WHAT DOES THE SUNDAY TERROR ATTACK MEAN FOR MALI—AND AFRICA?

At least two people have been killed in a tourist resort popular with westerners – Le Campement – in Dougourakoro, east of the capital of Mali Bamako. A spokesman for the country’s security ministry said that one of the dead was a Franco-Gabonese national but the nationality of the other person killed was not known. Meanwhile, Mali’s Security Minister Salif Traore said late on Sunday that at least four attackers were killed by security forces.

“We have recovered the bodies of two attackers who were killed,” Traore told journalists, adding that they were “searching for the bodies of two others”, without specifying if any more were on the run.

Even thought the US embassy in Bamako had warned earlier this month of “a possible increased threat of attacks against locations of worship, Western diplomatic missions, and other locations in Bamako where Westerners may frequent”. However, suspected jihadists attacked the hotel resort on Sunday in Mali’s capital, and took hostages, which prove how much security measures are fragile in the country.

Malian troops and soldiers from France’s Barkhane counter-terrorism force were called to the location. Residents nearby reported hearing shots fired while smoke billowed into the air. This is not the first terrorist attacks in West Africa and particularly in Mali, since radical Islamist cells have gained a foothold in several parts of the country and in the Sahel region.

In 2012 Mali’s north fell under the control of radical groups linked to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb or AQIM that hijacked an ethnic Tuareg-led rebel uprising, though the Islamists were largely ousted by a Franco-Chadian cooperation-led military operation in January 2013. But later on; jihadis have mounted numerous attacks on civilians and the army, as well as on French and UN forces still stationed there.

In January 2016, 30 people were killed, including many foreigners, in an attack on a top Burkina Faso hotel and a nearby restaurant in the capital Ouagadougou. AQIM claimed the assault, saying that the gunmen were from the al-Murabitoun group of Algerian extremist Mokhtar Belmokhtar.

However, not only but also in March 2016, at least 14 civilians and two Special Forces troops were killed when gunmen stormed the Ivorian beach resort of Grand-

Bassam, which was also claimed by AQIM.

It perhaps could be quite a nail-biting time for you wondering what drives terrorism in Africa. Well, Sunday’s attack is the latest in a series of high-profile assaults in north and West Africa targeting locals and tourists. The war against Islamist militants in Mali was expected to be long over. more than five years ago, French President François Hollande launched Operation Serval, a military campaign aimed at rooting out about a thousand fighters belonging to the region’s Al-Qaeda affiliate—AQIM—and an assortment of other groups that had captured the north of Mali in early 2012. French and Chadian forces chased the radicals out of Timbuktu and other towns, and then fought them in a desert valley near the Algerian border. Several hundred jihadis were killed in one week of fighting in February and March 2013. The military operation was one of the most difficult and risky operations in the African history. “We fought like crazy lions, we went cave by cave, chasing the terrorists, and we killed almost all of them including Mokhtar Belmokhtar,” I was told earlier this year by a Chadian army colonel who spoke on condition of anonymity.

But it is obvious that the dispersal of the fighters and going cave by cave killing them has not prevented them from launching attacks on civilians and security forces in Mali, including one in August on a hotel in the central town of Sevare that killed five UN staff and 12 other people.

Perhaps, just like me, you’ve been wondering too; why terrorism in Africa is growing so fast, and it is a bigger threat than in the USA and Europe, but much less coverage? Both local and global factors are seemed to be at play, the focus of western efforts is likely to be ISIS in Syria and Iraq. However, the French defence minister says Spain has agreed to send troops to Africa to relieve French forces, while Belgium and UK have sent naval vessels to the eastern Med. Ongoing activity in Africa is likely to continue, but still fragile despite the billion dollars expended on counter-terrorism in Africa .

France has more than four thousand soldiers in its Bakhane force in five countries in the African Sahel – Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso – all of which have been threatened by the jihadist threat across their porous borders.

In addition to the French operation Barkhane; the UN has a 12 000-strong force known as MINUSMA in Mali, which began operations in 2013. It has been targeted constantly by jihadists, with dozens of international peacekeepers killed in the fragile West African country.

The Pentagon conducts an annual training exercise in Africa involving troops from other Sahelian states such as Niger and Chad, and sponsors military training and civilian-led counterterrorism programs in Mali.

For France, the Sunday attack might be a strong sign and response to Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Mali in May, in which Macron has said France will be “uncompromising” in the fight against “Islamist terrorists” in Mali. As long as Macron shows no signs of backing away from the fight against the Islamists in Mali; such attack appears to be part of the cost France has been paying for its recent attempts to take a leading role among Europe’s cautious nations in trying to fight extremism and cleans chaos in the Middle East and parts of Africa, which means they are now and will be a target for terrorist attack for a while.

For Mali, the assault on Le Campement was the clearest sign yet that an Islamist force that seized a large part of the country back in 2012—or its sympathizers—remains a threat. But the Bamako attack was also a significant strike against a more distant enemy. The probable architect behind this attack might be Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a one-eyed Algerian war veteran nicknamed “Mr Marlboro”. He has been declared dead more than hundred times, who fought as a holy warrior in Afghanistan in the 1980s and orchestrated the 2013 siege of an Algerian gasworks in which dozens died. Al-Mourabitoun — or, the Sentinels — the militant group he founded in 2013, claimed credit for the Radisson attack. However, local dynamics could be one of the drivers as well, or even the main driver, behind the attack. Yet here again we should not make any premature assumptions. Pointing fingers at some individuals or communities before we get solid evidence might prove dangerous in the current context.

