in the recent statement of the President of the Supreme Court José Leonidas Bustos, who said it could be understood in this way if it was used “as a tool to financially support the political ends of the armed struggle.” Given the widespread involvement of both FARC and right-wing paramilitary in the traffic of illicit drugs, this decision will be hugely important—and no doubt the United States will keep a close eye on this issue.The road ahead is by no means clear, especially as the parties have decided that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed,” and there is strong opposition to the process led by ex-president and now Senator Álvaro Uribe. The sticking point at the negotiating table on how the demobilization and disarmament will take place will be no doubt extremely difficult. The government has promised that this peace agreement will be endorsed by the Colombian public, but it’s not clear yet if there will be a referendum or a different tool will be used. In the meantime, Congress is already studying a constitutional reform that would allow for the implementation of the agreements, and the Attorney General announced a halt on the imputations of charges to all members of the FARC. For Colombia to succeed in the enormous task ahead, it will need broad support from the international community. But more importantly, it will need support from Colombians themselves in the form of a radical step: to search for forgiveness and reconciliation. Ending the longest and one of the most violent conflicts in the continent surely is worth all of these efforts.

1. Egypt : Active Personnel : 438,000 

Egypt is a country in the north of Africa with a staggering population of 94 million people and has face major political crises in the recent past but this has not changed its position as a leading African country when it comes to military strength A significant percentage of Egypt’s population (over 35 millions) are fit for active military service and more than 1.5 million individuals reach the military age every year. With almost 5,000 tanks including armoured fighting vehicles , self propelled guns and towed artillery , Egypt is a force to reckon with when it comes to Africa.

Having a total of 1,100 aircraft including 245 helicopters , 343 fighters , 390 trainer aircraft and 28 mine warfare, 84 serviceable air ports and a budget over 3.63 billions dollars pumped into Egypt’s defence every 365 days makes Egyptian military the strongest among other countries in Africa.

2. Algeria : Active Personnel : 130,000 

Algeria is the biggest country in Africa , with an area that covers approximately 2.5 million sq km and has a coastline of 998 km. The Nation’s defense budget is 9.59 billions euro.

African is a country with a strong military , that is trained and equipped mostly by France and Germany. They do possess strong ability to counter Jihadi threat , since the civil war that ravaged the country in the 80’s between the Army and the Islamists. Now Algeria is one the the most stable country in a region plagued by Jihadism.

The recent intervention of Algerian’s security forces in the In Amenas hostage crisis in the South of the country, was a clear success and the Algerian rescue operation showed a good degree of professionalism among the Algerian Security Forces.

3. Ethiopia : Active Personnel 138,000 

Ethipia has a population of almost 94 millions. It has 182,000 active frontline personnel. The nations covers 1 million sq km. Ethiopia’s defense budget is 308 millions euros. It has 560 tanks and 81 aircrafts.

Ethiopian Army is the leader of the coalition currently fighting the Shababs in Somalia. The army is well trained and well equipped , mostly by the United States. Ethiopia is a growing country that has clearly become the regional power in Eastern Africa, alongside Kenya. The development of their army is part of a broader process that saw the development of every part of the Ethiopian Society.

4. South Africa: Active Personnel 62,000 

South Africa is a country that covers 1.2 millions sq/km. and has a coastline of 2,798 km. Defense budget of South Africa is 4.18 billion euro. The nation has 191 tanks, 213 aircraft and its total naval strength is 30 warships.

Since the end of the apartheid , South Africa is a country that rejected violence ,and was reluctant to have a strong army. However in the last decades , the recent global and regional events , showed that South Africa, in order to keep the integrity of its border and limits immigrations from neighborings countries needed to have a strong Army. South Africa is the most technologically advanced country in Africa , and therefore all the continents try to immigrate there. Recently there has been violents riots against foreigners in Johannesburg, because the population was exceeded with the numbers of illegals crossing the borders and living in South Africa. Additionally a strong army is needed to cope with the problems of the poachers , who are killing everyday hundreds of endangered animals across Africa , especially in the Kruger Park that is a Park of the Size of Israel. These poachers are a clear danger to South African Natural Resources, more grave they also don’t hesitate to kill rangers ,policeman and even civilians if there are interference with these activities. These poachers usually come from Mozambique, and are equipped with High-Tech materials, that it is difficult for rangers only to cope with them.

