Young Diplomats

Why the US are so powerful? The main reasons lying behind their dominance is that they base their power on several pillars : geographical advantage , culture of innovation , high level of education , financial and economic flexibility and stability , military dominance and a stable political system. These pillars basically permit the US to still solid and powerful even if one of them is weakened. That is why the decline of the dollar and their monetary hegemony would not mean necessarily a decline of the US.

At the heart of U.S. power is its geography and the strategic depth that this geography provides. The nation’s vast internal infrastructure is buoyed by a robust national highway system, as well as the globe’s largest rail system and longest internal waterway network. Moreover, the United States is self-sufficient in almost all major industrial and agricultural commodities, with the exception of petroleum. Even then, it is the world’s largest petroleum producer.

The United States has no strategic threats on its immediate borders, with even further depth supported, for now, by its military and aerospace power. This geographical productivity and external security allow it to take a hands-off economic approach unmatched by most other economies. Its free economic environment cultivates a strong entrepreneurial culture and allows venture capital platforms to flourish; gives it leadership roles in innovation and research and development in all areas of technology and academia; enables a robust financial center; and creates a flexible labor market. In total, U.S. economic power is far from just a consequence of the dollar’s hegemony in global finance and makes it a magnet for capital and investment accumulation.

A few countries have replicated aspects of those strengths, but no single country has done so on the scale of the United States. For example, the United States sits at or near the top in every category of technological development, while other countries can only lead in some areas. On the whole, the United States can satisfy most of its economic needs, making it one of the world’s few heavily industrialized countries with little trade exposure. This gives it more resilience than others to withstand downturns in global trade.

No other country can take solace in this fact. Modern China emerged from a bitter internal civil war in the aftermath of Japanese occupation, compelling it to overcome its internal tension by employing a centralized economic system with strong government oversight of its corporate structure. The same is true of Japan’s keiretsu and South Korea’s chaebol, both closely linked corporate systems. This type of economy is also prevalent in Europe, where a high level of regulation has quashed any chance of developing an entrepreneurial tech hub on the scale of California’s Silicon Valley.

Despite these strengths, the U.S. approach poses risks over the next decade. The concern remains that the monetary tools used to manage these risks were blunted with the response to the last economic downturn, and that recovery from a new downturn could drag on given the current state of U.S. interest rates, possibly requiring more stimulus spending. Such spending would only exacerbate the deficit and problems underpinning it. The United States’ status as global hegemon certainly does not make it immune to crises, even painful ones that force it to turn inward. So while continued economic prowess for the United States appears likely in the long term, the immediate outlook is not necessarily as rosy.

Potential Weakness of the Dollar

There is no doubt that the United States’ dominant role in the global financial system gives it outsized influence. The dollar’s status as the global reserve currency, U.S. influence on multilateral financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, and New York’s position as the financial capital of the world gives Washington strong leverage that it uses to influence the actions of other nations. As in the case of the recently lifted sanctions that isolated Iran, even if other countries do not align with U.S. positions, they would likely capitulate to U.S. wishes so as not to lose access to U.S. financial markets. The United States still needed support from Europe for those sanctions to have a significant effect, but even without that support, the sheer size of U.S. financial markets would have given unilateral sanctions significant weight.

While ETM Analytics has taken the view that the U.S. role in the global financial system is supported largely by the hegemony of the dollar, Stratfor sees the dominant dollar is just one component of a much larger mosaic supporting the long-term stability and health of the U.S. economy. A gradual decline in the dollar’s role as a global reserve currency does not undermine the rest of the United States’ economic strengths. Those give the United States more flexibility in dealing with any economic challenge, and that is likely to continue underwriting the stability of the U.S. economy. While the U.S. economy, like every other, certainly remains subject to periodic downturns that will no doubt be painful at times, the United States has the ability to weather them more easily than any other large country.

One point that the ETM series drives home is that regardless of its intent, the Fed’s actions matter on a global scale, meaning it poses a risk to the rest of world. But to Stratfor, it is not a question of whether the dollar’s role in international finance is an exorbitant privilege that other nations are driven to “abhor,” but rather how well the Fed walks the thin line of balancing its own monetary policy requirements with the requirements of the global economy.

The Fed’s mandate is to safeguard the health of the U.S. economy. However, the United States remains isolated from other global economic problems, particularly in trade. This means that the potential of the Fed’s monetary policy to disrupt the global economy is diluted by natural economic buffers in the United States against external shocks. This question lies at the heart of the monetary tightening cycle that the United States began late last year.

Regardless, the U.S. struggles to balance its interests with those of the global economy and its relative economic insularity give the rest of the world incentive to find ways to protect itself. Both Stratfor and ETM Analytics agree that as it stands, no single entity could easily match U.S. financial dominance, and it does not appear that one is on the way.

No Obvious Potential Successors

For many years, the mantle of global financial hegemony was held by European powers. Collectively, Europe is a region more populated than the United States with roughly the same global economic output — and far more international trade. However, one of Europe’s defining characteristics is its divisions, both geographical and historical. Europe is riven by mountain ranges and peninsulas allowing countries like Germany and France to generate and trade large quantities of goods without being forced to work together to transport them to the ocean and beyond. The result is a continent defined by cultural differences, with strong identities that have been formed often in direct opposition to one another. These identities hinder attempts to unify the continent under a single banner, be it by military means like those of Napoleon, or political means like the European project.

In the short term, sheer political willpower can overcome these obstacles, but ultimately European unity tears itself from within. The eurozone encountered a crisis just eight years into its existence. Attempts to solve the crisis by transferring capital from the wealthier north to the worse-affected south (and Ireland) have led to rising friction within the bloc. This has led to the emergence of populist and nationalist political movements, in the south advocating a write-off of debt and in the north seeking an end to bailouts. Both regions have seen demands to exit the eurozone. The euro is a currency whose foundations are laid in different countries, all of whom have proved unwilling or unable to pull together in a crisis. The next crisis could very easily see the currency’s end.

China is now more dependent on the global financial system than it has ever been. Unlike the United States, China is not relatively isolated from trade, it does not yet have a vibrant consumer sector, it lacks strategic depth from outsiders militarily, and it does not possess the same productive and encompassing technological innovativeness.

Whether or not U.S. actions are directed at China, these vulnerabilities are forcing Beijing to take a more active stance on international issues, including trade and finance. However, China does not want the yuan to replace the dollar as the global benchmark currency. For the Chinese currency to do so, China would have to drastically reform its financial system by liberalizing the yuan exchange rate, removing capital flows and taking other actions that would undermine Beijing’s control over the country as it navigates a crucial economic shift over the next two decades. Even as China embarks on the internationalization of the yuan and the liberalization of parts of its currency regime, it is doing it very slowly and in ways that would prevent real offshore liquidity to the point that it no longer has control over its currency.