For Africa, the achievements and failures of Africa’s neoliberal economic policies that many African governments on the continent, including Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, Libya and Chad, has also had a disastrous effect as it has increased economic hardship and pushed more African young people towards extremism. Africa’s experience with neoliberal economic policy presents a classic example of a state which progressively shifted from a relative welfare state to glutinous state. Neoliberal reforms were not concerned with social issues but with market efficiency, which worked against the basic tenets of human rights and constitutional safeguards for the young African generations. Hence, a considerable young African people have resorted to criminal activities in the nation and turned against their own local communities. This Sunday attack and all other terror attacks in Africa explain in part why killing, kidnapping, and other criminal activities and social vices are thriving in the Sahel region, Niger Delta region, Sinai and other parts of the African continent.

The African Audiovisual and Cinema Commission: Are We Ready Now?

The Ministers of Culture, Youth and Sports of African Union Member States established the long awaited African Audiovisual and Cinema Commission (AACC) on 17th June 2016 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

The AACC will be in charge of promotion and development of the African audiovisual and cinema industry, and will create appropriate structures at the national, regional and continental levels; strengthen cooperation between African States in the area of audiovisual and cinema; and promote the use of audiovisual and cinematic expressions as factors of rapid development, job creation, solidarity, integration, respect of values and mutual understanding in order to foster peace, and a positive image of Africa.

The time is now for African audiovisual industry 

The AACC seems to come at the right time to tackle the challenges that face African audiovisual and cinema industry. Algeria’s Amine Hattou, a filmmaker, agrees with many Chadian movie-makers like Prosper Nadsilem and Allamine Kader who believe that the big challenge still the environment, the absence of real industry. Hattou says that the Algerian cinema scene works without clear schemas of production and distribution. 80% of movie theaters in the country are closed and owned by the state, and even with the emergence of private TV channels; the market is not mature enough to give those films a space to be shown. Africa needs an eco-system that can make the local production sustainable.

Moussa Z. Ibet, a film Director and Actor said in an interview that the new commission may be in favor for countries like Chad: “When I first heard of the AACC; the first thing that came to my mind was prospect, hope this could be the beginning of a great film industry in Chad.” With the creation of AACC, Hattou is optimistic that one day African filmmakers and producers can be independent from the global cinema system that promote a certain African cinema that consolidates the western vision, full of clichés and wrong stereotypes on Africa and African people, hopping that “we can only achieve our goal by creating a south-south production platform, an African system of making, producing and distributing films.”

A common destiny

Prosper Nadsilem visited many African countries, including Burkina Faso and Nigeria. During his visits; he realized that all the countries are facing same cinematic problems. Still East and South African audiovisual and cinema industries are more advanced than the Francophone regions of Africa, he believes that the idea of making the AACC an African Union initiative is quietly brilliant, and it’s going to support all of us wherever we are in Africa.

“Our problems are similar, we belong to the same land, we share the same challenges, and we need to make people understand that there is no north, west or South Africa, there is only one Africa.” Many African filmmakers and actors say that despite the fact that some African films win prizes at festivals all over the world; these films are rarely programmed for regular screenings at home, due to the lack of movie theatre rooms, or due to the lack of audiences.

Funding and Budgeting

“The newly established commission definitely came to heal our wounds” according to Propser Nadsilem. Still, big film industries like Nollywood and Discopro are usually financed by businessmen, contrary to local film industries. Hence, he hopes that necessary attention will be put on countries that are not so developed.

A number of reports say that AACC is part of a five programs ecosystem that is mobilizing 410 million USD in program funds for the promotion of this industry over the next five years. These resources will be raised from both the private and public sector and will be implemented primarily by the private sector. Audiovisual and cinema industry accounts for five USD billion in continental GDP, employing an estimated five million people. With the current push for its development, this industry is expected to grow to over 20 million jobs and 20 USD billion in annual GDP contribution. Say reports.

Africa is ready to leapfrog

Achille Rouaimon, film director and Actor, argues that he has been waiting for the AACC for a long time. He continued by saying that African cinema plays an important economic and social role; it has good impact on society in terms of culture, education, and economic development. He believes that the developments in the last ten to twenty years brought a mix of promises and successes for the African audio-visual and cinema. “With the newly established commission; I believe Africa’s movie industry is ready to go on to the next level.” Rouaimon stressed

It is quite obvious that the AACC seems to have the ability to create a suitable environment for free integrated audiovisual and cinema presence across the continent. However, that will require a real democratization of political systems in Africa. We cannot talk about audiovisual and cinema reforms if there is no political will at the top of the political pyramid, because the result is always a false reform in the political system roll over between moderate and strong forms of authoritarian control.

The content for this article is made possible by Cakra Studi Global Strategis (CSGS) first ever monthly discussion. The discussion was attended by students and professors from International Relations departments originating from three different campuses in Surabaya, Indonesia.

As the country with the second largest GDP per capita, Qatar’s presence in the world of international politics simply cannot be ignored. The wealth Qatar possesses is also made possible through its moderate and neutral tendency in foreign policy implementation. Qatar can also be considered to have always had a very friendly relationship, at least superficially, with United Arab Emirates, Arab Saudi, and the United States. However, on 6^th June 2017, the three countries along with some of their allies decided to place sanction on Qatar. In this article, the author will try to explain the reasoning behind Qatar’s sanction.

