Young Diplomats

As you know, one of the purposes of YoungDiplomats is to create and spread knowledge on geopolitics, international reations and war studies. How? Articles is only a minor part of YoungDiplomats. We are building a social network around YoungDiplomats activities. Then YD is about to plan several events worldwide. Here are recaps of our activities !

Conferences

During a conference, we have the ability to dispense information and knowledges on a specific topics. YoungDiplomats organized its first Paris conference on Kurdistan and we made several other conferences in T’chad.

Simulation

We also made several simulations on how could international community solve issues such as the Syrian conflict. These can be tests to challenge your oral skills and you can also understand how hard are international negotiations when it comes to high stakes conflicts !

Interviews

YoungDiplomats interviewed dozens of political personnalities worldwide. Above, you can see Gentiana Fana and Harriett Lee Thomas former U.S ambassador in Turkey. Those interviews are a chance to meet real actors of international relations ! YoungDiplomats will interview the former president of France by December !

At the beginning YoungDiplomats aimed to deliver knowledge thanks to a website. Now we are much more. With conferences, debates, interviews and simulation we have the ability to become a worldwide organization of geopolitics.

The main role of military is to protect the sovereignty of the nation and to keep its people and the borders safe. The Asian military forces are among the strongest militaries in the globe. The region is made up of five of the world’s top 10 most powerful armies. Still in the same region, some military forces are more powerful than the others. This article is available on  : http://www.theestle.net/2015/10/05/top-10-strongest-and-most-powerful-military-forces-in-asia/

Asia is a huge continent. In fact it is the largest continent in the world. It has five of the world’s top 10 most powerful armies. Here is a brief overview of the top 10 most powerful militaries in Asia as of 2015. This ranking grants a good approximation of a country’s basic military readiness and as such provides an impartial view of the nation’s military strength. In descending order, below is a short overview of the Top 10 Strongest and Most Powerful Military Forces In Asia as of 2015.
10/ AUSTRALIA

Australia’s military expenditure is the thirteenth largest in the world. Australian Defence Force (ADF) is the nation’s armed forces. They comprise the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), The Australian Army and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). The Governor-General is the Commander-in-Chief of the ADF. The nation’s military force is technologically sophisticated but relatively small. Though its 58,235 full-time active-duty personnel, 22,072 active reserves and 22,166 standby reserves make it the largest military in Oceania, it is still smaller than most Asian militaries. However, the country’s military force is supported by a significant budget by worldwide standards and is able to deploy forces in multiple locations outside Australia.

9/ INDONESIA

Indonesia military is the 7th strongest in Asian-Pacific. Its armed forces have been able to maintain mandated strength levels without resorting to a draft. Most of the personnel enlisted are recruited in their own home regions and generally train and serve most of their time in units close-by. Military spending in the national budget was widely estimated 4 percent of the country’s GDP but is supplemented by revenue from many military-run businesses and foundations. Indonesian army has about 400,000 active-duty personnel. Indonesia allocates around 4 percent of GDP to its military.

8/Taiwan

Officially the Republic of China, Taiwan maintains a large technologically advanced military. Although this fact seems largely unnoticed, Taiwan’s military build-up has succeeded and is now largely complete. The present military balance across the Taiwan Strait is somewhat more favourable for Taiwan, though Taiwan’s relative strength will inexorably decline over the next decade as China’s modernization effort continues.

7/ Pakistan

Pakistan is a regional and middle power, and has the seventh largest standing armed forces in the world. It without doubt has one of the best military forces in the world by all aspects. The Pakistani military has over the years proven its superiority and strength when it comes to protecting the country from all threats both internally and externally.

6/ Israel

Israel has one of the highest ratios of defence spending to GDP of all developed nations. The Israel Defence Forces is the sole military wing of the Israel security forces. It comprises of the army, air force and navy.

5/ Japan

Even though Japan has officially denounced its right to declare war, it maintains a modern military with the world’s eighth largest military budget. Its military might is used for self-defence and peacekeeping roles. The deployment of troops to Iraq marked the first overseas use of Japan’s military since the Second World War. Japan increased its defence spending for the first time in 11 years in response to growing disputes with China. It has also started its first military expansion in over 40 years by placing a new military base on its outer islands. Japan spends big on defence, and is the sixth most expensive spender in the world. Japan’s military is fairly well-equipped. It currently has a large number of active personnel  and personnel in reserve. It also has  large number of aircrafts, ships and is the world’s fifth largest air force.

4/ South Korea

South Korea is a regional power with the world’s tenth-largest defence budget. The nation allocates 2.6 percent of its GDP and 15 percent of all government spending to its military. South Korea has sixth-largest number of active troops (more than 650,000) in the world. South Korea has been increasing its defence spending due to both the increasing armament of Japan and China, and the constant threat from North Korea. South Korea has a relatively large military force for its small size. It has many active personnel and personnel in the reserves. South Korea also has many tanks and aircraft. The South Korean military is generally well-trained and routinely takes part in military exercise with the United States. South Korea’s air force is also the sixth largest in the world.

3/ Turkey

With an estimated strength of 495,000 deployable forces, Turkey has the second largest standing armed force in NATO. The Turkish armed forces comprises of the Land Forces, the Naval Forces and the Air Force. Turkey is one of the five NATO member states which are part of the nuclear sharing policy of the alliance. The NATO member has contributed soldiers to various initiatives around the world. The Turkish military took part in operations in Afghanistan, as well as in peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. Turkey also maintains a large military force in Northern Cyprus.

2/ India

India is a nuclear weapons state and a regional power. The country is already the world’s largest importer of military goods. It has the third largest standing army in the world. It ranks ninth in military expenditure among nations. India has provided 100,000 military and police personnel to serve in 35 UN peacekeeping operations across four continents. India has ballistic missiles with a range capable of hitting all of Pakistan or most of China. Indian military strategy has been dominated by its long-simmering conflict with Pakistan, although there have also been minor wars between China and India in the past.

1/ China

With more than 2.3 million active troops, the People’s Liberation Army is the largest standing military force in the world. China is a recognized nuclear weapons state. It is a potential military superpower. Over the years, it has developed or acquired numerous advanced missile systems. China has embarked upon a relentless policy of massive military spending, with a 12.2% increase in spending over the past year.

Who are the strongest countries in Asia ? Asia has become over the years the most important region of the World for the US but also for the entire West.  Asia has about 60 percent of the world’s population with different historical traditions, cultures and religions. Three of the four most populated countries of the world are in Asia: China, India, and Indonesia. During the 20th century, the world economy’s center has gradually moved from North America to the Asia-Pacific. A huge number of U.S. corporations conduct business in Asia today. It’s therefore important to assess the strength of the countries in the region to understand global Geopolitics.

5/ Islamic Republic of Pakistan

4) Republic of India

3) North Korea

“Leaders are agents of change whose intuitive abilities and personal qualities are essential in getting followers to extend their energies and attitudes towards larger goals and values.”

The above words of Abraham Zaleznik unequivocally articulate the role of leadership in the permutation of change. Change is an abiding reality of human existence. However, as Victor Dike rightly observed, the direction of change in a society depends on the manner in which resources are mobilized by the leader, and attitude of the people toward change. These resources mobilization and attitude of the people are not easily determined in a large and heterogeneous country like Nigeria.

Change may be conceptualized as “any modification in established patterns of inter-human relationships and standards of conducts.” In other words, “It is the significant alteration of social structure.” Social structures mean the “the pattern of social action and interaction which include norms, values and cultural phenomenon. Leadership on the other hands is defined by Tannenbaum as interpersonal influence exercised in a situation and directed through the communication process towards the attainment of a specialized goal or goals.  Leaders in the context of this essay refers to persons who occupy important positions in the formal polity such as Presidents, Ministers, Governors, Legislators, Party officers, local government chairmen, Council Ministers and also the local chiefs.