Diluting U.S. Financial Primacy

Nonetheless China — much like Europe — has a strong desire to stabilize the global financial system so that any actions the Fed takes to manage the U.S. economy have only a limited effect worldwide. Though neither Europe nor China can likely supplant the dollar by themselves, they can dilute its influence. Decentralizing global currencies is one way of doing so, and it is clear that China is pushing in that direction. In April, China floated the idea of issuing bonds denominated in Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) and spent much of past year successfully lobbying the International Monetary Fund to include the yuan in the SDR basket.

In theory the SDR, a collection of major world currencies, could be an ideal mechanism on which to base a global reserve system. Regardless, the acceptance of this concept is likely to be slow, over the course of decades, since backing the SDR as any sort of functional reserve currency would require China to build a consensus with most of the world’s economic powers, including the majority of Europe. Europe — especially the United Kingdom and Germany — has been more receptive to some of China’s strategies to internationalize the yuan and may eventually view the SDR as an ideal way to lessen the Fed’s influence over global finance markets. Regardless, consensus-building from China to use the SDR will likely be slow, barring global financial panic. In the meantime, we will probably see countries (and banks) slowly move away from the dollar and balance risk by keeping more reserves in other hard currencies as well as the yuan.

For the United States, such a loss would be manageable so long as the transition is slow and does not cause a sudden run on the dollar. The tangible benefits of having the global reserve currency have always been up for debate, with some studies suggesting it adds less than 1 percent to gross domestic product. Former Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke recently noted that the benefits are “mostly symbolic.” However, from a geopolitical perspective, a more distributed international financial system would surely undermine the United States’ ability to slap sanctions on companies that do business with U.S. rivals. That said, the United States’ power does not rest on any single tool. A weakening of its stranglehold over international financial transactions would weaken just one method for the United States to project power.

Our view is that the dollar would likely still play a large part in any successor currency regime. That role might not approach, as it does today, the roughly 45 percent of cross-border payments nor the 64 percent of global foreign exchange reserves held, but the dollar would likely retain the largest share in a successor regime — especially if the eurozone falls apart. While this might require the United States to adjust its debt situation, it is likely that the transition would be slow as other countries gradually diversify their holdings and payments away from the dollar, given that the dollar has no clear successor.

The U.S. debt situation could certainly come to a head over the next two decades (as could those of other major economies) but in the aftermath, the overall strengths of the U.S. economy would make recovery easier. Superpowers throughout history have seen the levers that enforce their status come and go, but the very definition of a superpower is that it naturally develops new ones to replace those that break. Until a single, unified bloc can balance the United States in the same way that the Soviet Union did, it will remain the center of the global geopolitical system regardless of the role the dollar plays.

By Adrien Gonin, Palau de la Generalitat, Placa de Sant Jaume

Current politic and economic situation in Catalonia

Catalonia is seeking since the new election of its president, Puigdemont, to a secession process with the Spanish government. After 100 days of presidency of Puigdemont, the Catalan parliament has for the first time the majority for the independence. Catalonia represents the second strongest region in Spain, with 28 181€ GDP per inhabitant, compare to 22 800€ in Spain and a lower unemployment rate (20,3% versus 24,5% for Spain) – but still very high. Catalonia is also the first region to receive foreign investment in Spain, with an increase of 57% between 2014 and 2015.

A Dialogue on the independence referendum between Spanish and Catalonian government is still not existing 

After his meeting with Spanish president Rajoy, Puigdemont emitted again the wish to have an open dialogue with his Spain: “We need a free discussion on the independence process, we need to create a new relation with Spain. Today, the government refuses to organize a referendum. A dialogue between us and Spain is necessary.” Puigdemont also deplores the consequences for the international image of both parties: “I told Mr Rajoy the image of Spain would be tremendously improved internationally if he agreed on the staging of a referendum with Catalonia.”

Puigdemont also highlighted the lack of state investment in Catalonia, whereas Catalonia contributes as Spain´s rich region to the national treasury. His delegate to foreign affairs, Raül Romeva completed: “Catalonia represents 20% of Spanish GDB and we only receive 7% Spanish investments. Spain investments are too low. Nevertheless, it is our first trade partner. We hope for a better cooperation with Spain, the current relationship is damaging us both.”

Finally, Catalan´s leader presented a list of 46 points to Rajoy for a better collaboration with Spain: “I think our obligation is to dialog, we wish to become independent in a democratic way but there is no possibility to negotiate with Madrid.”

Peaceful movements and citizens claiming for a referendum

During the last years Catalonia had 5 strong mobilizations in the streets. This mobilizations stayed peaceful and no violence has been resented. As a fact, there is a demand for an official referendum in Catalonia but it doesn´t mean there is a strong majority for the independence.

The government and reporters can only use the data of the regional elections from February, 27^th 2016. The results didn´t show any strong majority for or against the independence movement:

Results of the regional elections, 27.02.16:

• 48% strongly in favor of the independence
• 39% strongly against
• 13% uncertain

There are no similarities between Catalonia´s current situation and previous claims for independence declared Puigdemont – “Spain is not a dictatorship, we won´t declare our independence unilaterally.”

The first step is the referendum, depending on the following results, Spain and Catalonia will have to face decisions regarding the status of Catalonia in Spain or as an independent state.

New Spanish government? New dialogue?

Since general election in December 2015, Spain´s parties have failed to agree on the creation of a new government, fresh election will be called this summer. It seems that the left party Podemos has the key for the next elections. According to Puigdemont, only an alliance between Podemos and the socialists will be positive in order to organize a referendum in Catalonia.

How is Catalonia preparing a potential independent State?

Actual Catalonian president, Puigdemont declared “It is our mission to prepare the legal and institutional framework for a future state of Catalonia by the end of my mandate – 2018. Our roadmap is to go from a pre-independent to a post-autonomous county”.

Nevertheless, Catalonia doesn´t want to become an enemy of Spain – “they will remain our first partnes” declared both Puigdemont and Romeva.

Concerning the European Union, Catalonia wants to stay in the Union. Future Catalan citizens will remain Spanish but also member of the EU. “We are 7,5 million Europeans in Catalonia” declared Puigdemont. “But in order to join the EU, it is first necessary to be recognized as independent from Spain. I think the European Union will have the same dialogue with us as with the UK now.