Things You Need to Know

Qatar’s Power.

Qatar’s role in International Relations can be attributed to its hard power which is its economic massiveness. Qatar also possesses two soft powers that makes it very powerful in contemporary global politics, which is Al-Jazeera; it’s government-owned major global news agency, and Qatar Airways; the four time winner of “World’s Best Airline”

Qatar’s Alignment

In the eyes of global society, it can be perceived that Qatar used to be on the same alignment as United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Arab Saudi. However, in the more current context, Qatar can be perceived to be more aligned with Iran and Turkey than before. The UAE-Saudi alignment can be said to be the antithesis of Iran-Turkey alignment, hence the recent improvement between Qatar and Iran-Turkey can be said to displease United Arab Emirates and Arab Saudi.

The Countries Imposing Sanctions

There are seven countries that imposed sanction on Qatar; Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Libya, Bahrain, and Maldives.

Relief Requirement

Saudi Arabia has given 13 demands for Qatar to meet if Qatar ever wants the sanction to be alleviated. The 13 demands are; 1. Curb ties with Iran; 2. Sever all ties to terrorist groups which are specified as Muslim Broherhood, Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, and Hezbollah; 3. Shut down Al-Jazeera, its’ affiliations, and 4. news outlets that Qatar funds; 5. Terminate Turkish military presence in Qatar; 6. Stop all fundings for individuals, groups, and organizations designated as terrorist by the countries imposing sanction, 7. Hand over terrorist figures; 8. End foreign interference; 9. Stop political contact with political oppositions in Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt and Bahrin; 10. Pay compensation for loss caused by Qatar’s policies in recent years; 10. Consent to monthly audits; 11. Align itself with other Gulf and Arab countries in all relevant dimensions; and lastly 13. Agree to all demands within 10 days of the ultimatum  publication.

Saudi and Qatar Relations

Saudi Arabia can be said to be the pioneer of the sanction. Worth noting the chronology of the sanction; where the sanction was concluded in Gulf Cooperation Council meeting which take place right after Trump personally visited King Salman of Saudi Arabia. Those being said, understanding Saudi Arabia and Qatar relations is essential in order to understand what is currently happening in regard to Qatar’s sanction. Even though both countries were often perceived to be on the same alignment, the author believes that between the two countries, relationships between the two countries are not that good even prior to the sanction. The author identifies two main factors which spark conflicts between the two countries; the controversiality perceived of Al Jazeera — which caused Al-Jazeera to be banned in Saudi Arabia, and the complex royal family issue in Qatar.

The Causes

Indeed it is undeniable that Middle Eastern international politics tend to be conflictual, and to a certain extent the place can be said to be the contemporary proxy wars playground between international superpowers. In the context of Qatar, the author identified six possible factors of conflict which leads to Qatar’s sanction. The first one is the regional power politics, which the fact is that geographically, Qatar is placed in between Iran and Saudi; the two blocs of Middle East. The second factor is great power politics which initiates the proxy war in Middle East (e.g U.S, Russia, China, etc). The third one is economic disparity between countries, where Qatar is undeniably the richest and one of the largest economic powers in Middle East. The fourth one is terrorism aspect, in which Middle East countries, including Qatar, tend to have a certain sort of involvement with terrorist groups, one way or another. The fifth one is the possible controversial and provocative stance Al-Jazeera is often alleged to have, where due to its influence, it can easily affect the perception outcome of the international world towards Middle Eastern countries. The last one is ideological difference between Shia and Sunni muslims, where it has been used to explain or even justify plenty of conflicts happening in Middle East. According to the author, the factors accurate to explain what is currently happening are economic factors and the regional power politics factor, where only both, under the author’s discretion, will be further discussed in depth in the next section of the article.

The Author’s Conclusion

            It is common sense that for small countries, neutrality in political alignment is a must. The author strongly believes that the recent improvement between Qatar’s and Iran – Turkey relations is not about Qatar abandoning its former alignment but its about Qatar neutralizing its stance in between the two power spectrum. It is also worth noting that regional power politics is, to a certain extent, inevitable. Throughout the history, regional rivalry is almost observable in every part of the civilized world; there was the conflicts between Korea, China, and Japan; the conflict between European countries like the Thirty Years’ War; the rivalry in Southeast Asia like Indonesia-Malaysia 1962’ confrontation. The author therefore concludes that this patterned rivalry happens also in Middle East, which means that there have always been distrusts between the Middle Eastern countries; Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Qatar, etc. The sanction however happened mainly due to the sheer power a country as small as Qatar has. In 2004, Al-Jazeera was voted the fifth most influential global brand by brandchannel.com and one of the best five news Web sites by Webby Awards. The massive effect Al-Jazeera has in directing the view of global community is something that the author believes to be intimidating to other Middle Eastern countries; especially Qatar’s neighbor Saudi Arabia. This is showcased in how shutting Al-Jazeera is one of the ultimatums of Saudi Arabia’s. Regarding Qatar Airways, in spite of the fact that the U.S sanctioned Qatar and suspended its’ airways, the Qatar Airways is going to buy some shares of American Airlines. In conclusion, Qatar is powerful, and its power is extremely intimidating. Saudi Arabia and its allies; afraid to not be able to anticipate Qatar’s future actions, decided to persuade Trump to impose sanction on Qatar, and managed to do so.