Nigeria is a diverse country with more than 250 ethnic groups and languages politically arranged into a federal structure with a bloated centre. Since independence in 1960, the country has experienced different changes in all facets of life. These changes have brought about far reaching economic, social and political challenges. The discovery of oil in the 1960s enthroned a mono cultural economy skewed towards consumption rather than investment. The promise and prospects of the early years foundered and persistently remained elusive as a result of systematic corruption, sectionalism, patronage and intensified struggle for the centre which bogged the leadership of the country down in a corrosive identity politics plunging the nation into several years of political instability and violent conflicts. After a checkered history of several military interventions, a civilian rule was established in 1999.

Since the beginning of the fourth republic, the need for change and social re-engineering has been the subtle and obvious task of the leadership of the country: change from the patronage of the earlier years, change from lack of plan discipline which led to the failure of many development plans, change in value orientation from the vicious circle of corruption that threatens to destroy everybody, change from being a renter state which depends on the outside world for basic needs such as food to a strong and self-reliant economy, change from public service inefficiency, change from sectionalism and identity politics that is fuelling crisis and crippling the country from becoming a mobile society where one could live in any state of his choice, secure employment at the state and local levels without limitations, and participate meaningfully in the affairs of the community of his abode.

There is no doubt that changes of this nature require leaders who, according to Woodrow Wilson, by boldly interpreting the nation’s conscience could lift a people out of their everyday selves. It was the desire for such leadership at a time when impunity got to its peak that made the change mantra of the current party in power to gather an unprecedented momentum that saw the defeat of an incumbent president in the history of Nigerian politics. The coming of President Muhammadu Buhari to power as a popular candidate was such a monumental change because he was able to galvanize people based on his personal qualities and not identity. Similar to the abortive third republic, a progressive party represented by the All Progressive Congress defeated the conservative People Democratic Party. The lack of political ideology as a bane of Nigerian politics, however, resurfaced as some disgruntled members of former ruling party and others joined the new party in power for political cover rather than commitment to the progressive ideals the party stands for. No leader can successfully govern a vibrant society without an ideological compass (apology to Victor Dike). This lack of ideology is reflective in the frosty relationship between the executive and legislature, and it underscores the legislative racketeering over budget passing at one of the critical moments of our national life.

One bitter experience of recent time was how the ill preparation of the past leadership in Nigeria resulted in a devastating effects of the collapse of oil prices and production on our economy plunging us into a recession in the early days of this administration with GDP contrasting by 2.2 per cent in the third quarter and inflation soaring to 18.5 per cent. The lesson from this is that, the leadership of the country needs to be poised towards taking the lead in making personal sacrifices and planning ahead. There is need for more “societal leaders” who subordinate private narrow goals for broader community and national objectives as opposed to “instrumental leaders” who use power and influence primarily in the pursuit of private goals. This is when we can begin to take cost-cutting measures that include rationalization of overheads and recurrent expenditure, and diversify the economy.

As the country takes a new course in this change era to improve security, fight corruption and revamp the economy, the policy questions facing the change leadership include: how to help people through change in terms of value reorientation and return of the welfare state especially when they have no choice or control; how to understand and respond to the different perspectives, feelings, and responses people have to change while achieving alignment with national objectives; how to overcome foreign and local forces impeding our match towards development and industrialization;and how to build relationships and persuade supporters, detractors (including agentsof hate speech) and fence-sitters to get on board with the change as another election is around the corner.

*Kamal Ololade Ahmed is a postgraduate student at the Nigerian Defence Academy can be reached via email, ebullientololade@live.com

This article draws a comparison between the Chinese military and war capabilities and the U.S ones. However, this article isn’t a simple comparison you can find on internet. It will provide you information and tools to understand what factors are paramount when it comes to war.

Economy and public spendings

According to an old French saying : ” money is the sinews of war “. The United States has understand this fact. In 2017 the military expenditures of the U.S reached more than $600 billion (3.1% of GDP). China has spent much less money: less than $230 billion (1.9% of GDP). However the US economy isn’t as efficient as the Chinese one. It is likely that the US military expenditures will reduce in the years to come while China will doubtlessly raise its spendings

Men and soldiers

As you know China is composed of 1.3 billion inhabitants and is the most populated country. The U.S is the third country in terms of demography with 300 million of inhabitants. China has 2.3 million active military personnels and there are 1.4 million of U.S soldiers. Concerning this asset, China gets the upper hand by far. Then, China can raise more soldiers since Chinese are much more numerous in general.

Land power 

China and the U.S have approximately the same number of tanks but the U.S army totally surpasses China in terms of armored fighting vehicles. They are quite important because they offer mobility to an army.

Air power

The U.S totally dominates China in the air. The U.S air force counts more than 13,000 aircrafts against 3,000 for the Chinese air power. In modern wartime, aircrafts are very important and more and more accurate. This American superiority can be decisive for targeting bases and military compounds.

Sea power

The U.S has more destroyers but China owns much more fregats, corvettes and patrol crafts. These ships offers mobility and quick moves. However destroyers are heavier and more powerful. The U.S marine has a paramount asset which is the number of its aircrafts carrier (19), while China only has one aircrafts carrier. Even if their usefulness is contested because of theirs numerous vulnerabilities, they remain assets to displace soldiers and aircrafts from one place to another.

Bases around the globe

Here again, the U.S owns an important advantage. Both countries have plenty of military installations around the globe but the U.S is much more present near China than China is with the U.S. The role of South Korea (because of the THAAD which has efficient radar to foresee military activities in China) and Japan are paramount in the defense system of the U.S. Americans are ahead because they have been one of the leaders in the world since the beginning of the Cold War. China did find a real stance on international scene at the beginning of the 80s, following the Xiaoping reforms.

Energy

We’ve talked about tanks, aircrafts and destroyers, but these vehicles need fuel. China consumes 12 million oil barrels per day and produces 4,3 million per day. The U.S produces more (9 million per day) but consumes way more than China. Considering the U.S shale oil and gas production of the recent years, the U.S is far beyond China in terms of energetic self-sufficiency.

Acclimation to war

China and Chinese soldiers have not been engaged in a war since the Vietnam war. Contrarily to them, U.S soldier are used to war since the beginning of the 21st century. Even if we have to take exercising into account, acclimation to battlefield does matter.

Nowadays, no one knows which country would win. This conflict is unlikely to erupt because China and the U.S are also important economic partners.

YoungDiplomats decided to publish three speeches of an american diplomat, businessman and writer, Chas W. Freeman. They are high value speeches because a former American diplomat gives his feeling on what is diplomacy.

Remarks to the Watson Institute of International and Public Affairs

Ambassador Chas W. Freeman, Jr. (USFS, Ret.)
Senior Fellow, Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Brown University
Providence, Rhode Island, 19 March 2018

This is the first of three lectures on diplomatic doctrine.  It was prefaced by an earlier lecture, titled “Diplomacy: A Rusting Tool of American Statecraft.”  This lecture constructs an analytical framework to consider diplomacy as strategy.  The second will use historical examples to explore diplomacy as tactics.  The third will consider diplomacy as risk management.

I am far from the only American to be deeply concerned about the consequences of the ongoing gutting of our diplomatic establishment.  I anticipate that once we Americans have destroyed the Department of State and related agencies as well as the Foreign Service of the United States, we will have to reinvent them.  They can be essential tools of statecraft that guide and complement our armed forces, make their use unnecessary, or translate their victories into new and stable relationships with the defeated.