Conclusion: everything depends on the referendum

To conclude, we only run in circle by analyzing every possibility about Catalonia leaving Spain or not. The first step is the referendum. The situation is now totally blocked, with on one side, a very quiet Spanish government when it comes to speak about Catalonia, on the other side, it is clear that Catalonia is seeking for international recognition. The more Madrid’s government wait to dialog with Catalonia, the more Catalonian will feel frustrated and be for the independence.

Adrien Gonin, YoungDiplomats Special Envoy to Catalonia

Does Bernie Sanders Want To Be Hillary Clinton’s Vice President? The questions remains open since a  Unity Ticket Could Avoid Ugly Convention Battle.  Even if Bernie was opposed to it at the beginning , things changed after losing three out of four contests on Tuesday, Sanders issued a statement that seemed to suggest he may be interested in the job after all. He even declared during a meeting in Rhode Island : “Democrats should recognize that the ticket with the best chance of winning this November must attract support from independents as well as Democrats. I am proud of my campaign’s record in that regard.”

Bernie Sanders is an independent Senator of Vermont. Since his political debut a socialist in 1971 he has been inspired from the Scandinavian economic and political systems. Sanders is today a serious candidate to Democratic Primary, leading to the presidential elections.

Senator Sanders is about to make history. No one would have bet on a 74 years-old candidate to be such an important character of the 2016 elections. Bernie Sanders is fighting for his last, biggest battle he ever had. His ideas never changed since the 70´s: he was a socialist during the cold war, he is still one today. Sanders defines himself more precisely as a “social democrat, with Scandinavians roots”. From a European perspective, socialists are very common, but it is still an injury in the United States for many citizens. More than a surprise in the American election, Bernie Sanders will remain a long term symbol of protestation against the neo liberal system.

Where does Bernie´s success come from? What distinguish him from his opponents?

Everything from the beginning pushed Sanders out from the election. From where does his success come? How does Bernie manage to unify so many Americans behind him?

Contrary to Barack Obama, Bernie Sanders is white and old. Obama had much more charism as a leader than Sanders. Afro-American voters, who represent 20% of the United States electorate, are not interested in Sanders. The young, white people are coming in mass to attend the old professor Sanders.

As Obama in 2008, one of the keys of Bernie´s success is the internet. His advantage does not come from the number of his followers or fans. But Bernie Sanders is the most raised candidate on Facebook or Twitter. Many American bloggers provide a huge amount of information and propaganda for Bernie Sanders. Sanders is pushed up by social communities, which provide a very positive image of the senator through the web.

Unlikely to his first opponent Hillary Clinton and also the republicans, Sanders campaign is not financed by big corporations or rich contributors but mostly from small private donations. According to his team, 99% of Bernie’s contributors gave less than $100. But all this small donations enabled Sanders to collect $1 million by April 2015. Such an amount was never reached in any American presidential campaign. Today, Sanders is just behind Clinton in terms of campaign finance.

Bernie’s Program

The propositions from the Vermont Senator are based on the reduction of inequalities between rich and poor people. As he often mentioned, 1% of the world´s population holds 50% of the global wealth. To do so, Sanders propose 5 main pillars:

1. A state providing healthcare insurance, available for everyone and free for the poorest
2. Increase the minimum wage to $15
3. Tax higher incomes
4. Introduce public and tuition-free universities
5. Introduce paid vacations

Is Bernie a plausible candidate?

Today, Hillary Clinton is still ahead in terms of delegates: 1,758 against 1, 076 delegates for Bernie Sanders. Despite the very close results, Clinton has an advantage as she obtained far more super delegates than Sanders (469 versus 31). The next elections in New-York on February, 19th will be a crucial date. 1,931 democratic delegates are still to be allocated yet. Bernie Sanders is already behind Hillary Clinton. The election in the state of New-York will be his last chance to challenge ex-minister and pretend to the presidential elections.

Summary

Over the weekend, 33 million Iranians went to the polls to vote in historic dual elections, and the results suggest that an important change is underway in Iranian politics. According to the latest reports, the country’s parliamentary elections yielded a rough three-way split among reformists, moderate conservatives and hard-liners. Of the 285 seats up for grabs, 70 will be contested in a runoff vote in April. Meanwhile, the Assembly of Experts elections resulted in a landslide victory for allies of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, as moderate politicians walked away with 15 of Tehran’s 16 district seats.

For Iran’s hard-liners, these results are discouraging. Hard-line politicians lost ground in both the parliament and the Assembly of Experts. Moreover, substantial wins by reformists and pragmatic conservatives in both elections suggest that moderate candidates’ strategy of cooperating across the ideological spectrum has proved successful. But with no guarantee that unity among Iran’s moderate factions will hold once the final votes have been tallied, the outcome says more about what Iranian voters want than about what the newly elected bodies can actually deliver.

Analysis

While Iran’s Interior Ministry has yet to release the official voter turnout, it is no surprise that many polling locations had to extend their hours to accommodate long lines of voters in this round of elections. Iran’s reformist factions, which comprise secular and Islamist politicians promising to adapt to an ever-changing world, typically capture many votes, especially in urban areas. However, these factions boycotted elections in 2004 and 2008 in response to the clerical Guardian Council’s disqualification of hundreds of their peers from the elections. As a result, voter turnout was much lower in both years than it was on Feb. 26.

In the face of potential disqualification and tight controls by the highly conservative Guardian and Expediency councils, Iranian politicians tend to form coalitions and secure endorsements before the elections are held to try to ensure seats. However, these marriages of convenience do not always hold up once the vote is over. Before the reformist-moderate coalition can be considered a newly cemented political force that will lead Iran toward pragmatic change, it is important to consider the issues dividing it and the challenges that lie ahead for the country as a whole.

High Expectations From Iranian Voters

The latest elections made it clear that much of the Iranian public wants what moderate candidates are offering. For pragmatic conservatives such as Rouhani, this means a healthy economy, safer public spaces for women and better opportunities for international investors; for reformists, it means social liberalization, media freedom and a cautious but assertive foreign policy. But with another round of elections fast approaching in 2017, the candidates voted into office will need to show tangible results quickly if they want to keep public sentiment from souring toward them.

However, effecting change is easier said than done, and a number of obstacles will stand in the newly elected officials’ way. First, economic growth — at least the kind that Rouhani promised during his presidential campaign — will be virtually impossible to bring about. Based on current market conditions, it is unlikely that Iran will be able to boost its oil exports to 2.5 million barrels per day, as Rouhani had hoped. Even if the country managed to raise its exports to a more realistic goal of 0.5 million bpd by the end of 2016 and oil prices rebounded to $40 a barrel, energy revenues would still be far lower than Rouhani could have ever predicted in 2013.