AUTHOR’S NOTE: The information provided is an expression of author’s speculations and understandings from the discussion which is done in spite of limited information and data regarding the issue. The author therefore personally apologizes if there were any unintended bias and misinformation.

This policy paper suggests a two-fold strategy for the Russian Federation over Nagorno Karabakh, one for the short-term, another one for the long-term.

In the short-run, a “wait and see” policy maintaining the “frozen” status quo is necessary because at the moment it is impossible to assess the future geopolitical situation given the election of Donald Trump as the new President of the United States. On the other hand, the Russian Federation needs a long-term policy to settle the issue definitively, because this conflict is inherently unstable. A full-fledged war in Nagorno Karabakh would be a threat not only for the stability in the South Caucasus, but also for the stability of the Russian Federation.

1. Short-term policy: maintain status quo of a “frozen conflict”

As long as the future international setting will not be more understandable and Armenia and Azerbaijan are not willing to accept a settlement, the best possible solution is to deter them from resuming hostilities. It means that in the short-term the best solution for Russian Federation is to preserve the status quo, i.e. to maintain the conflict “frozen”. Indeed, this will allow the Russian government to keep some leverage both on Armenia and Azerbaijan. The reason for this is that the break-out of a full-fledged war could be a real catastrophe for Russia, due to the following reasons:

1. Risk of a proxy war with Turkey. 

The Russian Federation will be obliged to help Armenia because of CSTO’s commitments. This could worsen the relations with Turkey, as Ankara is Azerbaijan’s ally, due to the common historical heritage between the two countries. This in turn could convince Turkey to provide military support to Azerbaijan. Furthermore, such a proxy war could create internal tensions on those territories within the Russian Federation that have close ties with Turkey, such as Tatarstan for example. In addition, it could be also a problem for a positive settlement of Syrian war

1. Instability at Russian borders

The start of a war on Karabakh’s ground, will not only undermine Russia’s relations with Ankara, but it could also destabilise the entire South Caucasus region. This might carry the risk of a spill-over of hostilities and the movements of fighters to the Russian North Caucasus.

In order to prevent these possible consequences of a war in Nagorno Karabakh, the Russian Federation must prevent both sides in the conflict from using military measures. To this end, the sales of Isklander missiles to Armenia was the right choice. Indeed, they had an important deterrence effect on Azerbaijan during the last April skirmishes. Nevertheless, I suggest not only insensifying military ties, but economic and political ones too. For this purpose, it will be important to:

1. Continue to sell weapons to Armenia. 

Halting the sale of weapons to Armenia could give a comparative advantage to Azerbaijan. Baku’s regime could begin a new war once it feels militarily strong enough to attack Armenia. As Armenia, could still buy weapons from other sources, stop selling weapons to Armenia might lead it out of Russia’s sphere of influence, resulting in the loss of Russia’s closest ally in the South Caucasus, a region whose stability has a core importance for the Russian Federation.

Guaranteeing a balance in military power of both Armenia and Azerbaijan is therefore the best way to preserve the status quo.

2. Strengthen economic ties with Azerbaijan.

Russian industries should continue to invest in Azerbaijan’s economy, as Gazprom already did in September 2015. The Russian government should encourage the conclusion of further such agreements, in order not to let Azerbaijan become too economically independent from Russia. Especially when considering the ongoing construction of Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline, which is reinforcing the linkages between Baku and the European Union. Indeed, the building of this pipeline together with the Gabala-over-horizon radar negotiations, could be already perceived as an attempt by Aliyev’s government to escape the Russian influence. The strengthen of economic ties not only will avoid Azerbaijan to improve its own relations with the West and, moreover, they could be used to discourage Azerbaijan from re-starting the conflict in Nagorno Karabakh 

However, this can be only a short-term policy that should be adopted until the external conditions will have become clearer., given the fact that, concerning Nagorno Karabakh, several circumstances make the status quo as an option that cannot be pursued in the long-term.

1. Nagorno Karabakh conflict is based on cultural issues.

Both Armenia and Azerbaijan see Nagorno Karabakh as a cultural wellspring, due to the presence of important historical monuments in the region. Hatred is fostered since school, where textbooks contain plenty of rhetoric against the historic enemy. Moreover, the recent destruction of the Aga-Dede mosque has exacerbated the situation even further, bringing Azerbaijan to accuse Armenia of cultural terrorism. Nevertheless, Armenia has accused Azerbaijan of the complete destruction of the Armenian cemetery of Jugha.

2. To Azerbaijan the status quo is intolerable.

Azerbaijan could desire to gain full control over the region through a military operation. Indeed, Azerbaijan thinks that it is not able to guarantee Azerbaijan’s teritorial integrity as acknowledged by several UNSC’s resolution.

On the other hand, Armenia is satisfied with the status quo in the short-term, which allows it to maintain the de facto control over Nagorno. However, in the long-term the status quo might be unsustainable for Armenia too, because of its worsening economic situation and its geopolitical isolation, resulting from the current situation.

3. A war in Nagorno Karabakh could legitimise Aliyev’s regime.

Indeed, Azerbaijan is now witnessing an economic recession and the government could divert people’s attention from such domestic problems by starting a war against Armenia.

Given this inherently unstable nature of the situation in Nagorno Karabakh, Russian interests will be served best through a definite settlement of this conflict.