Reconstruction of these institutions to meet the new challenges before us will be a lengthy process.  But I believe that we should not wait to prepare ourselves for it.  We will need to train a new generation of American diplomats to levels of professionalism comparable to those attained by our military.  In the meantime, we should learn by observing others, like the Chinese, who, far from abandoning diplomacy as their preferred method of advancing their national interests, have just doubled their budget for it.

But the damage we are now doing to our alliances, our economic and other international relationships, and ourselves is not my topic today.  I will speak mainly in terms of military aspects of strategy but everything I say can equally well apply to economic and political strategy.

I am a retired practitioner of diplomacy.  I believe that we can and should distill operational doctrine from experience.  Diplomacy is the regulation of international relationships through the control of perceptions.  In this talk, I will cite practical applications of diplomacy to strategy.  Before I can do this, however, I need to prepare the terrain by defining a few terms and describing where each fits in the catalog of statecraft.

To formulate sound diplomatic strategy one must assure that the words one applies to foreign relations both correspond to reality and are relevant to analysis, deliberation, and planning.  I propose to discuss four categories of relationship that include or imply obligations: “alliances,” “ententes,” “protectorates,” and “client states” in this context.  How do each of these categories of relationship relate to strategy?

A strategy is a plan of action designed to achieve a desired objective through the lowest possible  investment of effort, resources, and time and the fewest adverse consequences for oneself.  In chess, a strategy that consists only of an opening move consistently yields failure.  Myopic moves in foreign policy – moves that do not anticipate the probable perceptions and counter-moves of others – also guarantee defeat.  The American invasions of both Afghanistan and Iraq were just such exuberant assaults with no planned follow-up, definition of victory, or concept for war termination.

Calling a statement or a collection of military campaign plans a strategy does not make it one.  Strategies cannot be wishful thinking.  They must match resources to objectives and focus on specific, attainable objectives.  Diplomacy is an essential part of any international strategy.  It involves molding the decisions and actions of others to one’s advantage as well as making one’s own moves.  It is a protracted game that is almost rule-free, far more complex than chess, and has real-world consequences.

The U.S. “National Security Strategy” and its companion “National Defense Strategy” released, respectively, in December 2017 and in January 2018, assign no specific resources to feasible objectives and specify no steps by which the belligerent approach they outline can be implemented.  They are unaffordable military bravado attached to no strategy.  They aggravate rather than cure the U.S. national strategy deficit.

No one can play chess without understanding the capabilities and potential uses of the various pieces on the board, both on one’s own side and on that of one’s opponent.  Knights move differently and do things that bishops and pawns can’t, and vice versa.  Each piece must be deployed or countered differently.  The same is true in foreign affairs, with the added complications that the contest has actions other than attack and defense, that one sort of piece can at any moment change into another, that there are often multiple players maneuvering independently but simultaneously in the same space, and that, even when the king is cornered, the game doesn’t end.  It just enters a new phase.

The atrophy of diplomatic vocabulary during the Cold War has dimmed appreciation of the relationships and balances of capabilities between relevant international actors, between them and one’s own nation, and between them and one’s competitors.  Today, almost the only words used to describe any sort of remotely cooperative international ties – however ephemeral – are “ally” and “alliance.”  These words have been so stretched, shopworn, and blurred in meaning that they have become semantic nulls.  They dull both vision and reason, contributing nothing but confusion to analysis or planning.

An “ally” is a partner that has accepted an obligation to offer broad support or assistance to one’s nation because it wishes to receive reciprocal support for its own interests and objectives.  The usual purpose of alliances is to add the power of others to one’s own.  But the so-called “pactomania” that followed Americans’ post World War II abandonment of George Washington’s long-respected warning against “entangling alliances” did not conform to this model.  The United States was embarked on a protective mission directed at denying our newly established sphere of influence to our Soviet adversary and its apparent Chinese auxiliary.

Security guarantees to others became part of a strategy of containment and deterrence, not one focused on power aggregation  There was little, if any, expectation that the Europeans in NATO[1], the West Asians in CENTO[2], the Southeast Asians in SEATO[3], or Northeast Asians like the rump Chinese state on Taiwan, occupied Japan, or south Korea would add much, if anything at all, to the military or economic capabilities of the United States.  These U.S. “allies” had been made poor and weak by history or by war.  They had nothing but their territory, strategic independence, and past prestige to contribute to the struggle with the Soviet Union and its satrapies.

The United States made them “allies” to bring them under its protection for purposes of strategic denial.  They were not national security assets but liabilities insured by American power in a game in which they were pawns.  They were not so much ramparts as tripwires, designed to change the risk calculus of the Soviet enemy.  In this context, assessments of the balance of benefits and risks of “alliances” and “allies” were beside the point.

The Cold War ended in 1989 – 1991.  But this peculiar history continues to shape American thinking about “alliances” and “allies.”  The American people view foreign policy as largely about Americans nobly safeguarding U.S. “allies” from their enemies, who are – by extension and adoption – also ours.  Any nation not overtly hostile to the United States and in some way cooperative with it can be a so-called “ally” worthy of American protection.  But the impulse to vindicate  national honor by defending “allies” coexists with the suspicion that they may be playing America for a sucker.  Hence the inherent appeal of the populist demand that “allies” reimburse the United States for protecting them, especially now that they have returned to wealth and power while America declines in both.

But, if Americans aspire to be something other than global mercenaries, we must ask:

(1) Now that the collapse of the Soviet enemy has made strategic denial to it of these countries irrelevant, what’s in it for the United States to protect them at all?

(2) What responsibility should so-called “allies” have to protect themselves?  And

(3) What can or should “allies” be asked to contribute to U.S. national security in addition to their own?

The answers to these questions depend to a considerable extent on assessments of what’s at stake, what benefits relationships confer, what risks they entail, and what costs they impose.

True alliances are rare.  They are relationships between nations that entail broad mutual obligations of assistance for as long as the alliance endures.  An alliance may be multilateralor bilateral.  Since the major purpose of defensive alliances is deterrence, they tend to be publicly proclaimed.  In its highest form, the members of an alliance agree to operate jointly, often under unified military command.  The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is the premier example of a multilateral alliance.  The fading “special relationship “ between the United States and the United Kingdom formed in World War II has been an exemplary bilateral alliance.  So has the U.S. relationship with Australia.

so-called “alliance” between Britain, America, and the Soviet Union in World War II met none of these criteria.  It was not an alliance but an instance of limited partnership in entente– a commitment to cooperate under particular circumstances, for limited purposes, for as long as this served common interests.  Entente confines both commitments and risks to agreed contingencies rather than leaving them open-ended.  Unlike alliances, limited partnerships pursuant to entente rely on policy coordination and parallel actions, not joint operations or unified commands.  Like alliances, when they are public, ententes deter challenges to the interests of their participants.   When they are aggressive rather than defensive, however, they are often kept secret to maximize strategic ambiguity, prospects for entrapment of foes, or surprise.

The common purposes that ententes embrace are temporary or conditional, not durable or broad.  Both Brits and Russians grasped the distinction between alliance and entente.  Americans did not.  This contributed to serious American strategic misjudgments that left the United States unprepared for postwar tensions.  When these tensions could no longer be ignored, a domestic “red scare” that threatened American liberties ensued.

Other examples of U.S. participation in ententes date back to the dawn of our republic.  They include the Franco-American “Conditional and Defensive Alliance” [Traité d’alliance éventuelle et défensive] of February 6, 1778, that ultimately enabled decisive French support for American independence.  Sino-American cooperation in the containment of the Soviet Union from 1972 to 1989 was another such limited partnership.  More recently, we have seen entente find expression in the formation of  parallel international and Islamic coalitions to liberate Kuwait from Iraq in 1991, and cooperation between the United States, China, France, Germany, and Russia to produce the Iran nuclear deal in 2015.   Anyone who mistook these expedient arrangements for the durable commitments to cooperation inherent in “alliance” was destined to be disillusioned.

