Young Diplomats

This article was originally published on the INSS website and is available here. This article was written by Orit Perlov and Udi Dekel.

Iran is the dominant actor in Syria. It dictates the fighting on the ground by the pro-Assad coalition, controls the Syria-Iraq and Syria-Lebanon border crossings, and tailors the re-organization of areas and communities based on an ethnic element. Iran wields much – and often decisive – influence on the pace of fighting, in consultation with Russia and Assad. A multi-tiered approach – including control of the Syrian central axis, territorial contiguity, and logistical and commercial axes – is used by different military groups and militias comprising an Iranian fighting force  Israel, which enjoys intelligence supremacy in Syria, is currently ignoring the presence of Iran’s proxies and the other forces under Iranian command in southern Syria. Apparently Israel believes that these forces do not constitute an imminent threat, at least in the near future, and is focusing on preventing the consolidation of substantial Iranian military capabilities in Syria, namely, missiles, rockets, unmanned aerial vehicles, air defense systems, and advanced weapons. It appears that at this stage, Israel relies on Russia and the Assad regime to keep Iran’s forces and its proxies away from the border. It is highly questionable, however, whether Russia and Assad have the will or the capability to get rid of the Iranian presence on Syrian territory, especially in view of the integration of Iranian commanders and Shiite fighters in the local forces.

The Iranian military involvement in Syria, which began in 2012, was designed to save the Assad regime and consolidate Iran’s long term influence in the country. Discourse on the social media is an important tool in understanding Iran’s method of operation in Syria, its forces and proxies stationed in the country, and the growth of its influence there. This article is based on the discourse and assessments of Syrian activists and leaders of public opinion (mainly Sunni) on the social media, verified by documents, pictures, evidence from the field, and interpretations by experts. All of this sheds light on the “Iranian model” in Syria, which relies on the buildup of a range of forces that are subject to Iranian authority and serve its interests in the region. In cooperation with the Assad regime, Iran’s intervention is kept on a low profile, as it deploys soldiers obedient to Iranian authority within the Syrian army, defense units, and militias presumably fighting for the regime.

It is commonly believed that since Iran and Hezbollah joined Syria’s civil war until the present time, i.e., the liberation of southern Syria from the rebels in July 2018, Iran, and not Russia has been the dominant actor in Syria. Iran dictates the fighting on the ground by the pro-Assad coalition, controls the Syria-Iraq and Syria-Lebanon border crossings, and tailors the re-organization of areas and communities based on the ethnic element. Iran wields much – and often decisive – influence on the pace of fighting, in consultation with Russia and Assad.

The operational outline of the pro-Assad coalition, which comprises Russia, Iran, and its proxies, is as follows: first Iranian advisors observe the site, and assess the operational feasibility and prospects for successful conquest. Then they meet with the Russian liaison officers in order to coordinate the land and air operation; military combat forces are then sent into the campaign – Syrian army forces and the Shiite militias under Iranian command. The area designated for liberation from the rebels is surrounded and besieged. The operation begins with a crushing aerial bombardment by Russian air units and the Syrian air force, combined with heavy artillery fire. Once the rebels’ strongholds have been weakened, the land forces penetrate and liberate the area. At the same time, negotiations with the rebels for a surrender settlement are conducted by Russian officers.

The Axes Approach

According to the Iranian approach, a number of axes are needed to preserve the Assad regime, which together with geographic control and command control in Syria is a key instrument of Iranian influence, and an important phase toward control of the Shiite crescent and creation of a land corridor connecting Iran with the Mediterranean Sea.

a. The Syrian “spine”: Axis of major cities in the center and north of the country, home to most of the population and the governmental and economic centers. An essential condition for victory in the war is maintaining control of the along the “spine” from Daraa in the south through the capital city of Damascus and continuing on the central axis leading north to Homs, Hama, and Aleppo, and west to Latakia.

b. Territorial contiguity: Iran is gradually taking over a number of key areas in order to create a contiguous territorial presence between Iran and the Mediterranean Sea, first aiming at the easier portion and then proceeding to the more difficult parts: the Syrian-Lebanese border, followed by Damascus surroundings, the Iraqi-Syrian border, east-to-west strategic hinges, and now southern Syria. In the next stage, forces will be freed up to take over two more challenging regions in northeast Syria – the Kurdish zone, supported by the US-led Western coalition, is essential for Iran, because it controls the Syrian-Iraqi border, and the Idlib province, the last stronghold of the Sunni rebels, which is protected by Turkey. Gaining control of these areas is too difficult at this stage, and has therefore been postponed to subsequent stages of the civil war.

c. Logistics: the main supply corridor from Iran to Syria via Iraq, and from there to Lebanon (by land and by air). This axis (which in a speech in August 2017 Hassan Nasrallah called “the liberation road”) is essential to the buildup of Iran’s capabilities in Syria and its ability to send forces, weapons, and logistics support to its proxies.

d. The commercial and trade axis will be reopened after being completely closed the past few years. It will pass along the “spine” from northern to southern Syria along the M5 international highway from Turkey to Jordan and the Gulf states via Syria. This axis will help in Syria’s economic reconstruction and relieve Iran of some of the economic burden.

Structure of the Iranian Force

The online discourse also reveals a multi-layered structure of forces in Syria marked by growing Iranian influence.

a. The Quds force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps is an organic Iranian force responsible for Syria; the other forces operate under it. Its order of battle and deployment have changed during the war according to the operational needs, varying from 2,000 to 5,000 soldiers. The force includes commanders and consultants operating alongside other forces in the pro-Assad coalition – the Syrian army, the Syrian militias, and the Shiite militias. The Quds force was reinforced in the second year of the civil war when there was serious concern about the survival of Assad’s regime. In the first stage, most of its mission was defensive – guarding President Assad, his loyalists, and his strongholds. With the progress of the fighting, most of its missions switched from defense to offense and assistance in the liberation of areas taken by the rebels. The force later helped open up the strategic routes and arteries.

b. Syrian National Defense Forces: In the early years of the civil war, when the Syrian army (the Syrian Arab Army – SAA) under Assad’s control almost collapsed (due to desertions, lack of recruitment, and heavy losses), Iran decided to help Assad establish the National Defense Forces (NDF) – Syrian militias with Iranian command, training, financing, and armaments. The NDF forces are the Syrian equivalent of the popular Shiite Iraqi militias (Hashad al-Shaabi) and Hezbollah in Lebanon. According to reports, the NDF has recruited some 90,000 Syrian volunteers, with the goal being to base most of the force on Alawites and Shi’ites. At the same time, they have also recruited people from other sectors.

c. Local Defense Forces (LDF) – police, security, and civil administration units of local militias believed to number up to 50,000 men. This body, manned by people loyal to the regime, was established by Iran in response to the demand of local communities loyal to the rule of the central regime in Damascus, in part in order to detect and eliminate those cooperating with the rebels and opposition groups in Syria. Iranian or Hezbollah commanders are integrated in these militias.

d. Shiite militias – the Shiite militias from Afghanistan (Fatemiyoun Liwa) and Pakistan (Zeinabiyoun Brigade) recruited and operated by Iran. These militias are believed to number 10,000-15,000 soldiers. They were designated for use as a key strike force in liberating territory held by the rebels and later for strengthening Shiite and Alawite communities in Syria and protecting them from revenge and hostile activity by the various radical Sunni militant groups. Iran, in coordination with Assad, is encouraging the soldiers of these militias and their families to immigrate to Syria, where they undergo a process of naturalization and absorption in preparation for remaining there, even if it is decided to remove foreign forces from the country as part of a political settlement. The soldiers and their families are settled in officers’ neighborhoods abandoned by Sunni refugees and displaced persons. The purpose is to strengthen Shiite identity in Syria and together with the Shiite and Alawite recruits to the LDF/NDF militias, to consolidate long term Iranian influence and fortify internal support for the Assad regime.

