Young Diplomats

This Article is a continuation of Pakistan : In search of Strategic Depth in Afghanistan Part I : http://www.young-diplomats.com/pakistan-search-strategic-depth-afghanistan-part/ 

Contemporary/More recent issues  

Today the mother of all problems is the sanctuary issue; Afghan Taliban are safe in Pakistani territory (Khalilzad, 2017). An indicator is the fact that Mullah Omar died in a hospital in Karachi. Pakistan has submitted two lists of conditions to America and one list of conditions to Afghanistan for further cooperation against Taliban. These lists contain a series of demands that need to be met to safeguard what Pakistan calls its legitimate interests. Pakistan seeks an equation where the relative position of Afghanistan is that of Belarus to Russia.

Pakistan has always assumed that the Soviets and Americans would come and go, but they will stay on. The quest for territory has become a source of conflict, internal and external (Diehl & Goertz, 1988) in the Afghanistan-Pakistan zone. Afghanistan has provided Pakistan with a zone for further political control and development. If not in  control, Pakistan seeks to deny the area to any other power. But it hasn’t gained economically from Afghanistan directly but has garnered a lot of international aid, humanitarian and military (Gammeltoft, 2002).

By participating in the GWOT^[8], Pakistan has ensured a steady flow of weapons for its military, economic aid and diplomatic support, especially for its nuclear arsenal. Afghanistan has been a cash cow.

 Why has Pakistan done what it has?  

Pakistan is among few countries in the world that have understood the issues and has a large population of ethnic Pashtuns and a smaller population of Hazaras. It has a constituency that can act as an ethno guarantor to the groups in Afghanistan. Pakistan has been more successful in Afghanistan than any other country. It has used Afghan actors and not externals. It understands that a fractious group will not be able to achieve what a smaller unified, compact mission oriented one can. Pakistan sponsored Taliban were quickly able to realize their aims and settle in the shoes of the Afghan government. On the other hand, American troops with NATO partners and others ISAF have still not been very successful in bringing freedom to Afghanistan (Sanger, 2009).

Pakistan would prefer a weak Afghanistan over a strong one that may align with India leading to the encirclement of Pakistan by enemy interests (Felbab-Brown, 2015). An Afghanistan that is not within the influence of Pakistan can be a base for domestic sections like Punjabi Taliban, and Sipah-e-Sahaba to attack the Pakistani state. Pakistan has allowed for the growth and maintenance of certain military-politico organisations to work against India and Afghanistan. Those directed at Afghanistan have to be kept engaged at all times. There are fears that they may turn their heads towards Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces if they are not supported and directed. This concern is especially high as some of these organisations have links with TTP (Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan) and other anti-Pakistan groups.

By ‘ecological perspective’^[9] international actions are often dependent on the environment of the state and how it perceives the environment (Diehl & Goertz, 2002). Also, important are the perceptions and assumptions of the decision makers. The viability^[10] of an act is also an essential condition and in the case of Pakistan geography and location have lent this support. Pakistan recognised this opportunity and operationalized it by using the general instability in its neighbourhood and freedom of action provided by the cold war tussle between the superpowers.

How does Pakistan continue to have influence?  

There are many natural connecting points between Pakistan and Afghanistan, making it valuable for access to Afghanistan. The same can be ascertained from the passage below:

“…a number of border passes between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Its seven routes are well-known which run through its territory, i.e., Malakand, Khyber, Gandab route through Mohmand territory, Khyber and Kohat route through Parachinar, Bangash or Paiwar route through Kurram, Gomal, Tochi routes through Waziristan and in the south there is the famous Bolan route to Quetta in Balochistan province. These passes are corridors of invasion and commerce between the Indus plains and Central Asia. Moreover, there are many key passages through the mountainous Pakistan border, which include two from Paktika Province into Pakistan’s Waziristan region: one at Angoor Ada, a village that straddles both sides of the border east of Shkin, and further south, the Gumal River crossing valley, which cuts through the Sulaiman Range and the Charkai

River passage south of Khowst, Afghanistan, at Pakistan’s Ghulam Khan village into North Waziristan. One of the busiest Pakistan border crossing is at Wesh, just northwest of Chaman, Pakistan, connecting Kandahar and Spin Boldak in Afghanistan to Quetta in

Pakistan, is a flat, dry area, though this route involves Pakistan’s

Khojal Pass at 2,707 m (8,881 ft) just 14 km from the border.” (Hilali, 2010)

Pakistan had retained greater operational control, during the Soviet jihad, as well as during the anti-Taliban and anti-Al-Qaeda phases (Sanger, 2009). The shift of US attention to Iraq led to the vast mobilisation of resources from Afghanistan theatre to the Iraqi theatre allowing Pakistan and Taliban to enhance their roles and routine activities.

Pakistan’s desire to control stems from the Treaty of Gandamak which gave British control over Afghanistan’s foreign policy. Today Pakistan is the remnant of that power at Afghanistan’s eastern borders (Jawad, 1992).

The domination of Pakistan wasn’t something new, the third king Amanullah Khan was overthrown with organisational base across the boundary with the support of religious and tribal leaders (Barfield, 2011). Even at that time Pashtuns under Nadir Shah with the help from British India ultimately prevailed and brought in conservative Islamic practices in contrast to Amanullah’s reforms, and subsequently, the Soviet influence was reduced.

  Taliban Factor

When the Taliban were driven away due to the first influx of American troops in 2001, they escaped into Pakistani territory ensuring a continued Pakistani regulation if not some level of control over their acts (Sanger, 2009). The larger number of escapees belonged to Taliban and not the Al-Qaeda. Taliban’s target was the internationally recognised government of Kabul and not the United States. In GWOT Pakistan’s promise involved killing the enemies of America on its soil. These members of Taliban were the enemies of the Afghan government. But it is observed that Al-Qaeda conducts a large number of successful attacks. Hence it is often a compelling argument that Taliban has subcontracted many acts to Al-Qaeda. It is easy for Pakistan to exert influence as on both sides of the aisle there are Pashtuns.

It is also easy for Pakistan to hold on for long, while other distant powers like the Greeks(Yes! Alexander came here too), British, Russians and Americans always have had to go back home. During the period of engagement, they need a supply chain, and logistics can be a nightmare in the dry, hilly terrain of Afghanistan that is interspersed with local power holders.

By having an active hand in Afghanistan, Pakistan gains in preventing any support base for the secular Pashtun nationalists within its borders from challenging the Punjabi/ Pakistani power. Hence, Pakistan arrested many of the secessionists and nationalists in the GWOT, though many of the operations were said to have been directed against Al-Qaeda. It was easy for Pakistan to brand them as al-Qaeda/Taliban and hand over to the US.