Exchanges of concrete benefits – like base or transit rights – for protection are also often called “alliances.”  They are not.  Nor are they ententes.  They might more accurately called “protectorates.”  These are symbiotic relationships in which the protected power seldom feels a sense of obligation to its protector but recognizes the need to provide it with recompense for its support.  Protection may be soundly grounded in the interests of the parties to it but it does not involve reciprocal undertakings.

The U.S. commitment to Saudi Arabia is an example of a protectorate.  (It was briefly elevated to an entente when Saddam Hussein’s Iraq attempted to annex Kuwait and the United States sought its withdrawal in cooperation with the Saudis and other Arab partners.)   These days, relations with the Kingdom involve Saudi purchases of weapons as well as military training and support services from the United States, Saudi facilitation of U.S. overflight of its strategically positioned territory, and coordinated (but not joint) intelligence and anti-terrorist operations.  In return, the United States backs Saudi national security policies, even when it considers them dubious, as in Yemen.  (Ironically, not so long ago, it was the Saudis who found themselves supporting U.S. policies in which they didn’t believe – like the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.)

Other prominent examples of U.S. protectorates misdescribed as “alliances” are Japan and south Korea.  Japan emerged from defeat and occupation to become a great economic power.  It provides bases and logistical support that are essential to U.S. power projection around the world.  The Republic of Korea (ROK) survived war with other Koreans and their Chinese protectors to become a wealthy and powerful state  Despite their affluence and self-defense capabilities, both Japan and south Korea rely on protection from the United States.  They are consumers of American security services with no reciprocal obligations to the United States.  As such, they are strategic dependents, not direct providers of security to a sometimes paternalistic United States.  Neither has any obligation to help defend Americans in time of need.

It is significant that Japanese-American relations now seem to be evolving away from dependency and toward entente.  In the future, as independent Japanese strategic perspectives and capabilities continue to emerge, Japan may assume a greater role in supporting the U.S. in carefully defined contingencies.   If so, of course, Tokyo will demand an equal voice in setting the agenda for US-Japan cooperation.  Neither Japan nor the United States is yet prepared for this.

By contrast with alliances, ententes, and protectorates, client state relationships are based on a one-way flow of support from the patron nation to the client.  Client states owe no allegiance and  benefits to their patrons.  The misuse of the word “ally” to describe them implies honor-bound mutual obligations that do not exist.  Client states add no significant power of their own – political, economic, cultural, or military – to that of their patrons, though they may add base and transit rights or other facilities that improve the geopolitical circumstances of their patrons.  Sometimes they are clients only because their independence frustrates a strategic rival and it is therefore desirable to guarantee it.

Client states typically have enemies, otherwise they would not seek backing or protection by an external power.  Sometimes their enemies are also adversaries of their patron; sometimes not.  In any event, client states are hostage to regional forces that are often foreign to the interests of their patrons. The very dependency and vulnerability of client states can give them leverage over their patrons.  They have the freedom to scheme to get a patron into unwanted battles with others or to  burden it with requirements for diplomatic or material support at the expense of its own objectives and interests.

Client states in the Middle East like Egypt, Israel, and Jordan enjoy and have received enormous strategic support from the United States.  Egypt, which occupies a key bottleneck in strategic lines of communication between Asia and Europe, allows American overflights as a courtesy rather than an obligation.  Others (though notably not Israel, given its lack of acceptance and connections in the region) provide the United States with logistical support for power projection.  But none feel obliged to do anything at all in return for the United States in exchange for the American backing they receive.  These are relationships that are grounded in self-interest.  They are not the product of affection or loyalty, whatever their domestic U.S. supporters may assert.

As Egypt showed its former patron, the Soviet Union, in the early 1970s, client states are quite capable of switching allegiances when they believe doing so might benefit them.  Today, Egypt is once again in the process of repositioning itself between Russia and the United States.  Israel has been at odds with the United States on many policies, but Washington’s unflinching support for it continues to enable it to ignore American interests as it pursues its own. Israel, too, is now diluting its dependence on America by developing closer ties to other great powers like Russia, China, and India.  Meanwhile, Jordan is taking on some characteristics of a U.S. protectorate, as it furnishes bases and facilities to U.S. forces and intelligence agencies engaged in war in neighboring Syria.  But Jordan, too, is pursuing strategic ties to Russia.

Some flourishing bilateral relationships are, of course, based on transactional exchanges of benefits free of any particular implied obligation.  As examples, Singapore and India separately see it as in their interest for the United States Navy to remain a nearby presence.  To this end, Singapore cooperates with the United States, allowing American naval vessels to use its port facilities on an ongoing, pay-as-you-go basis.  India has begun to buy U.S. weaponry, to exercise with the U.S. Navy, and to couch its rivalry with China in terms calculated to appeal to Americans.

Singapore is close and attentive to Washington.  Delhi keeps its distance, despite its presumed ideological affinities with the United States as a “fellow democracy.”  But neither country has  compromised its independence, and neither should be described as an ally, entente partner, protectorate, or client state of the United States.

From the dawn of the American republic, the key task of U.S. foreign policy has been to foster an international order conducive to continued life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness at home.  For its first fifteen decades, the United States aspired to advance this objective through vigorous expansion across the North American continent, hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, equal-opportunity exploitation of markets in Asia, and a combination of example-setting and lofty talk about international trends and events.  Americans accepted George Washington’s insight that alliances were entangling hazards to diplomatic navigation as well as risky IOUs that others might call at any time they chose.  Until 1945, the United States avoided any sort of relationship with foreigners that entailed defined obligations.  Then a new, bipolar world order was born.

In the Cold War, nations for the most part clung to their respective positions in relation to the competing United States and Soviet Union.  There were, of course, notable exceptions.  Cuba switched from American client state to Soviet protectorate.  France withdrew from formal participation in its alliance with the United States through NATO but retained a relationship of entente with it.  The United States downgraded its relations with Taipei from entente to protectorate in order to pursue cooperation with the rival regime in Beijing.  Egypt famously switched patrons.  Iran turned on its American protector.

Despite the overall strategic immobility and diplomatic trench warfare that it exemplified, the Cold War was not entirely without dramatic paradigm shifts.  President Richard Nixon’s 1972 outreach to China and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s 1977 embrace of Israel exemplify diplomatic breakthroughs through grand gestures aimed at building new strategic relationships.  Such grand diplomacy seeks to bypass fruitless bargaining over insuperable but arguably petty differences with an adversary.  Its purpose is to enable the two sides to make a fresh start at seeking common ground, to begin a process of expanded strategic cooperation to mutual advantage, and to defer apparently intractable problems until more favorable conditions for resolving them can emerge.

By traveling to the enemy’s capital while making no specific demands of it, Nixon and Sadat, each in his own way, followed Churchill’s advice to “appease the weak, [but] defy the strong.”  Each gave his longtime adversary the crucial psychological satisfaction of being treated with respect.  Each implicitly acknowledged the legitimacy of his opponent’s national security concerns and the need eventually to address them.

Grand diplomatic gestures are gifts that call for grand responses, not haggling.   Nixon’s gesture enabled the United States and China to end two decades of fruitless bickering over various sore points in Sino-American relations.  China famously takes the long view.  China opened to the strategic relationship Nixon sought.