e. Shiite rapid intervention forces: Iran sometimes uses Shiite militias from Iraq and Lebanon (Hezbollah’s Radwan units, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Hezbollah Clavade, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Liwa’a Zulfiqar, Liwa Dhu al-Fiqar, Liwa Abu al-Fadhal al-Abbas, Kawe al-Jafiryah, and others) as forces for rapid intervention in combat areas in order to decide the battle when forces are inadequate for overcoming rebel resistance. At the peak of the fighting, the rapid intervention forces contained up to 30,000 soldiers. In contrast to the attempt to make the Afghan and Pakistani militias into Syrian citizens, the militias from Iraq return to their home countries when their missions are accomplished.

f. Hezbollah – The Damascus Shield and Protector of Lebanon Perimeter: Hezbollah has operated in Syria since 2012 with an order of battle varying from 4,000 to 9,000 soldiers (the number varies according to the unfolding events of the civil war) alongside Assad and under Iranian direction. Hezbollah’s first mission in Syria was to save the Assad regime and closely protect Damascus. In late 2016, Hezbollah forces took part in the battle to liberate Aleppo, Syria’s second largest city. At the same time, Hezbollah focused on fighting in order to preserve its achievement in the area bordering Lebanon, called the Q zone – Quneitra, Qalamoun, and al Qusayr. The main goal was to expel the rebels and the Sunni population in essential areas, in order to safeguard the access roads from Syria to Lebanon, settle a friendly population along and adjacent to the Syrian-Lebanese border, and prevent terrorist and revenge attacks by Salafi jihadist groups in Lebanon. The discourse on the social media suggests that Shiite combatants (excluding those from Iraq) land in Beirut Airport, and proceed to recruitment, absorption, and training camps in Lebanon operated by Hezbollah. After their training period is over, the recruits wearing Syrian army uniforms, are integrated into forces fighting on the side of the Assad regime.

g. Lebanese and Iraqi mercenaries. These fighters are not members of the various Shi’ite militias, but help in fighting in areas where logistical and operational support is needed. They are funded by Iran and, like the Shiite militias from Iraq and Hezbollah, also return to their home countries when their missions are accomplished.

Implications for Israel

Iran conceals its control in Syria; it wants to act and influence behind the scenes, while integrating the forces under its command into the country’s militias and military governmental framework. It is therefore difficult to establish precisely the number of Iranian proxy forces in Syria. According to many Syrian media reports, especially on opposition websites and social media, the Iranian forces, Hezbollah, and the Shiite militias are participating in the fighting taking place in southern Syria while wearing Syrian army uniforms. Russia is certainly aware that not only are the pro-Iranian Shiite militias not withdrawing from southern Syria, but they are even reinforced there. Presumably the Iranian project in Syria will continue, and forces identified with Iran will be deployed near the border in the Golan Heights under some kind of cover in the near future.

Israel, which enjoys intelligence supremacy in Syria, is currently ignoring the presence of Iran’s proxies and the other forces under Iranian command in southern Syria. Apparently Israel believes that these forces do not constitute an imminent threat, at least in the near future, and is focusing on preventing the consolidation of substantial Iranian military capabilities in Syria, namely, missiles, rockets, unmanned aerial vehicles, air defense systems, and advanced weapons. It appears that at this stage, Israel relies on Russia and the Assad regime to keep Iran’s forces and its proxies away from the border once they realize that Iran’s growing involvement and penetration of the local Syrian forces in effect undermines the regime’s sovereignty. It is highly questionable, however, whether Russia and Assad have the will or the capability to get rid of the Iranian presence on Syrian territory, especially in view of the integration of Iranian commanders and Shiite fighters in the local forces. In this case, Israel will have the option of attacking the Iranian proxies even after Assad completes his liberation of the Syrian Golan Heights.

This article was originally published on the INSS website and is available here. This article was written by Orit Perlov and Udi Dekel.

World politics is subject to new order. Enemies in yore are now friends and vice Versa. India, friend of Muscovites, is now hooking up with Americans. Iran, a once first-rate friend of ours, is now foaming against our country. Russia, which had been averse to Taliban, is now striving to get their patents. In such transitional international arena, if anybody still looks at present world texture through the perspective of 1980s, it is evident that he/she will be groping in dark. Hence, foreign policy must always undergo metamorphosis in line with world order.

Op-Ed by our Pakistani ContributorSuhail Khan Mandukhel.

“The views and opinions expressed in some articles are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position or editorial policy of Young Diplomats magazine.”

World politics is subject to new order. Enemies in yore are now friends and vice Versa. India, friend of Muscovites, is now hooking up with Americans. Iran, a once first-rate friend of ours, is now foaming against our country. Russia, which had been averse to Taliban, is now striving to get their patents. In such transitional international arena, if anybody still looks at present world texture through the perspective of 1980s, it is evident that he/she will be groping in dark. Hence, foreign policy must always undergo metamorphosis in line with world order.

Pakistan is magically situated country. It is no exaggeration to state that our country can act both like a tryst and a warring front for other countries to engage either friendly or belligerently. In the words of Stephen Cohn,” while history has been unkind to Pakistan, its geography has been its greatest benefit”. However, our strategists couldn’t work world chessboard in their favor. Unlike other contemporary nations, Pakistan is deconstructing its list of friends. Even our neighbors have it in for our country. In my write-up, I will try to encapsulate the measures which our policy makers must undertake for a conducive foreign policy.

Preoccupation of our foreign policy is Kashmir issue. Since independence, Pakistan has been championing the cause of Kashmiris. Speaking unreservedly, however, so far this issue has been dealt unconscionably. Instead of handling this issue like an international conflict, our rulers have pursued its fruition in a religious mannerism. Resultantly, world takes it for granted and slights this problem as nonissue based on religion. Had Pakistan presented it before the world as an unsentimental and a realistic issue under the rubric of populism, Kashmir would have achieved self-determination in pattern of East Timor. Ensuing it, India is at a full stretch to pare down Muslim majority of Kashmir into minority, and if it succeeds in doing so, foundation of our struggle will meet over-the-top collapse. Although it is no denying the fact that bedrock for the creation of Pakistan was two-nation theory, we still have to internationalize cause of Kashmir in line with UN charter about self-determination.

Afghanistan, a country of topsy-turvy geopolitics, is a thorn in the side of Pakistan. It has been dwelling on doctrine of Irredentism. While Pakistan is shrugging off this claim of Afghanistan as “an Alice in the wonderland”. So far, we couldn’t resolve this issue once for all. More problematically, India is making the most of Afghans’ disillusionment towards Pakistan. Only In 2015-2016, India provided development fund of Rs880 Crore to Afghanistan. Interestingly, Afghan Army is in the pocket of India. Whenever India stirs it up, it sprays flurry of bullets cross the border. Unfortunately, our rulers are addressing this issue lousily. As a result, India had succeeded by a long shot in using Afghanistan as a military outpost. Now open-ended question is, how can Pakistan win over Afghanistan with salutary measures? For sure, China can be most suitable go-between for this entente. Auspiciously, even Taliban consider China a “pacifist” state. If china makes Taliban Parley with Afghanistan and an omnipotent democratic government prevails there, war-torn Afghans will eventually bug out from much-touted claim on Pashtun Areas of Pakistan. Currently, Titular Afghan government is deliberately re-agitating Durand line issue in order to canalize the anxiety of Afghans. Once if Afghanistan gets a viable and potent government, it is likelihood that the issue of Durand Line will be shelved for good.

Another topical issue faced by Pakistan is caustic relations with Iran. After Pakistan announced unvarnished support for Afghan Mujahedeen in 1980s, our image before Iran was reshaped as a Sunni state. After 9/11, this image was further hosed when Northern alliance-financed by Iran-engaged in a square dogfight with Taliban. Later on, Iran took strong umbrage at the Anti-Shia drive of banned outfits in Baluchistan which brought about death toll of over 1,700 Hazaras. Latterly, Pakistan is perching on a confused seat between Saudi and Iran. Vanguard of Islamic Military Alliance, which Iran mistakenly considers to be an Anti-Shia conglomeration of Sunni states, is from Pakistan. Both Saudi and Iran are diametrically important countries for Pakistan. Tehmina Janjua, foreign secretary of Pakistan, asserted aptly,” it is difficult for Pakistan to maintain equal relations with Saudi and Iran, but we (Pakistan) will not go against Iran interests”. It means Pakistan will have to deal this issue deftly. Saudi is already in bonhomie with us so the only exigent measure to be taken in this regard, is propitiating Iran without any delay. Militant groups like Jaish-ul-adal and Jundullah, which are operating attacks along boundary line, must be crippled. Iran must be given the surety that Islamic military alliance wouldn’t be used against its interests at all events. Moreover, too importantly, Pakistan should assimilate Iran into china Pakistan economic corridor.