Any strong influence of India in Afghanistan or Central Asia was also checked.

Pakistan as a country has understood that sticking with a military victory is not enough. One has to move ahead and capture victories in the realms of social acceptance, governance, development. But the solution or method it has adopted is: prolongation/elongation of the last phase of success in the military sphere.

America’s mistake  

By knocking off the cross, Americans assumed the cathedral had fallen. They had even taken help from the high priest (Pakistan) for success in the very act. The processes have to be Afghan led and Afghan owned, but the West must step in where it is needed to do the heavy lifting.

They are not to substitute for Afghans but to enable them. 

Further, the budgetary and workforce fluctuations induced by domestic concerns also had an effect on their overall act in Afghanistan.

In the absence of shared goals and shared threats, Pakistan benefits by working very differently from its strategic projections (Mullick, 2009). American and Pakistani regional interests vary to a great extent. Transactional nature of alliance with Pakistan dis-incentivises Pakistan from having the same goal but incentivises adoption of common procedures.

An often made mistake is the assumption that the West and Pakistan wanted the removal of USSR from Afghanistan. That was just one of the desired outcomes for Pakistan. Also desired was the removal of PDPA and coming to power of a non-communist form of government and Pakistan ensured that it was an Islamist government.

In this conflict, there is too much of territoriality. The essential conflict is for territory and regional hegemony. Though nations are imagined communities, in Afghanistan the nations are spread out and interspersed among the provinces. In Pakistan, there are multiple nationalities but the state is stronger, and there have not been much revisionist tendencies in Afghanistan. Though religion is common to both states and so is the nation of Pashtuns. We must understand that nations don’t always need territory. For example, Jews had been a nation even in exile. In this place territory is in practice secondary to nation but with the cultural aspects demanding a stricter adherence in the form of honour, the discourse is dominated by territoriality

While some issues between the two states are time and space specific and hence tend not to repeat, there are those that are repeating and can occur at a different combination of time and space. India-Pakistan relations, US-Pakistan and India-US relations have a strong bearing on anti-insurgency actions in Afghanistan. These three tend to impel Pakistan to seek greater influence in Kabul for two reasons.

1. It seeks benefits from Kabul.
2. It wants to get whatever it can, even if it isn’t going to fulfil its responsibilities to Afghanistan.

By meddling in Afghanistan today, it can reduce some pressure on Taliban and deflect focus, from Afghan development and international efforts to combat insurgency, to Afghan inability. Its role therein can never be disregarded and hence, Pakistan’s interests must be taken care off and respected in Afghanistan and Kashmir. This will lead US to deliver on many of Pakistani demands.

This often compels Afghanistan to violate the underlying architecture for reconciliation with many former warlords of Taliban and the likes of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. This underlying architecture is necessary for Afghanistan’s internal peace.

CONCLUSION  

Pakistan’s ability to control Afghanistan’s destiny is contingent to how long it can run with the hare and hunt with the hounds. They are fighting a war of choice that often appears similar to a war of need. Even if they are not a party to the settlement they have to be comfortable with the arrangement (White, 2017) otherwise the permanence of the settlement would come into question. The present situation reflects a lack of communication between Afghanistan and Pakistan

History has shown that Afghan and Pakistan relations have often repeated a pattern^[11].While territory is significant, the search for strategic depth has ensured that the current dispensation in Kabul has a trust deficit with Pakistan. The very act of domination has prevented any reconciliation between the two neighbours and created agencies that have state like capabilities.

The territory in contest is owned by a community as well as two states. This problematizes the situation as some states tend to signify some community-based allegiances and rights. Most wars are fought for territories but due to the influence that comes along with it (Diehl & Goertz, 1988).

Jyoti Ranjan Pradhan

Time has proved that Pakistani-US relation is the marriage of convenience after the America’s new Islamabad-restraint policy is unveiled. Unsurprisingly, it has brought Islamabad to boil and Pak-US relations has pledged to a new low. Pak-US relations has mainly floated in the security-focused milieu, where trust deficit remains a barrier in maintaining warm ties.

The main factor of trust deficit in today’s Pak-US ties is the allegation of Terror-nourishing on Pakistan, which has been denied by Islamabad. The second factor is America’s ambition of shifting the paradigm of the Afghan war in India’s interest. Since Pakistan would never tolerate facing the music of Indian-Magnetics in the war-torn Afghanistan to its west. Eventually, the New America’s policy has skewed many possible repercussions.

Jeopardizing and giving a cold shoulder to Islamabad’s interests in the region is fueling the flames. Since Pakistan is the only US ally with a tremendous human loss of 27000 lives and $120bn of economic loss in the America’s war. That’s why Washington’s Islamabad-restraint approach is not more than fanning the embers of anti-Americanism in Pakistan, where another Iran would be the addition of new ants in Washington’s pants. But Pakistan possesses options to move away from US-lap but the US cannot tolerate to part ways as a triumph in Afghanistan without Pakistan’s work is merely a pipe dream. Eventually, the $900m American peanut-aid to Pakistan is too low in comparison with worthy economic relations of $110bn between Pakistan and China.

Insult to the injury is the tone of US state secretary Mr. Tillerson where he threatened that the US could strike inside Pakistan and the state may lose ‘privileged status’. In such case, Pakistan seems to be reviewing its Washington policy as reflected from the tone of Pakistani premier, Mr. Shahid Khaqan Abbasi at the 72nd session of United Nation General Assembly. Where he conveyed that neither Pakistan is going to be the scapegoat in America’s war nor prepared to fight Afghan war on its soil. Furthermore, the change of tack by Trump Administration at UNGA is the reflection of the fact that America can never win the Afghan conflict without a Pakistan, which has significantly curbed Taliban insurgents on its soil and restored peace in the war-torn Swat and Waziristan.

On the other hand, Pakistan is not capable of simply ignoring the harsh US demands. New challenges for Islamabad are on the way when Washington is persistently asking to curb Haqqani and other militant groups on Pakistan’s soil (where Washington hasn’t provided any proof to the allegation of the existence of Haqqani group on Pakistan’s soil). But Pakistan can no more turn a blind eye towards the case of terror-militias on its soil, which I the reason behind the straining Pak-Afghan-US nexus. The regional challenge for Islamabad is to maintain cozy ties with Kabul in order to counter Delhi-magnetics in Afghanistan.

Apparently, giving a cold shoulder to the historical chapter of the cold war could be fatal for the interests of both the states as the war-mushrooms in Afghanistan are the by-products of Pakistan-US liaison of the 1980s.

Anas Khan

About the Author: 

Anas Khan is a student in International Relations at National Defence University, Islamabad.

He bears keen interest in Affairs of  South Asia and Afghan war.