5. Nigeria : Active Personnel 80,000

Nigeria is the most populous country of Africa , with a population of around 175 millions inhabitants. The country’s defense budget is 2.11 billion. It has 363 tanks and 96 aircraft. Nigeria’s total naval strength is 75. It covers 923,000 sq km and has a coastline of 853 km.

Nigeria is engaged in a war with Boko Haram, and extremist Islamic group that is committing terrorists actions in the North East of the country. The Nigerian army was poorly equipped until recently , but since the kidnapping of more than 300 Nigerians girls in a school two years ago, the government has seek American Help. Nigerian Army was trained and equipped by the US and was able in late 2014 to launch a vast offensive against Boko Haram. This offensive was reinforced by the election of a new President , that is an ex military , and who wants to totally eradicate Boko Haram. So far , the offensive has been successful , with the Boko Harams militants being pushed away of Nigeria to Cameroun. The Nigerian Army even created a coalition with other neighboring countries such as Chad and Cameroon to eradicate Boko Harams rear bases in these countries.

Sources : Global Fire Power.

The caliphate faces an enemy more deadly than the bombs being dropped upon it. It has not been able to construct a viable economy to provide all of the necessities that a society requires and people will not wait forever to fill their stomachs or for the lights to work.

A film released at the end of August by the Islamic State heralds the coming of a new gold Dinar currency. Najeh Ibrahim, a former member of the Islamist Gamaa Islamiyah, says that this tells the world that the Islamic State is a sovereign state and tells Muslims that their dignity and economic power is being restored.

In November of 2014, the idea of the gold Dinar was first announced. There was a debate within the leading circles of the Islamic State if it was a sound economic plan. In spite of doubts by some, the accumulation of gold and silver for the coins was undertaken, but little more was said of the new currency until the film Rise of the Caliphate: The Return of the Gold Dinar presented the issue as a part of the strategy of the Islamic State to destroy the United States and the West and to create an independent caliphate economy.

Return of the Gold Dinar continues the IS practice of tying every action to the Abbasid Caliphate that ruled much of the Middle Eastern region from 750 to the middle of the thirteenth century, which was an Islamic empire not much different from the Persian and Egyptian empires and minted its own coinage. The new coins are to display religious symbols like those on the original coins. Baghdadi would like his followers to imagine that they are a continuation of the long ago caliphate with only a mere 750-year disruption.

The idea is not new. The proposal to create a gold Dinar was advocated in 2002 when Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad of Malaysia presented it at the Organization of the Islamic Conference. The problems in the economies of Muslim societies were attributed to foreign domination and a gold currency was to be the means of escaping dollar domination by creating a Muslim economic community.

Daesh’s monetary problem is not domination by the USD. Rather, it is that the erasing of the borders between Iraq and Syria did not change the line drawn by two separate economies using two different currencies.

If Daesh intends to create a single economy, it must create a common currency that will enable buyers and sellers to agree upon a price for goods and services without having to first decide upon an exchange rate.

The obvious solution is for Daesh to create its own currency that will circulate throughout the caliphate; but getting the public to accept the new colored pieces of paper from a government that may not exist in a few years makes conversion a near impossibility. The other choice is for people to conduct business in a currency that can be trusted, such as the USD or the Euro. The Turkish Lira is preferred in many cases over the local currencies, but using foreign currencies requires people to have access to them.  How can people acquire sufficient foreign funds to finance their daily needs when the economy is isolated from the surrounding countries?

What commerce does occur is of a criminal nature. How much the caliphate acquires from the export of historical treasures or human organs or oil is all a guess. Contributions from wealthy supporters in Saudi Arabia or the Gulf States or ransom money from kidnap victims provides only a few drops in a desert that is consuming vast amounts of money to finance an ongoing war.

Much of the wealth of the caliphate comes from taxation of its citizens and sale of grain or petroleum that are kept as caliphate monopolies. Exploiting these resources, though, is finite. Farmers will not plant if they cannot expect a reasonable price for their crops and factories will not manufacture if the owner cannot acquire fuel or materials that he can afford or gain a profit that makes the effort worthwhile.