Our foreign policy needs instrumental masterstrokes. Pakistan has never been a failing state. CPEC is centerpiece of OBOR initiative. We are inseparable allies of China a “Superpower-to-be”. Therefore, our foreign policy must exude the features of a flourishing state. I will conclude my write-up with the well-asserted Quote of Christopher Jaffrelot,” Pakistan is not a failed state, it is a state under tension”. And now it is high time that this tension must be released.

About the Author : 

Suhail Khan Mandukhel

Zhob Baluchistan

Student of Political Science

Twitter.com/SuhailMandukhel

A year was enough for the situation to change radically in Zimbabwe. But it will take more than an election to make a fresh start.
Zimbabwe has been through radical changes within less than a year. President Robert Mugabe decided to resign in November 2017 after 38 years of oppressive and chaotic rule. His former right arm Emmerson Mnangagwa who had replaced him after an obscure coup had to compete in the general elections on July 30th 2018. As expected he won and thus ensured his position as President for the next five years. But he has countless crises to deal with and a lot of criticism to face. In other words he does not bring a lot of confidence to Zimbabwe, which is in an extremely delicate situation after Mugabe’s regime.
Even though Mr Mugabe is out, the ruling party was by no means removed from power. The Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF) is still dominating the political landscape and should now enter its fifth decade of ruling. Zanu-PF is carrying the image of an oppressing and highly corrupted party, an image that Mr Mnangagwa is trying hard to detach himself from. However the recent election is far from reassuring the public opinion about the nature of the new regime. The latter made an effort to invite international observers to control the ballot. But these observers reported unfair procedures and violences perpetrated by the authorities.
The opposition candidate Nelson Chamisa claimed to have won the election and condemned a fraud organised by the ruling party. The reaction of the government was the interruption of Mr Chamisa’s press conference and the arrest of fifteen members of the MDC on August 3rd. However, Mr Chamisa did not give up and publicly announced on August 9th that the MDC would contest the outcome of the election and bring the case to the Constitutional Court. It is an encouraging initiative but it is very unlikely to be efficient. The judiciary power in Zimbabwe is known for being biased and most of the judges are controlled by the Zanu-PF. Therefore Mr Chamisa’s legal procedures are likely to fail and Zimbabwe will probably have to face five more consecutive years of Zanu-PF’s rule.
However it is crucial for the country that a wind of change blows over the national governance. Such a situation cannot go on as 75 percent of the population lives below the poverty line and 90 percent of the labour force is unemployed. The government has been overspending over the last months to guarantee the success of the election. And yet the economic potential of Zimbabwe is obvious. The country can rely on its tremendous reserves of platinum, lithium and gold, as well as on its thousands of acres of croplands. At least Mr Mnangagwa did not follow the South African example and immediately stopped in December the policy of expropriation of the white farmers initiated by Mr Mugabe. The country needs experienced workers to stimulate the economy.
But what Zimbabwe needs the most is help from outside. Mugabe’s term has chased foreign investors away and that must change. For now Mr Mnangagwa has Great Britain’s support and the efforts must be pursued. At the moment China is substantially increasing its investments in Africa and the Chinese President Xi Jinping just came back from a big tour through the continent. He is focusing on the most attractive countries and Zimbabwe must not miss the boat. On August 8th Mr Jinping congratulated Mr Mnangagwa for his victory. But the next step will be the Forum on China-African Cooperation in September in Beijing. This summit can be the starting point of a new era for Zimbabwe.

YoungDiplomats decided to publish three speeches of an american diplomat, businessman and writer, Chas W. Freeman. They are high value speeches because a former American diplomat gives his feeling on what is diplomacy.

Remarks to the Watson Institute of International and Public Affairs

Ambassador Chas W. Freeman, Jr. (USFS, Ret.)
Senior Fellow, Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Brown University
Providence, Rhode Island, 5 April 2018

This is the second of three lectures directed at laying a basis for the development of diplomatic doctrine.  It deals with diplomacy as the tactics of foreign relations.  The preface to this series and the first lecture in it set out some thoughts on diplomacy as strategy.  The third lecture will consider diplomacy as risk management.

In American foreign policy, perpetual warfare, arms races, economic bullying, and derogatory rhetoric seem for the time being to have supplanted diplomacy.  This is a profoundly destabilizing approach to foreign relations.  Once it has run its course, Americans will need to rediscover, reconstitute, and rebuild diplomatic capacity.

Our objective in doing so should be to train and field diplomats who are as skilled in the profession of persuasion as our military are in the profession of arms.  The extent to which we are able to draw on diplomatic doctrine – guidance for the application of judgment to trends, events, and opportunities – will determine the speed and effectiveness with which we can accomplish this.  We need to work now on developing such doctrine for application to our foreign policies and practices when that is possible.

Diplomacy is an instrument of statecraft that few Americans have been educated to understand and whose history – even in relation to our own country – most do not know. Diplomacy emphasizes peaceably arranged change, but it is not pacifist.  Diplomacy is how power persuades states and peoples to accommodate adjustments in relations they instinctively disfavor.  It uses words to portray capabilities and convey intentions in order to shape the calculus of foreign partners and opponents and cause them to make desired changes in their policies and behavior.

Diplomacy is the verbal tactics of foreign relations.  It is the alternative to the use of force as well as its prelude, facilitator, and finale.  It is both the implementer of policy by measures short of war and the translator of the results of war into durable outcomes.

Americans celebrate our independence on the day of its official declaration, July 4, 1776.  Most imagine  that we achieved our autonomy then or on October 19, 1781, when we (and the French) defeated the British at Yorktown.  But this ahistorical view disregards the essential role of diplomacy in such adjustments of relations.  U.S. separation from the British Empire was only secured when the British conceded it.  It took John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, John Jay, and Thomas Jefferson nearly two years to persuade the British to accept that the necessary consequence of their military defeat was American independence.  This became a legal reality only on September 3, 1783, when Britain and the United States signed the Treaty of Paris.

The failure of Americans to recognize the centrality of diplomacy to war termination, including in our own war of independence, is not inconsequential.  Recall the ludicrous triumphalism of President George W. Bush after the defeat of the Iraqi Army in 2003, when he stood on an aircraft carrier under a banner, reading “Mission Accomplished.”  Subsequent events in Iraq provided a costly reminder that no war is over until the defeated admit defeat and accept its consequences.  Such adjustments do not happen automatically.  They are achieved through diplomacy or not at all.

The tragic American experience in Iraq was also a reminder that to achieve peace, there must be a leader among the defeated populace with the authority to commit them to it.  This is why the United States left the Japanese emperor on his throne after World War II.  The failure to consider, let alone address, the question of who might be able to commit Iraqis to cooperation with their foreign occupiers – and what would be required to persuade Iraqis to do so – accounted in no small measure for the anarchy that followed the removal of the Saddam regime in Baghdad.

Diplomatic tactics for war termination are an essential element of any war strategy.  But the translation of military triumph into political victory is a task that the American way of war all too often omits.  This reflects a history of pursuing the annihilation of enemies, their unconditional surrender, and their political reconstruction through occupation.  Disdain for diplomacy that negotiates postwar adjustments in relations, together with “mission creep,” is a major reason that so many American wars spin on without end or abate, only to resume in altered form.

Most Americans seem to see diplomacy and war as a discontinuous dichotomy.  But diplomacy does not halt when war begins.  Nor does the role of military power end when peace replaces war.  Effective diplomatic communication is essential to escalation control.  It is also necessary to convince enemies to make concessions that justify ending wars with them on agreed terms.

War is the pursuit of policy through violent coercion up to and including mass murder.  It does not supplant the need to pursue policy by other means.  Enemies must be made to see that it is in their interest to agree to terms rather than to suffer devastation or annihilation.  This makes diplomatic communication more important than ever in times of war.  One should never lose contact with the enemy on the battlefield or at the negotiating table.  Even when the objective of war is unconditional surrender – generally, a counterproductive posture that incentivizes maximum resistance by the enemy – diplomacy is important to lay the basis for the postwar order.  It is not the military end state that vindicates strategy, it is the political end state.