In the year 1947, Pakistan came into being. From conception to legal existence, this was one of the fastest creations of a modern state. There were strong claims, of all its citizen belonging to one nation, but it lacked many of the epistemological groundings for the same. It was a multiethnic state, and because of its quick formation, there was a greater impetus or pressure to create a national narrative(for the creators, it would be the national narrative). If any constituent nationality withdrew, as it happened in 1971, the very basis of Pakistan’s creation would be in question.

Since the beginning, Afghanistan challenged Pakistan’s right to the Pakhtun(Pashtun) areas within Pakistani limits. Nations being imaginary and functional communities lead to their constituents having a level of interoperability that all states aspire (Anderson, 2006). Pashtuns who were in the majority and the ruling group in Afghanistan had a national, ethnic tribal and clan consciousness, (Shahrani, 2002) though not without contradictions, and Pakistan feared this would pose a future challenge for it had a large Pashtun populace.

In the previous century, Afghans had fought many wars with the British rulers of Pakistan^[1](then a part of British India) and had lost their territories to the east and south. Historically, borders between governed entities have always changed and have been contested.

The historical genesis lies in the colonial rule over the territory currently with Pakistan. When the British got Punjab and Sindh in 1849, they experienced the regular Afghan raids over these areas and thence endeavoured to have a settled border in this area which ultimately led to the Durand line in 1883 (Omrani, 2009).The dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan was at the beginning an issue between two states, both claiming to be nations and they each had one predominant nationality. With time India also became an issue for Pakistan.

What is strategic depth?  

Strategic depth is the concept of having a hinterland to which the government, military (and its assets) and vital installations can move to in times of war if the enemy comes very close. This zone would allow a chance to regroup for defence and compel the enemy to make further inroads, forcing it to invest in more troops, transportation, and logistics. A supply chain would also have to be put in place. The defender, however, is in familiar territories and has the time and space advantage.

Pakistan’s concept of strategic depth  

Pakistan has sought strategic depth in Afghanistan against India. This stems from territorial insecurity, of having a geographically long but thin country that can easily be penetrated (Rashid, 2010) by a strike corps of Indian Army, more so after the loss of East Pakistan(Bangladesh). For this reason, it has opposed any Indian influence in Afghanistan that can jeopardise its grand control plans in Afghanistan.

The Soviet jihad was in many ways beneficial to Pakistani power apparatus’ interests as it could now direct the war against its adversaries; the rulers Amanullah Khan, Mohammad Najibullah

Ahmadzai and Burhanuddin Rabbani, when he came to power after Dr Najib’s stepping down (Khalilzad, 1995).

In 1996 with the domination of Afghan polity by Taliban, Pakistan came very close to achieving the desired strategic depth, but with the beginning of Global War on Terror(henceforth referred to as GWOT), Pakistani territory ended up providing strategic depth to Taliban^[2].

Pakistan- story  

Pakistan was much well integrated with its neighborhood before its existence as a political entity. The very lands that are today known as Pakistan were politically and socially much closer to central Asia, Iran, and other parts of South Asia. Its port of Karachi was the most important port in the region. The key ports in southern^[3] Asia at that time were Aden, Karachi, Singapore, Hong Kong. With the creation of Pakistan, the initial years involved an isolation from its neighborhood to consolidate its unique separate identity. This isolation was political, social and economic. In fact, Pakistan was closer to the other major countries of the world, politically, like UK, USA, PRC, Turkey and West Asian countries.

Afghanistan-Pakistan Issue  

Afghanistan and Pakistan were conjoined twins due to the Durand line issue and the shared population of Pashtuns. The Pashtuns were often a disquieted group. Pashtuns of FATA^[4] more so. Those living in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (then, NWFP) were closer to the state than those residing in FATA. There were efforts to extend the domestic policy in these tribal areas to the foreign policy geared towards Afghanistan. Pakistan also continued many of the policies that the British before them had practiced with respect to the Afghans.

In 1954-55 Pakistan unified all its provinces in West Pakistan providing Afghanistan the impression that its influence in Pashtun areas of Pakistan was being extinguished permanently (Omrani, 2009).

Pakistan would also want to avoid the nutcracker situation where it has to face adversaries on both sides; India and Afghanistan, who may cooperate against Pakistan (Durrani, 2010).

Pakistan’s fears are not entirely unwarranted. Afghanistan though not a great power had considerable military and political strength during Daud Khan’s rule. It had a strong influence in zones within de facto Pakistani territory. This derived from the cultural aspects, something that is often underplayed in International Relations. In South Asia, some identities are stronger than nation, territory and perhaps religion.

Afghanistan used this influence and ability and first laid claim to the Pashtun lands, within the territory of Pakistan that had been annexed by British in the Anglo-Afghan wars, in 1847 (Chopra, 1974).Soon, Afghanistan was receiving arms and aid from USSR. There were clashes followed by suspension of diplomatic ties in 1955 and 1962. Pashtun nationalists supported Afghanistan in Pakistan on many occasions (Rashid, 2010).

Anti-Soviet Afghan Jihad

The Anti-Soviet Afghan jihad in the 1980s was a great opportunity for the Pakistani government as it was able to send in Pashtuns pliable to its cause to rule Afghanistan and hence placing the issues that Kabul raised time and again, in the backburner. The ruling PDPA government was systematically delegitimized and militarily defeated by mujahedeen, who were constituted by Pakistani and refugee Pashtuns(Afghan Pashtuns in Pakistan as refugees) among other Afghan ethnicities.

Pakistan also moved many militants to Afghanistan, who were trained to act against Indian interests in Jammu and Kashmir. This was done under American pressure^[5] in 1993 to show that it was removing anti-India terror infrastructure, whereas it was merely relocating them for advanced training, (Gardner, 2017).

The war on terror since 9/11 has turned up to be a multi-generational struggle. Terrorism^[6] in its modern sense, anywhere, has been a long-lasting effect and not just a series of events. Pakistani security establishment has for long subcontracted attacks within Afghan territory⁷ to other agents(Khalilzad, 2017).

The focus of the GWOT has been in this region commonly called Af-Pak, but this does not mean that there has been no historical tussles.

Pakistan was not recognized by Afghanistan when it was created. As per Afghan sources, they were supposed to get back the lands of KPK⁸ and FATA^[7] at the end of the hundred year lease to the UK signed by Akbar Ali.  There were skirmishes between Afghanistan and Pakistan after the 1950s. Afghanistan approached the USA for support, but USA needed Pakistan against USSR influence. So, Afghanistan unable to get what it needed, was backed by USSR in its tussles with Pakistan. This reached a peak when PDPA came to power as PDPA government was directly opposed by Pakistan. Pakistani proxies often entered Afghan territory to launch attacks, and these were responded in kind. (Fair, 2014)

The government in Afghanistan after the 1978 coup, wherein Daud Khan and his entire family were killed, was not much liked by people and was opposed by large sections of the political elite.