Our special envoy Sam G. travelled to war-torn Somalia in order to continue our series of articles regarding Ghost Countries. Sam’s articles are a reflection of what he saw on the ground when he travelled into Somaliland, an autonomous region in the dangerous and lawless Somalia. 

In the port of Berbera, a Somaliland port city on the Gulf of Aden and opposite Yemen, which is itself in a state of civil war, has become the new location of a UAE air force base. A large investment by the government of the UAE to refurbish the dilapidated port has made this air base a possibility. The port of Berbera, provides the unrecognized state with crucial access to international waterways for trade.

Traditionally, most of the products that pass through the port are livestock which is exported to various Gulf states, although much less since the breakout of the war in Yemen. Nowadays in the

Berbera ports, there may be more asylum seekers escaping the war in Yemen than economic trade. The main question for Somaliland regarding a UAE air base on its soil is simple, will the UAE air force use it to launch attacks in Yemen from Somaliland?

The answer to that questions is still unclear. If it does choose to do so, the fear is that Somaliland will now become a target itself and risk being dragged into a regional conflict that it cannot afford to be involved in by any means. The general feeling in the country by its citizens is that they have no interest to be involved in any regional conflict at the cost of peace.

This may be what really differentiates Somaliland from its southern neighbours of Puntland and Somalia, the real desire amongst the vast majority of its citizens to safeguard peace and rule of law in the country. I was told when I was there that when someone moves to a new home in Somaliland, their neighbours will get to know them as quickly as possible. If the new resident arouses any form of suspicion by the neighbours then they will be immediately reported to the police. Although it may sound a little paranoid and extreme, this heightened sense of responsibility and cooperation with local police and security forces may be what is necessary to ensure peace within this fragile region.

Politically, the country is in the midst of finding its place on the international scale. Economically speaking, sadly, it is very weak for almost endless reasons. With an extremely high unemployment rate and the vast majority of the population, (especially male) addicted to khat, (gat, qat) the economy is burdened with large amounts of foreign currency leaving its borders daily to Ethiopia in order supply its citizens its daily fix of the African plant.

Illegal in most western countries, chewing of the green leaves is widely enjoyed in neighbouring Yemen, Somalia and Ethiopia as well. Although an important tax earner for the Somaliland government (about 20% of total taxes revenues) and a large supplier of domestic jobs, the country devotes about 30% of its annual GDP, about 534 million dollars a year to the import of the plant from Ethiopia, paid for in foreign currency. A massive burden on the domestic economy and a wide-scale epidemic of addiction to the plant leading to joblessness, the country would be far better off to criminalize it – if only they could do so without starting a revolution, and that isn’t a joke. After various enquiries as to why the plant is not grown locally, I was informed that the local climate is not suitable for khat production and of course the local water crisis, which makes such a venture all but a dream. It seems as though the government is engaged in ‘khat politics’ in its dealings with its most important ally Ethiopia, and therefore has no immediate interest to put an end to the khat imports, especially as long as they are profiting from the ba

dly needed import taxes.

On arrival to Hergeysa from Ethiopia, (one of the only ways to enter the country) flyers are greeted by a different kind of Somalia, one that is not seen in everyday news. First of all, the Somali flag is nowhere to be seen in the country, only that of Somaliland can be seen. Not only can it be seen, it’s flown from every place possible and painted on every bare spot found. The people of the region are very proud to call themselves Somalilanders and have no problem explaining that their country does in fact exist. It very well might exist, at least according to the stamp on my passport it does and the Somaliland visa I obtained prior to my arrival.

The locals are very friendly and frequently stop to greet and chat with any tourist they see, presumably because there are so few. Although the country is extremely religious with women completely covered, the local women are seen all over the streets and typically make up most of the workforce. Men in the country tend to have a much higher unemployment rate than women. Even with the highly religious nature of the country, it seems to be no problem for opposite sexes to interact with one another, in a country where alcohol is illegal because of religious laws.

Travel within the country is generally quite safe, however problematic. The ride from Hergeysa, to the port city of Berbera is one that would not take much longer than an hour in most developed nations. The poor quality of the pot-hole filled roads and the police checkpoints dotted along the way, multiply travel time drastically and takes three to four hours to complete the journey. The city of Berbera itself is one with huge natural and historical value to tourists. A historical port city with Ottoman, Arab and local Somali influences, it was largely build by traders and has not been renovated for hundreds of years. It may be one of the only places in Africa that is home to a mosque built by the Ottoman Empire and a dilapidated synagogue built by Jewish traders from Yemen, almost side by side. A few kilometres away along the beach, camels roam freely in a country that contains half of the world’s population of camels. If only the world saw Somaliland as independent from Somalia, more tourists may decide to witness the country’s beauty.

Iraqi Kurdistan since the formation of Iraq on the way from one crisis to another and now stepping into an unknown and problematic one, but of course there will be a future of Kurdistan independence as long as there is an individual as Kurd therefore the cause of independence will go on. With the coming of ISIS after 2014 Kurd has raised the cause of self-determination one more time as it is so far an “unaccomplished mission” . Kurdistan independence will have regional and international implications. 