Getting fresh investment is a near impossibility and the economy is in decline which is making the acquisition of a new medium of exchange a serious issue that cannot be delayed too much longer.  Before the rise of the Islamic State, 11 of Iraq’s 35 million people were engaged in agriculture. They farmed twelve million acres of land. In spite of this domestic production, Iraq imported five billion dollars in foodstuffs, much of which was used to provide food packages to the impoverished Sunni in the provinces now under Daesh control.

Since the seizure of large areas of Iraq by the Islamic State, the amount of acreage under cultivation has been cut in half with no possibility of supplementing the loss foodstuffs with imports, while Syria is in even worse condition. Half of the population of 22 million has been displaced and no longer contributes to the economy. If the caliphate cannot provide food and essential services to the people under its control, it faces an insurrection.

The solution chosen by the caliphate is to turn to the gold Dinar that has as much symbolic value as is does as a means of financing the society. While gold speaks of wealth and security in the minds of most people, there is a hazard in adopting a gold currency. The value of the gold coins comes from the quality of gold metal and not from the quality of the issuer. Anyone doubting the longevity of the caliphate will be inclined to horde the coins under a rock somewhere or smuggle the coins outside. The loss of money from the economy will translate into an overall deflation as the scarcity of money raises its value; and that is likely to depress the economy even further.

Return of the Gold Dinar is a declaration of economic warfare upon the United States for reneging upon its pledge to preserve the gold standard and imposing the dollar standard upon the world. The caliphate assures its believers that it will exact its revenge by breaking the dollar and by bringing back the use of gold to finance world commerce.

Egyptian Finance Minister Fayyad Abdel Money, a former professor of economics, points out that there is not enough gold in the world to finance the more than 75 trillion dollar global economy. The U.S. represents a quarter of the total, a power somewhat beyond that of the caliphate.

After all of its talk about the mystical powers of gold, it is their own economy that is a serious weakness in the survival of the caliphate. The caliphate is consuming itself and needs a fresh infusion of wealth.

That means acquiring a commodity that can be marketed outside of the caliphate. The caliphate is targeting for that purpose opium from Afghanistan that produces 90 percent of the world supply and has the extra advantage of being the largest grower of cannabis. It is focusing on The Badakhshan Province, which saw a 77 percent increase in opium production during 2014 and has a minor Taliban presence. The mountainous province extends into Pakistan, Tajikistan and the Xinjiang Province of China. The Russian Federal Drug Control Service estimates that the opium trade is worth a billion dollars.

The move of the Islamic State into Afghanistan is bringing it into conflict with the Taliban, which also relies upon opium as a source of revenue. As its forces strengthen in the north, Islamic State is likely to spread deeper into the Taliban’s territory as both organizations battle to control the illegal drug trade in a Poppy War.

Felix Imonti  writes for GeopoliticalMonitor.com

Involvement in the Syrian conflict is putting Russia’s internal security at risk, as evidenced by both al-Nusra Front (or al-Qaeda in Syria) and Islamic State (ISIS) calling for terrorist attacks on Russian soil. These threats need to be treated seriously for several reasons. Militant jihadist organizations are active in Russia, the country remains a recruitment ground for extremists in Syria (as many as 2,400 Russian citizens have joined ISIS alone according to the Federal Security Bureau) and, finally, Moscow’s decision to support Bashar al-Assad has fueled resentment among a predominantly Sunni Muslim minority in the country.

In order to tackle these issues, Russia has been forced to take soft and hard measures, some rooted in the period preceding its intervention in Syria. These actions target the general Muslim public, including guest workers from Central Asia, and they’re aimed at preventing radicalization and curbing the effectiveness of the Islamic insurgency in the North Caucasus – a region that’s often referred to as “Russia’s soft belly.”

The possible grievances of Russian Muslims were addressed in three steps. An official Muslim clergy, concentrated around the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Russia officially supported the decision of the Russian president to intervene in Syria. Various anti-extremism measures were also taken by its members to counter pro-ISIS propaganda, e.g. issuing anti-ISIS fatwas and extending support for the concept of a ‘new socialization of Islam in Russia’ (a murky idea firstly mentioned by Vladimir Putin in 2013).