For wars with limited objectives to end, the combatants must be able to end their combat through a  negotiated resolution of differences on terms they consider acceptable.  The fact that they are fighting makes it all the more important that they talk.  This consideration is why the Chinese – contrary to Western practice – wisely left their embassies in place during their conflicts with both India and Vietnam.  The need to preserve the negotiability of differences is also why Bismarck counseled that one should be polite even when conveying a declaration of war.

Diplomacy in the run-up to war and during it serves to prevent still other adversaries from becoming enemies, to preclude the formation of hostile coalitions, to deny alliances to adversaries, and to divide enemies from their allies and partners.   Wartime diplomacy works to bolster one’s own alliances and partnerships, to extract concessions from actual and potential belligerents, and to lay the groundwork for order and stability to succeed mayhem.  Far from ending during warfare, diplomacy complements military operations and enables them to fulfill their political purposes.  It is how the warring parties translate the results of their combat into adjustments in relations between them.

As important as diplomacy is to the fruitful conduct of war, it is also the principal and most effective alternative to it.  In some respects, diplomacy can be likened to ju-jitsu [柔术] – the use of an opponent’s energy, strength, desires, preconceptions, and mode of coercive action to match, misdirect, disarm, and counter him.  Success depends on knowing what one wants, understanding one’s opponents’ preoccupations, being prepared, seeing one’s objective through one’s opponents’ eyes as well as one’s own, exemplifying stamina and resilience, and knowing when to exploit openings as they appear.

For the most part, Americans have not thought about the role of diplomacy in the expansion of the United States to its present borders.  Some of the diplomacy that built America was peaceful.  Some involved financial transactions.  Some represented the translation of military success into territorial adjustments and other concessions.  American diplomacy opportunistically exploited strategic calculations on the part of the foreign nations with which the United States was negotiating to make America great.  Here are a few  examples.

In 1802, President Thomas Jefferson authorized James Monroe and Robert Livingston to try to buy New Orleans and Florida from France for up to $9.375 million.  Napoleon had just suffered a dispiriting defeat in Haiti and written off French colonial ambitions in the Western Hemisphere.   He needed money.  On April 11, 1803, Napoleon unexpectedly offered to sell the United States all of France’s remaining territories in North America.

Without waiting for further instructions,  Monroe and Livingston set about negotiating a treaty purchasing France’s “ Louisiana” territory for $11.25 million, plus the forgiveness of $3.75 million in French debt.   It took them two weeks to reach agreement with the French.  Their opportunistic diplomacy peacefully doubled the size of the United States at a cost of about 3 cents an acre.  (Had Americans tried to take this territory by force rather than diplomacy, we could have succeeded, if at all, only at vastly greater expense in treasure as well as blood.)

In 1844, President James K. Polk was elected on an aggressively expansionist platform.  At the time, the border between the United States and British Canada west of the continental divide was in dispute.  Polk threatened to go to war with Britain over the issue.  Negotiations between his secretary of state and the British envoy to Washington began in the summer of 1845.  Britain made a deliberate decision to appease the United States rather than entrench a hostile relationship with it.  In 1846, the two sides concluded the “Oregon Treaty.”  This confirmed U.S. sovereignty south of the 49^th parallel everywhere but on an undivided Vancouver Island.

Polk’s diplomatic success enabled him to turn his combative attention to Texas.  In 1846, he provoked war with Mexico.  In the negotiations that followed the U.S. Army’s  victory, the United States insisted on  maximum terms from Mexico, softened by financial inducements.  The resulting Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, signed on February 2, 1848, ended Mexican resistance, resigned Mexico to the U.S. annexation of Texas, and compelled it to sell California and the rest of its territory north of the Rio Grande.  In 1853, the U.S. ambassador to Mexico, James Gadsden, was able to buy additional territory from a still-intimidated Mexico through which to route a southern transcontinental railway.

In 1859, Russia offered to sell Alaska to the United States, hoping that this would position Americans to counter British power in the North Pacific.  The U.S. Civil War intervened.  But, in 1867,  Secretary of State William Seward took up a renewed Russian offer and was able to arrange terms for the territorial transfer.  The U.S. acquisition of Alaska ended Russia’s presence in North America and ensured American access to both the Pacific’s northern rim and the Arctic.

In normal times, diplomacy is not concerned with redefining frontiers but with arranging and policing the terms of trade, investment, and other citizen and corporate interactions across borders.  The first treaties American diplomats negotiated were “treaties of commerce and navigation.”  These were bilateral agreements designed to outflank British and other colonial mercantilism.  They typically ensured “most favored nation” treatment with respect to trade, enshrined “national treatment” and prohibited discrimination, offered access to local courts or arbitration tribunals, exchanged consular officers to promote trade and investment and protect citizens, and established the rules for commerce and shipping in times of war.

Sixty-three such treaties remain in force in the United States today, despite the late 20^thcentury replacement of their primitive bilateral regulation of trade and maritime commerce with  the more sophisticated and efficient multilateralism of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.  These and other treaties define the multilateral framework of globalization from which the Trump administration is now withdrawing the United States.  The American abandonment of multilateral trade and investment diplomacy, combined with aggressive protectionism that ignores previously prevailing norms, foreshadows future U.S. isolation and irrelevance in global economic governance.

Other major trading nations show no interest at all in replacing multilateral institutions and the globalized economy they regulate with new bilateral arrangements with the United States or each other.  On the contrary, they are going ahead with new multilateral schemes that bypass or exclude the United States.  Examples include the Japanese-led revival of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), burgeoning arrangements under China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and policy harmonization and standard setting under the Paris Climate Change Accord.  Future American administrations will find themselves on the outside of these arrangements, trying to get in.  Resentment of American unilateralism is replacing allegiance to U.S. leadership.  Readmission to the councils of governance in an order that has been redefined without U.S. input will demand an unprecedented level of American diplomatic skill.

It is not new for the United States to exempt itself from global norms.  What is new is the relative decline in American power in relation to others and the norms they have accepted.  As an example, the United States is now the only country not to use the metric system.  This ensures that American products cannot meet the standards of foreign markets without redesign or conversion.

This difference has not been much of an impediment for the U.S. economy, given its size,  dynamism, and ability to print dollars instead of exporting goods and services to pay for imports.   But, as the U.S. absents itself from multilateral institutions, others will see an opportunity to use differences like this to their competitive advantage.  (I have personally seen American industry lose billions of dollars in markets abroad to the combination of U.S. complacency and foreign exploitation of standard setting to exclude the import of U.S. products.)  In a globalized world, lack of alertness to such issues soon makes one uncompetitive.

The pseudo-populist plutocrats of the Trump administration came into office asserting that the open world economic order that successive previous administrations had fostered was unfair and had victimized American workers.  The United States has now set the rules it created and enforced for so many decades aside.  This is not just isolating America, it is severely undermining global order and governance.  Meanwhile, alliances are becoming conditional, transforming themselves into ententes.  Protectorates are decoupling themselves from their protectors, as confidence in the reliability of their security guarantors wanes.  Client states are cynically abandoning allegiances and repositioning themselves between patrons.  New trade pacts are coalescing even as other, more inclusive regimes cleave asunder.  In the new world disorder, survival amidst prosperity will demand proficiency in the tactics of diplomatic maneuver.

If the key to sound strategy of any kind is whether one is asking the right question, the key to sound tactics is to ask “and then what?” before taking action.  Strategy must be set at the top but tactics are best driven from the bottom up and from the field in.  Those on the front lines are best positioned to judge the most effective tactics for pursuing strategic objectives in the circumstances they face.  But the current trend is toward the centralization of American decision-making in Washington, the substitution of deductive reasoning from ideological presuppositions for inductive reasoning, and the disparagement of expertise and experience.