In recent decades the Kurds in Iraq has gain some type of independence as Iraq is busy with internal problems and crisis that lastly has changed the status-quo of Kurdistan region from de-facto into a de-jour this has been granted in Iraqi constitution after the liberation of Iraq by the US. However, the central and regional governments (Baghdad and Erbil) have failed to find mechanisms to manage historical and recent disputes regarding territory, economy and paramilitary forces such as Peshmarga. Again, after the Iraqi liberations proved that starting a new dispute and crisis is easier to end old ones, therefore each year we realize new crisis and disputes between Baghdad and Erbil. Since, the power vacuum has caused Kurds to empower themselves in the so called “disputed area”  as Iraqi regimes was used to prevent Kurdish hand in these areas such as in Kirkuk and Mosul. The decision of holding referendum within these areas is a strategic goal for Kurd to create a de-jour power since Iraq has failed to implement article 140 from Iraqi constitution which put mechanisms to solve the issues related “disputed areas”.

The continues situation of Iraq to be in chaos is used by the Kurd to  launching referendum  that consequently it will reach the Kurds to independence, besides it will add a new crisis after ISIS. Consequently, Baghdad refuse to recognize also regional states such Turkey and Iran, plus European, and the US refused to show their support to Kurdistan referendum as they afraid of a new regional actor in MENA that will affect Kurds in the region. Indeed, Referendum will have internal and regional applications even so the result is not for secession, however in comparison with previous decades is not going to be a shocking political development anymore. It is fortunate that there are conflicts of interest among regional power Turkey-Iran/ Shia- Sunni. In addition, Kurdish diplomacy and relations has changed the perspective of Gulf countries as they were used to stand against Kurdistan independence. Moreover, leaving Kurds alone is not in the policies of the US and European as they are looking for a partner in the region to role a play against Iran, Turkey and terrorism.

in Iraq, Kurds have faced identity discrimination as Arabs are in the majority, and in the past, were perceived as second-class citizens. The Kurds had a crisis of identity. For most of the Kurdish population, it’s hard to recognize themselves as Iraqis not Kurdistanis. Moreover, as a result of what they experienced in the past, it’s hard for the Kurds to integrate themselves in a unified Iraq. In addition to that, Iraq has faced another ethnic cleansing wave due to war with ISIS. Meanwhile, Kurds fear the repetition of history. Throughout modern history, Iraq’s different governments have given promises to the Kurds when they were weak, but when a government was in a stronger position it would not keep its promise. This happened repeatedly in the 1960s, 1970s, and after 2003.

In the region, Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria have tried hard to suspend Kurdish self-determination. These states are working hard to crack down national movements and democratic struggle that make Kurds to gain their self-determination. As a result, this cause has made the Kurd to be involved in most of the crisis and wars in MENA region. Meanwhile, the relations are unstable among the mentioned regional countries w accordingly different regional powers at different times support the Kurd against one another.

However, the real problem that faces this referendum is not lack of foreign supports, though lack of consensus among political parties in Kurdistan region makes the future of this referendum and Kurdistan to be uncertain as the parliament has been suspended to function by the PDK (The Kurdistan Democratic Party) and affiliated parties as the result they want the decision of holding referendum to be made by the president of Kurdistan (Masoud Barzani) , on the other hand, the movement for Change Party, also known as Gorran (which means “change” in Kurdish) and other political parties has requested reopening of the parliament as pre-condition for their participation in referendum as they expect that referendum without decision from parliament rapprochement wouldn’t be successful, so the referendum is not going to be easy as relations has begun to split since 2015 and dialogue has failed within 2 years.

The Kurdistan region is currently facing internal problems such as a financial crisis, the war against ISIS, and the parliament being non-active. However, the two political parties, particularly the PDK, don’t believe though that these problems will delay the referendum process. Kurds totally realize that a referendum is not without its risks, but this would not stop them to hold the referendum as they took risks before in the upraising of 1991 and the elections in 1992. Kurds should be determined this time, and they would wish to wait until others give this right to them to start the referendum process. However, the future of this referendum is uncertain.

“Nobody gets involved in the Middle East and comes out of it the good guy.” This is both a cynical and truthful take on the state of affairs in the Middle East espoused by fictitious Secretary of State Catherine Durant on Netflix’s hit show, House of Cards.

And to many, the Middle East may be its own house of cards. Since the 1980s, the United States government, in an effort to assert its status as a world superpower, has interjected itself in Middle Eastern affairs. Beginning in Lebanon, the saga of the United States’ intervention in the Middle East has sprawled through Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, Turkey, and, most recently, Syria.

Attaining peace in the Middle East is a noble goal, but an incorrect assertion made by American presidents and diplomats is that once the head of evil is sawed off, another one won’t replace it. This had led American’s foreign policy in the Middle East to be very near-sighted and simplistic: to get rid of the bad guys.

In the 1980s, the bad guys in Afghanistan were the Soviets, who had invaded to maintain the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDP) communist regime, and President Ronald Reagan sought to displace them. President Reagan’s strategy was finding a mutual enemy of the Soviets, which Reagan found in the form of the mujahideen. Through collaboration with Saudi Arabia, the United States supplied the mujahideen with weaponry to be used to topple the Marxist Afghan government and repel the Soviets, a goal that was successful, but would soon create further problems for the United States.

The mistake that President Reagan made in Afghanistan is the same mistake President Obama made and that President Trump is currently making in Syria: believing that the enemy of our enemy is our friend. Just as the United States had little in common with the mujahideen, and later the Taliban, the United States has little in common with the Syrian rebels. Both are radical fundamentalist Islamists who support jihad against the West.