Second, as recently as two weeks ago, President Vladimir Putin submitted to the State Duma a bill banning sacred texts (Bible, Quran, Tanakh and Kangyur) and excerpts from them as being recognized as extremist materials in Russia. It was a response to the conflict between the head of the Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov, and a court in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, which ruled that an Islamic book labeled Supplication (Dua) to God: Its Meaning and Place in Islam was extremist literature and as such illegal in Russia. The decision provoked a harsh reaction from Kadyrov – he threatened to punish a judge and a prosecutor who made the ruling, even by breaking the law. Eventually Vladimir Putin took side of the Chechen leader. Kadyrov is his trustworthy ally and insider into Russian Muslim world. The reaction of the Chechen leader to the Supplication to God ban convinced Putin that extremism laws may serve as a trigger for serious religious conflicts, and as such need to be addressed.

The third approach towards maintaining control over Russia’s Muslim population is through intimidation. A recent crackdown against Hizb ut-Tahrir (an organization illegal in Russia since 2003) should be viewed in this light. The FSB conducted at least 25 raids against the organization’s members. 97 suspects were detained, but 70 of them were quickly released. 16 of the 17 remaining suspects were only accused of sympathizing with Hizb ut-Tahrir. These poor results of a highly publicized special operation prove that its main purpose was to send message and keep Russian Muslim communities under control rather than combat any real terrorism threat.

A much more brutal strategy is currently being developed in the North Caucasus. Back in 2014, the insurgency level for the region was lowered. Nonetheless, Dagestan remains the center of political, terrorist, and combat activities, and the greatest source of instability within Russia. Thus it has become a target of the Kremlin, which has started to introduce policies to address the situation.

Local security and political structures were identified as a main source of failure in previous attempts to deal with militants. Therefore federal units took the lead in combating the insurgency, which quickly brought results in the form of the death of the so-called Emir of the Caucasus Emirate (CE) Aliaskhab Kebekov, his successor Magomed Suleimanov, and other senior leaders and rank-and-file members of the organization. At the same time, security organs stepped up repression against Salafi imams and activists. Some of them were killed, others were presented with an alternative: to leave country, even go to Syria using false documents, and to never come back.

The head of the Republic of Dagestan, Ramzan Abdulatipov, with support from Moscow, consequently began to concentrate power in his own hands. Local, influential strongmen, who in past often used the Islamist insurgency to solve their problems, were quickly targeted. Said Amirov, former powerful mayor of Makhachkala, has already been sentenced to life in prison; Sagid Murtazaliev, the former head of the Dagestani Branch of the Pension Fund of Russia is on the run (among other things, he is accused of involvement in murders and supporting terrorism); Sagidpasha Umahanov, the head of Khasavjurt, was forced to resign as well as Imam Jaraliev, the head of Derbent. These are only the most prominent cases among many others.

Russia hasn’t suffered from any terrorist attacks since the country started its operation in Syria. Also, the situation in the North Caucasus is calmer than ever since the beginning of the second war in Chechnya. Partially, this is because of external factors. The rise of ISIS has unexpectedly diverted the attention of would-be militants from the Caucasus, who prefer to wage “five-star” jihad in Syria rather than in their native region. As a result, the threat from ISIS on the Caucasus remains low as it suffers from material, financial and human power shortages. The organization has displayed an inability to conduct any serious actions against Russia up to now. The same rings true for the remnants of the CE, as the organization hasn’t named a new leader since summer 2015, and some observers even claim that the CE no longer exists.

All of these factors indicate that on both levels – national and regional – Russia’s anti-terrorism strategy seems to be working. However, as Russia’s involvement in the Syrian conflict deepens, new shortcomings may come to light.

Jaroslaw Marczuk is an Opinion writer for geopoliticalmonitor.com

Analysis: Twenty-five percent of the Palestinian economy is dependent on Israel . Without the commercial ties  with Israel, the Economy of the West Bank would collapse , and West Bank will turn into a second Gaza.

There is an important risk that the waves of terror of these last weeks, push the Palestinian Authority, who is surviving only thanks to external aids and “donations”, to dissolve, and to proclaim new elections in the West Bank. The disappearance of the Palestinian Authority (PA) would be catastrophic for Israel , from a security perspective.