To face the crises much more Soviet support was sought by the government.

Pakistan empowered its proxies with American and Saudi funding through ISI control and direction (Weinbaum, 1991). Pakistan gains further leverage but its proxies were unable to deliver hence Taliban was allowed to move into Afghanistan and capture Afghanistan district by district. Taliban secures and brings in a form of government and stability while keeping Pakistani interests in mind and protecting and safeguarding them.

In Afghanistan-Pakistan relations, water plays a crucial role as it’s a need for both countries especially as both are arid and temperate. The Soviet Union and America had both funded agricultural programmes in Afghanistan. Many a dam were constructed. With the civil war, there was a break in these activities and Afghanistan was reduced to a dependency for all its economic activities. But a revitalized Afghanistan stands to make choices that might undercut Pakistan. Hence, national security and natural resources come out as two fundamental Pakistani interests in Afghanistan.

Jyoti Ranjan Pradhan

The fallout from the UK referendum that ended in victory for those wanting the country to exit from the European Union (EU) is still reverberating around the world. But what does it mean for Africa?

The decision will fundamentally affect the continent’s relationship with Britain. It will have an impact on trade, aid and diplomacy. And, with Britain going it alone, the moderating influence of the EU will be lost. The EU offers an important commitment to internationalism, social freedoms, human rights and inclusive global development, and the UK has contributed to this positioning. The split will be immensely damaging for all parties.

The Brexit campaigners argued for “taking back control” of aid and trade. But in a globalised world, this small island mentality is absurd. Britain thankfully no longer rules the waves, nor has vast swathes of the globe as colonies under its control. But sometimes the rhetoric suggests it does – or should do. This is, of course, naive and arrogant, and betrays an extraordinary lack of understanding of contemporary global political economy.

Baffled by this madness, Chinese official commentary put it nicely: Britons were “showing a losing mindset” and becoming “citizens of a nation that prefers to shut itself from the outside world”.

Aid, trade and diplomacy

The UK is an important trading partner with the continent, and deals with the EU govern much of this. Only this month an EU Economic Partnership Agreement was finalised with the Southern African Development Community, allowing free trade access to Europe for some countries. Now all these arrangements have to be renegotiated bilaterally with each of the other 162 World Trade Organisation members. It will be a slow and costly readjustment, creating much uncertainty.

Then there is aid. The UK has been a substantial contributor to the EU aid programme, providing €2 billion, including 14.8% of the European Development Fund. While I would be the first to admit that not all of this was effective or efficient, it has allowed a broader mandate than the increasingly narrow focus of the UK aid spend. And the UK influence on the portfolio has always been important.

But perhaps more important than the flows of cash is the influence of the UK on European development debates. Whether through the government or NGOs, think-tanks or research institutes, the UK has always added to the discussion about, for example, the impact of EU domestic farm subsidies on African agriculture or the importance of debt cancellation in the poorest countries. This has been particularly so since the establishment of the UK Department of International Development in 1997 and the G8 Gleneagles summit agreement in 2005, and a commitment – amazingly across governments of different political hues – to a progressive aid agenda, particularly in Africa. This role in European positioning globally will be much missed.

Setback for internationalism

The UK’s diplomatic “soft power” has been often exercised most successfully through the EU as part of a joint commitment to change – whether around issues of conflict, migration or development. This allowed a common voice, and a more measured position. This is certainly the case in Zimbabwe, for example. With, until recently, serial failures of UK diplomacy, the EU has provided a useful bridge and a more effective approach to engagement through a succession of EU ambassadors to the country who did not carry the colonial baggage of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. This will be sorely missed, and not only in Zimbabwe.

The UK voters who pushed for Brexit were worried about jobs, livelihoods and immigration. Those who will lead the country as a result do not have these concerns at the centre of their agenda. They have a vision of free trade and further economic liberalisation: exactly the processes that will undermine yet further the poor and marginalised who voted to leave. This is the tragic contradiction of the “democratic” result, and will lead to more strife into the future.

A cross-party and sustained commitment to internationalism, social democratic freedoms, human rights and inclusive global development, as enshrined in the Sustainable Development Goals, may not survive this sea-change in political fortunes in the UK. The racist slogans and posters and the narrow nationalism that dominated the campaign reveal an uglier side to British (perhaps English) politics, most shockingly shown in the political murder of parliamentarian Jo Cox – a passionate campaigner for more progressive views on social justice and development.

Political prejudices

Who takes over in the UK following the resignation of Prime Minister David Cameron really matters. Not just in the UK, but in Africa too. Everyone should be very worried about the upcoming shift in leadership. We don’t yet even know the candidates, but the political opportunist Boris Johnson is at the head of the race.

Johnson’s attitudes to Africa can only be described as backward and colonial. His slur on US President Barack Obama revealed much. His tales of his holiday in Tanzania frame Africa as a last wilderness, threatened by growing African populations, and could have come from a colonial explorer from the 19th century. His rants on Zimbabwe betray a shallow understanding of history and politics and, as one commentator described it, an “obnoxious and overbearing British imperialist mentality”. His political prejudices are clear: it is not good news.

The chaos in the global markets provoked by this crazy populism will take time to stabilise, and will affect the poorest more than the rich. And the nasty side of British politics, rejecting a progressive internationalism, will undermine the UK’s standing in the world.

We will all be poorer because of Brexit, including in Africa.

This post, written by Ian Scoones, appeared on Zimbabweland.

By: Calvin Khoe

“Know your enemy, know yourself; in hundred battles, you will never be in peril” — Sun Tzu

Year of 2017 provides relentless uncertainty of security situation for the global community, especially for East Asia region. The core of economic and industry in Asia; China, japan, and South Korea synchronizes to accelerate prosperity in the region of Asia. All asian countries from South to South East and Central Asia; or even the global community are highly influenced by East Asia’s stability. Safe to say that prosperity through economic and trade stability will not be achieved unless security stability is established.

The tension of Korean Peninsula reached its highest peak in 2017 since the Korean War ceasefire in 1953. The involvement of global powers and multiple actors in the issue worsen the situation in the peninsula. As a global citizen, objective perspective in analyzing the matter is required. An objective understanding of both countries’ interests and powers will lead us further into an objective assessment. This article will provide an overview on military power (hard power) comparison and how the political elements are utilizing the hard power. The end of this article aims to give a picture on how the centre of gravity of a country becomes the key factor in driving political elements and hard power elements.