Often this sort of “narcissistic policy disorder” – to quote George Will – results in resort to attempted economic coercion through sanctions.  Sanctions are politically attractive.  They sever relationships and unravel ties that bind parties together.  The immediate damage they do is regrettably almost always reciprocal.  Groups and activities on both sides suffer.  But the pain usually falls directly on parts of the private sector and very indirectly on the public at large – not at all on the politicians demanding punitive action or on the government of which they are part.   Thus, sanctions are effective political theater even if they almost never work. There are numerous reasons for this.

The first is the nature of economic power.  Unlike military power – which persuades by menacing the life, liberty, and happiness of those to whom it is applied – economic ties draw their power from the gains nations, companies, and individuals make from exchanging what they have for what they don’t.  Like a string, economic power connects peoples, companies, and individuals and enables them to pull each other together.  It induces cooperation through mutually beneficial trade and investment.  This makes economic measures ideal tools of any strategy aimed at building communities or other cooperative international relationships, as the political effects of removing trade barriers in the European community or the growth of the Sino-centric supply-chain economy in East Asia both illustrate.  But the fact that economic power  links and encourages rather than sunders or discourages profitable exchanges of goods and services between nations also makes economic power a very poor tool of coercion.  You can pull on a string.  You can’t push on it.

Second, sanctions can be essential bargaining chips to be traded for concessions by their target.  But this requires that they be part of a negotiating strategy, not a punitive end in themselves.  At the bargaining table, sanctions are useful as threats.  The fear of sanctions, the precise effects of which can seldom be modeled with accuracy, is generally more compelling than their actual effect.  If sanctions are in fact imposed, their only utility becomes their removal in exchange for concessions that are part of a deal.  But the longer sanctions are in place, the more difficult they are to remove.

Third, once sanctions are put in place, two things routinely happen.  Their efficacy begins to be measured not by their effect on the policies and behavior of their target but by the pain they are seen to inflict on it.  Their original purpose of compelling changes in behavior by their target is effectively forgotten.  While the politicians grandstand, markets quickly adjust to the distortions in supply and demand that sanctions create.  The government that is the object of the sanctions engages in import substitution, finds other suppliers, and institutionalizes smuggling to meet the demand for whatever it has been deprived of.  This is good for its domestic industry, the economic competitors of the power imposing sanctions, and the profits of organized crime.

Fourth, as new patterns of commerce set in, some in the country imposing sanctions come to count on the protection from foreign competition that sanctions afford.  As an example, consider the opposition of American sugar producers to the lifting of sanctions that preclude Cuba, which is a much lower cost sugar producer, from selling sugar in the United States.  Some in the target country or in third countries also acquire a vested interest in the continuation of sanctions.  Consider the growth of the armaments and other industries under sanctions on apartheid-era South Africa or the emergence of Brazil as an alternative source of soybeans for Japan and other importers after the Nixon administration restricted their export in 1973.

Fifth, like war – for which it is spuriously touted as a substitute – sanctions punish but do not automatically translate into changes in policy or behavior on the part of their target.  Ostracism does not persuade, it enrages.  Unacceptable demands are not made acceptable by maximum pressure and attempted public humiliation unaccompanied by a credible negotiating process.  Nations are at their most dangerous when they perceive an existential threat or an injustice from which there is no potential relief through diplomatic dialogue.  Japan reacted to such sanctions with a desperate attack on Pearl Harbor.

Finally, even when integrated into a negotiating process, sanctions increase public pressure but thereby encourage resistance, exacerbate recalcitrance, facilitate shifting the blame for everything going wrong domestically to those imposing them, rally nationalists against perceived foreign bullying, and make compromise more rather than less difficult.  So sanctions typically retard rather than speed agreement at the negotiating table.  In the end, as the Iran nuclear non-proliferation deal illustrated, the only utility of sanctions is their removal.  This can seldom produce a deal resolving the dispute that justified them, but it can serve as a bonus to one.

In the new world disorder, the American advantages that once gave unilateral U.S. sanctions their unique impact are disappearing.  In 1950, the United States provided 16.7 percent of the world’s exports and took a whopping 81 percent of its imports.  In 2016, these figures had fallen to 9.1 and 13.8 percent, respectively.  A disproportionate percentage of American exports now consist  of financial and other services for which there are an increasing range of alternative non-American sources.  This makes America a very powerful but no longer dominant force in international trade and investment.  Americans have fewer followers internationally and a declining ability to impose economic and financial isolation on our foreign adversaries.

In these circumstances, the United States, as the issuer of the principal currency for settling international transactions, has come to rely on its sovereignty over the dollar to block trade and investment with countries like Iran, north Korea, and Russia.  But this effectively imposes U.S. policies to which they object on economic powers like China, India, Japan, and south Korea.  As these countries see it, the United States is abusing its power as the issuer of the preeminent global currency.  This is driving them to explore work-arounds and substitutes to the dollar in their own trade with countries under U.S. sanctions.  If they succeed, the consequence for Americans could be a catastrophic loss of the “exorbitant privilege” of printing money to pay for imports that we have long enjoyed.  In any event, current trends guarantee that future generations of American diplomats will have less financial coercive power to work with.  This will test their negotiating skills in ways that previous generations have not experienced.

Diplomatic negotiation is a teachable art.  It differs from negotiation in other contexts because it takes place between nations, not citizens subject to coercion by the sovereign authority of their government through litigation in its courts.   The participants in diplomatic negotiation have the option of resorting at any time to the use of force against each other.  They can choose to accept or ignore the prevalent norms and rules of international law.  Implicit agreement on rules by one side cannot assure that the other side will adhere to them.   If diplomatic negotiations fail, the result is protracted impasse, escalating tensions, or armed conflict, not a lawsuit leading to a court decision and penalties.  The stakes in international negotiation are higher than those in domestic transactions.  All the more reason to demand excellence from those charged with conducting it.

Diplomatic negotiation should be viewed as an application of national power by measures short of war.  The object is to persuade one’s opponent to embrace the need to accommodate one’s demands, faute de mieux.  The purpose of diplomacy is not to reach agreement with the other side but to achieve the end state one’s strategy requires.

Very occasionally, not talking is a form of negotiation.  It can allow time to ripen circumstances conducive to concessions by one’s adversary, for example, by inciting quarrels between it and third parties, encouraging insurrection against it, or demonstrating one’s coercive capabilities against a third party.  Or it can mean using talks to shelve issues, stall for time to strengthen one’s position, allow the situation to evolve in one’s favor, create a crisis that forces the other side to make decisions it would otherwise evade, or make the other side appear to have been so unreasonable as to leave no alternative to the use of force against it.  Stalling for time can also mean entering talks but conceding only minor points, insisting that the major issues or principles be reserved until they can be resolved to one’s advantage.

Diplomatic intercourse should never be seen as a favor to the other side but as a convenience to one’s own.  It is a means by which to convey one’s position directly to an adversary, to listen to its reasoning about its position on the issues in contention, to argue for changes in that reasoning, and to warn, cajole, and probe for evidence of willingness to concede specific points.  Direct dialogue can lend gravitas and the credibility of body language to threats or carefully articulated offers to compromise in ways that written messages or communication through intermediaries cannot.  It can help develop constructive ambiguity, repair bruised amour propre, facilitate cooperation on issues of common concern notwithstanding confrontation on other matters, develop personal relationships that ease the resolution of disputes or enable collusion once opportunities ripen for it, and provide a distraction for the media.  Meetings with adversaries are the theater in which diplomacy best struts its stuff.

The major task of diplomacy is the management of relationships.  In the new world disorder, these seem certain to be more fluid than they were in the last century.  Transactionalism seems set to replace fixed friendships and animosities.  The progressive debilitation of the (admittedly imperfect) protections of international law is leaving countries with no alternative to defending themselves as best they can with whatever weaponry they can build or acquire.  Relationships embodying obligations are diminishing, freeing states to maneuver in accordance with their interests as they see them.  There are likely to be many ententes, but progressively fewer alliances and protectorates.  The rivalries in a multipolar state system are unlikely to support many client states – free riders on the ambitions of a single great power patron.  Smaller states are likely to consider strategic promiscuity a safer course than bonding with a particular patron.