Officials could try to bolster other areas of Iran’s economy, whether through the $7 billion stimulus plan Tehran announced in October 2015 or with the billions of dollars’ worth of manufacturing deals it has signed with European investors. But these efforts may not yield the tangible results Iranians demand quickly enough. Though inflation has declined significantly since Rouhani took office, youth unemployment remains high at around 25 percent. This issue is very important to Iranians, especially the young voters who flocked to the polls in the latest elections and who will undoubtedly return for the 2017 vote.

If Rouhani and his moderate allies fail to deliver the economic progress their constituents are hoping for, they will need to make good on their promised social reforms to keep their momentum ahead of the 2017 presidential vote. But this, too, will be difficult to achieve. The factions within the moderate coalition do not hold the same views on social freedoms. For instance, female lawmakers enjoyed their biggest wins yet during the Feb. 26 elections, but several prominent members on the same moderate ticket as the female victors have adopted conservative stances toward women. In particular, Ali Motahari, who garnered the second-most votes in the Tehran district, has labeled leggings to be detrimental to public space and believes headscarves should be compulsory. Furthermore, Ali Larijani, the powerful speaker of Iran’s parliament, strongly supports Rouhani’s economic policy but has declined to comment on the president’s social liberalization efforts.

Despite the consensus among most moderates and some conservatives that Iran should open up its economy, reformists, pragmatic conservatives and traditionalist conservatives embrace social reform to different degrees. Though young voters demand greater social freedoms for men and women alike, the members of the coalition now ruling the Iranian parliament apparently do not see eye to eye on implementing many of those measures. The same is true of the media freedoms advocated by reformists, which have polarized the moderate conservative factions. It comes as no surprise, then, that Rouhani has been unable (or perhaps unwilling) to follow through with his pledge to release politicians of the banned Green Movement, even though the move would be popular among many Iranians.

In the end, security may be the only realm in which the agendas of all Iran’s political groups fully align. Iran will maintain an active ballistic missile program regardless of whether a hard-liner, reformist or pragmatic conservative government is in place. This program is a critical component of Tehran’s national security strategy, and no political leaders are pushing to dismantle it, despite the fact that it violates certain U.N. sanctions. The country’s nuclear program will be similarly protected, an enduring source of tension between Iran and other members of the international community. Though reformists espouse greater engagement with the West, moderates and conservatives alike stand firmly behind the nuclear program, regardless of what impact it has on the country’s relationships abroad.

Taken together, these points of contention suggest that despite the strong showing moderates had in the latest elections, economic and social change will be slow to follow. Rouhani and his allies have by no means cinched the next presidency. After all, many of the hard-liners who lost in the Feb. 26 elections did not lose by much, and several hard-liners remain popular, especially outside of Iran’s densely populated cities. If Iran’s new leaders cannot fulfill their mandate, and quickly, the tables may turn on them before the next electoral race even begins.

The previous cease fire negotiated in Minsk in May 2015 is for now largely holding. No serious fightings have been reported since between the two countries. But things are about to change, with Russia awaiting EU decisions concerning the financial sanctions and Ukraine facing deep internal divisions , the cease fire could live its last days. Still Moscow has little to gain and a lot to loose in this conflict. The probability that Russia will give up in Ukraine is therefore getting higher and higher everyday.

In recent weeks, there have been signs of progress in negotiations between Moscow and Kiev over the long-standing conflict in Ukraine. First, local elections in the separatist territories of Donetsk and Luhansk have been postponed from April to July, possibly an effort by the Moscow-backed territories to allow more time for talks with Kiev and the West. Holding these elections without Kiev’s permission would set back the Minsk negotiations, if not derail them altogether.

Second, the April 29 agreement between Ukraine and the separatists that led to the cease-fire was implemented on May 1, the Orthodox Easter holiday, and is set to last at least until Victory Day on May 9. Before the cease-fire took effect, fighting along the line of contact had increased considerably, but violence has decreased dramatically since then. Though violations have occurred, mostly by Ukrainian forces, no casualties have been recorded on either side.

Russia’s Timing

For Moscow, these two moves complement other conciliatory gestures in the works. Earlier in April, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko and Russian President Vladimir Putin negotiated the return of Ukrainian military pilot Nadia Savchenko, whose imprisonment in Russia over the past two years has become a major political issue in Ukraine. Her imminent release — if approved — could become an important symbol of Moscow’s cooperation.

The timing of these developments is crucial; they come just a few months before the European Union will decide whether to maintain its sanctions regime against Russia because of the conflict in eastern Ukraine. The sanctions automatically expire on July 31 unless all 28 EU members vote beforehand (likely in late June or July) to maintain them. Russia has worked tirelessly to divide European consensus and persuade more sympathetic countries to break the bloc’s unanimity in past votes, though the Kremlin has yet to succeed on the Ukraine issue. Most EU countries, particularly Germany, as well as the United States have specified that Russia must more actively implement the military and security components of the Minsk protocols for sanctions to be lifted.

Of course, those components — including the removal of all foreign troops from Donbas and the return of the separatist territories’ border with Russia to Ukrainian control — are unlikely to be fully realized in the next few months. Still, Moscow may surmise that by significantly reducing the number of separatist cease-fire violations, it will convince some European leaders to reconsider the sanctions policy. Russia and many European countries have suffered because of the sanctions regime (and Moscow’s subsequent countersanctions against the European Union), causing certain EU countries such as Italy and Hungary to waver on an automatic extension of sanctions. Moscow likely views a sustained observance of the cease-fire over a period of two to three months, even without fully implementing the Minsk protocols, as sufficient to break EU unanimity on the matter.

Kiev’s Security Imperatives

But a compromise on sanctions is exactly what Kiev wants to prevent. The Ukrainian government has long indicated that all security and military components of the Minsk talks must be met prior to implementing its political components, namely granting greater autonomy to the Donbas territories and permission to hold local elections there. Many Ukrainians have similar expectations. The prospect of Kiev conceding on these emotionally and politically charged issues contributed to the ruling coalition’s recent loss of public support and eventual collapse, culminating in the April 10 resignation of Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk. The new government that formed on April 14 under Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman must remain firm in negotiations with Russia while delivering on domestic reforms, which have stalled because of political infighting, if it hopes to avoid a similar fate.

The Europeans have pressured Ukraine to make greater progress on the Minsk talks, too. Accordingly, Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Vadym Prystaiko has said Ukraine is ready to hold elections in various Donbas territories as early as this summer, though he has stipulated that security must first be restored. However, significant advances in negotiations with Moscow or an end to EU sanctions on Russia without achieving the concessions Kiev demands could prove dangerous for the new Groysman government. Consequently, Ukraine is only interested in maintaining a cease-fire if it leads to extensive security concessions by Russia. Yet Kiev is also constrained by the West’s urging to ease up on the political front so Moscow can be more cooperative on the military front.