 According to John M. Collins, security objectives are divided into two classifications known as “Defend” and “Safeguard”. “Defend” is referring to defending the national goals and “Safeguard” is referring to safeguarding the national interest. Thus, the national interest of a country is the byproduct of its national goals. From a realist perspective, it is believed that countries mainly seek survivability of their nation-states and fight to achieve their national goals. A country needs to assess any threat to the security objective and design a strategy to tackle the threat. Therefore, in order to survive, all countries need to have a continuous maintenance to their security objectives.

In the case of the North and the South Korea, I believe both countries have the same national goals of Korean Peninsula reunification. However, the national interest are different. The interest of North Korea is reunification under Pyongyang and their nation-state ideology while South Korea believes on the reunification under the rule of law and democracy. Therefore, the clash of interest due to different perspectives and ideologies leads to tension and sense of distrust between both countries. It is also undeniable that the foreign involvement of the US, China, and Russia for decades also shapes the dynamic in the peninsula. In short, we can conclude that the high tension situation followed by a sense of distrust will not provide a room for talk or negotiation.

There are two primary tools to secure and achieve the country interest known as military and diplomacy. First of all, North and South Korea look to each other as a threat and therefore military power assessment is important to determine a precise politico-military policies. In doing the military assessment, this article will compare the demographic and military head to head. Thus, we can see the comparison of both hard power capabilities. All the data were taken from globalfirepower.com.

Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) /North Korea

Demographic:

DPRK total population is 25,115,311 with total 10,100,000 fit for military service. Currently, there are 6,445,000 estimate total military personnel with 945,000 active duty personnel in the arms forces follows with the reserve personnel up to 5,500,000. Complemented with the prediction of 415,000 is reaching the military age.

Head to Head Comparison:

Air Power: DPRK air power consists of total three branches of service (army, air, and navy) equipped with 458 fighter aircraft, 572 attack aircraft, 100 transport aircraft, 202 total helicopter, and 20 attack helicopters.

Army Strength: DPRK army equipped with 5,025 combat tanks consist of Main Battle Tanks, medium, and light tanks. Followed with 4,100 armored fighting vehicles, 2,250 self-prepelled artillery, 4300 towed artillery, and 2,400 rocket projectors.

Navy Strength: DPRK army equipped with 11 frigates, 2 corvettes, 438 patrol craft, and 76 submarines.

Republic of Korea (ROK) /South Korea

Demographic:

ROK total population is 50,924,172 with total 21,035,000 fit for military service. Currently, there are 5,829,750 estimate total military personnel with 627,500 active duty personnel in the arms forces followed with the reserve personnel up to 5,202,250. Complemented with the prediction of 690,000 is reaching the military age.

Head to Head Comparison:

Air Power: ROK air power consists of total three branches of service (army, air, and navy) equipped with 406 fighter aircraft, 448 attack aircraft, 348 transport aircraft, 709 total helicopter, and 81 attack helicopters.

Army Strength: ROK army equipped with 2,654 combat tanks consisting of Main Battle Tanks, medium, and light tanks. Followed with 2,660 armored fighting vehicles, 1,990 self-propelled artillery, 5,374 towed artillery, and 214 rocket projectors.

Navy Strength: ROK army equipped with 1 aircraft carriers, 13 frigates, 16 corvettes, 70 patrol craft, and 15 submarines.

The comparison in numbers are made with exclusion to modernization of military equipment, and the comparison is made to establish approximation of the military capabilities. The North Korea focuses on the development of ICBM and Nuclear Head missile as proven by the data which indicates that North Korea possesses more rocket projectors than South Korea. This program becomes the primary deterrence of DPRK to the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the US. In the side of ROK, the recent agreement with US to deploy the anti missile systems or known as THAAD also becomes the deterrence of ROK to the DPRK.

The increasing tension based on military deterrence which is driven by different national interests and country objectives made a “back and forth” progress on North and South Korea reconciliation. In scheme of military there are 3 values of military victories which are victory without peace, war without victory, and victory without war. The North and the South are both aiming for victory without war, this value of victory is can be achieve by two ways. First, enhance the correspondence of military deterrence and economic sanction. Second, open dialogue and seek a common agreement.

It can be said that the reconciliation of Korean peninsula is located in the centers of gravity (COG) of these two countries. According to Clausewitz, center of gravity is “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends”. Meanings the COG would be translated as the capital city, individuals, or the ideology. In the North Korea the “King of Kim” is the COG followed by their ideology which is made by the “King”. In the South Korea, the COG would be in a form of democratic ideology and South Korean nationalism values. Thus, North Korea possess a tangible and centralized COG and the South Korea has an intangible, decentralized COG. Once again, the COG is the foundation of national goal which produces the national interest, and military or hard power exist as a tool which is remotely controlled by the COG. In short, this overview concludes that seeking the point of convergence which fulfills the interest of the COG of North and South Korea to establish a peaceful peninsula is a key way to resolve the tension and achieve the “Victory Without War”.

Edited by: Albert Sutanto

Hindutva an Ideology of fanatical Hindu religious organization Rashtria Swayamsevk Sangh (RSS) preaches one religion, one culture, one nation and one country. The RSS established in 1923 AD, has been struggling for transformation of the diverse Indian society into Hindutva.

What is the Hindutva movement?

The Hindutva movement came into its peak in 1980, when the RSS launched its Political party Bhartya Janta Party (BJP). Mass Ghar Wapsi,( return to home) i.e. coming back to the  Hinduism, Hinduvising the culture of Indian society, twisting  the history, renaming the cities names build up on the names of  Muslims and Brittan and demolishing the religious places  are few tactics of the  RSS and BJP for achieving their goal.

According to the constitution of India, the country is declared a secular state. The founding fathers of India were well aware and had foresighted vision that Indian society is abode of varied culture, religion and nations. That’s why they had separated religion from state. A number of articles of the constitution clearly say that India is secular state. After forty second amendment to Indian constitution in 1976 its preambles maintain that the country is secular, no religion is state religion. Unfortunately, the ground realities are totally different. In April 2017 the Pew research center has ranked India as fourth worst country for religion intolerance and fanaticism, after Syria, Nigeria and Iraq. Atrocities against minorities and Dillate a lower class of Hindu religion are the business of day in India. India a country of 1.3 billion people has eighty percent Hindus, fourteen percent Muslims, two percent Christian, two percent Sikhs and reaming two percent are the followers of other religions. Hence twenty percent minority and sixteen percent Dalit cast of Hindus are under cruelty of the RSS and BJP.