Where interests for a time coincide, nations will cooperate.  Where and when they do not, they will not.  This environment will penalize diplomatic immobility and incompetence and reward agility, flexibility, versatility, and responsiveness to change that underwrites adaptation, resilience, and innovative approaches to deal with new problems and opportunities.

Some international relationships are bound to be adversarial.  Diplomacy must seek to forestall the transformation of adversaries into active enemies.  That is, unless – as is rarely the case – overt  hostility by one foreign party can stimulate rapprochement by a larger, more capable nation whose support would facilitate the pursuit of other, more important interests.  It is usually in the national interest to inhibit the evolution of relations from skepticism to passive resistance to active opposition on issues. Such evolution can lead to broadly adversarial relations.  Adversarial relations easily become broad hostility or outright enmity.

During the Cold War, the United States learned to rely on deterrence rather than diplomacy to address potentially explosive situations.  This made sense in a world order with essentially fixed frontiers between two great blocs of states in which the United States enjoyed unmatched coercive power.  But, in the context of disorder and fluid relations between states, it should not be the first resort of statecraft.  Deterrence leaves the causes of potential conflict to evolve for the worse, stimulates arms races, invites countermeasures, generates “security dilemmas,” and often precludes cooperation on unrelated matters.  Its effect is to prevent problems from exploding now but to leave them to explode later.  Sometimes the passage of time erases or alleviates the danger that disputes might erupt in armed conflict.  But it can also permit them to fester and enlarge their potential to produce catastrophe.

Delay makes sense when one’s power is growing relative to that of others.  But, strong as the United States is and will remain, others are growing ever stronger.  The balance of economic and military power is shifting away from America.  In these circumstances, deferring problems for later resolution assures that when and if they come to a head, U.S. leverage will have weakened even as the outcome of conflict has become more uncertain..  Future American diplomacy must focus first on resolving disputes, not perpetuating them.

“Ignorance is the cause of fear,” Seneca reminds us.  Fear generates suspicion.  This easily becomes hostility.  Mutual familiarity may not breed affection but it is the best cure for imagined security dilemmas, in which each side’s defensive responses to the other are seen as threatening and requiring an escalatory response.

Losing contact with the enemy on the battlefield risks surprise, flanking, or encirclement.  Halting communication with a diplomatic opponent carries similar risks.  The principle of statecraft embodied in what the Arabs call “Muʿāwiyah’s Hair” applies.  The second Umayyad Caliph, Muʿāwiyah ibn Abī Sufyān, famously declared: “should there be but one hair between me and the others, I would not have it cut: for if they slacken it I would pull, and if they pull I would slacken it some.”

The dangers of substituting protracted deterrence for diplomacy are well illustrated in the current confrontation between the United States and the so-called Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.  For sixty-five years, U.S. policy toward the north Korean regime has consisted of containment through ostracism, embargo, confrontation, and military shows of force.  There is no gainsaying the despicable cruelty and thuggish belligerence of the Kim Dynasty.  But at no point has the United States, which is unquestionably the stronger party, developed a strategy for  coexistence with north Korea.  There has been no American initiative to seek replacement of the 1953 armistice with a peace, despite the commitment of its signatories to do so.  Instead, American policy has consistently projected the collapse of the north Korean regime or its conquest if large-scale combat on the Korean Peninsula recurs.  The north Korean response has been a desperate drive to develop nuclear weapons to deter direct or indirect U.S. imposition of regime change.  This effort has now achieved – or is nearing – success.

It has also produced a breakthrough for north Korean diplomacy in the form of American agreement to a summit meeting  – something that Pyongyang has long sought.  The mere fact of this meeting confirms the importance of the DPRK, its new status as the possessor of a nuclear deterrent, and – by implication – the legitimacy of both its state and its security concerns.  President Trump agreed to this meeting on the basis of a south Korean read-out of a private conversation with Chairman Kim Jong-un to which no Americans were privy.  So far as we know, Chairman Kim has not confirmed the president’s interpretation of his words directly or indirectly.  They have not left the realm of hearsay.

Talking with adversaries is usually better than not talking, provided you know what you’re going to say and are confident you know what your counterpart can and cannot accept.  Direct communication with north Korea’s leader on terms that convey respect for his power (but not his policies) may prove to be the key to a breakthrough.  But it could also produce a catastrophe.

That is bound to be the case if the president simply repeats past American positions and does not address the fears that underlie north Korea policy.  From Chairman Kim’s perspective, the United States has been saying: “if you don’t disarm yourself, we reserve the right to kill you, so give up your deterrent now, and we’ll see what we can work out.”  Libya’s Colonel Qaddhafi took a chance on a similar offer and gave up his weapons programs.  A few years later, he was memorialized by the U.S. secretary of state with the words, “we came.  We saw.  He died.”  It will be very difficult to persuade Kim Jong-un to place his trust the United States.

Summits between adversaries are the diplomatic equivalent of single combat to decide battles between armies.  Summits risk everything on the outcome of a single encounter.  They add a direct clash between egos to a contest of interests.  If they are well prepared, summits can ratify or finalize agreements and consolidate new relationships.  But they can also exacerbate and further entrench confrontation.  Given the stakes, summits are seldom, if ever, undertaken without extensive prior consultation and negotiation between subordinates.  They proceed only when such dialogue has confirmed that an encounter between leaders has a high probability of producing a breakthrough rather than a setback in relations.

In some ways, despite the vast superiority of U.S. military power, President Trump will find himself at a disadvantage at any summit he may have with Mr. Kim.  The United States has never had many experts on the DPRK.  The past year has seen an exodus from the U.S. government of most of the American diplomats and officials with experience of direct contact with north Korean counterparts.  By contrast, the north Korean side is staffed with officials who have spent decades dealing with Americans.  The balance of expertise favors Pyongyang, not Washington.  So does the balance of fervor.  The issues for Chairman Kim and his country are existential.  President Trump’s personal prestige may depend on the outcome of a meeting with Chairman Kim, but the future of the United States does not.  As Mr. Trump often says, we will see what happens.

Whatever that is, American diplomats need to learn from it.  The U.S. military has the healthy habit of after-action reviews to learn from what went right, what went wrong, and what might have been done better in an engagement.  Sometimes what is learned is sufficiently important to be incorporated into doctrine.  More commonly, it provides insights into how training can be improved.  A reconstituted, more professional United States Foreign Service should institutionalize similar reviews of its own performance and make them as mandatory and routine as the inspection of management functions in embassies and other diplomatic organizations now is.

The constant review of experience is essential to extract and test the hypotheses that constitute the doctrine – the institutional memory and essential skill set – of any profession.  The substance of diplomacy involves maneuvers between states and peoples.  These are both intellectually fascinating and emotionally engaging.  Much ink is spilt describing and analyzing them.  Diplomats – even retired diplomats – easily become fixated on the issues with which diplomacy must grapple and fail to focus on the process and methodologies by which such grappling must be done.  But such a focus is the sine qua non of mastery of the diplomatic arts.  Such mastery  will be essential for the recovery of American leadership once the current, self-inflicted weakening of the United States politico-economic role in world affairs is behind us.

Diplomacy is a universal skill, not the preserve of any particular nation or its history.  There is a great deal to be learned from the ways in which the statesmen of other countries manage – or fail to manage –  the issues that confront them.  But the American experience alone is rich in examples of effective diplomatic tactics.  It is time for Americans to start mining that experience for the lessons it contains and to incorporate what we learn in a teachable body of interrelated operational concepts.  The raw materials to build such diplomatic doctrine are before us.  We just  need to exploit them.

On October 7, Brazil will hold its first election since Operation Car Wash ravaged the political landscape. Four years ago, the probe was still in its first months and hadn’t yet reached its status as the  “biggest anti-corruption investigation in Brazilian history.” The scandal that tarnished virtually every single major political party will now have an effect on the election – whether it is in the rise of fringe candidates such as far-right Jair Bolsonaro, or in the lack of interest by young voters.

Citizens between 18 and 70 years old, regardless if they’re living abroad, are required by law to vote (or else present a justification to the Electoral Justice System for absence). Failing to do so has serious consequences, as people could be prevented from obtaining passports, taking out loans from public banks, or even enrolling in a public educational institution.