The coming months will shape the direction negotiations take, revealing whether Russia will be able to manipulate the security situation in eastern Ukraine and get economic sanctions removed. Meanwhile, Moscow’s efficient use of the latest cease-fire agreement will continue to have important implications for how the political and security situation in Ukraine plays out.

With King Abdullah II spending 25% of his time abroad in 2015, the Jordanian monarch has not lacked opportunities to meet foreign leaders. Three months into 2016, Abdullah has already visited Washington three times to discuss the war in Syria and the refugee crisis in Jordan, and he regularly meets regional leaders, including Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and Saudi King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud. Despite Turkey’s critical role in the Middle East, especially in the ongoing Syrian war, Abdullah has not met with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in more than three years, since March 6, 2013. What explains the cold relations between the Jordanian and Turkish leaders?

Aykan Erdemir, a former Turkish member of parliament and a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, told Al-Monitor, “The Jordanian royal family sees Erdogan and the AKP [Justice and Development Party] as first and foremost a Muslim Brotherhood movement. From the Jordanian point of view, this is a problematic relationship.”

Erdogan has repeatedly attacked Sisi, even calling him an illegitimate tyrant following the 2013 overthrow of Ankara ally President Mohammad Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood. Egypt is one of Jordan’s strongest allies, so the Turkish president’s attacks on Sisi have strained ties with Abdullah. In addition, while Erdogan has strongly supported Hamas, another Brotherhood movement, Abdullah is close to Fatah, Hamas’ Palestinian rival. Jordanian leaders regularly meet with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, who also heads Fatah. Erdogan’s support for the Brotherhood not only strikes an ideological nerve in Amman’s foreign policy but also irritates the Jordanian regime domestically.

“The Brotherhood in Jordan represents one of the opposition centers to the king’s power, and Erdogan is one of the sponsors of the Brotherhood in the region, both intellectually and politically,” Soner Cagaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, told Al-Monitor. Jordan has adopted a series of restrictive measures against the local Muslim Brotherhood over the past year. Of note, on March 29 the government barred the organization from holding internal elections and last year canceled a 70th anniversary rally.

The bad blood between Abdullah and Erdogan runs deeper than ideological divisions. Hassan Momani, professor of international relations at the University of Jordan, told Al-Monitor, “It is clear that t​here is no personal chemistry between King Abdullah and Erdogan.” The two leaders’ upbringings differed greatly. While the Jordanian king received his education in England and the United States, Erdogan remained in Turkey and participated in Islamist politics from a relatively young age.

Although Erdogan has been criticized for launching verbal tirades against regional leaders, it has been Jordan’s monarch who has repeatedly attacked the Turkish president. According to a leak reported March 25 in Middle East Eye, Abdullah told US congressional officials during a January visit to Washington, “The fact that terrorists are going to Europe is part of Turkish policy and Turkey keeps on getting a slap on the hand, but they are let off the hook.” Asked whether the Islamic State (IS) was exporting oil to Ankara, Abdullah responded, “Absolutely.” Abdullah’s accusation that Ankara is working with IS likely does not sit well with Erdogan, as Turkey has suffered several horrific attacks by IS of late.

An informed source, who requested anonymity for lack of authorization to speak with the press, told Al-Monitor that ties between Amman and Ankara had reached a “crisis.” Given that the king’s quotes were published right before Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu was scheduled to visit Jordan on March 27, the source wondered whether the timing of the leak had been intentional, to try to sabotage the visit, which had required weeks of planning.

Abdullah’s condemnatory remarks about Erdogan this year were not his first. In April 2013, Abdullah had told Jeffery Goldberg of the Atlantic magazine, “Erdogan once said that democracy for him is a bus ride. ‘Once I get to my stop, I’m getting off.’” In the same interview, Abdullah says he believes Erdogan is not truly committed to democracy and is more interested in promoting Islamism and tightening his grip on power.

Oraib Rantawi, director of the Amman-based Al-Quds Center for Political Studies, reiterated that Ankara’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood extends throughout the region and that this has been a major stumbling block to relations with Jordan. Rantawi told Al-Monitor that over the past several years, since the Arab Spring, “Turkey has found an opportunity to expand its hegemonic role in the whole region, which was against Jordanian interests in general.” This is a view commonly held by Amman elites.

Khalid Dalal, Royal Court media director, and Minister of State for Media Affairs Mohammad Momani refused Al-Monitor’s repeated requests for interviews.

The differing approaches to the five-year Syrian war have also exacerbated relations between the two leaders. Cagaptay explained that while Jordan has placed an emphasis on supporting “moderate” rebels in southern Syria, radical jihadists and IS militants have thrived on Syria’s northern border with Turkey due in part to Ankara’s policies. Summing up Abdullah’s position, Cagaptay said, “Turkey has played it wrong by producing — unintended as it might be — policies that have resulted in the rise of radicals in northern Syria.”

Nonetheless, ties between the two countries are not uniformly negative. Trade remains relatively strong, having reached $1 billion. Yet, the ideological clashes over the Muslim Brotherhood, lack of personal chemistry between Erdogan and Abdullah and with conflicting views toward Egypt’s Sisi have ensured that ties between Amman and Ankara remain poor. Given the many regional challenges to both countries bordering Syria, a strong relationship between Abdullah and Erdogan would appear to be beneficial to both sides. But for now, ideology trumps realpolitik.

The country is at a dead end, and everything is a mess.

The main Turkish opposition, if such a thing really exists, is still unable to clearly express where it stands on the Middle East, foreign policy in general, a new constitution and the debates about the presidential system. Certain opposition groups still dance around such issues as the corruption and smuggling trial of Riza Sarraf, the Kurdish question, the Obama-Erdogan meeting and the country’s looming economic crisis. On the other hand, the Kurdish movement believes that politics is based on how loud you are, and are betting that the present chaos in the country will somehow weaken the ruling administration.

The Kurds think the government will have no choice but to sit at the table again for restarting the negotiations. If not, then it is “the peoples’ revolution” time. Others think the government will either come to its senses or lose power by gradually getting exhausted as it faces more problems, at home and abroad. All factions of the opposition seem to be counting on a strategy whereby they will win when the government loses.

Turkey, however, is now on a path in which everybody will lose more, and it will remain so unless a serious exit plan can be found.

Have no doubt that the weakened government will be more oppressive, more cruel and more lawless. If not, it will write its own laws and enforce them. The government will enhance a policy of confrontation instead of negotiations as the Kurds’ room for maneuver diminishes by the day.

his is the path that the government has chosen, furiously blaming anybody from the opposition for “supporting terrorism” instead of questioning their own policies. This is the kind of government we have: It is not disturbed by the status of the country — on the contrary, it perceives the difficulties that Turkey faces as a solution to its own problems. All of this “martyrdom” propaganda, “the red on the flag is the color of blood,” and “dying for the homeland is what makes it real,” all is used toward that goal.