 The woes of the Muslims

The RSS and its allies have committed heinous crimes against the Muslim community in India. Mob violence, use of force to prevent religious practices, attacks on innocent Muslims for cow slaughter, and lynching for beef eating are common in India. Besides individual and fundamentals groups’s violence against the Muslims, there are some preplanned carnages of the Muslim community in India. On December 06, 1992, the Babri Mosque in the city of Ayodhya, Utter Perdesh State was demolished by the Hindu militants and the RSS. In the same incident more than 1500 Muslims were killed and 1829 people were injured. Properties of the Muslims were looted and plundered. The Muslim community was dragged in state of trauma and distress. To date a number of the grieved Muslims have been running from pillar to post for the justices. While the blood of the innocent Muslims still had not dried other heart-stopping massacre took place in Gujarat state. The Law enforcement agencies were ordered from higher authorities not to respond, at that time the Prime Minister Narendra Modi was chief minister of the state of Gujarat.  In the massacre more than one thousand Muslims were murdered and a number of Muslims were injured. The Gujarat carnage took place because of burning of Sabarmati train in Godhra. It was alleged that the Muslims had ignited the train. Later, it was declared that the RSS and the Militant Hindus were responsible for the torching of the train. In the train burning 57 Hindus were burnt alive.

Unfortunately, in the massacre the state authorities were involved. Hiren Pandey a Minister in the cabinet of Modi in Gujarat state has confessed in his sworn  statement that the massacre were preplanned, the  police were asked not to interfere. To prove this claim, an Intelligent Bureau (IB) officer said in his sworn statement in the Supreme Court of India that the riots were, no doubt, preplanned. Deplorably, the atrocities of the RSS do not end here. The other communities of the country similarly face the same cruelties of the fascist RSS.

The sufferings of the Sikh community 

Sikh community is two percent of the Indian population which is roughly twenty million population of the country. The Sikh community faces the hate crimes and violence as the Muslims do. Strangely, in the violence and bloodshed of

Sikhs, besides the RSS, a so-called secular party of India, the Congress party of India is also involved. According to official recode of Indian authorities more than 2800 Sikhs are killed to date. But according to independent sources 80000 Sikhs are murdered because of hate crimes. Hindu militants deem Sikhism is a sect of religion. Fortunately, due this mentality intensity of the suffering of the Sikhs community is at low level. However, those Sikh people support the Khalistan movement, the moment for separate county for Sikh people in the Punjab state of India, are ruthlessly crushed.

The wretchedness of the Christian people

The Christian another significant minority of India is also not safe from the cruelties of the RSS and other fundamentalist Hindus. The Christian are regularly assaulted by the RSS. The priest and other workers of the churches are attacked; sexuality assaulted, and forced to change their faith on the gun point. According to the Foreign policy Magazine a 71 years old Christian nun has been raped in the regime of the Narendra Modi. The churches are demolished, the priests are compelled to renounce their belief and embrace the Hinduism. Those people who refuse to this madness and cruelty of the radical Hindus have to bear the burnt of the barbarism. The Christian of India suffers more atrocities in the contemporary India than ever before in the history.  In 2007-8 Hindu militants have burned the churches, and Christian houses, in the riot more than 91 Christian were murdered and 1800 injured. In the same incident more than 60000 Christians were left homeless. Similarly, in 2013, one hundred Churches were attacked and four hundred Christians had suffered the mayhem of the Hindu militant fundamentalist.

Is India really Secular and Democratic?

In the above discussed sorry state of affairs, is it appropriate to say India is a secular and democratic country? In my opinion, saying India is secular and democratic state is injustice and spreading salt on the wounds of the grieved minorities of India. Since PM Modi took office, there has been alarming rise of intolerance, violence and hate crimes. In the medieval India, religious tolerance, coexistence and respect for other faiths was hallmark of Indian civilization and culture. The seed of this religious intolerance and hate crimes had sowed in time of colonization of India by the Great Britain, and it is full grown in the regime of   PM Modi. Regrettably, as a prime minister of the county, he should have openly condemned these incidents of violence and bloodshed. But he has not spoken a word against the brutalities and human rights violations. In fact Narendra Modi’s silence is a tacit support to his party’s militant wings the RSS. The fascist RSS and BJP want to achieve their despicable agenda of Hinduizings or Hindutuva by means of violence and force. This is not only venomous for the minorities but also dangerous for the secular and democratic state of India, a home of a number of ethnic communities.

“The views and opinions expressed in some articles are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position or editorial policy of Young Diplomats magazine.”

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Many voices and numerous statements have been raised on the African continent, from politicians, journalists, economists, to ordinary citizens are questioning the CFA franc that mobilizes the monetary system in the francophone zone of Africa; since the independence. The CFA zone is consisting of 14 African states, eight of them in West Africa (WAEMU) and six others in Central Africa make up the (CEMAC); including Chad.

Currency devaluation

Experts recently pointed out that the “West and Central African francs that have not been adapted and reviewed to the international standards are outdated and need to be reviewed.” Other analysts in the continent argued that the CFA should be devalued to encourage growth in the region. Some even went further that the CFA franc should be abandoned. On the other hand; and during a recent extraordinary CEMAC summit in Cameroon’s capital Yaoundé; Central African leaders have refused to devalue the CFA franc.

Nditson Tamkiro Ndilira, an economist at Chad’s Ministry of Finance and Budget, views the devaluation unnecessary and risky for the moment; it’ll add inflation and place new demands on government resources, especially for oil exporting countries in the region. That devaluation should take place gradually. “We should not repeat the mistake of 1994, we need to diversify our economies first, and then we can think of currency devaluation.” Ndilira said.

Advantages and disadvantages

Many economists and financial analysts say that the CFA zone exports will be the first beneficiaries from the devaluation of the CFA.  But on the other hand, CFA zone imports will be negatively affected by foreign imported goods, which will increase in prices, especially for non-oil importers in the CFA zone.

Monetary cooperation between the CFA franc zone and France is ruled by some essential principles; as a convertibility guarantee by France, the holding of each country’s foreign reserves by the French, a fixed peg to the euro and an unlimited transfer.

The linkage between the CFA franc and the euro zone

Some authors argue that the CFA franc zone won’t benefit from the euro zone unless there are some new reforms; they think that CFA economies have lower economic growth because of its linkage to the Euro zone economy and exchange rate system.

An official at Chad’s ministry of finance and budget, who spoke on condition of anonymity, thinks that the CFA fixed peg to the euro is beneficial for the CFA zone. He explains that the currency linkage is an internal French budgetary issue; it is not a monetary matter that would include France’s euro partners, the French Treasury has taken a single responsibility for guaranteeing convertibility of CFA francs into Euros, without any monetary policy implication for the Bank of France. “So why do we need to worry about this now?” He said.

On the other side, Nditson Ndilira wonders why each central bank in the CFA zone keeps 50% of its foreign reserves with the French treasury. He considers the CFA peg to the euro as a punishment to the CFA zone; he argued that the CFA should be unpegged from the euro zone, because it is a powerful, awkward force which retards development in the CFA zone.