But even obligated by law, Brazilians are by no means keen to vote. Trust in public institutions is at an all-time low. Almost half of voters have no idea who they will vote for in two months – a rate higher than ever before. As a reflection, polling institutes predict that up to 70 million might choose not to show up to the polls on election day.

Many youngsters between 16 and 18, when voting is allowed but not mandatory, have chosen not to register to take part in the election. The number of teen voters has decreased from 1.6 million to 1.4 million, representing 1 percent of the total.

READ THE FULL STORY NOW!

Indian Foreign Policy runs through the engine of need of the hour and ability to control global issues with in-hand solutions.
As George Modelski once said –

‘Foreign policy is the system of activities evolved by communities for changing the behavior of other states and for adjusting their own activities to the international environment’;

we are mending it as per our needs and deeds in international diaspora.India – a secular, sovereign, socialist, democratic, republic, bounded by these five multifaceted broadly explained terms acts as an intended multilateral dimension to boost our foreign policy in very significant manner. Indian foreign policy treats our diplomacy in idealistic manner with some core principles of Non Alignment, Sarve Bhavantu Sukhina and Nation First later. Whether, it will be the formulation of NAM after the meet of Asian nations in Bandung Conference proposed by Jawaharlal Nehru or the stress on preserving national interest first by Indira Gandhi or self reliance idea by Rajiv Gandhi or Gujral Doctrine by Indra Kumar Gujral or going nuclear by Atal Bihari Vajpayee or shifting it towards East from West by Manmohan Singh, the core principle always stands on “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam”- which is based on the ancient evident traditional principles laid by Great King Ashoka while propagating Buddhism in South Asia without use of any weaponry silently. This is the first ever example of Indian Diplomacy on the lines of peace and prosperity.

Today, with the new Prime Minister Narendra Damodardas Modi our policy replicates pro active approach with neighboring countries named as ‘Neighbourhood First’ with special focus towards South Asia, IOR nations and West simultaneously. There are two basic reasons to do so – First, building Indian stand at the world order and Second, access to the markets from where primary and tertiary products can be interchanged. India is now the world’s fastest growing economy which means it needs more market, energy, information, technology, capital, equipment, resources and connectivity to prosper further goals and remove barriers from free flow of goods and services. So, as to did it in practical approach some very key efforts put by Indian policymakers with the help of diplomatic means in regional space like – Defence sales to Mauritius, Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal (BBIN) grouping for advance motor vehicle movement and inter-grid connectivity, Kaladan multimodel project, Land Border Agreement with Myanmar, permission to access Chittagong port, leased Chabahar port from Iran, and energy deals with Nepal etc. Overall, multipronged strategy with multidimensional approach at multilevel co-operational capability leads India to the heights of diplomatic keenness.
Turning page from Look East to Act East is bridging diplomacy with developmental edges to leverage international co-operation and partnership to boost Indian domestic development. With this change, our sub focus is to balance China in IOR region with Line of Credit to smaller inefficient Islandic nations. Grave concerns arose when Chinese footprints rise in this region with OBOR and Silk road project particularly focusing Pakistan; an arch old dark shade of India, diplomatic intervention succeeded our foothold automatically to Chabahar in Iran. It’s a success of our diplomatic engagements that we are not in direct war with any nation from last 20 years after Kargil and maintaining rugged neighbors at West, North, and North-East simultaneously.
India is developing its hidden capabilities with time to garnish its position adequately. We are not in the position to lead or set rules of international order but paving slightly towards bolstering our position in main domain of decision making. ICJ ruling on Jadhav, WTO negotiations with USA, membership at SCO, promulgation of BIMSTEC to counter Pakistan over SAARC are the significant examples of workable success of India at diplomatic front. Soon, India will get their place at APEC membership, UN Security Council (P5+1) to establish itself as a key decision maker at top notch. New Delhi came with new type of diplomatic conclave at India named as Raisina Dialogue to act as a bridge for new ideas, concepts, possibilities and opportunities from out of the bureaucracy also. Several NPO, NGO, think tanks are now actively working with specialization in specific areas for the empowerment of our status in regional and global scale.

Core strategic priorities of Indian foreign policy and diplomacy vested in –

Increasing role of India in global governance.
Developing own circle of leadership for regional balance.
Deter Pakistan from the lines of terrorism.
Maintaining equal status quo with China.
Lure international community to support Indian rise; atleast domestically and regionally.
Safeguarding IOR from evident contenders.
Strategic outposts at key geographical locations.
Shaping role of BIG BROTHER into new outfit to pacify regional satisfaction.

With priorities towards neighbors, India is also knitting its web to prepare itself for future leadership in Asia. Among Asian Tigers of high economic growth and presence of DRAGON in Asian central mainland, India is now 3rd largest economy of world on PPP basis, leaving Japan behind us. Northern and North-West neighbors can act as a dodge to India but we are balancing in every sense like security, regional peace, nuclear balance, trade impact, and most importantly border issues. The high level meetings of defense personnel’s, frequent visits by top leaders, framing of bilateral agreements, humanitarian access to individuals, and breaking logjams or standoff by talks is living examples of our foreign policy.
“VASUDHAIVA KUTUMBAKAM” was and is the core ideology of Indian thought making process which means welfare for all. We are standing with it, from last 2000 years as an ancient sutra for eternal existence of humanity. In modern times where theory of nation-state is relevant, we people are living example of unity in diversity from centuries.
Of all this efforts lies into the ground, some structural hitch cocks still decelerating Indian pace like – Lack of strategic thinkers, low numbers of Indian Foreign Services personals, poor diplomatic skill sets, blurred blueprint of Indian vision on global issues, follow-up habit towards global leaders, poor performance of intelligence agencies (especially internal), political restraints on vague decisions, and resistance by states (provinces). Several issues were not treated properly in past by Indian side which dented our image regionally, when it comes in case of Sri Lanka, Tibet, Myanmar, Maldives and Bangladesh. Those mistakes even caused assassination of two Indian PM’s Rajiv Gandhi and Indira Gandhi. We paid really huge in those terms and now learned a lot to counter these types of shortcomings in future.
Indian foreign policy is now guided by institutional coordination and follow-up action on the policy made by government at North Block. This place is now embedded by new minds and our appointments are now more comprehensive with certain minimum skill sets required. Practical application of key policies is now ensured by Ministry of External Affairs and even Prime Minister’s Office is playing very significant role to figure out and solve real issues as they really want. Now on, India is working on consensus building, pouring young Indian talent pool in action, and more political consultation to grossly perform.
We are ready for steady go.

What are great powers? Let us break it down. They are states with exceptional economic, strategic and social influence on the landscape of Earth. At the core of this concept, currently, there are three such states: mighty America, aggressive Russia, and the economic power China. All are striving hard to win the king’s palace.

A year back, the biggest threat to American interests was terrorism, which has now been replaced with the great-power competition. The policy document ‘National Defense Strategy’ released by President Donald Trump’s administration placed great-power competition at the first place in the list of ‘major potential threats to the USA’, displacing terrorism to second place. This policy document portrayed both Russia and China as adversaries that were potential threats to US national interests, particularly in Europe, Asia and the Middle East, and generally in the world.

The things that caused this shift in US policy have their roots in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s revisionist and aggressive policies, and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. Washington sees the BRI as a threat to the US-led world order. Therefore, an effective policy to counter China’s influence is the need of the hour for American policymakers.

At face value, the option before the Trump administration is pretty clear: divide and rule. And the Americans have frequently enjoyed this rule. Breaking it down, recent reports by the US Central Intelligence Agency and other influential agencies show an aggressive Russian defense policy with exceptional military capabilities that can outweigh America’s strategic capabilities in the case of direct (highly unlikely) or indirect confrontation between the two major powers. In contrast, China has been asserting huge opposition to the US in trade and development linkages with the European Union in particular and the world in general.

The recent EU-China summit without the participation of Washington was a clear sign of China’s dominance in a trade war. Similarly, the successful implementation of BRI in Asia, Europe, Africa and the Middle East also solidifies Beijing’s trade dominance over America’s. In short, China’s economic policies are gaining applause in the international market. That’s a big problem for Trump administration, which has promised at home to “make America great again.” The latest sanctions and fines levied on Chinese tech giant ZTE shows a troubling path for both countries in a trade war.