By contrast, Israel is notoriously focused on immediate advantage, with little attention to long-term consequences for relations with neighbors, all of which it believes are implacably “anti-Semitic.”  Menachem Begin responded to Sadat’s unilateral gesture by attempting to bargain over details.  It took President Jimmy Carter’s  intervention at Camp David to persuade Israel to accept the normalized relations Egypt’s leader had offered.

Though the immediate results of their maneuvers were different, Nixon’s and Sadat’s breakthrough diplomacy illustrates an important canon of statecraft.  When there appears to be no effective answer to a question, one should consider whether the question one has been asking is the wrong one.  Elsewhere, I have described the capacity of diplomacy that changes the operative questions to change the calculus of other nations to conform to ours.  I will not repeat that analysis today.

In the case of China, if the issue was how to contain and retard its development, a policy of strategic distraction through support for Taiwan and Tibetan separatists, diplomatic embargo and economic and financial sanctions, and military deterrence made sense.  But, if the question was how to use China to offset Soviet power or how to limit the menace of Mao’s revolution to world order, acceptance of its government’s legitimacy, diplomatic engagement, and promotion of trade and investment were appropriate.

If the issue was how to prevent the consolidation of a Western-backed Jewish state on Arab land, Egyptian ostracism and confrontation with Israel were logical policies.  But, if the question was how to develop the Egyptian economy in partnership with the United States and under conditions of peace, engaging and establishing a modus vivendi with Israel was essential.

Today, the impasses between the United States and north Korea as well as Russia invite a change in the questions on which American policies have been based.   The same is true of China.  What is it we want to accomplish with these countries?  Our interactions with each are now as barren and dispiriting as those with China before the Nixon opening or between Egypt and Israel before the Sadat initiative.  What if we have the strategic questions wrong?

In the case of north Korea, diplomacy has been complicated by Washington’s failure to appreciate the deterioration of Pyongyang’s relations with Beijing or its implications.  The relationship between the two has devolved from protectorate, to client state, to noncommittal and strained.   But, despite its now purely transactional relations with Pyongyang, Beijing has a continuing interest in avoiding both north Korean enmity and in precluding the presence of a potential enemy like the United States in the northern half of the Korea Peninsula.  The primary purpose of north Korea’s nuclear weapons program has been to develop a deterrent to possible American rather than Chinese attack.  Given these realities, American attempts to outsource our problems with north Korea to China have always represented wishful thinking rather than coherent strategy.  Perhaps the right question was never how to force Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear program but how to convince it that it was secure enough from the possibility of American-instigated regime change to have no need for one.

And maybe the right question with Russia was not how to wall it off from Europe but how to give it a stake in peaceful coexistence with the European Union, how to nurture mutually advantageous interdependence between the EU and Russia, and how to incorporate Russia into a new European security architecture by interposing buffer states between it and NATO,.  How might NATO and the EU best promote shared prosperity and security for all Europeans, including Russians?  If the redivision of Europe by military confrontation and low intensity conflict in its borderlands does not serve American, European, or Russian interests, what are the alternatives?

Maybe the issue with Ukraine is not how to deny Russia an influential relationship with it but how to give Moscow a stake in the emergence of a viable, prosperous, independent, and neutral Ukrainian state that can serve as both a buffer and bridge between Russia and NATO.

Perhaps the issues with China are not how to prevent it from overshadowing the United States in the Indo-Pacific, how to confront it militarily, how to deny it influence in neighboring countries, and how to minimize its role in global governance.   Maybe the challenges are how to leverage rising Chinese prosperity and scientific prowess to our own benefit, how to institutionalize relationships between China, the United States and other Asian countries that reinforce regional peace and stability, and how to work with China to address global issues and manage the global commons.

If the questions are changed, the policy answers to them change too.

In the Cold War, Nixon’s and Sadat’s exceptional statecraft notwithstanding, diplomacy for the most part resembled trench warfare, with confrontations along well-established fronts that seldom moved.  The purpose of diplomacy in that era was to hold the line and prevent intrusions by each superpower into the other’s sphere of influence.  Each side sought to exploit local strife –  as in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique, and Afghanistan –  to its advantage.  But neither was willing to provoke war with the other that might escalate to the nuclear level.  Struggles between them took the form of proxy wars.  Within their respective spheres of influence, diplomacy was a form of imperial administration, holding subordinate states and their politicians in line and trying to mitigate this disunity their quarrels brought to their bloc.

We are now in a new and far more fluid and, arguably, much more dangerous era.  Spheres of  influence are more porous than ever before.  Transactionalism is spreading.  Alliances are eroding and with them the predictability they provide.  The limited and temporary partnerships characteristic of entente are multiplying.  Protectorates are losing credibility.  Client states are increasingly unconstrained and dismissive of their patrons.  Doubt and hedging had begun to replace trust and commitment in international relations long before Donald Trump was elected president of the United States sixteen months ago on a platform of ungracious nationalism.  Since then, doubt and hedging have become omnipresent.

The uncertainties agitating other great and middle-ranked powers are now acute .  By suggesting that the American commitment to NATO members and other allies was contingent on their reimbursing the costs to the United States of deterring attacks on them, President Trump signaled an apparent willingness to downgrade these “allies” to “protectorates” or even “client states.”  (That was, of course, before “the Blob” contrived to have the president’s agenda swallowed by “the Swamp.”)   Mr. Trump’s subsequent, partial assimilation by the military-industrial-congressional complex has not erased Europe’s newly aroused anxieties about dependence on America for its defense.  Japan and others in Asia have similar concerns, though, for the most part, they are too polite or cautious to voice them.

The norms of rule-bound behavior so carefully crafted into the United Nations Charter, the Geneva Conventions, and other multilateral agreements, like the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, are being set aside.  International law no longer constrains powerful nations from invading or dismembering others, overtly or covertly intervening to change their governments, assassinating their citizens, or unilaterally disrupting their commerce.  Today, expediency overrides principle, the ends justify the means, and might substitutes for right.

Meanwhile, the United States remains caught in Afghanistan, Iraq, and a steadily expanding list of other strategic sinkholes and pitfalls, its original reasons for invading these places long satisfied or forgotten.  The blowback continues to mount from these misadventures as radicalized, aggrieved Muslims seek reprisal.  We are caught in a vicious cycle of reciprocally escalating hatred and violence.   As a consequence, we Americans are cutting constitutional corners and debasing the due process that is the heart of our Bill of Rights. This imperils our domestic tranquility and freedom even as it lowers our moral standing abroad.

We have now declared our intention to focus our defense planning on fighting militant Islamism, Russia, and China, but we have developed no political or economic strategy for dealing with these challenges by measures short of war.  We Americans are sinking ever deeper into debt, with ever less to show for it.  We need a period of peace – a timeout from perpetual warfare –  to address a widening range of problems at home.  It is time to ask what strategy might best foster an international environment in which Americans can confidently expect to enjoy the civil liberties that are our most precious heritage, as well as prosperity, domestic tranquility, and personal security.

The sole remaining purpose of our wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria appears to be avoiding having to admit defeat.  These wars are costly in blood and treasure.  They raise rather than reduce the danger of terrorist attacks on Americans at home and abroad.  No one can explain what they are now about, still less how – after seventeen years of U.S. engagement in Afghanistan, fifteen in Iraq, and nearly seven in Syria – they will end and on what terms.  Our continuing participation in them is convincing evidence of American obstinacy, not our strategic acumen.  It does nothing to enhance the credibility of either our leadership or our military power.

The reinforcement of failure is always a mistake unless it is a tactical move linked to a strategic advance toward a broader goal.  No one has made the case that serious American strategic interests are now at stake in any of these wars.  No strategy depends on their outcome.  No alliance stands or falls on it.  These wars are all in need of achievable objectives that, once accomplished, could justify ending the U.S. role in them.