The United States is currently employing the CIA and the Pentagon to train and equip member of the Free Syrian Army in order to help them overthrow Syrian despot Bashar al-Assad. And while toppling the dictatorial al-Assad regime could very well be a stepping stone to peace in Syria, the means through which the United States is attempting to do so will only replace one evil with another, as it has been estimated that 60% of the Free Syrian Army adheres to some branch of Islamist ideology, with half of them sympathizing with the Islamic State’s jihad against the West.

The Syrian rebels and the United States have a common enemy, but that does not, and should not, make the two parties friends. The United States a bastion of freedom, individual rights, and equality, which are the exact pillars of Western civilization that over half of the free Syrian army want to see destroyed.

The only position held in common with the Syrian rebels by the United States is an opposition to al-Assad, and should his regime fall, the only bond linking the Syrian rebels to the United States will be broken, and the FSA will have no more incentive to collaborating with a government they hold utter contempt for.

Even should al-Assad fall, the head of evil will soon grow back in the form of whatever government is erected by the FSA. And unlike al-Assad’s regime, this regime will be hostile towards the West, posing a larger threat to America than al-Assad does.

Attaining peace and spreading liberal values throughout the world is a noble goal, and one that should be pursued, but it can’t be attained through funding the Syrian rebels. Just as in Afghanistan in the 1980s, once the government falls, the power vacuum will need to be filled, and the most likely candidate to fill that void is the FSA, a group that will wage jihad against the West in the same fashion as ISIS, and will subjugate women, homosexuals, transgenders, apostates, and non-Muslims, both of which are the antithesis of American interests.

Funding the Free Syrian Army, ultimately, has two plausible outcomes: Bashar al-Assad remains in power or Bashar al-Assad falls, and the FSA assumes power, the latter of which will lead to the creation of an illiberal government hostile to the United States and the West.

The Mercosur was created in a context of trial of unification of South American contries, in parts its aims were achieved, but there are some important internal and external entraves to be solved to enhance this Regional Bloc.

By Fabrício Barbosa

The 1980’s decade was decisive in South America, in these years the military governments had an end and the cloud of mistrust and rivalry among countries in this region, mainly between Brazil and Argentina, had gone, starting a new era of social and economic cooperation – needed after the region suffer Oil Crisis effects and the beginning of Neo-liberal agenda adoption.

In 1991 was signed the Treaty of Asunción among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay determining the inicial negotiations on intention of creating a common market. Nowadays, after many treaties and the association of Venezuela and Bolivia(the last one is still in process of integration), the Common Market of the South (Mercosur), is a regional bloc in process of integration that preach by democratic system among their members, provides the development and social integration in this region and has a Parliament, some Councils and a Court to solve troubles about the aplication of its treaties, the TPR.

To understand Mercosur’s entraves, it’s necessary to analyze the characteristics  of internal policy of their members, their economy and external facts. Historically, its countries has a recent democratic system, with many heritages from dictatorial governments and nationalism, that has as consequence some political instability.

In recent years, this reality changed with the real observance of Organization of American States and UNASUR principles, that condemn coups and can expel or suspend their members in case of non-observance of the traties. In Mercosur, the democratic system is preached by Ushuaya Protocol, from 1998, that firms the compromise with democratic system, and even with all these regulaments, there are some suspects of unrespect of democracy on some cases. Another challenge for Mercosur, is the bilateral treaties between their members and powerfull nations, like US, that is an strong partner of all members.

The relationship between US and Latin-america is traditionally bilateral, what allow them to apply your economic and military influence depending on its interest. A trial of settle a multilateral organization different than FTAA, can reduce US influence in some specific interests, for example, on to install their military bases, as it happens in Paraguay – and creates some mistrust with Brazil and Argentina. The economic differences among Mercosur members also creates difficults on development of coordinated actions, Paraguay and Uruguay requests concessions from Brazil and Argentina claiming that they had economic loses in Bloc, and between these other two, the most economic developed in region, there are some entraves on integration of their market, Brasil and Argentina produces some products in common, like vehicles, and they have some treaties about it that sometimes are unrespect by both sides. Other trouble between these two countries is the common strong relationship with China, whose products “steal” markets of brazilian and argentinian products in both contries.

The economy of Mercosur’s contries is mainly based on exportation of commodities, like sugar, soyabean and corn, and some countries in bloc produce the same ones, and this fact explains why is so hard to achieve a great economic integration in this region – vide the table below -, the lack of diversity and technology dependence generated by the global policy of comparative advantages is the main difficult for all emerging countries like these. Under this scope, Mercosur also faces some entraves with US na EU, due the fact of all parts adopts some protectionism: Mercosur wants to spread their agricolal products with the  conclusion of Doha Round, and the other side wants the access of their companies in Mercosur.

Despite all troubles, the Bloc has achieved  many goals, and as the european experience shows, all try of integration is slow, the Mercosur’s actual state of economic integration is not a real common market, it’s an unperfect customs union due to unconcluded treaties about free circulation of products in the Bloc.

The recent association of Bolivia and Venezuela, riches in oil and gas, is also a great point for the Bloc, that has poor discutions about energy. Other south american countries, even not being members, have somekind of economic association with Mercosur,  the Bloc also has concluded successful treaties with alternative countries and areas out of EU and North America, like the free trade treaties between the Bloc and Israel, a country that has showed to be a potencial technology developer, and Mexico, an important producer with a great market for vehicles.