Thus if China and Russia join hands against the US, that would be disastrous for the US effort to hold the portfolio of “sole superpower of the world.” Weighing up both sides of the argument, the divide-and-rule policy is the sole option for Washington for survival. In the past, the famous American policymaker Henry Kissinger employed this policy by aligning China against Russia during Richard Nixon’s presidency. Now, in his meetings with Trump, Kissinger has reportedly suggested the opposite of his previous policy. That is, align with Russia by giving it leverage against China in the international arena.

Trump’s recent one-on-one talk with Putin in Helsinki was a bold manifestation of Washington’s appeasement toward Russia. In that, Trump went quite opposite to the findings of his own national-security agencies. Thus, the US is no longer a Russophobe.

No doubt the path for the US to implement ‘divide and rule policy’ is difficult to pursue as there are differences between China and Russia on various issues, yet both Beijing and Moscow are not on conflicting terms.

As an example, Russia has still not opted to join China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. Similarly, the two countries view the Europeans differently. Russia has strategic interests in Eastern Europe while China is pursuing economic objectives. Similarly, the interests of both differ greatly in Central Asia and Middle Asia. In the Russian context, Central Asia should follow Moscow’s footsteps and only Kremlin has the right to interfere in the matters of Central Asian nations.

Summing up the differences between two Eastern powers, they have divergent interests in the world yet they are cooperating strategically, and therefore are not interested in conflict. In fact, both China and Russia have supported each other on various issues in the United Nation’s General Assembly and Security Council, and are seeking ways to enhance bilateral cooperation. Similarly, the platforms of BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) are of immense importance for both countries to advance their relations with a win-win strategy.

In conclusion, it is hard for the US to treat both Russia and China as adversaries at the same time. Thus aligning with one at the cost of the other is a viable option in the contemporary world for Washington to maintain its hegemony. Although the task is pretty difficult to achieve, it may succeed to some extent in a future decade as the thinkers in the White House are considering this advice of the legendary Henry Kissinger. In the end, recent events favor a possible alliance of the US with Russia at the cost of Europe to give a blow to Beijing’s dream of ‘Chinese World Order’.

On 26th of July a significant event unfolded in Pakistan, perhaps one of the most politically volatile countries in South Asia. Imran Khan emerged victorious amid the allegations of pre-poll rigging by Pakistan’s military establishment. Later in the evening, in a televised address, Imran Khan expressed his intent to improve the bilateral relationship between India and Pakistan, he also mentioned that Kashmir remains the bone of contention between two countries. However sincere he may be in trying to improve bilateral relations with India, history stands testimony to that fact that Foreign policy of Pakistan remains the monopoly of its Military establishment which might want to keep the pot boiling. 

On same day in 1999, India retrieved the strategic heights of Kargil that were captured by Pakistan Army regulars disguised as mercenaries. An understanding of political events which led to a military conflict between India and Pakistan would be able to give reader an understanding as of who calls the shot regarding Pakistan’s involvement with India. Towards the end of twentieth century, both India and Pakistan had tested nuclear weapons which resulted in an outrage from the global community. Of late, Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif, Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan respectively, decided to put an end to the speculations of a nuclear conflict by indulging in a bilateral dialogue. Mr Vajpayee undertook a groundbreaking bus journey from Delhi to Lahore to sign the famous “Lahore Declaration” on 21 February 1999 and reinstate the “Simla Agreement” of 1971 in letter and spirit. The Lahore Declaration was aimed at easing the tension between two countries.Under the terms of the treaty, a mutual understanding was reached towards the development of atomic arsenals and to avoid accidental and unauthorised operational use of nuclear weapons.

When the Lahore Summit was being planned, Pakistan’s Military had already outlined the nitty-gritty of ‘Operation Badr’ which, broadly put, was aimed to capture the ‘winter vacated posts’ along the strategically important NH1-A of India which connects Srinagar to Leh. Their objective was to thwart the movement of Indian troops towards Leh and subsequently seize the Siachen glacier, which Pakistan likes to call a “low-lying fruit”. ‘Operation Badr’ was materialised in May 1999 under the command of Major General Javed Hasan, Force Commander Northern Areas(FCNA). Whether Mr Nawaz Sharif was kept aloof of the above-mentioned developments still remains unclear. Either way, it was established that the elected representatives in Pakistan have no say in the foreign policy. In response to Pakistan Army’s misadventure, India launched ‘Operation Vijay’ aimed to regain the Kargil heights with a clear operational mandate to not cross the Line of Control (LoC), however grim the circumstances may be. After nearly two months of intensive military involvement, India evicted Pakistanis from Kargil.

More recently, in yet another unprecedented effort by India to establish peace with Pakistan, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Lahore on his way back from Kabul on 25 December 2015. He visited the farm house of the then Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif in Raiwind and both leaders reiterated their sincere resolve to put an end to all disputes including Kashmir through ‘comprehensive bilateral dialogue’ – a phrase deviced by Pakistan’s government itself. However, seven days after Mr Modi’s Lahore visit, a group of heavily armed militants,  belonging to Pakistan-based terror groups United Jihad Council and Jaish-E-Mohammad, aided and abetted by Pakistan Army crossed over the International Border(IB) and attacked the Indian Air Force base in Pathankot. The attack was perpetrated in response to the peace effort by Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan. Mr Sharif was perceived to be a ‘dove’ by Pakistan Army and it has largely been the reason why they played Imran Khan against him.

Now that Mr Imran Khan is set to form the Government in Pakistan, it is pertinent to look at his political background. Early in his political career, he was accused of being a person of ‘westernised’ thought by opposition parties in Pakistan, his ex-wife’s Anglo-Jewish identity did not go very with Pakistan’s orthodox society. After a plethora of political upheavals, Mr Khan matured into an ultra-conservative right-wing politician who was even dubbed as ‘Taliban Khan’ for having praised the Taliban. He supported the blasphemy law and vowed to establish an ‘Islamic welfare state’ on the lines of Medina.

Conclusion

It has now been established that Mr Imran Khan has been backed by Pakistan’s Military because of his ideology is more in sync with theirs. Whether he would toe the line of General Headquarters, Rawalpindi to go ahead with the peace process with India seems improbable. Since Pakistan’s inception, no elected Head of Government has been able to complete full term in the office. Imran Khan may want to break the jinx but for that he may have to comply with Pakistan’s all-powerful Generals.

Shashwat Vats, a History student based in India, is an observer of South Asian geopolitics, International Relations and Diplomatic affairs.

Criticized by the left for forming an alliance with Mr. Temer and his party, Lula said in 2009 that “in Brazil, Jesus would be forced to make a coalition with Judas if he wanted to govern.” Almost nine years later, we can’t think of a more appropriate way to describe Rousseff’s political marriage to Temer. In 2016, Temer actively conspired to get Rousseff removed from the presidency – and has, as his reward, occupied Brazil’s highest office since May 2016.

In two months, Brazilians will choose a new president. This past weekend, though, it was our candidates’ turn to choose their running mates. We explain why that matters.

LISTEN TO OUR PODCAST HERE!

Will Lula be able to run for president?
During its national convention this weekend, the Workers’ Party launched – for the sixth time – Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva as the party’s presidential candidate. In prison since April 7, the former president is still leading all polls, with his voting intentions ranging from 30 to 40 percent. This unlikely union of incarceration and popularity makes Lula the deciding factor heading into the campaign season. However, we won’t know for sure until September if his name will be on the ballot on October 7.

There are two possible paths for Lula to be granted the right to run for a third presidential term – and both depend on the Supreme Court. His first option is to go to the Supreme Court once the Electoral Justice system denies his candidacy registration. Lula’s workaround would involve trying to suspend his sentence (a criminal, not electoral, issue).

Lula’s legal options

In Brazil, individuals’ political rights are suspended after a criminal conviction. However, that happens only after all appeal routes have been exhausted. Lula’s case, despite the fact that he has been in jail since April 7, has not reached that point yet – as he still has appeals remaining at Brazil’s two highest courts, the Superior Justice Tribunal and the Supreme Court. A final guilty verdict would only come after – and if – he loses those appeals.

READ THE FULL STORY NOW!