America is caught in a “sunk costs trap.”  Our generals and their admirers are determined to carry on with failed interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and now Syria  because of the time, money, and blood Americans have poured into these misadventures, not because they have any expectation at all of success.  By this logic, the more we fail, the more blood and treasure we must commit.  This is not just financially ruinous, it is madness.

Afghans are handsome, charming people and redoubtable warriors.  But the United States has never had anything to gain from alliance, entente, protection, or the establishment of a client state relationship with Afghanistan.  The sole American interest there has been strategic denial – first to the Soviet Union and then to Arab terrorists with global reach.  Some Americans may well have strong opinions about how Afghans should govern themselves, but these convictions do not justify a war.  The United States has nothing to gain from involving ourselves in the contention between India and Pakistan that fuels Afghan instability.  Americans need to remember why we got into Afghanistan in the first place if we are ever to get out of it.

The basic mission of the U.S. intervention to overthrow the Taliban regime in 2001 was to convince Afghans that they could not afford to host al Qaeda or similar Islamist terrorist groups.  After losing about 150,000 dead over the seventeen years of the American invasion and attempted pacification of their country, Afghans have been left in no doubt about this.  With our original mission accomplished, it is time for the United States to roll back mission creep and leave Afghanistan on terms that make it clear that we will be prepared to resume military action against anti-American terrorists there or in Pakistan, if we deem that necessary. Deterrence can and should replace American boots on the ground in Southwestern Asia.

The U.S. war on Islamist militants in Afghanistan was the precursor to overt and covert interventions, drone campaigns, and other forms of warfare in Iraq, Somalia, Libya, Syria, and seventy other countries.  Far from reducing the threat of jihadi terrorism, these campaigns in the Muslim world have become its major stimulus and justification both at home and abroad.  The thesis that “we must fight ‘them’ over there or face them here” is demonstrably nonsense.  It is precisely because we are “over there” that they are “over here.”  This feedback loop must to be broken for Americans to enjoy affordable security.

The grievances that drive anti-American terrorism cannot be cured by military means.  They are political, and require political solutions.  Intensifying schisms within Islam, especially Sunni Islam, are part of the problem.  The United States is singularly ill-equipped to deal with these.  That must be done through entente with Muslim partners.  Saudi Arabia’s new emphasis on religious tolerance and combating extremist ideology and its leadership of the 41-member Islamic Military Coalition to Combat Terrorism makes it a logical candidate for this role in partnership with Europeans as well as Americans.

Meanwhile, a rebalance in U.S. relations with NATO allies, Japan, and south Korea is long overdue.  These countries, prostrate at the outset of the Cold War, have long since recovered their wealth and power.  It is time for them to assume greater responsibility for their own defense against external adversaries and internal terrorists.  They will not do so if the United States continues to configure and deploy its forces so as to be able to fight their battles without them.

The Trump administration has just designated Russia and China as strategic adversaries.  Both have noticed this and are responding.

Russia is a regional great power that remains traumatized by the Nazi invasion, the collapse of the Soviet Union and its empire, the indifference with which the United States greeted its effort to embrace the liberal international order, and the humiliation of ongoing Western denigration of its power and influence.  It fears American efforts to develop the capability to decapitate its leadership with a nuclear first strike, engineer regime change in Moscow, and establish a hostile military presence on its central and southern in addition to its northwestern, Baltic borders, where  NATO is currently entrenching itself.

Moscow’s principal defense against American hostility is the deterrent value of its enormous nuclear arsenal, which could destroy the United States and with it much – maybe all – of the world.  Short of Armageddon, Russia seeks to change U.S. policies that menace it and to ensure that it is protected from the United States and its European allies by friendly buffer states in Belarus and Ukraine.  The United States and much of Europe view this in mirror image terms – as assertively aggressive Russian behavior.  This image is buttressed by Russian agitprop and disinformation campaigns targeted at the electoral choices of voters in the West.  It builds on reactions to Russia’s opportunistic responses to backlash by Russian speakers in Ukraine against Ukrainian ethnolinguistic chauvinism.

Russia is not the originator of the digital-video, social media, and other hallucinogenic information technologies that have ushered in an age of unreason in the West.  But, the Russian state has joined advertising companies and political spin doctors in learning how to exploit Western neuroses and psychoses through these technologies.  The celebrity politics and the rot in civic literacy, civility, reality-based analysis, and policy dialogue that now afflict democratic societies have greatly enhanced the marginal utility of Russian agitprop.  American vulnerability to this cannot be remedied by defense budget plus-ups, bluster and shows of force, sanctions, arms transfers, or denunciatory diplomacy.  The only effective answer is to strengthen civil society, buttress the rule of law, and reinforce democratic norms here at home.  But we must also understand and abate the factors stimulating Russian rancor and pugnacity.

Russia’s aim is not to discredit democracy per se.  Nor is China’s.  Each is defending its interests as it sees them against threats it perceives, not making an ideological point.  (Both countries entered  post-ideological phases a quarter century ago.)  But, based on recent experience, neither sees Western democracy as likely to best the performance of its own form of  autocracy.  China, in particular, is content to let Western systems of government discredit themselves while it gets on with its own business.

The appeal of our political systems will fall and theirs will rise to the extent that we in the West fail to address the mounting anxiety of our citizens over stagnant wages, increasingly unjust income distribution, entrenched inequality of opportunity, declining domestic tranquility and personal safety, wrenching changes in social norms and institutions, and the like.  Better performance on our part is key.  But we should also examine our policies to reduce the extent to which they feed Russian fears and Chinese apprehensions.  The misapprehensions of American military capabilities and intentions stoked by our most recent statements of our national security posture do not serve our interests.

China is fully integrated into the global and regional economies; it cannot be contained.  America is being eclipsed economically in an increasingly Sino-centric Asia.  China is too big and potentially too powerful to be balanced by its neighbors, individually or collectively.  American military primacy along China’s borders is as unsustainable as European primacy along America’s borders proved to be as the 20th century began.  The United States will either coexist with China in the Western Pacific or be pushed back by it.

The United States has the politico-economic and military heft to help China’s neighbors accommodate its power on terms that make them full participants in the management of the Indo-Pacific region’s economy, security, and politics and avoid Chinese domination.  If China’s neighbors, especially Japan, assume much greater responsibility for their own defense, build regional coalitions, and enlist American support for a more independent and self-reliant stance than in the past,  U.S. dominance of the region’s affairs need not be followed by Chinese hegemony.

China is not just an Indo-Pacific power but a rising presence on the entire Eurasian landmass and in adjacent areas.  Its “Belt and Road Initiative” is a bold move to connect all of Eurasia from the Azores to the Bering Strait in a single, new geoeconomic zone.  There is no feasible American military retort to this Chinese grand strategy.  The parlous state of American finances precludes an economic response to it.  China’s connectivity initiative requires a geopolitical answer.

The example of American participation in European affairs is relevant.  The U.S. presence in Europe helps to offset the otherwise natural dominance of Germany, to allay the concerns of smaller countries about German ascendancy, and to facilitate pan-European cooperation. Similarly, American participation in Eurasian rule-making and implementation in cooperation with Europe, Japan, and others as well as China could temper and offset Chinese influence, relieve the concerns of smaller countries about Chinese power, and facilitate confident transnational cooperation among the nations of the supercontinent.

We are clearly entering a new phase of history.  But the key challenge of U.S. foreign policy remains how to foster an international order conducive to continued life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness at home.  These purposes are best served by a peaceful international environment.  Nurturing such an environment requires a diplomatic strategy of relationship and coalition-building that is more than just military.  This is especially the case when, as now, the power of others – military as well as economic – is growing relative to that of the United States.  Americans have a strategic interest in sustaining international law as a reassurance to other countries that they need not arm themselves with nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction to defend themselves against us or other stronger nations.  The United States has a vital interest in addressing the causes of potential conflicts, not just deterring their outbreak and allowing them to worsen unattended.  Americans need to prevent adversaries from becoming enemies and to preclude the formation of coalitions against us.