Towards a single currency for Africa

Many statements have been raised on the continent for monetary union projects; including the African Union that plans to create an African Monetary Fund in Cameroon and an African Central Bank in Nigeria to pave the way for a common currency for the whole continent by 2021.

According to Ndilira; Africa is not ready yet for a common currency for the whole continent, especially the CFA region. He explains that it is impossible for the moment, because it cannot happen without real scarifications and serious regional integrations.

“There’s something called – reality – stands between political speeches and actions.” Ndilira added.

The Rohingya crisis exposes the flaws of the United Nations and the mechanisms driving world politics

The state of internal affairs in Myanmar took a downward spiral in late August with violent clashes between Rohingya militants and government forces. This conflict is symbolic because it highlights how the international community and the systems that it has built has not effectively solved the conflict which is now a multi faceted one, ranging from alleged commission of war crimes to a refugee crisis. Thus this case study becomes the ideal example to explain how the international community has failed facing and attempting to solve a multitude of challenges

The failure of the United Nations from the very beginning…

The Rohingya, concentrated mainly in the Rakhine state, constitutes to a third of the population there. However, being a group that practices the Sufi inflicted variation of Sunni Islam in a Buddhist majority country means that recognition does not come easy. The 1948 citizenship law in Myanmar was exclusionary, and once the military Junta came into power into 1962, laws were passed limiting the ability for the Rohingya to gain access to full citizenship and rights associated with such privileges.

Later in 2014, the United Nations backed a national census which provided identification to the Muslim minority group- a move considered renewed political commitment by the government. Yet, the Buddhist nationalist movement responded quick to the matter, threatening to boycott the elections. Similarly, in 2015, the nationalist movement lobbied for the removal of the temporary white card Rohingya holders to vote in a constitutional referendum. International efforts to restore the citizenship rights of the Rohingya, led by the United Nations have evidently failed to counter the mass influence of the Buddhist nationalist movement. Whilst the right to a nationality and a right to take part in the government through direct and indirect means are universal in nature, the UN has not been able to ensure that similar rights are administered to the Rohingya. Instead a multilateral giant in the field of international relations, bows the head and bends the knee, to a mere nationalist party originating from a non P5 member country.

The refugees

The Myanmar government’s proposition that the Rhohingya are illegal Bangladeshi immigrants was present ages before the recent escalation of tensions, despite historical and cultural artefacts marking their presence since the Arakan Kingdom. On the other hand, the fact that the Bangladeshi government does not recognize the Rohingya as citizens they eventually inherit a “stateless” status. Yet with recent clashes, the exodus has intensified with refuges flowing into several hotspots, which, according to the council on foreign relations, are:

1. a) Bangladesh: 33 000 registered refuges, and close to 250 000 unregistered refugees
2. b) Malaysia: 90% of its registered 150,700 refugees by June 2016 were from Myanmar.

c)Indonesia and Thailand: to a lesser degree than Bangladesh and Malaysia

The international community has a responsibility of intervening to help the nations that house these refugees to build capacity in order to accommodate the needs of the refugees. Yet, it stays silent when the conditions in refugee camps deteriorate progressively. It does not flex its muscles when Bangladesh turns down refugees from its border posts back into the chaos that they attempted to escape from for the hope of a better life, if not for them, but for their children. Such a violation of customary international law or jus cogen, being the principle of non-refoulement goes unnoticed- is it either because of a lack of awareness, or because the international community refuses to bat an eye?

Does the UN have the resources to manage the sudden influx of Rohingyan refugees?

“No, we don’t, not at this point. The numbers are immense and they just keep growing.”, says Vivian Tan, a spokesperson for the UNHCR.

I’ll just let that quote do the talking.

The inertia of geo politics

The organization of Islamic states in its January 19^th meeting criticized Myanmar of its harsh reactions to the Rohingya populous. Yet Myanmar’s stance did not alter; at the end of the day there’s only so much that words can do.  Instead they acknowledged the chances that the Rohingya can be infiltrated by the ISIL. Why would they arrive at such a decision you, may wonder. This is because of the fear of being tagged as a state sponsor of terrorism, in the event of supporting non state actors, which makes taking a neutral stance the best of course of action that would eliminate any negative repercussions that may otherwise occur by supporting non state actors: case in point being how easily the Gulf Cooperation Council turned on Bahrain. The precedent set with the OIC assuming such a stance is disastrous. Although they claim to be the collective voice of the Muslim world, their decision to abandon the Rohingya people, means that the Rohingyas lose out on a potential representative to voice out their opinions and an ally, making them more exposed to further violence from the Myanmar government.

“Fundamental violations of human rights always leads to people feeling less and less human”

-Aung San Suu Kyi

Ironic, coming from the defacto leader of a government accused of systematic ethnic cleansing, which amounts to crimes against humanity, according to the Rome Statute. Suu Kyi, rewarded as a champion of human rights by the international community itself, is now leading the very cause of mass human rights violations in Myanmar. The current secretary general of the United Nations, Antonio Guterres urged Suu Kyi and her government to cease all violence in the fear that it would destabilize the region. The government promptly replied by blaming the militants in Rakhine for misinforming the international community.

This example testifies how far international responses to crises go- due to a lack of control over members of the international community. The government can now resume its killing, mass destruction of homes and ethnic cleansing without having to bat an eye towards the concerns of the international community. All the government has to do is deny, and resume its operations. After all, who’s going to stop them? All the international community can do is whine.

Some may say a solution to the conflict is near, but reality is that a solution seems far-fetched. The ARSA, also known as the Rohingyan militants, have offered a ceasefire to allow the flow of humanitarian aid till the 9^th of October. Unfortunately, the government does not negotiate with terrorists. Silence by the international community to the government’s response shows the inability of the international community to enforce a solution. This is because in the bigger scheme of things, supporting or refuting an action affects political alliances, which in turn affects the security of the state and its people; not responding, or in other words, remaining impartial yields a better outcome to a nation making a business as usual stance the most attractive option a country has.

Should we reform the United Nations?

Moreover, it highlights the hypocrisy of the international community. The international community can complain and have their way with Saddam Hussein in Iraq, or Gadaffi in Libya, but it wishes to stay silent with Myanmar. Does this not question the accountability of the international peace keeping system that apparently has the right to pick and choose where it wants to be involved in?

In conclusion, it is becoming increasingly evident that the international community and the mechanisms it has erected are clearly failing. A lack of capacity to address global issues, a lack of control against members of the international community and a lack of enforcement of action against violators of existing international norms and other checking mechanisms due to deadlock caused by foreign policies and political alliances make the existing system weak and flawed.  Change is needed, and it is needed soon.

It maybe reform of the United Nations. It may be scrapping it altogether and replacing it with a better system. Whatever it may be, a fix is needed. And it’s needed soon.