Dictatorships don’t end well

On one hand, it is hard these days to say out loud things such as, “No sir, let us not be martyrs but brothers,” or “homeland should be where you are happy to live” or “let the red of the flag be the color of a flower.” But the issue is not only about courage. Forget about the suicide bombings, how can our voice not get weaker as news of martyrs occur almost daily? When they say “we killed eight of them and they killed one of us” how can we make the people say “no, eight and one equals nine of us?”

It must also be realized that further alienating Turkey in the international community is not a solution, but rather another factor to drive the current administration to more extreme stances. Which country led by someone the world declared a “dictator” ever got something good out of it? We see what happens to these countries. It is true that those most worried about this are those in the government, but it is actually the whole country that collapses in such situations. Nobody hands you a “plug-and-play democracy.”

I am not suggesting one shouldn’t criticize this government. On the contrary, I say it is a dangerous road to walk. Tying all hope to the government getting weaker and not putting up a struggle for democracy — I say nobody will win anything on that road. I say standing up against a terrible government is not possible with a terrible opposition. The way is not an opposition of the hardcore nationalists of the MHP, nor the CHP’s indecisive and ineffectual style, nor the Kurdish movement’s efforts to cut ties with the democratic struggle. Democrats, liberals, and all the other lines of opposition: I simply say that putting all hopes in the weakening government will never provide a real way out.

Since conducting its first successful nuclear test in 1964, China has maintained one of the least belligerent nuclear policies in the world. But certain changes in technology over the past two decades have forced Beijing to re-evaluate its approach. In the coming years, China will look to revamp its nuclear force to keep its deterrent credible against the increasingly lethal arsenals of the United States and Russia.

Of all the nuclear powers, China was the first to declare a no-first-use nuclear policy, pledging to use its nuclear weapons only against states that launch a nuclear attack against it first. Beijing has also promised never to deploy its nuclear weapons on foreign soil, and it has long opposed the idea of establishing an extended nuclear deterrence. Furthermore, though China has built up an arsenal that is both large and diffuse enough to survive an initial strike, it has avoided engaging in an arms race with the United States and Russia to match their nuclear strength. It also stores its nuclear warheads in a separate location from its delivery systems, mating the two only in times of great tension. In short, Beijing has confined its nuclear program to providing a credible but minimal deterrence.

And for the past few decades, the approach has suited China’s particular needs. Beijing has long understood that it lacks the technological capability, industrial capacity and financial resources needed to keep up with its U.S. and Russian rivals. Joining the massive nuclear arms race of the Cold War would have been a losing proposition, especially since China’s minimal deterrence was effective on its own. (Even though the U.S. and Russian arsenals were vastly superior, China was able to use its expansive geography and numerous underground facilities to maintain its second-strike capability.

Beijing also feared the prospect of keeping its nuclear arsenal on high alert, ready to launch at a moment’s notice. Doing so would have made its missiles more vulnerable to seizure and use by rogue forces, a particularly troubling possibility for Beijing during periods of political turbulence, such as the Cultural Revolution. Because of its minimal deterrence policy, China has been better able to ensure that it retains control of its nuclear arsenal.

Beijing’s nuclear doctrine has given it more room to maneuver in its interactions with other nuclear states as well. For example, its own refusal to extend its nuclear deterrence outside its borders has given China the ability to similarly denounce the inclusion of neighboring Japan under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. In addition, China’s stance has likely done less to drive countries in its region, including South Korea and Japan, to pursue their own nuclear arsenals than an aggressive approach would have.

Is Beijing Falling Behind?

However, since the end of the Cold War, technological progress has gradually undermined China’s certainty that its nuclear arsenal and policies are enough to protect it. Though the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals have gotten smaller, they have also become far more accurate — and as a result, more deadly. At the same time, new technologies have dramatically improved countries’ intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, while emerging weaponry, such as hypersonic missiles, is undermining traditional missile defense systems. Each of these developments has weakened Beijing’s ability to rely on its vast territory and underground facilities to protect its nuclear arsenal from attack. The United States, for instance, is in theory much more able to find and destroy China’s nuclear missiles now — no matter where they are located in the country’s expansive terrain — than it was during the Cold War.

Beijing has similar concerns about its nuclear weapons’ offensive effectiveness. Advances in ballistic missile defenses have raised the question among Chinese leaders as to whether their nuclear weapons, should they survive a first strike, would even be able to penetrate an enemy’s defenses.

As China’s assessment of its nuclear posture changes, so will its patterns of investment and technological development. Beijing has already begun pouring more money into the sea leg of its nuclear triad, launching its first nuclear ballistic missile submarine patrol last year. Nuclear submarines are difficult to detect, and their exposure to danger can be reduced when they are used as part of a bastion strategy, which involves protecting nearby seas without venturing too far from Chinese ports. China’s ability to pursue nuclear ballistic missile submarines, which require nuclear warheads to be mated with their delivery systems, can be credited at least in part to Beijing’s growing assurance that it can keep its arsenal secure. The same confidence will encourage the Chinese to start wedding the two sets of components in land-based systems as well, enabling Beijing to order a more immediate nuclear response to any incoming attack.

Meanwhile, China will also continue to grow its nuclear arsenal in a way that improves its chances of surviving an enemy assault. The Chinese are not only moving their missiles from fixed silos to mobile platforms, which are more difficult to target, but they are also building nuclear missiles that have a much longer reach and can be launched from deep in the heart of China. These missiles include the DF-41, the world’s longest-ranged nuclear missile. Moreover, China will begin to rely more on missiles equipped with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, or MIRVs, rather than single warheads. Such missiles have a better chance of making it past an enemy’s ballistic missile defenses with at least some of their warheads intact.

China’s nuclear force alterations will not mean the abandonment of its long-standing no-first-use and minimal deterrence policies. In fact, from its perspective, arsenal upgrades are a necessary measure for maintaining the credible threat underpinning those policies. However, other states are unlikely to assume such benign motives and will remain wary of China’s actions. Rapidly advancing nuclear powers with roughly equivalent arsenals, such as India, may interpret Beijing’s moves as the initial signs of an impending arms race. Even China’s non-nuclear rivals, including Japan, could respond by reviewing their own nuclear positions. Meanwhile, the United States and Russia, ever cognizant of China’s increasingly powerful nuclear arsenal, will try to tamp down Beijing’s efforts by integrating it into future arms control agreements.