To enjoy affordable security, we must rebuild and develop America’s competence at diplomacy as well as war fighting.  This effort must begin with efforts to restore precision to our diplomatic terminology and reasoning processes, to sharpen our analysis of international realities, and to rediscover diplomacy as strategy.  To this end, we should focus on the development of diplomatic doctrine – a teachable body of interrelated operational concepts that enable us to use all elements of our power to influence the behavior of other states and people by measures short of war.  We can do this if we rediscover diplomatic history and develop case studies that make its lessons accessible to practitioners.

We have a military establishment of unprecedented professionalism and competence.  But many, if not most of the challenges we face are not amenable to military solutions.  Excellence in diplomacy is at least as essential to the future of our country as is excellence in the conduct of military operations.  The leveling of legacy institutions like the United States Department of State and the Foreign Service by the Trump administration promises to offer an opportunity to begin anew.  We must prepare the way to enable a future  administration to seize that opportunity.

^[1]The North Atlantic Treaty Organization.  NATO is an outgrowth of the Treaty of Brussels, a mutual defense treaty between Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, and the United Kingdom concluded in 1948.  These states, plus the United States, Canada, Portugal, Italy, Norway, Denmark and Iceland, formed NATO in 1949.  By the end of the Cold War, in 1991, NATO had grown to sixteen member states.  Since then, it has expanded to twenty-nine members, becoming the de facto security architecture of non-Russian Europe.

^[2]The Central Treaty Organization, formed in 1955 by Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It was dissolved in 1979.

^[3] The Southeast Asian Treaty Organization, formed in 1954 by Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan (including East Pakistan, now Bangladesh), the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States.  SEATO was dissolved on 30 June 1977 after many members lost interest and withdrew.

As every news reader know, Donald Trump has launched a massive trade war against former U.S partners namely China and the European Union. On 25th of July, Jean Claude Juncker, the president of the European Commission and Donald Trump, no need to introduce him, signed a ” cease fire “. However, for several reasons,  the trade war is far from over.

China is again and again the enemy

During his campaign, Donald Trump carried on plenty of attacks on Chinese trade policy. In January 2018, he began his trade war by slapping tariffs on solar panels and washing machines, and shortly after, on steel and aluminium. When it comes to foreign policy, one could only find differences between Obama and Trump presidencies. Nonetheless, both of them point out China as the new enemy and rival of the United States. When Obama had started the negotiations for the trans pacific partnership, he casted aside China. From an economic perspective the U.S and the E.U are too tightly closed to maintain a violent trade war. The U.S, no matter which administration we’re talking about, needs the E.U to counter China. The trade war with Europe might go to an end. But it is likely that this end is just the first step of a more global economic war.

With Europeans, is the hatchet of war completely buried ?

If the E.U had a president, that would be the president of the European Commission. This institution is similar to a national government. There is a deep gap between his feelings on international trade and the ones of European citizens. Indeed, they feel more and more reluctant about free trade, especially in developed countries such as France or Italy. According to a 2015 polls made by YouGov, ” When it comes to the specific benefits or drawbacks of free trade agreements, the French and the Germans are divided, if not slightly negative “. In Austria or Italy, the governments are clearly against free trade. Western Europeans people are living a paradigm shift and soon or later, ballot boxes will be impacted by this shift. Consequently, in the medium term, conflicts about trade policies between the U.S and European peoples are likely to erupt.

International relations and especially geoeconomics is hard to predict. But some trends can be fully analyzed and understood. States and empires have always handled trade and businesses. It has to be said that firms, corporations, supra national organizations have done their best to override national sovereignties, in terms of trade policy.  What we point out as a ” trade war ” can be seen as a simple return to normalcy in diplomacy and geo-strategy.

On 15th of May, YoungDiplomats did its first conference in France. As you know the purpose of YoungDiplomats is to deliver opinions and analysis on geopolitics. We implement in every country and attract people at conferences or debates. In France, more than 200 000 young people are Law or Politics student. Getting involved into this student community is paramount for YoungDiplomats. To lay the groundwork for our next activities in France, we decided to make a conference on the geopolitics of Kurdistan. We wanted this event to be participatory. The public could ask prepared questions to our interveners : Gerard Chaliand and Kendal Nezan.

Gerard Chaliand is one of the best geopolitical analysts in France. He visited Kurdistan several times and wrote a lot on this issue. Kendal Nezan is the president of the Kurdish Institute in Paris and has a deep knowledge concerning the Kurdish people.

The main part of the conference : an important historical background

The case of Kurdistan is unique. This non-recognized country is split across four states : Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria. Kurds are an old people. They would be the descendants of the Medes who lived near Iran. History of the Middle-East is marked by invasions and empires. The Macedonians with Alexander the Great, The Romans, The Arabs, The Persians, The Mongolians and the Turks took the lead, each civilization at different eras. Consequently, the Kurdish people did not build a strong foothold able to last several centuries. From 1270 to 1918 the Ottoman empire ruled over Middle East and was divided in many Milehs, each one being more or less autonomous vis-à-vis the central power. By the beginning of the 16th century, Kurdish principalities made a deal with the Ottoman Empire : Kurds protect the eastern borders of the empire against the Persians. In exchange, they would gain more autonomy. This agreement worked more or less efficiently for more than three centuries. Nonetheless, it gave Kurds a stable situation.

The Great War is an important moment in Kurdish history. Following the conflict, empires are destroyed and forced to adopt the nation states ideology. Many states were born from the aches of the Ottoman Empire : Iraq, Turkey, Syria and so on. Once again, Kurds didn’t have their own state and their situation is different from one country to another…

Turkey and Ataturk

At the end of the first world war, the Ottoman empire collapsed. Turks didn’t have their own state and were about to lose their sovereignty because of Western domination. But, thanks to Mustapha Kemal’s military abilities, Turkey found back its sovereignty. Mustapha Kemal was seen as Ataturk, the father of all Turks. Before kicking westerners out of Anatolia, he had promised Kurds that the all new State would be as Kurds as Turks. When Turks’ independency was restored, he denied Kurds theirs rights and self-determination on their lands. In 1923 the Lausanne treaty recognized the legitimacy of the new Turkish state.

From the 1920s to nowadays, the relationship has been more or less harsh. For example, the Turkish government voted deportation acts in 1930 and in 1980. This second deportation act has laid the groundwork for a latent conflict between Turkey and its Kurdish populations. In 1984, Abdullah Ocalan built the PKK in order to fight the Turkish government. The situation is consistently stretched. In 2014, a minor event has made the conflict burst again. Moreover, Erdogan, decided to antagonize Kurds in order to strengthen the nationalistic feeling. In Turkey Kurds live far from Ankara and the other large metropolis. Most of them are mountain people isolated in the south eastern, near the Syrian border. They are used to fight and handle insurrectionary war. In January, the Turkish government invaded Afrin in order to strike the PKK and especially its Syrian branch, the YPG. Erdogan, who concentrates almost every power of the Turkish state between his hand, also conducted an operation in the Iraqi Kurdista

The case of Iraq

In Iraq Mustapha Barzani has taken the lead against the Iraqi government. As in Turkey, the situation isn’t a constant war but a latent conflict. Iraq established a policy of “ Arabization “. They forced thousands of Kurds to speak Arabic and forget their culture. Moreover, at the end of the 1980s, Saddam Hussein launched operation Anfal which planned a genocide. Iraqi forces killed 100 000 Kurdish civilians. Even if the state of latent conflict might draw a similarity between the Kurds in Iraq and in Turkey, there is a major difference. Indeed, more the Iraqi government weakened stronger became Iraqi Kurds. Contrarily to the Turkish government, Iraq has known three great wars since 1991. At the end of the first Gulf war, Kurds of Iraq decided to seize the opportunity and became de facto autonomous.