About the Author :  Isuru Abeysekara is a 19 year old who just graduated from high school in Sri Lanka. He is involved in MUN, debating and several community service projects in his locality. His interests to name a few include economics, animal welfare and international peace and security. 

The Central African Republic’s (CAR) postcolonial history has been dominated byconflict. From the disastrous rule of Jean-BedelBokassa, through President André Kolingbaand then Ange-Félix Patassé, the CAR ultimately came to the Bangui Agreements, which aimed to resolve widespread social and economic grievances. Since then, the most important of CAR peace effortswas the Global Peace Accord, signed initially by the ARPD, UFDR, and FDPC groupsin Libreville, Gabon in June 2008. It granted amnesty for acts against the state prior to the agreement, and called for a disarmament and demobilization process to reintegrate former rebels into society and the regular CAR armed forces.

Other rebel groups signed on to the agreement later or signed similar agreements, as was the case for the UFDR in December 2008. The only major group not to sign was the CPJP, which continued on until signing a peace agreement with the government in August 2012.Prior to that, the CPJP and UFDR continued to fight over control of artisanal diamond fields in western CAR, especially around Bria. The CPJP announced that it was ready to end fighting and signed a ceasefire deal, but violence resumed and more than 50 deaths were reported in September 2011. A CPJP-UFDR deal that October, signed in Bangui, called for the demilitarization of CAR’s Bria region.

That history leads to conflict in CARthat again intensified in 2012 when disparate Muslim groups in the country unified under the banner of the Séléka movement. Angered by the exclusionary rule of President Francois Bozize’s administration, Séléka militias overthrew him despite pleas for help from France.TheSélékamovement tried to fill the resulting power vacuum by appointing Michel Djotodia as president. Large-scale sectarian violence broke out as Christians in the country formed their own Anti-Balaka militias and attacked Muslim civilians in Bangui and other provinces in the country. More than 1 million Muslimcivilians fled the capital into the CAR north and to Chad and Cameroon in 2013.

The Sant’ Egidio peace agreement

The most recent CAR deal came in June, when the government of President Faustin-Archange Touaderaand more than a dozen armed groups inked an agreement mediated by the Roman Catholic Community of Sant’Egidio. It briefly raised hopes forpeace based on three main points – the political situation and ceasefire, security and economic issues, and humanitarian and social issues. The very next day, hopes for the agreed-upon commitments and “a dynamic of reconciliation” ended in the gunfire of heavy fighting between Séléka and Anti-Balaka forces at Bria and elsewhere in the north. It seems obvious that “getting an agreement” to end the war is an illusion.One wonders why these deals brokered by the UN or western powers so often fail to be implemented once they’ve been negotiated, in CAR particularly.

Former Prime Minister Martin Ziguélé, a widely respected CAR economist, argues that peace agreements can work with the commitment of all parties and careful follow-up by experienced leaders.

Peace agreements or protections to end the civil war?

Perhaps the most significant reason for the recent escalation of violence lies within Touadéra’s government. The new president, who was Bozizé’s prime minister, has relied heavily on former Bozizé ministers to build a new government and – as Stratfor analysts note – reform security services and reintegrate former militants. It’s resented by militant groups who wanted change in 2013, and given the anemic CAR leadership may lead to another coup in the near future.

The transitional government in CAR headed by Catherine Samba-Panza was supposed to restore order and security, protect the population and start putting the country together while it was falling apart. Yet hostility and resentment increased, and the ethnic tensions deepened as armed groups fragmented, multiplied and became increasingly criminalized. The transitional government was a fiasco, and the international community should have ended the mandate of the transitional institutions after one year, replacing them with more professional people and a real strategy.

Former minister Marie-Reine Hassen, a widely respected Central African economist and ambassador,argues that a rush to elections was too dangerous and risked more atrocities, but the advice wasn’t heeded and those elections added fuel to the fire. The months-long surge of renewed violence followed in the aftermath, but there are a number of factors that make a working peace deal elusive.

Hassen doesn’t believe in peace agreements in CAR at all. Forums, gatherings, summits and peace conferences don’t deliver results on a crisis she connects to human rights violations and impunity. Rebel groups committing serious human rights violations, some of which may constitute international crimes, are never held accountable in each successive wave of peace deals. No dialogue has ever brought any peace. Negotiations were never the solution. Now the situation has worsened as the new government is completely unable to control the territory and ensure public order and security, but it’s precisely the rule of law and the end of impunity that Hassen views as the only win-win solution.

What’s really fueling the CAR crisis

For his part, Ziguélé looks at economic and financial reason. “The leaders of armed groups are looking to control areas of economic interests, mining sites and cattle breeding areas, in order to feed their activities,” he says.“The struggle for this control has opposed armed groups between them for many months with collateral victims among civilians.” Yet this moment in the CARconflict seemsthe most destructive in its violent history, and is a result of the failure to fully invest in lasting peace agreements.

Ziguélé argues that strong security measures are needed to convince both Séléka and Anti-Balaka fighters to leave the armed groups, but Hassen adds that the recent conflict has shattered what remained of an economically devastated state. Anger over disparities, real or perceived, in the Muslim and Christian groups are triggered by economic issues, and sectarian motivations are very apparent.

Hatred of the Sélékas degenerated into anger at all Muslims from Christian Anti-Balaka groups as the violence spreads. Their ranks, as well as those of the Séléka armed groups that overthrew Bozizé, have fractured into armed bands scattered across CAR carrying out equally vicious attacks, fighting has also increased in the central and eastern provinces of the country, and apart from the frequent attacks on UN peacekeepers and humanitarian workers, the world isn’t paying attention anymore.

Finding a peace process that works

Some Séléka fighters say there’s no place for the international community if Touadéra fails to initiate a national dialogue with all CAR actors.On the other hand, Ziguélé thinks international actors have to play a great role on peace agreements, beside African and regional actors. Yet, as Hassen notes, neither the UN, nor the African Union, nor the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) has prevented the CAR collapse and its ongoing disintegration. Mediation by Congo-Brazzaville President Denis Sassou Nguesso made the conflict worse, and targeted sanctions don’t help.

Mediators may do more harm than good, but the main responsibility for protecting the CAR from mass atrocity crimes lies with the government of CAR, and that means a stronger leader than Touadéra may be necessary. If the security dilemma is addressed through a clear, credible and extensive commitment in CAR, by external forces (China, USA and France) that adequately deal with spoilers and power sharing, careful mediation can deliver a peace deal. Regional powers including Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Chad and perhaps Sudan need to play a role, but that won’t happen if peace processes are manipulated by elites or other interest groups with in CAR. It’s only when the country itself comes to an agreement that peace might be achieved.