Jesus is considered as one of the most fascinating and influential personalities of all time; he has had a central role not only within the church but also in the development of western culture. This explains why, 2000 years later, we still talk about Jesus, and we still analyze the meaning of his speeches. The aim of this essay is to analyze the words that are written in the Gospels and give an explanation of why its message should not be considered political. The guidelines will be the Bart Ehrman’s view regarding the impossibility that Jesus’ intention was to give a political meaning to his words since he was an apocalyptic prophet, who believed that end of the world would have arrived soon.

What we know historically about him is much less than what is expected. The difficulty lies in the fact that we possess a large number of sources about him, and it is not easy to distinguish which one is valid because many people are acting and writing in his name. Despite the great variety of opinions surrounding him, there are several facts on which most of the scholars of antiquity agree. Jesus was a Jewish man, who lived in the poor village of Nazaret, in Palestine, probably shortly before the death of Herod the Great. He belonged to a peasant class, and so he probably wasn’t neither able to write and read. He appeared to be a preacher and a teacher, who was crucified in Jerusalem during the reign of the Roman Emperor Tiberius. This is pretty much all we can say about him; considering that the story of his birth is mentioned only in the two first chapters of Luke and Mark in the New Testament. (Borg 1997, p. 5)

The official bibliographies about Jesus can be found in the fourth Gospels, in fact, these texts had been introduced into the Bible and officially recognized by the Catholic church. The Scholars usually divide the Gospels present in the New Testament between the synoptic Gospels, the ones written by Matthew, Mark, and Luke, from the Gospel of John. The root of the word “synoptic” suggests that these three Gospels are linked to the similarity of their content, in contrast to the differences shown in the Gospel of John, such as the use of an exalted language when Jesus speaks of himself or the frequent use of complex and lengthy discourses. Another general agreement among the scholars is that we do not own the original Gospel texts. They were probably not directly written by the persons named in the titles, (Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John), but by individuals who were not followers or eyewitnesses of Jesus and who lived likely from forty to sixty years later. This could be a reason for the huge number of discrepancies and contradictions, and reports of some historical events which have never taken place, within the pages of the book. (Borg 1997, p. 123)

However, it is also interesting to notice the changes in the understanding of the Bible during the centuries.  Indeed, before the Enlightenment, the way of seeing and reading the Bible, considered as a divine product, was called “natural literalism.” This means that they gave a literal interpretation to what was written in the text. After the Enlightenment revolution, when people began to build their knowledge through the lens of scientific rationality, scholars developed a different view of the Bible, which was no more considered as a product of God, but as a human product. More precisely, they reached the conclusion that it was the product of two ancient communities; the ancient Israel, which wrote the Old Testament, and the early Christian movement, which wrote the New Testament. (Borg 1997, p.123)

It was precise during the 19th and 20th century that thousands of books about Jesus were written, and among these, one of the most famous is “The Quest of the  Historical Jesus” by Albert Schweitzer. His major theme was the understanding of the coming Kingdom of God, announced in the Gospels, through the “apocalyptic eschatology” point of view. The word “eschatology” has its root in the Greek word “eschaton” that literally means “the end.” Thus, Schweitzer believes that Jesus and the early Christian community’s ideas were the expectation of the imminent arrival of the last judgment day. (Borg 1997, p.128)  

“At the end of His career Jesus establishes a connection between the Messianic conception, in its final transformation, and the Kingdom, which had retained its eschatological character; He goes to His death for the Messiahship in its new significance, but He goes on believing in His speedy return as the Son of Man”( Schweitzer 1968, p.253)

A similar point of view is also given later by one of the most famous scholar interested in the study of Jesus, called Bart Ehrman.

“I will argue that Jesus stood in a long line of Jewish prophets who understood that God was soon going to intervene in this world, overthrow the forces of evil that ran it, and bring in a new kingdom in which there would be no more war, disease, catastrophe, despair, hatred, sin, or death. Moreover, Jesus maintained that this new kingdom was coming soon, that in fact his own generation would see it.” (Ehrman 1999, p. 21)

Therefore, Jesus is described as an apocalyptic prophet, whose mission was the preparation of humankind for the forthcoming arrival of the new Kingdom. The first Christian communities waited confidently for the establishment of a new world until at least the end of the first century. During this period were written many other apocalyptic works, subsequently defined by the Church as apocryphal, but slowly, this expectation of the arrival of the new Kingdom faded, eventually disappearing almost entirely. Accordingly, Christians have changed their original view about this Apocalyptic prediction, even though they still think Jesus preached about the last judgment day and about the importance of behaving according to God’s rules, they disagreed on the issue of timing this prediction right after the first Jesus’ generation, Indeed, this would have a call into question his divine nature.  Ehrman, instead, still believes that Jesus was a failed Apocalyptic Prophet, who wrongly preached that the end of the world was close.

“But in those days, after that tribulation, the sun will be darkened, and the moon will not give its light, and the stars will be falling from heaven, and the powers of the heavens will be shaken. Moreover, then they will see the Son of Man coming in clouds with great power and glory.…… So also, when you see these things taking place, you know that he is near, at the very gates. Truly, I say to you, this generation will not pass away until all these things take place.”( Mark 13:24-27, ESV )

In these verses of the Bible, Jesus is clearly talking about a forthcoming arrival of the Judgement day, and although there is much disagreement over the interpretation of the words “these things” for timing this prediction, we cannot question the Apocalyptic nature of his speech. This means, as also Ehrman Bart states, that Jesus should be considered as an anti-political prophet, due to his beliefs in the imminent construction of a new order. In  fact, his concern wasn’t related to the Roman politics of his age, since he was convinced that people should prepare themselves for the incoming  Kingdom that would have been dominated by a new condition of peace here on earth with the defeat of the evil forces, and the thought that in this new world: “Indeed there are those who are last who will be first, and first who will be last.”( Luke 13:30, NIV) The meaning of these words is that all the oppressed and the poor would be lifted up in the coming Kingdom; this is also the “good news” announced in his message from which it was taken the name “Gospels.” Therefore, he did not really worry about solving the poverty issue of the present or to condemn slavery explicitly in Roman Empire, because the forthcoming of God’s Kingdom would have taken justice itself. Inside these verses, there wasn’t any hidden meaning of rebellion against the Roman Institutions. This new Kingdom would not require the implementation of new social reform programs, and Jesus’ intention was not transforming the society from within, but preparing people for its destruction. ( Ehrman 1999, p.190)