The fall of Saddam Hussein and the destruction of Iraq pushed Kurds to strengthen their territory and take over swans of the country. In 2004, the regional government of Kurdistan was recognized by the international community. Ten years later, The Islamic State rule Mosul and the Iraqi army ran away in front of the soldiers of the so-called caliphate. Consequently, Kurds took advantage of the weakening Iraqi state and once again, expand their territory. But, in 2017, Massud Barzani, the son of Mustapha Barzani, did a referendum to claim autonomy. The majority of Kurds voted yes to the autonomy. Barzani bet that the Iraqi government would take that truth into account without saying anything. But he lost his bet when Baghdad sent men to take back the new territories conquered by Kurds. Following these events, Iraqi Kurds lost an important part of the federal budget accorded by Baghdad. Now, the Iraqi Kurdistan knows a severe humanitarian crisis.

Kurds in Syria : towards a Turkish implantation ?

When France left Syria at the end of the second world war, one did not talk about a Kurdish territory in Syria. Indeed, at the North of the country there were only three cantons: Djezireh, Afrin and Kobane. Consequently, Damascus didn’t deem them as threats contrarily to Baghdad or Ankara. The Assad dynasty thought that the control of Syria relies on the control of Damascus. This ideology didn’t urge them to strike on Syrian Kurds, since they live far from the capital. In 2014, when the Islamic State became more and more dangerous for Syria, Kurds seized the opportunity. They wanted to connect theirs three cantons. Thanks to their military success in Kobane they were seen as heroes and brave warriors especially by the West. They capitalized on this success and achieved the connection between their towns.

But Erdogan didn’t want a Kurdish stronghold at the south of Turkey, able to protect his potential enemies of the PKK. Consequently, as mentioned above, the Turkish army decided to invade the canton of Afrin and naming this assault as a “ security operation “. As a result of this operation, the canton of Afrin may become an extension of Turkey. For example, Turkey is training men so they could become new officials. Everything indicates that Turkey is seeking for a long-term implantation in Syria

Tools to understand the Kurdish question

Beside this long historical background, Gerard Chaliand and Kendal Nezan answered to the questions of the audience. Here are the most important information to know

• Gerard Chaliand put a stress on this information during the conference : Kurds are warriors. They are used to fight and are aware of their strategic asset. Indeed they live on mountains, which are not easy to conquer and invade.
• A student wondered why the “international community “ didn’t do anything to support Kurds and prevent the Turkish support of Islamists militias (especially during the assault on Afrin). Gerard Chaliand explained that the “international community” doesn’t exist. In international relations, states follow their interests and ideologies.
• Kendal Nezan insisted on the false appearances of the UN. The council of security held a minute of silence when the Israeli government installed gantries at the Temple Mount, but didn’t do anything when the Turkish army bombed Afrin and killed thousands of civilians.
• We also figured out that Kurds are not one people. More than one-time, Kurdish Iraqis behaved following their own interests. For example, the Iraqi Kurdistan needs a sea access to exist. Only Turkey provided this sea access. Consequently, Turkey played a game to divide Kurds. But if Kurds were a strong bloc no states could divide them.
• In the same idea, Syria Turkey and Iraq have always done their best to split Kurds.

The conference in Paris was a success. YoungDiplomats plans other conferences in France and beyond. Thanks a lot for having read this overview and other events will come soon !

The conference was a success and the implantation in France has just started !

2 July / MEXICO

Newly elected Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador
cheers his supporters at the Zocalo in Mexico City.

11 July / RUSSIA

US President Donald Trump opened a two-day Nato summit
with a blistering attack today, claiming Germany was ‘captive’ to Russia.

14 July / GREENLAND

A massive iceberg drifting near the coast of Greenland has triggered fears of flooding
if it breaks up, leading the authorities to evacuate a high-risk zone

15 July / RUSSIA

French President Emmanuel Macron reacts during the World Cup final match between France and Croatia. France have won their second World Cup, after defeating Croatia 4-2 in the Luzhniki Stadium in Moscow, Russia.

19 July / SOUTH AFRICA

Former US President Barack Obama speaks in Johannesburg, South Africa on behalf of the Obama Foundation. In his speech, Obama criticised ‘strongman’ politics and urged a renewed respect for human rights, comments that have been widely regarded as a thinly veiled attack on President Trump.

20 July / ERITREA

Adisalem Abu embraces his twin daughters for the first time in 18 years after an Ethiopian Airlines flight arrived in Eritrea. The flight has been seen as further confirmation of an unexpected end to 20 years of deep hostility between the neighbouring countries

Moscow – Young participants in the 6th season of the Gazprom International Children’s Social Programme Football for Friendship have safely returned to their home countries. They are boys and girls of different nationalities and different physical abilities, who visited Moscow on 8–15 June to participate in the final events of the Programme: the International Friendship Camp, First Football for Friendship World Championship, International Children’s Forum, and the events of the FIFA World Cup Organising Committee. The Young Footballers from North and South Korea played in the same team and returned home as best friends.

According to the results of the Open Draw, which took place back in February 2018, the Young Footballers from these countries found themselves on the same international friendship team — Blonde Capuchin — which united young talents from different parts of the world.

From the first days of the International Children’s Camp in Moscow, the participants from North and South Korea got on with each other very well. They had lots of conversations, and, during the time of joint football competitions, these young people presented themselves as the strongest players of their team. During the project, the Young Footballers became true friends and, before going back to their home countries, promised each other to keep in touch, and perhaps, meeting again.

Young Ambassador from South Korea Chan Woo Kim, who has been professionally playing football since the age of 7, was selected to participate in the 6th season of Football for Friendship by the South Korean National Football Federation as a result of an open competition among youth football clubs of the country.

On the other hand, young participant from North Korea Tae Gwon Ri, who has been playing football since the age of 8, also underwent a serious selection for participation in the Programme: he won a competition for ball handling among his peers from the best North Korean youth football schools.

Vladimir Serov, Global Director of the Football for Friendship International Children’s Social Programme, argued that the 6th season of Football for Friendship managed to bring together children from all corners of the world on the same team. Values promoted by participants in the Programme are the basis of harmonious development of the individual, without which it is impossible to achieve success not only in sports, but in all other spheres of life.

“Thanks to the special atmosphere that we have managed to create on the project, all the children regardless of their gender, nationality, and physical abilities can freely communicate with each other without any boundaries at all” Serov added.

It is obvious that this young diplomacy became a true symbol of the 6th season of the Programme because Football for Friendship has proven once again that there are no borders for partnership, teamwork, and mutual understanding.

“Participation in the Football for Friendship Programme helped me not only make new friends from different countries of the world, but also improve my sports skills because we were trained by real professionals. And I will always remember the opening day of the World Cup because I was lucky enough to represent my country at the opening ceremony of the Russia–Saudi Arabia match! My dream came true!” said Young Ambassador Tae Gwon Ri (North Korea, 12 years old).

PJSC Gazprom has been implementing the Football for Friendship International Children’s Social Programme since 2013.The aim of the project is to develop children’s football, promote football diplomacy, tolerance and respect for different cultures and nationalities among children from around the world. The key values supported and promoted by participants include friendship, equality, justice, health, peace, loyalty, victory, traditions, and honour.

By Idriss Zackaira