In the beginning, Mercosur suffered several external and internal critics, it was seem as an imprudent treaty that could results in dissolution. But nowadays, the countries showed that it’s possible to superate the differences –in this case, to realise that they are economic, hitorically and culturally similar -, and now, the bloc is noted and influent due mainly to it’s population of 270 million consumers. The challenges have been superated, very slowly, but the benefits probably will come fast on next years if the jobs accelarate, and for that, the same hope in the beginning of the negotiations must be ketp.

About the Author : Fabrício Barbosa is a brazilian International Relationships student and Technician in brazilian law that has a strong interest on his country’s economy and policy (internal and external). He studies for the exam to brazilian diplomatic service and is specializing i

Our special envoy Sam G. travelled to war-torn Somalia in order to continue our series of articles regarding Ghost Countries. Sam’s articles are a reflection of what he saw on the ground when he travelled into Somaliland, an autonomous region in the dangerous and lawless Somalia. 

Somalia (The Federal Republic of) is internationally recognized as one homogonous state. In reality it’s a an extremely fragmented area of autonomous regions, territories controlled by the recognized government, Al-Shabaab controlled areas, and the northern region largely under the control of the unrecognized State of Somaliland. A country not only extremely fragmented, but one that has also been in a constant state of turmoil since the fall of President Barre in the early 1990s. Somalia is widely classified as a failed state and most prominently known for its rampant Islamic extremism and ‘pirates’ off of its coast.

The northern part of Somalia is known as the State of Somaliland, an unrecognized state and the most prosperous region of Somalia. Of course, Somaliland is not actually governed by the internationally recognized government in Mogadishu (it only controls small portions of the country), but rather controlled by its own government, secured with its own police and military forces, and powered economically through the use of the Somaliland Shilling (not to be mistaken with the Somali Shilling).

Just like the state itself, their currency, the Somaliland Shilling is also unrecognized and therefore worthless outside of its borders. Within the country, the currency has a value of about 8000 Shillings to 1 American dollar at the time of writing. Since the exchange rate is so high, shoppers in the country generally only use the national currency for micro-payments and the American dollar for larger ones.

That being the case, the use of cash in not as prevalent as one might think. The average Somalilander makes the majority of their payments through the use of a cell phone in the form of mobile payments and do not require cash. All of the shops in the country are equipped with the ability to accept mobile payments, from the capital city to small villages untouched by any other forms of technology. Although extremely religious and very traditional, the population has embraced technology and the thought of economic advancement from the average citizen until the highest political level.

Somaliland’s borders are based on the British colonial borders that were dissolved before the briefly independent state of Somaliland became part of a larger Somalia. Until today these are the borders that are internationally recognized as Somalia. Somaliland can be considered an oasis of peace in the turbulent horn of Africa. The country is safe, largely democratic and holds a monopoly on the use of force within the Somaliland region. Bordering Djibouti, Ethiopia and the semi-autonomous region of Puntland in Somalia, (which does not seek full autonomy) the unrecognized state is protected on all sides by the Somaliland army which effectively keeps its citizens safe from groups like Al-Shabaab who seek to disrupt this peace.

Culturally and linguistically it is completely homogonous to the rest of Somalia and other regions within surrounding states that contain large populations of ethnic Somalis. As Somalia and Somaliland are clan based societies, the differences between the two countries only differ by clan-based demographics but are ethnically homogenous. So the question is why does Somaliland seek to be recognized as an independent state? During the period it was officially part of and controlled by Somalia, Somalilanders suffered economically from a government which centralized most of the country’s resources in the southern regions with its capital in Mogadishu.

The north was far less prosperous economically and educationally and was unable to hold any political power. With the fall of the Barre regime and the breakout of the Somali civil war, Somaliland was bombarded by Somali ‘government’ jets which effectively destroyed the capital city of Hergeysa almost completely. Today, they have complete independence over their territory and have successfully created an area almost free of terrorism and other instabilities plaguing neighbouring Somalia. A truly romantic story of a ‘non-existent’ peaceful oasis in a turbulent region.

As stated in previous articles, the international community has a tough time recognizing states that unilaterally declare independence and drift from the international set of norms for establishing a state. Such is also the case of Somaliland which continues to be recognized as part of a country that is considered the blueprint for failed states. To date, many of the issues the country faces is as a result of just that, that it is unrecognized. Most countries and especially international organizations are either reluctant or unable to establish relations with Somaliland without the presence of Somalia. This policy has caused tragic hardships for the government and people of Somaliland who have just come out of a multi-year draught and had little to no international support because of the need to cooperate with the government in Mogadishu instead of the one in Hergeysa.

Although the light at the end of the tunnel seems dim, the government in Hergeysa has managed to create close and extremely important ties with neighbouring countries in the Gulf, especially with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This is a very interesting aspect of the foreign relations of a country that doesn’t exist. On the one hand, the country drastically needs the recognition, the foreign direct investment and partnership with neighbouring countries such as the UAE.

On the other, they risk getting involved in regional turmoil which has the potential to de-stabilize the fragile peace they have achieved in their small strip of territory. The Sunni-Shia rift, which has intensified politically in past months and especially recently in the Gulf with the ‘Qatar crisis,’ Somaliland’s leaders need to act carefully in order to not be drawn into the chaos. Although, the country’s leaders officially stated that they have sided with the UAE and Saudi Arabia on the issue (for obvious reasons), this policy has created controversy within the country. Somalilanders are asking why they should be involved in a conflict that doesn’t concern them?