The anti-political nature of Jesus can also be understood through the analysis of some passages of the Bible, where several times he refused the offers of being involved in politics.                                                                                           For instance, when he was 30 years old the devil tried to corrupt him, with the offer of being the ruler of all the kingdoms of the world, he firmly refused saying: “Worship the Lord your God, and serve him only.”( Matthew 4:9, NIV). Another time, a crowd tried to elect him as their king, but he showed once more his indifference to politics. “Jesus, knowing that they intended to come and make him king by force, withdrew again to a mountain by himself.”(John 6:15, NIV) Finally, in another passage, he distanced himself from politics by refusing identified as a political messiah. Indeed, some disciples of the Pharisees wanted him to adopt a political side, but he clearly stated the limit between God and Caesar’s competence with these words: “Give back to Caesar what is Caesar’s and to God what is God’s.”(Mark 12:17, NIV)

In conclusion, this essay has covered the questions about who Jesus was and what was his message, which, it was said, shouldn’t be understood from a political perspective. It is not easy to make a summary of Jesus thoughts in few lines due to the variety of sources about him, but following Ehrman’s studies has emerged a central point. Jesus was an apocalyptic prophet that came to the earth to preach the close establishment of a new Kingdom in which the humble would have been lifted up. So, for Jesus, the only duty of people was to follow him to be prepared for the Imminent arrival of God. Therefore, there was not any hidden political message in his preaching.  

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. BibleGateway.com – 202 online Bibles in 72 languages, in text and audio format. (2016). [online] Biblegateway.com. Available at: https://www.biblegateway.com/versions/ [Accessed 4 Mar. 2016]. (English Standard Version “ESV”, New International Version “NIV)
2. Borg, M. (1997). Jesus at 2000. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press.
3. Ehrman, B. (1999). Jesus, apocalyptic prophet of the new millennium. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4. Ehrman, B. (2012). Did Jesus exist?. New York: HarperOne.
5. Schweitzer, A., Montgomery, W. and Robinson, J. (1968). The quest of the historical Jesus. New York: Macmillan.

Why Erdogan can’t end PKK war

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s months-long war against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) has become unbearably destructive and deadly, and the violence is threatening to spill over into western Turkey. The general picture emerging is that the PKK cannot be eliminated militarily and no negotiated settlement with the organization is foreseeable.

In this context of impasse, Turkey is trying to manage a crisis that becomes deeper and harder to control. The growing casualty toll among security forces is but one dimension of the crisis. During the last week of March, 21 soldiers and police were killed in the urban warfare raging in the southeast. Most of them were killed by PKK-made roadside bombs, in booby-trapped buildings, by vehicle-borne bomb attacks and by sniper fire. According to official figures, fatalities among security forces since July have exceeded 420.

The situation is obviously extremely disturbing for Erdogan, who is seen as the proprietor of this war. He took on the PKK militarily and used the campaign to his political advantage. He persuaded voters that he and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) were the only ones who could cope with the PKK terror threat, which the public suddenly perceived as its No. 1 problem as the Nov. 1 elections approached.

But now, Erdogan finds he cannot deliver his promised solution. The terror threat shows no sign of easing and the number of combat deaths increases daily. Erdogan is to trying to persuade the public to accept the security forces’ fatalities by constantly invoking the significance of “martyrdom” in Islam. He never misses an opportunity to emphasize how the PKK is suffering disproportionate casualties.

Speaking March 18 in Ankara, he said Turkey had suffered more than 300 casualties since the war began. He added, “But do you know what we have gained? We have demonstrated once again to friend and foe that this is our land. This is a magnificent gain that can be compared only with the Battle of Gallipoli.” He said in a March 25 speech, “The number of our martyrs has passed 300. But the number the terrorists have lost is at least 10 times as much.”

Erdogan has turned his accolades of martyrdom into his standard rhetoric in the war against the PKK. While talking of the Turkish republic, whose borders are defined by treaties, he is taking a risk when he says, “For a land to be a country, it needs the blood of martyrs.” Is he unaware that the Kurdish separatists, who have lost many more people, could adopt the same narrative?

This is Erdogan’s style. When he undertakes a tough challenge, he always says, “We will go to the end.” Is it possible for the Turkish forces to “go the end” of the war by totally eliminating the PKK? Is it possible, given the realities of the Middle East, to find a military solution to Turkey’s Kurdish problem, similar to Chechnya and Sri Lanka? Given the balance of power that heavily favors Ankara, it is possible — but only theoretically.

If Turkey tries to see this military battle through to the bitter end, we can visualize the result. Take the destruction and death of the past eight months and multiply it by as much as 10. Terrorism would increase in major western Turkish cities. It is not far-fetched to predict tens of thousands of fatalities, and the destruction of even more Kurdish-populated towns. The number of displaced Kurds could exceed a million people. Another wave of migrants would flood Europe via Turkey, and Turkey’s economy would suffer severely.

Such a war could, of course, spill over to Syria and Iraq, and Turkey could find itself confronting major powers. The PKK has sizable popular support bases in all countries where Kurds live. It is well-organized, has developed alliances with major powers and has no shortage of manpower. As such, it is able to absorb severe blows.

Could “going to the end” in the Kurdish war mean the end of Erdogan’s regime, or even the end of Turkey? A military solution is practically impossible.

Then, what about a political solution? Never mind a political settlement — is it possible even to agree to a cease-fire with the PKK? In the current circumstances, that goal, too, is out of reach. One can achieve a cease-fire only through negotiations. But as long as Erdogan’s main political ambition is his executive presidency, it seems impossible to conduct overt or covert negotiations with the PKK.

In 2016, Erdogan will submit to the parliament a draft constitution that calls for an authoritarian presidency. If the draft goes through parliament, we will have a constitutional referendum. If not, Erdogan’s game plan calls once again for early elections. While passing through these phases, Erdogan cannot reach an accord with the PKK without risking the nationalist votes he badly needs. He would also jeopardize his plan to keep the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party below the 10% vote threshold in an early election.

Because of all this, one must accept the reality that Turkey will continue to live in a civil war environment of great risks. As long as the war rages, the cost of a potential political settlement will continue to rise, regardless of whether Erdogan attains his ideal presidency — which actually means a dictatorship.

The PKK is raising the bar. In a March 29 radio message, PKK military chief Murat Karayilan told his followers to escalate the fighting. He listed Kurdish autonomy and the release of imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan as essential to resolving the war.

Cemil Bayik, co-chair of the Union of Kurdish Communities, the highest political structure of the PKK, told The Times of London in mid-March that the movement’s basic goal is to smash Erdogan and the AKP.

Erdogan is using his war against the PKK as a tool for his presidential agenda, bringing the country to the threshold of a crisis. It is urgent to sever the link between the war and his presidential agenda, but Erdogan himself remains the major obstacle to that goal.