In the case that the PA loose control of the West bank , the civil administrations , the security and the economic burden will have to be assumed by the State of Israel. This would clearly put Israel as a occupying power and thus legitimize the defamatory campaigns of pro-Palestinians groups such as BDS.

20 years ago, when the Israeli government gave the control of a great part of the West bank to the PA, there were less than 10,000 people working in Palestinians Governmental Institutions. Most of them were workers in the fields of education and health, they were logically trained and supervised by few Israeli experts.

Today more than 150,000 people are working for in the administration of the Palestinian Authority. To this number it is important to add the officials and the retired people that still receive a pension from the PA, which makes around 1 millions people. The budget of the Palestinian Government is around 3.52 billion euros, and an important part of it is coming from donations coming from various countries around the world.

If the PA is dismantled , who will pay for all of this? Who will administrate the offices and administrative services? Without to mention the enormous cost for security, because of the Army deployment in these zones.

The dependence to Israel , is for the moment the main reasons , why Mahmoud Abbas and most of the Palestinians living in the West Bank are reluctant to renounce to the Oslo Agreements and to establish unilaterally “A Palestinian State under Occupation”, which will significant the dissolution of the AP.

The reasons why this situation did not happen yet is well known among many experts of the Middle East : “The Palestinian Economy , especially in the West Bank rely mostly on Israel. Israel is the no.1 partner of the Palestinians concerning economic trade , and many Palestinians are working in Israel”. Without Israel, the West bank would transform very easily into a second Gaza Strip , without clear leadership and with one of the unemployment rate among the highest in the world. All of this would inevitably conduct to an aggravation of the Security Situation.

A good example of the Palestinian economic dependence to Israel , could be found on the database of the Israeli-Palestinian Economic Chamber.  There are more than 1,000 Israelis factories operating in the West Bank, divided in more than  14 Industrial zones. The most famous one is the one of Mishor Adumim, close to Jericho, which possess more than 330 factories. Other important zones are the ones of Barkan in Samaria (160 factories), Atarot , located on the route between Jerusalem and Ramallah and small ones close to Jewish Settlements in the Jerusalem Area.

All these factories, without exceptions are low-tech factories that uses the advantages of the West Bank : cheap labor and many advantageous financial conditions such as low taxes, and loans at an interesting rate. These factories include food processing and textile factories, garages, printing houses, furniture manufacturers, metal and plastic factories and suppliers of construction materials.

The Israeli economy has evolved these last years : progressively the High-Tech products and the industries specialized in High-Tech services , especially financial platforms have replace the traditional industries such as the one of the textile.

The Cities specialized in textiles such as Ofakim and Dimona in the South of Israel , have seen their factories of textile outsourced in Neighboring Arab countries and then later in China and South-East Asia. The reason for that is that the cost of labor was way cheaper in other countries. Nowadays , even Palestinians are favoring the Chinese products rather than Palestinians one , because they are much cheaper.

Still , Traditional industries remains the main the keystone of the Palestinian Economy. There are around 30,000 Palestinians that works in the Israeli Industrial Zones in the West Bank, while 20,000 others are directly working in the construction, transport or agricultures in Israeli communities.

An industry of subcontracts

There is also indirect Israeli-Palestinian trade which provides employment to many people in the West Bank, especially in the textile and furniture industries. A considerable part of the furniture displayed in Israeli stores, for example, was actually produced in West Bank  under full supervision of Israeli companies.

It is stored in factories and warehouses in the settlements in order to avoid the security checks at crossings and the trouble of transferring the goods from Palestinian trucks to Israeli trucks

There is also an entire industry of subcontract work performed by Palestinians for Israel. If we add the 100,000 Palestinians who work in , we will find that at least 200,000 Palestinians makes a living from their connection to Israel. According to the Israeli-Palestinian commerce chamber, they make up more than 25 percent of the Palestinian workforce and produce about 20 percent of the Palestinian Gross Domestic Product.

Most of these Palestinian workers don’t have an alternative if they lost their job and  the current wave of violence may cause the security arrangements in the West Bank to collapse and lead Israel to cancel Working Permit into Israel, and to “block” the Palestinians enclaves. The result will be a destruction of the West Bank’s shaky economy and inevitably the region would turn into a second Gaza, with an important deterioration of the Security Situation.